The Legitimation of Post-crisis Capitalism in the United Kingdom: Real Wage Decline,Finance-led Growth and the State

Since the 2008 financial crisis, capitalist development in the UK has been marked by both continuity and change. Whilst the Coalition government effectively re-established the UK's ‘finance-led’ growth model, it simultaneously broke with the legitimation strategy which New Labour had advanced in the pre-crisis conjuncture. The Coalition advanced a distinctive ‘two nations’ strategy which sought to secure a limited but durable base of support in a context of fiscal consolidation. This strategy was conditional upon the deep and unprecedented period of real wage decline which took hold in the post-crisis conjuncture. However, the Coalition successfully transformed this potential liability into a political asset, constructing a series of ‘moralised antagonisms’ between wage earners and welfare recipients, on the one hand, and private and public sector workers, on the other. Whilst this strategy secured a limited base of popular support, it also re-embedded a series of structural weaknesses within post-crisis UK capitalism. These imbalances are likely to undermine the stability of the UK’s finance-led growth model in the future and will condition British politics as the country embarks upon the process of leaving of the EU.     

The Exchange Rate and Inflation in the UK

The United Kingdom is a highly open economy, and has a monetary policy strategy of targeting inflation in consumer prices. In this paper, we look at the evidence from the UK on inflation behaviour, and examine the propositions from several theoretical models about inflation dynamics in an open economy, focusing in particular on the hypothesized connections between the exchange rate and consumer price inflation. Theoretical open‐economy macroeconomic models ‘cover the waterfront’ on this issue, ranging from ‘exchange rate disconnect’ to a rigid link between nominal exchange rate changes and inflation. We estimate on UK data the open‐economy Phillips curves implied by the alternative explanations. We argue that, of the alternatives considered, only a model where imports are modelled as an intermediate good, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999) , provides a reasonable match with the data. Unlike the standard model, in which imports are treated as a final consumer good, the intermediate‐goods specification provides support for a policy of CPI inflation targeting.     

Finance,power, and the British balance of payments

ABSTRACT

The Brexit referendum marks a critical juncture in Britain’s political economy. Benjamin Cohen argues that a nation’s monetary sovereignty lies in its balance of payments (BoP) flexibility (2008, 2015). I argue that a country’s position in the global financial régime must also be accounted for when explaining its BoP dynamics. This allows us to understand why, while sterling has long lost its ‘world currency’ status, Britain’s BoP exhibits some of the same features associated with American ‘exorbitant privilege’. To appreciate the UK’s own BoP flexibilities as well as to flesh out the Anglo-American axis in the international financial order, I compare the UK’s external balance sheets with those of the US. Given the complexities and uncertainties inherent in BoP analyses, I advise against micro-analyses of the BoP in favour of a broader approach that takes into account macro-dynamics as well as the International Political Economy (IPE) concerns outlined above. Elaborating such an analysis for the UK BoP, I explore the potential implications of Brexit for Britain’s external balance sheets and its political-economic future. While Britain’s financial power has helped insulate its balance sheets from external shocks, Britain’s impending departure from the European Union heralds a period of considerable uncertainty.     

Hedging its Bets: The UK and the Politics of European Financial Services Regulation

Some argue that European financial services regulation is witnessing a shift from a ‘market-making’ to a ‘market-shaping’ paradigm after the global financial crisis. This so-called ‘new’ political economy explanation stresses the role of ideas to understand this change. We consider this claim by providing an in-depth examination of recent European hedge fund legislation from the perspective of two key ‘market-making’ coalition members: the UK government and the hedge fund industry. We accept that the legislation represents a set-back for the ‘market-makers’ but question whether it represents a victory for the ‘market-shapers’. Moreover, we cast doubt on the causal role of ideas, calling for a domestic politics approach.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Economic transition,dualism and informality in India: Nature and patterns of household-level transitions

