Human Capital and the Convergence Process Among Countries

This paper examines the convergence process across countries for the period 1980–2000, giving special attention to the role of human capital as a conditioning factor. The originality of the study is in the use of new proxies for human capital, such as publications and patents ratio and the patents/articles ratio which reflect the efficiency of the scientific work, in contrast to the quantitative measures usually used in the growth literature. The analysis suggests that: (i) convergence is conditional on structural factors, population growth, human and physical capital; (ii) the new proxies of human capital control fairly well the different steady‐states among countries; (iii) the different levels of human capital affect countries differently, according to their levels of development. Higher levels of human capital are suitable to differentiate the convergence process among developed countries, and basic or intermediate levels are more suitable to differentiate convergence among the less developed countries.     

教育人力资本、健康人力资本与地区经济增长差异——基于中国省际面板数据的实证研究

在M-R-W增长模型框架下,将人力资本的内涵扩展至教育和健康两个方面。用教育收益率修正了教育人力资本指标,而健康则主要从投入角度加以测度。应用传统的固定效应模型和动态面板模型(DGMM)估计教育人力资本、健康人力资本对地区经济差异的影响。结果显示,人力资本促使全国省际间人均GDP增长出现明显的"俱乐部"收敛现象,而三大地区内部的经济增长则表现出条件收敛趋势。从教育人力资本产出弹性可以看出,东部地区经济增长的驱动力正从物质资本向人力资本方向转变。以每万人拥有床位数代表的健康人力资本促进了全国及区域范围内的经济增长。     

Public Capital and Economic Growth: A Convergence Approach

This paper estimates dynamic effects of public capital on output per capita. Based on an open economy growth model, I derive a version of the income convergence equation augmented with public capital. This equation is estimated using panel data of United States and Japanese regions. Sensible results are obtained when public capital is disaggregated into components. In both countries, the infrastructure component of public capital turns out to have significantly positive effects. The implied elasticity of output with respect to infrastructure is somewhere around 0.1 to 0.15. This suggests a modest contribution of infrastructure to postwar growth of the two countries.     

Per capita output convergence across Asian countries: Evidence from covariate unit root test with an endogenous structural break

This study investigates long-run convergence of per capita output across ten Asian countries over 1960 to 2014 by taking advantage of possible economic growth determinants, which may be responsible for setting Asian countries on a long-term steady-state growth path. We simultaneously examine the presence of output convergence in the region, as well as the statistical significance of these economic growth determinants, by using a unit root test with a stationary covariate. In addition, the study allows for the presence of endogenous structural changes in the time series under investigation in order to capture sharp drops in per capita outputs, which may be brought about by influential economic events, such as serious economic slumps in domestic economies or the global financial crises in 1997–98 and 2008–09. The limiting distribution of the covariate unit root test that permits structural breaks is also derived. The results show significant evidence to support the convergence hypothesis. In particular, asymptotically absolute convergence holds among Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. In addition, Thailand shows a convergence tendency in terms of asymptotically relative convergence toward Singapore. Malaysia, Indonesia, and India also turn out to converge toward Hong Kong in an asymptotically relative sense. Certain potential growth determinants, such as the trade/GDP ratio, inflation rate, government expenditure/GDP ratio, and quality of human capital, may help these countries achieve and maintain the long-run convergence process toward the reference countries in the region.     

Economic Growth and Convergence of EU Member States: An Empirical Investigation

The aim of this article is to construct a European production frontier using deterministic methods, and to break down growth and convergence during the period 1980–2001. The results show that EU growth is primarily driven by physical and human capital accumulation, the contribution of which is essential for the cohesion of European countries. We find capital accumulation and efficiency change to be important convergence factors within the EU, while technical change has worked against it. The approach used has also enabled us to analyze the differences in growth performance of Member States and highlight the role of human and public capital, supporting the European cohesion and development policies carried out in this period.     

Why Isn't Convergence Instantaneous? Young Workers, Old Workers, and Gradual Adjustment

The human capital of young and old workers are imperfect substitutes both in production and in providing on-the-job training. This helps explain why capital does not flow from rich to poor countries, causing instantaneous convergence of per capita output. If each generation chooses its human capital optimally, given that of the preceding and succeeding generations, human capital follows a unique rational-expectations path. For moderate substitutability, human capital within each sector oscillates relative to that in other sectors, but aggregate human capital converges to the steady state monotonically.     

