Social trust,institutional and political constraints on the executive and deregulation of markets

Social trust is frequently claimed to be conducive for economic reforms. Likewise, the scope of policy liberalization is influenced by the political power structure as manifested in institutional and political constraints on the executive (IPCE). However, social trust and IPCE are possibly intertwined in their effects on economic liberalization. This paper empirically explores the relationship between social trust, IPCE and the scope of economic deregulation as measured by the first difference in the regulation subindex of the Economic Freedom of the World index. The results provide evidence in favor of a positive association of social trust with deregulation and of a negative association between institutional or partisan veto-points and deregulation. Yet, according to our analysis IPCE are an obstacle for economic deregulation only in relatively low trusting environments and social trust unfolds a particular strength as driver of deregulation with increasing levels of IPCE.     

Economic reforms and human development: evidence from transition economies

Do market-oriented economic reforms result in higher levels of human well-being? This article studies the impact of macro-level institutional and infrastructure reforms on the economic, educational and health dimensions of human well-being among 25 transition economies. We use panel data econometrics based on the LSDVC technique to analyse the effects of market-oriented reforms on the human development index (HDI), as a measure of human well-being, from 1992 to 2007. The results show the complexity of reform impacts in transition countries. They show that institutional and economic reforms led to positive economic effect and significant impacts on other dimensions of human development. We find some positive economic impacts from infrastructure sectors reforms. However, not every reform measure appears to generate positive impacts. Large-scale privatizations show negative effects in health and economic outcomes. The overall results show the importance of the interaction among different reform measures and the combined effect of these on human development.     

Permanency and Flexibility of Institutions: The Role of Decentralization in Chinese Economic Reforms

The purpose of this paper is to offer a Lachmannian analysis aimed at studying the coherence and the efficiency of reforms in China in terms of institutional change. The idea is that transition dynamics cannot be analyzed by reference to market criteria only; transition is, above all, a change in institutions. Every transition economy thus faces the problem of creating a new institutional framework which associates the co-ordination of activities by the market with the preservation of a centralized mechanism of resource allocation. We explain that, in China, this role is played by decentralization. Indeed, we demonstrate that Chinese economic reforms, of which the main institutional vector is decentralization, show the particularity of reconciling, within one single logic, the permanency of a well-established institutional order required for the co-ordination of individual plans, and the flexibility of institutions necessary for the move towards the market. We then defend the theory that both the success and the originality of Chinese economic reforms rest on their capacity to resolve the permanency-flexibility dilemma.     

Growth effects of FDI in 80 developing economies: the role of policy reforms and institutional constraints

Theoretical and empirical literatures have identified several channels through which foreign direct investment (FDI) influences economic growth. This paper examines the impact of FDI on economic output growth per worker using aggregate production function augmented with FDI inflows, economic policy reforms and institutional constraints. The paper covers 80 developing countries over the period 1980–2006. We use panel data and employ fixed, random effects and GMM methods for estimation. Our results highlight the importance of FDI, policy reforms and institutional development for growth in developing economies. Finally, we demonstrate that irrespective of reforms and institutions, an increase in FDI affects output growth positively.     

Groping for Stones to Cross the River versus Coordinated Policy Reforms: The Case of Two Reforms in China

Abstract

China’s economic transition has reached a stage where the past experimental approach is no longer sufficient. Future policy reforms need to be carried out in a holistic rather than a piecemeal manner. This paper analyzes the reforms of two related institutions in China: the household registration system and the rural land system. We argue that further institutional changes warrant national initiatives and coordinated reforms rather than merely drawing on local pilot experiences. A holistic policy package that can simultaneously promote the reforms of the household registration and the rural land system is proposed. We use fiscal simulations to illustrate the feasibility of the proposed holistic policy package.     

Why China's approach to institutional change has begun to succeed

In the constantly changing modern economic environment, a country's ability to implement institutional reforms is crucial to maintain economic growth and to promote the welfare of its citizens. Unfortunately, it can be difficult to persuade institutional stakeholders that the change is necessary, and as a result, efforts at institutional change often fail. To avoid situations in which change is sudden and disruptive, China has chosen a more cautious approach of gradual institutional change leading to smooth reform, which Deng Xiaoping referred to as “crossing the river by stepping from stone to stone” — a metaphor that translates into doing a careful experiment before broad application of an approach for which you lack prior experience. This approach allows adaptation to local conditions during subsequent broader adoption of a new approach, and can thereby decrease the risks and costs of adopting a new strategy by first testing the change and then demonstrating the potential benefits to local residents and governments. This innovative approach has been a key component of China's economic reforms since 1978, and the Chinese experience shows how adapting programs to local natural and social conditions can help to motivate change and sustain the implementation of new institutions.     

