Risk Aversion and Trade‐Union Membership*

If trade unions provide only their members with insurance against income variations, as a private good, this insurance will provide a stronger incentive for more risk‐averse employees to become union members. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and various direct measures of individual risk attitudes, we find robust evidence of a positive relationship between risk aversion and the likelihood of union membership for full‐time employees. This association is particularly strong for males and in West Germany.     

Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship

In the “Knightian” theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as well as occupational self-selection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent's wealth then entail increases in risk borne. Thus, even under decreasing risk aversion, there are robust instances in which workers are wealthier than entrepreneurs. This empirically implausible result suggests that risk-based explanations for entrepreneurship are inadequate.     

RISK ATTITUDES AND THE DEMAND FOR PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: THE IMPORTANCE OF 'CAPTIVE PREFERENCES'

ABSTRACT ** :  Captivity to a mainstream public insurer, is hypothesized to constrain the choice of purchasing private health insurance, by influencing risk attitudes. Namely, risk averse individuals are more likely to stay captive to the National Health System (NHS). To empirically test this hypothesis we use a small scale database from Catalonia to explore the determinants of private health insurance (PHI) purchase under different forms of captivity along with a measure of risk attitudes. Our results confirm that the captivity corrections are significant and can potentially bias the estimates of the demand for PHI. Risk aversion increases the probability of an individual being captive to the NHS. The latter suggests a potential behavioural (or cultural) mechanism to isolate the influence of risk attitudes on the demand for PHI in publicly financed health systems.     

Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions

We analyze the effects of buyer and seller risk aversion in first- and second-price auctions in the classic setting of symmetric and independent private values. We show that the seller's optimal reserve price decreases in his own risk aversion, and more so in the first-price auction. The reserve price also decreases in the buyers' risk aversion in the first-price auction. Thus, greater risk aversion increases ex post efficiency in both auctions - especially that of the first-price auction. At the interim stage, the first-price auction is preferred by all buyer types in a lower interval, as well as by the seller.     

Effects of background risks on cautiousness with an application to a portfolio choice problem

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on an individual's expected utility function under which any zero-mean idiosyncratic risk increases cautiousness (the derivative of the reciprocal of the absolute risk aversion), which is the key determinant for this individual's demand for options and portfolio insurance.     

Housing investment in urban China

What explains the rapidly increasing housing investment demand in China? To address this question, we develop an analytical framework featuring how expected capital gains impact households' housing investment decisions when subject to financial constraints. Housing demand in China takes place not only through households' owning multiple houses, but also through their owning a larger primary living residence if they are constrained from buying multiple houses. We show that households are more likely to own multiple houses when expecting higher capital gains. As expected capital gain increases, the primary housing demand of those households who are constrained from owning multiple houses increases, while those owing multiple housing units invest in extra ones instead of improving primary housing. Our empirical findings, based on 2010 and 2011 household survey data, are consistent with our theoretical predictions. We also find that the marginal effect of expected capital gains is higher for wealthier households. This links the booming housing market to widening income inequality which is a typical growth pain in a developing country like China. As an extension, we apply the analysis to derive implications of the institutional features (such as purchasing restriction policy and the existence of subsidized housing) for China’s housing markets.     

Financial opening, deposit insurance, and risk in a model of banking competition

We study the impact of competition on banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks’ riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.     

Uncertainty, Insurance, and Division of Labor

This paper develops an equilibrium model to investigate the relationships between transaction uncertainties, risk aversion, insurance, specialization, per capita real income, and productivity progress. It is shown that transaction uncertainties can restrict the division of labor; the level of division of labor decreases with the degree of risk aversion; insurance will promote the equilibrium level of division of labor, per capita real income, and productivity.     

Risk aversion, wealth, and the DARA hypothesis: A new test

The Pratt-Arrow hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is widely invoked in economic models of uncertainty but empirical tests, especially those using nonexperimental data, have yielded mixed results. This paper reexamines the DARA hypothesis using an expected utility model of life insurance demand and a 23-year sample of aggregate time series data from the U.S. After controlling for household size, age, income, loss probabilities, premium expenses, and inflation, the effect of wealth on insurance demand is found to be positive and statistically significant in linear and loglinear regressions, explaining more than 93 percent of the variation in coverage. Thus, in contrast to the prevailing theory, this empirical test presents evidence of increasing absolute risk aversion. This research was completed during a sabbatical at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business. The financial support of the S. S. Huebner Foundation for Insurance Education is greatly appreciated. The author is also indebted to participants at the Forty-Second International Atlantic Economic Conference in Washington, D.C. for helpful comments. Any errors are the responsibility of the author.     

区域寿险和非寿险与经济增长的关系研究——基于新疆的实证分析

本文以新疆1980年-2008年的财产保险保费收入、人身保险保费收入和GDP数据的对数值为依据,进行实证分析。通过分析认为,新疆财产保险发展、人身保险发展与经济增长存在正相关关系;新疆财产保险业发展与经济增长存在协整关系,而人身保险与经济增长不存在协整关系;短期内财产保险、寿险都不是经济增长的Granger原因,但经济增长却是财产保险和寿险发展的Granger原因,而从长期来看,寿险的增长可能是经济增长的Granger原因。     

Insurance and the behavior of competitive firms under revenue risks: a note

This paper re-examines the model of Ford, Mpuku, and Pattanaik [“Revenue Risks, Insurance, and the Behavior of Competitive Firms”.Journal of Economics 64 (1996): 233–246] wherein a risk-averse competitive firm faces insurable revenue risk. The optimal output and insurance cover of the firm are shown to be deterministically related in that the marginal costs of self-insurance and market insurance are equated. In response to increasing risk aversion, the firm always takes a higher insurance cover. Increasing fixed costs generate an income effect which induces the firm to take a higher insurance cover should the preference of the firm satisfy decreasing absolute risk aversion. Market insurance and self-insurance can be either substitutes or complements, depending on the shape of the variable insurance-premium schedule.     