中国区域经济分化与空间动能解析

1949—2019年，中国各省份经济总量不平等程度先下降后上升，在近十年的短周期内也呈现先下降后上升的态势；而人均实际GDP不平等程度则处于水平波动的状态，近年来呈现σ趋同态势，并在2019年出现β趋同的新迹象。创新能力较弱、政府债务率偏高和劳动人口占比偏低是当前落后地区增长动能匮乏的重要原因。研发支出、资本存量和就业规模是区域经济差距形成的主要原因，可以解释1999—2019年省级层面GDP差异的889%和人均GDP差异的591%，其中研发支出与就业规模是地区GDP总量分化的主因，研发支出与资本存量是地区人均GDP分化的主因。空间计量分析发现，中国区域经济增长的空间溢出效应显著存在，但研发支出、资本存量和就业规模的空间溢出效应存在明显区别，仅周边研发支出对地区经济增长存在正向空间溢出效应，并且东中西三大经济带的空间溢出效应存在一定差异。     

Soaring dragons,roaring tigers,growling bears

We perform a comparative analysis of regional growth and convergence in China, Russia and India over the period 1993–2003 by means of non‐parametric methods and kernel density estimates. Our results indicate that wealthy regions were largely responsible for the rapid growth in all three countries. For China and India, capital dissipation was identified as the major determinant of regional growth. In Russia, capital deepening impeded positive changes in labour productivity, leaving technological change as the only source of regional growth. Furthermore, we find that the increasing regional income inequality in all three countries was driven by technological change which more than offset the convergence resulting from capital deepening in China and India.     

The Growth Crisis of Germany: A Blueprint of the Developed Economies

Germany has realized tremendous growth rates in the aftermath of the Second World War. Since the early 1970s, growth rates declined and settled down at a more or less constant rate of 2% per year, only to experience a renewed negative trend around the early 2000s. Estimating GMM growth models in a panel of 187 countries between 1970 and 2010, we illustrate that large parts of historical welfare increases have emerged due to conditional convergence, human capital accumulation, and innovation activity. Whereas conditional convergence was the main driver behind the extraordinary postwar growth rates in Germany, human capital accumulation in Germany currently lags behind the average level of most developed countries. While this may explain the moderate position of Germany in the group of the 25 richest countries, the developed countries on their part are experiencing a period of below-average GDP growth. In nearly all advanced economies, growth reveals a downward trend since the turn of the millennium. We argue that this decline must be traced back to a general lack of radically new ideas in the world economy. The explanation of the German growth crisis may thus be considered a blueprint of the situation in developed economies.     

International capital flows and convergence in the neoclassical growth model

To analyze how capital mobility affects economic growth and convergence, this paper will use the analytical solution to the neoclassical growth model with a constant saving rate, beginning with the closed-economy Solow growth model. An introduction to international capital flows will follow. In an open economy, free capital mobility assures an instantaneous convergence in interest rates that, under a perfect competence situation, implies the instantaneous convergence in income levels among homogeneous countries. Taking into account this question and to reconcile these results with empirical evidence, that is, with the gradual convergence observed, the assumption is introduced that in spite of free capital mobility, there are international credit restrictions. In this case, we will show how the rate of convergence depends on the international capital inflows received. The authors would like to thank Maria Isabel Abradelo for her help in translating this paper.     

Trade,growth, and convergence in a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model

In models in which convergence in income levels across closed countries is driven by faster accumulation of a productive factor in the poorer countries, opening these countries to trade can stop convergence and even cause divergence. We make this point using a dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin model—a combination of a static two-good, two-factor Heckscher–Ohlin trade model and a two-sector growth model—with infinitely lived consumers where international borrowing and lending are not permitted. We obtain two main results: First, countries that differ only in their initial endowments of capital per worker may converge or diverge in income levels over time, depending on the elasticity of substitution between traded goods. Divergence can occur for parameter values that would imply convergence in a world of closed economies and vice versa. Second, factor price equalization in a given period does not imply factor price equalization in future periods.     

Income convergence among U.S. states: cross‐sectional and time series evidence

We perform convergence tests on the U.S. states for per capita income from 1930 to 2009. Cross‐sectional tests support overall σ‐convergence and β‐convergence but may not hold true for the last three decades. Time series tests suggest that about half of the states exhibit stochastic convergence and of these all are also β‐converging. Probit regressions reveal that the likelihood a state is converging is a function of changing capital to labour ratios, the size of the agricultural sector, and levels of taxation and tax revenue. Regional disparities in convergence remain among the southern and midwestern states.     

Evidence on the Convergence of Per Capita Income: A Comparison of Founder Members of the Association of South East Asian Nations and the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation

This paper investigates the per capita income convergence patterns of a set of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. We obtained a time‐series analysis for stochastic convergence by applying unit‐root tests in the presence of two endogenously‐determined structural breaks. We then supplemented the results by tests that produced evidence for β convergence. The evidence shows that the relative per capita income series of ASEAN‐5 countries were consistent with stochastic convergence and β convergence, but this was not found for SAARC‐5 countries. For the ASEAN‐5 countries, the structural breaks associated with the world oil crisis and the Asian crisis impacted heavily on the convergence/divergence process.     