Where are we in the political economy of reform?

We review the experiences of developing countries with market-oriented reforms, using the tools of modern political economy. We impose intellectual discipline by requiring that actors behave rationally using available information and that basic economic relationships such as budget constraints be accounted for. We attempt to integrate two approaches, one based on dynamic games played by interest groups, with one that focus on limited information and the dynamics of learning.

We describe the “starting point” as the set of “old” policies and we attempt to explain the dynamics (political, economic and informational) that lead to reform (section II). We analyze strategies for reformers subject to political constraints (section Ш). We evaluate the aggregate and distributional costs of reforms, emphasizing the importance of looking at the right counterfactuals (section IV).

We conclude by pointing to the challenges ahead: the second-stage institutional reforms necessary to take off from underdevelopment.     

The nexus of economic and institutional evolution

The current state of the development economics literature ascribes an indisputable central role to institutions. This paper presents a formal model of institutional evolution that is based on the dynamic interactions between formal and informal institutions and economic development; the main features of the model is consistent with the fundamental theories that shed light to institutional evolution, namely the collective action and transaction cost theories, as well as dialectics. As informal institutional quality accumulates like technological know-how, while the level of formal institutional quality is chosen by the government to maximize welfare, subject to the economic and political costs. The solution of the model yields a punctuated trajectory of formal institutional evolution. Simulations reveal that the extent of diversity in informal institutional quality across a country delays formal institutional reforms. We also observe that, both the optimal quality of formal institutions and welfare are higher the more homogeneous is the country with respect to its informal institutions or the cultural attributes.     

Did support for economic and political reforms increase during the post‐communist transition,and if so,why?

We study the dynamics of individual support for changes in the economic and political system, using a unique dataset for 12 transition economies over the period 1991–2004. We document that support for transition was initially lower in the CIS countries and that there has been a converging trend in the support for reforms between the CIS and the Baltic and Central and Eastern European countries. We suggest several explanations for the initial divergence and the post‐98 convergence in support for transition between these three groups of countries, and show that economic growth, declining income inequality and improving quality of governance have contributed to increase the support for transition. In addition, we find that increased support for the market economy and democracy in the CIS is accompanied by a larger increase in trust towards the political institutions. Our results also confirm the implications of Aghion et al. ( 2010 )'s model of a negative correlation between trust and the demand for government regulation.     

Entrepreneurship,trust and corruption

I propose a theoretical model where trust towards strangers is a channel through which institutions determine economic outcomes, in particular, entrepreneurship and corruption. More importantly, I show that the role of trust has been overlooked since high levels of trust do not always enhance desirable economic outcomes. Trust helps individuals to participate in economic exchanges aligned with social welfare, but it also facilitates individuals to cooperate for the achievement of corrupt deals. Under this more general view of trust, the model generates a non-trivial new prediction at the individual level. Specifically, the individual-level relationship between honesty and trust changes depending on the institutional quality of a country. Dishonest individuals are the more trusting individuals in countries with poor institutions, and the less trusting in countries with good institutions. Using individual-level data of 80 countries from the World Value Survey and the European Values Study, I present empirical evidence in support of this prediction.     

Trust and Growth

Why does trust vary so substantially across countries? This paper presents a general equilibrium growth model in which heterogeneous agents transact and face a moral hazard problem. Agents may trust those with whom they transact, but they also have the opportunity to invest resources in verifying the truthfulness of claims made by transactors. We characterise the social, economic and institutional environments in which trust will be high, and show that low trust environments reduce the rate of investment. The predictions of the model are examined empirically for a cross-section of countries and have substantial support in the data.     

Did growth and reforms increase citizens' support for the transition?

How did post-communist transformations affect people's perceptions of their economic and political systems? We model a pseudo-panel with 89 country-year clusters, based on the aggregation of about eighty thousand interviews conducted in 14 countries between 1991 and 2004, to identify the macro and institutional drivers of the public opinion. We find that: (i) When the economy is growing, on average people appreciate more extensive reforms and dislike unbalanced reforms. They dislike reforms when they are associated with higher unemployment. (ii) Nostalgia for the past regime increases when worsening income distribution or higher inflation interact with more privatizations of state enteprises. (iii) Cross-country differences in the attitudes towards the present and future are largely explained by differences in the institutional indicators for the rule of law and corruption. (iv) Cross-country differences in the extent of nostalgia towards the past are related to differences in the deterioration of standards of living.     

