经济效率理论研究述评

帕累托效率,新古典经济学中的非效率、莱宾斯坦的X非效率、新制度经济学的非效率以及实证研究中出现的效率概念,既有联系又有差异。经济效率的内涵在这些名目繁多的效率理论中基本保持了一致,即资源的不浪费。其差异在于,各学派沿着不同的思路对非效率进行了解释。但是,经济效率本质含义的普适性、共同特性要大于经济效率概念在各学派之间、理论与实证之间的差异性。     

X效率理论与企业X效率审计

X效率理论是企业进行X效率审计的基础.X效率是一种由组织和动机所形成的效率.传统企业效率审计是以配置效率和投入产出效率为基础,没有涉及X效率的审计,企业X效率审计在我国尚处于空白期.本文阐述企业X效率审计理论的要点,分析了企业进行X效率审计的主要理由,提出了企业X效率审计的程序和主要内容.X效率审计的主要内容包括市场环境时企业生产经营影响的审计,企业文化建设情况的审计,企业激励机制对企业效率影响的审计,企业劳动合同情况的审计,企业管理人员素质的审计和企业员工效率审计.     

X运输集团内部审计问题研究

在并购案例中,如何加强监管,建立有效的内部审计相当重要.笔者阐述了内部审计相关理论,并以X汽车运输集团作为研究对象,将理论与实践相结合,讲述了X集团内部审计情况,产生的问题,并提出了解决办法.     

试论X效率理论在地勘单位激励机制中的应用

本文针对地勘单位现状,运用X效率理论,探讨如何运用激励手段来改善地勘单位内部的低效率。     

我国财政支出效率分析与提升应策

财政支出效率包括财政支出的资源配置效率和财政支出的X—效率。我国财政支出效率低下的原因是多方面的。要解决支出效率低下问题，必须转变政府职能，规范财政供给范围，净化财政支出内容；建立政府财政的民主决策制度与民主监管制度，加快财政决策与财政监管的民主化进程；加强财政立法工作的力度，推进我国财政管理与财政监管的法治化进程；树立财政支出效率观念；规范分税制财政体制，为财政支出效率的提高奠定体制基础。     

主体功能区形成机制研究——基于要素适宜度视角的分析

基于要素的区域性和非区域性划分,要素适宜度为主体功能区建设提供了有力的理论支持。通过理论分析和模型推演,区域性要素对非区域性要素的效率选择,以及由此而生的分工专业化和聚集是主体功能区形成和发展的动力之源,并且区域经济发展的根本目标也是建立在要素适宜度水平不断提升过程中的可持续发展。     

企业合作网络的效率、交易风险及治理机制研究——基于中小企业与大企业关系的视角

本文认为,构建中小企业与大企业合作网络,有利于网络组织成员规模经济的实现,从而有效避免“X非效率”,降低交易成本,通过协同效应给网络组织成员带来合作剩余。但是,企业合作网络的稳定运行是有条件的,为了有效降低合作网络的交易风险,必须努力提高大企业的内聚力与辐射力并加强网络外围中小企业间的联合。     

我国上市公司非效率投资的形成机制和对策研究

由于信息不对称和委托代理问题的存在,过度投资、投资不足的投资非效率现象难以避免。文章在分析了我国上市公司非效率投资的形成机制的基础上,提出只有建立有效的激励和约束机制才能真正减少我国上市公司非效率投资。     

股期激励对投资影响研究

公司所有权和经营权的分离造成了所有者和经理人之间的利益存在冲突,股权激励是一种通过经营者获得公司股权形式,使他们能够以股东的身份参与企业决策、分享利润、承担风险,从而勤勉尽责地为公司的长期发展服务的一种激励方法。文章通过理论分析,借鉴国内外的上市公司非效率投资问题上的研究成果,研究在目前阶段我国企业的投资问题,建立投资中的非效率投资计量模型、股权激励比例与非效率投资关系模型,希望为后期分析经理人持股与公司非效率投资之间的关系以及影响股权激励作用发挥的主要因素,为促进上市公司进行理性投资,提高投资效率提供一定的帮助,同时也期望为实行股权激励,改善相应的激励机制提供一定的参考。     