We examine the Indian economy during a peak period of high growth between 2005 and 2012 to analyse the nature and patterns of household-level transitions across different sectors, characterised by varying degrees of formality/informality and various production structures and labour processes. We find that even within this brief period, there has been a huge volume of household-level transitions across sectors. However, the overall economic structure, and its segmentations, has continued to be reproduced, along with a regeneration of ‘traditional’ non-capitalist informal spaces. To ascertain the nature of household-level transitions in terms of economic well-being, we employ a counterfactual analysis. We find that majority of transitions in the economy have been ‘unfavourable’ in nature, with large proportion of households undergoing sectoral transitions that are not optimal for them, given their socio-economic characteristics. Furthermore, the likelihood of ‘favourable’ versus ‘unfavourable’ sectoral transition, on average, significantly varies with household characteristics, some of which, like social caste, are structurally given and cannot be optimally chosen by households. Drawing upon this analysis, we reflect on the competing strands of literature that seek to explain the persistence of informality. Our analysis highlights the complexity of India's contemporary development trajectory, whereby the pre-existing economic structure is reproduced, paradoxically, through a continuous reshuffling and reconstitution of economic spaces, accompanied by significant volume of ‘unfavourable’ household-level sectoral transitions.     

Immanuel Kant and Endogenous Growth Theory

Despite the modern origins of endogenous growth theory, we argue that the ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’ written by Immanuel Kant in 1784 provides an early and coherent example of such a theory. Kant's endogenous growth mechanism is driven by the inherent rivalry that exists between agents which increases effort and strengthens the accumulation of knowledge, which in turn is carried through generations. In an exercise in ‘rational reconstruction’, we present a mathematical model of Kant's mechanism. We use the model to contribute to the contemporary policy debate as to whether ‘keeping up with the Joneses’ leads to excessive effort.     

Aggregate Productivity in the Post-war British Coal Industry

An econometric model, using OLS regression, of aggregate productivity in the post-war British coal industry is given. Some of the methods used by Weisskopf et al. (1983), in their ‘social model’ of aggregate productivity in the US economy are drawn upon; however all ‘social’ variables included in this coal productivity model are found not to be significant. The results suggest that pit closures have been an important source of aggregate productivity growth throughout the period; this does not imply, however, that ‘unproductive’, or ‘uneconomic’, pits are intrinsically so, rather their status as such may be the result of a ‘political’ process. Average colliery size and the industry's capital stock were also found to be important explanatory variables. Attention was paid to the effects of the national miners' strikes during the period; these effects were found to be structurally insignificant.     

Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Wolf? Rethinking the Core and Periphery in the Eurozone Crisis

Recent literature on the eurozone crisis has begun to rethink those explanations of its origins that rely on narratives stressing the ‘immaturity’ of political and economic governance in the countries of the European periphery. These narratives are typically challenged by frameworks which understand the eurozone as a region characterised by a ‘beggar-thy-neighbour’ hierarchy between the economic growth of Germany, which leads to precarious, ‘financialised’ growth in the periphery. Yet, this article shows that core–periphery scholarship is unable to adequately challenge the immaturity thesis due to its preoccupation with German ‘victimisation’ of the European periphery. By exploring country-specific direction of trade and capital lending statistics, I shows that there is little basis for the argument that Germany is to blame for the origins of the eurozone crisis in the individual countries of the European Periphery. This article shows that by bringing core–periphery analysis into dialogue with Comparative Political Economy, a critical approach to the Eurozone crisis can be developed which leaves behind the myth of the German ‘big bad wolf’. Instead, I show that imbalances between the core and periphery are a product of a flawed construction of the Single Market and Economic and Monetary Union.     

The New ‘Passive Revolution’ of the Green Economy and Growth Discourse: Maintaining the ‘Sustainable Development’ of Neoliberal Capitalism

This paper analyses the rapidly emerging discourse of a green economy based on green growth. It highlights inherent conflicts and contradictions of this discourse such as the myth of decoupling growth from the environment, pollution generations and resource consumption. Using key theoretical constructs of both Gramsci and Polanyi, the paper argues that the green economy/growth discourse can be seen as a Gramscian ‘passive revolution’ whereby the dominant sustainable development discourse, subsumed by capitalist hegemony, is protected in the context of global environmental, economic and development crises. The ‘neoliberalising of nature’, or in other words, the privatisation, marketisation and commodification of nature, akin to Polanyi's fictitious commodities, continues and intensifies with green economy/growth strategies. Greening the economy and associated strategies of green growth divert attention from the social and political dimensions of sustainability and issues of social and international justice. In this way, the inexorable march or ‘sustainable development’ of neoliberal capitalism is maintained. This paper goes on to argue that contesting the claims of green economy/growth discourse through political struggles by civil society against the neoliberalisation of nature is a sign of a slowly emerging counter-hegemonic ‘double movement’ which challenges capitalist hegemony and the commodification of society–nature relations.