AID, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND GROWTH

Foreign aid has often been intended by donors to entice recipient nations into policy and institutional reforms favorable to private sector economic development. In this study, we investigate the relationship between aid and changes to economic freedom in recipient nations over the 1990–2000 decade. The evidence is mixed. In general, we find that foreign aid has no significant effect on economic freedom overall. However, using a hedonic approach on the different categories of economic freedom, we find that aid has still managed to contribute toward a policy and institutional environment favorable to growth, as the different categories of economic freedom improved by aid more than offset those which are harmed by aid, in terms of their impact on growth . ( JEL 010, 019)     

Globalization and financial development

This paper argues that globalization is a key factor in stimulating institutional reforms in developing countries that promote financial development and economic growth. Advanced countries can help in this process by supporting the opening of their markets to goods and services from emerging-market countries. By encouraging these countries to increase their participation in global markets, advanced countries can create exactly the right incentives for developing countries to implement the reforms that will enable them to have high economic growth.     

论我国信托业制度变迁的路径锁定与突破

本文从制度经济学角度出发,阐明了中国经济体制改革制度变迁的特点,深入分析了我国信托业发展过程中存在问题及其根源,指出我国信托业陷入了一条与地方政府的非正常关系不断强化、坏账和风险不断增加的路径,形成了制度变迁的路径锁定.在此基础上,结合中国信托业发展的外部环境和自身发展特点,提出了突破信托业现有制度变迁的路径锁定.     

The institutional foundation of China's economic growth

China's economic growth is (undoubtedly, undeniably, unquestionably) regarded as a miracle due to the changes it has brought to the lives of the Chinese as well as to the global economic structure. This paper analyzes China's economic growth from the perspective of institutional reforms. The main argument is that, through the redefinition of property rights, the operation costs of China's planned economy under full public ownership have been reduced dramatically. Human resources have greatly improved in terms of productivity and creativity, thus providing China with competitive advantages in the global market.     

关于中国人民银行独立性的研究--来自独立性指数和政策反应函数的证据

本文的目的在于 :(1 )根据GMT和CWN的方法 ,将中国人民银行有关法律指数化 ,并通过独立性指数的纵向和跨国家比较来分析中国人民银行在法律层面上的独立性变化和独立性程度 ;(2 )构建中国人民银行政策反应函数 (policyreactionfunction) ,并通过政策工具变量 (instrumentvariables)和政治事件虚拟变量 (dummyvariables)的变化来反映中国人民银行的实际独立性。     

Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy: A transaction costs analysis framework

Water markets and associated allocation policy reforms have struggled to achieve their intended goals in many water-stressed rivers, in part due to the institutional friction imposed by transition and transaction costs. This paper elaborates a transaction costs analysis framework to examine the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy reforms. This analysis rests on three pillars: i) a synthesis of three theoretical traditions of institutional analysis (Williamson, North, and Ostrom) often considered independently; ii) a framework to examine the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over time; and iii) an illustrative analysis of three large river basins – the Colorado, Columbia and Murray–Darling – with varying levels of success in market-based water policy reforms. The resulting framework accounts for water's complexity as an economic good. This framework and the case studies lead to the identification of several policy implications including the need for: a multiphase sequencing of reform, strategic investment in institutional transition costs, and institutional choices that preserve future flexibility to adjust water rights and diversion limits to manage social and environmental externalities.     

Culture, caution, and trust

Trust is an important determinant of economic development. Understanding its origins is therefore critical. We develop a principal-agent model with heterogeneous players to determine the aggregate amount of trustworthiness and trust in a society. People are distributed according to their preference toward caution, which we model as loss aversion. The first two moments of the distribution across principals and agents—along with institutional quality—are critical to the process by which trustworthiness and trust are formed. A direct effect suggests that more caution leads to less societal trust. An indirect effect of greater caution, working through trustworthiness, leads to more trust. Paradoxically, the net effect is almost always positive. The results are similar when we use expected utility theory. Different distributional assumptions can influence the results.     

Unemployment,institutions, and interdependencies: identifying successful reforms

Labor market reforms, which reduce institutional rigidities, are assumed to be a well-suited approach to lower unemployment. However, it is still not perfectly clear which reforms actually lead to a fall in unemployment. One crucial issue is that reforms do not work in isolation, but have labor market effects which depend on other institutional factors. Such institutional interactions have rarely been considered in empirical macroeconomic studies in a systematic way, mainly due to model uncertainty. As a solution to this problem, a Bayesian model averaging approach is adopted in this paper to identify robust and significant institutional interactions for unemployment. Using a panel data-set for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005, five robust and significant interaction terms are identified, and country-specific reform effects for the institutional indicators are derived.