Two-part tariffs set by a risk-averse monopolist

This paper revisits the classical issues of two-part tariffs by considering risk aversion of a monopolistic seller. Under demand uncertainty, equilibrium unit price declines and approaches towards marginal cost as the seller becomes more risk averse. Marginal-cost pricing prevails, irrespective of the seller’s risk attitude, if clients are homogenous. Under cost uncertainty, unit price is higher than marginal cost and monotonically increases in risk aversion. The model is then extended to accommodate buyers’ risk aversion and it is found that demand uncertainty makes unit price decline in the seller’s risk aversion again but increase in buyers’ risk aversion.     

Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance

Using the self-stated degree of risk aversion regarding health from the GSOEP we find some evidence for risk aversion being a source of advantageous selection. Risk averse men more often procure supplementary insurance for hospital visits despite needing the additional coverage less.     

“Fair go” for all? Wealth and Risk Aversion of Australian Households*

A mean‐variance framework is applied to Australian household financial portfolios in order to provide estimates of relative risk aversion in the economy. Controlling for various socio‐economic characteristics, we explore whether risk aversion heterogeneity is a function of wealth heterogeneity. In contrast to most studies, we find evidence of very high risk aversion amongst the majority of households of poor households but vastly lower risk aversion amongst the high percentiles in the wealth distribution. Applying a first differences model across three survey waves spanning 2002 to 2010, we find that risk tolerance increases significantly with wealth. Risk tolerance is positively associated with mortgage payments, but rental payments have no relationship. In addition, we found no evidence that holding a university education has any discernible impact on risk aversion. Lastly, we present some preliminary findings as to the impact of financial advice on observed risk aversion. Financial advice is found to accentuating risk aversion, particularly amongst the wealthiest households. The findings have potential implications for the distribution of wealth in Australia that has received renewed interest recently.     

Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables

I study a screening game in a competitive insurance market in which insurance customers differ with respect to both accident probability and degree of risk aversion. It is shown that indifference curves of customers may cross twice; thus the single crossing property does not hold. When differences in risk aversion are sufficiently large, firms cannot use policy deductibles to screen high-risk customers. Types may be pooled in equilibrium or are separated by raising premiums above actuarially fair levels. This leads to excessive entry of firms in equilibrium.     

On the Economic Meaning of Machina's Fréchet Differentiability Assumption

This note shows that M. J. Machina's (1982, Econometrica50, 277-323) assumption that preferences over lotteries are smooth has some economic implications. We show that Fréchet differentiability implies that preferences represent second order risk aversion (as well as conditional second order risk aversion). This implies, among other things, that decision makers buy full insurance only at the absence of marginal loading. We also show that with constant absolute and relative risk aversion, expected value maximization, second order risk aversion, and Fréchet differentiability are equivalent. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D81.     

Voluntary participation and intergenerational risk sharing in a funded pension system

We explore the feasibility of a funded pension system with intergenerational risk sharing when participation in the system is voluntary. Typically, the willingness of the young to participate depends on their belief about the future young's willingness to do so. We characterise equilibria with voluntary participation and show that the likelihood of their existence increases with risk aversion and financial market uncertainty. We find that mandatory participation is often necessary to sustain a funded pension pillar and to let participants benefit from intergenerational risk sharing.     

RISK TAKING BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The discussion surrounding the recent reregulation of the thrift industry suggests that (i) thrifts engaging in "risky" activities are more likely to become insolvent and that (ii) thrifts already near insolvency are likely to take on more risks resulting in increased loss. This paper considers the relationship between insolvency and risk taking in a simultaneous framework and uses 1978–1983 data for Illinois thrifts to investigate the relationship. The paper explores the likelihood that risk taking by thrifts increases as the probability of insolvency increases, that risk taking increases as the probability of failure (i.e., closure by the regulator) increases, and that the probability of insolvency increases as risk taking increases. Preliminary empirical results suggest that an increase in the probability of insolvency increases risk taking and that an increase in risk taking increases the likelihood of insolvency. This latter result is (statistically) significant only when one measures risk by an index of diversification. If sustained in more extensive testing, this result implies that regulatory restrictions on asset diversification are counterproductive.     

Financial Intermediation with Risk Aversion

The paper extends Diamond's (1984) analysis of financial intermediation to allow for risk aversion of the intermediary. As in the case of risk neutrality, the agency costs of external funds provided to an intermediary are relatively small if the intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns. Even though the intermediary is adding rather than subdividing risks, the underlying large-numbers argument is not invalidated by the presence of risk aversion.
With risk aversion of entrepreneurs as well as the intermediary, financial intermediation provides insurance as well as finance. In contrast to earlier results on optimal intermediation policies under risk neutrality, the paper shows that when an intermediary is financing many entrepreneurs with independent returns, optimal intermediation policies must shift return risks away from risk averse entrepreneurs and impose them on the intermediary or on final investors.     

Genetic adverse selection: Evidence from long-term care insurance and Huntington disease

Individual, personalized genetic information is increasingly available, leading to the possibility of greater adverse selection over time, particularly in individual-payer insurance markets. We use data on individuals at risk for Huntington disease (HD), a degenerative neurological disorder with significant effects on morbidity, to estimate adverse selection in long-term care insurance. We find strong evidence of adverse selection: individuals who carry the HD genetic mutation are up to 5 times as likely as the general population to own long-term care insurance. This finding is supported both by comparing individuals at risk for HD to those in the general population and by comparing across tested individuals in the HD-risk population with and without the HD mutation.