中国经济增长的“俱乐部收敛”特征及其成因研究

本文以经济增长文献中有关收敛性理论为基础 ,对中国自建国以来 ,特别是 1 978年改革开放以来 ,省际间的经济增长差异进行实证分析。本文认为中国地区间的经济增长 ,不仅存在着显著的“俱乐部收敛”(clubconvergence)特征 ,即按东中西划分的区域内部人均产出具有明显的聚集现象 ;而且存在着条件收敛 (conditionalconvergence)的特征 ,即在具有相同的人力资本、市场开放度等结构特征的经济地区间存在着一定的增长收敛趋势。本文实证分析的结果还显示 ,各地区间工业化水平的差异和产业结构的变动对增长收敛性构成显著的影响。     

On the optimality of public capital for long-run economic growth: evidence from panel data

The role of public capital in economic growth is examined using data from the Penn World Tables and other sources on a large number of countries. Drawing on intertemporal optimization, the theoretical framework nests the exogenous (Solow) and endogenous types of growth and is data-consistent. It is found that public capital makes a significant contribution to growth. The actual level of investment on public capital is suboptimal. Growth in recent decades can be characterized as ‘endogenous’ with little sign of convergence. There is evidence of a growth slow-down between the 1970s and 1980s. Human capital also significantly enhances growth.     

Tests of the “convergence hypothesis”: Some further results

The article presents new tests of the convergence hypothesis. It first analyzes the unconditional pattern of growth of human and physical capital (conventionally measured by an inventory method) and shows that these tests do support the hypothesis that domestic inputs of poor countries appear to be catching up with those of rich countries. On the other hand, when one analyzes the pattern of growth of physical capital and Solow residual, then one is led to reject the convergence theory. Building on this discrepancy, I demonstrate that the poor countries have failed to catch up with rich ones because the progress that they have achieved in educating their workers (which is evidenced in the convergence of domestic inputs) is not sufficient to compensate for their poor endowment in the knowledge on which the education of workers stands.     

TESTING CATCHING‐UP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: “GROWTH RESISTANCE” AND SOMETIMES “GROWTH TRAGEDY”

This paper provides empirical evidence that there is no convergence between the GDP per‐capita of the developing countries since 1950. Relying upon recent econometric methodologies (non‐stationary long‐memory models, wavelet models and time‐varying factor representation models), we show that the transition paths to long‐run growth (the catch‐up dynamics) are very persistent over time and non‐stationary, thereby yielding a variety of potential steady states (conditional convergence). Our findings do not support the idea according to which the developing countries share a common factor (such as technology) that eliminates per‐capita output divergence in the very long run. Instead, we conclude that growth is an idiosyncratic phenomenon that yields different forms of transitional economic performance: growth tragedy (some countries with an initial low level of per‐capita income diverge from the richest ones), growth resistance (with many countries experiencing a low speed of growth convergence), and rapid convergence.     

Labor productivity and technology heterogeneity

This paper investigates the role of technology club heterogeneity in economic growth and convergence. To do so, we break up labor productivity change into three factors – efficiency, technological, and capital–labor ratio changes – while distinguishing the impact of technology club heterogeneity respectively. This allows us to observe what is happening within and between clubs; as well as between the world and club technologies. Our labor productivity decomposition is nonparametric in nature and thus overcomes the issue of specifying functional forms for the club technologies. Our results reveal the existence of technology heterogeneity and divergence: the world technology is defined by advanced and rich countries; there exists intra-convergence phenomena (mostly due to capital–labor ratio change), but inter-convergences (owning to capital–labor ratio and technological changes) are not found. Finally, we argue that follower and marginalized countries have adopted imitating strategies, but with respect to different dimensions, namely technological change or capital–labor ratio.     

Financial integration, capital mobility, and income convergence

Recent studies have found that capital moves 'uphill' from poor to rich countries, and brings little or no growth dividend when it does flow into poor economies. We show that Europe does not conform to this paradigm. In the European experience of financial integration, capital has flown from rich to poor countries, and such inflows have been associated with significant acceleration of income convergence. Analysing broader samples of countries, we find that 'downhill' capital flows tend to be observed above certain thresholds in institutional quality and financial integration. But Europe remains different even when allowing for such threshold effects, and its experience is similar to that of interstate flows within the United States. Our findings are consistent with the notion that financial diversification reduces countries' incentives to save in order to self-insure against specific shocks.
— Abdul Abiad, Daniel Leigh and Ashoka Mody     

Social capital, innovation and growth: Evidence from Europe

This paper investigates the interplay between social capital, innovation and per capita income growth in the European Union. We model and identify innovation as an important mechanism that transforms social capital into higher income levels. In an empirical investigation of 102 European regions in the period 1990-2002, we show that higher innovation performance is conducive to per capita income growth and that social capital affects this growth indirectly by fostering innovation. Our estimates suggest that there is no direct role for social capital to foster per capita income growth in our sample of European Union countries.