西方公有资产理论及其对我国的启示

不同时代的西方学者们对公有资产的规模、效率等问题进行了深入的分析和探索,这些理论对我国国有资产管理实践具有极其重要的启发意义。借鉴西方公有资产理论,我国国有资产管理基本的应策是调整国有资产分布;建立政府民主决策制度,使资产的配置和使用体现民意;规范中央与地方之间的财政关系,为国有资产效率的提高提供体制基础;加强对资产的考核监督工作;积极推进国有资产的流动重组和转化经营;加强国有资产管理信息系统建设。     

Regulation and efficiency in transition: the case of Romanian banks

Using disaggregated panel data for the period 1996–2002, this paper estimates the cost efficiency of Romanian banks and relates it to regulation implemented by the National Bank of Romania. We estimate efficiency using a model that combines the frameworks of both stochastic frontier analysis and shadow cost functions. Our results indicate that, for all types of banks, the cost of technical inefficiency decreases in the years following tightening of regulation. A significant part of this decrease can be attributed to the policy change. Overall, the short-run increase in cost due to additional regulation exceeds the benefits from reduced technical inefficiency. However, our model does not account for other benefits, besides changes in X-inefficiency, such as stability of the banking system, which may be significant.      

Inefficiency in the Spanish Cooperative Banking Sector

This paper researches X-inefficiency and scale economies in Spanish cooperative banking between 1988 and 1996, using the stochastic cost frontier methodology. The Translog cost function, with three outputs and three inputs, is used to measure X-inefficiencies across time and size. During this period of time there is no important reduction in inefficiency levels, so deregulation and internationalization has little effect on the Spanish cooperative banking market. We can see that large cooperative banks are less inefficient than small ones, indicating that it would be convenient to increase the size of these kinds of banks in order to reduce inefficiencies in this sector. We also find scale economies during this period.     

Inefficiencies in Public Environmental Services

The paper discusses efficiency issues in the public provision of environmental services, in particular waste water treatment. It is shown that in the face of increasing, respectively decreasing returns to scale the zero profit constraint of a cost minimizing public firm induces underinvestment, respectively overinvestment in public capacity compared with efficient allocation between public purification and effluent control by private polluters. X-inefficiency of the public firm counter-acts the inefficiency in allocation arising from overinvestment, and it reinforces the inefficiency in allocation in case of underinvestment in public purification capacity. As subsidy can bring down the user's charge imposed on sources, but it will also increase X-inefficiency. The subsidy counteracts underinvestment but reinforces overinvestment in public capacity.     

银行商誉资本与货币竞争性发行——来自中国白银风潮前夕银行微观数据的经验证据

1976年哈耶克提出了货币非国家化理论 ,主张赋予私人银行独立的货币发行权以约束政府滥发货币的行为 ,但反对者认为追求私利的发钞行必将无限增发货币引致通胀.文章将银行的发行和信贷统一起来分析银行声誉如何影响其发行行为,研究表明:在竞争性发行条件下 ,声誉机制能够有效地约束发钞行的行为,银行因追求长远收益而稳健发行.进而,文章以银行的生存历史和是否为上海银行公会会员度量声誉 ,利用白银风潮前夕中国34家发钞行和150家银行的微观数据检验声誉机制的作用 ,研究发现:声誉越好的银行,兑换券发行越稳健;声誉为银行带来了诸多经营优势,如更多的实收资本、盈余积累和存款 ,以致声誉好的银行贷款规模更大 ,利润水平更高 ;发钞行确实是因追求长远收益而稳健发行.根据民国时期银行竞争性发行的历史经验 ,文章首次为货币非国家化理论提供了微观证据 ,也为当前的货币政策制定和人民币国际化提供了启示.     

Deregulation and governance: plight of Japanese banks in the 1990s

The governance structure of public corporations is determined by the agency relationship between shareholders and managers, and the agency theory predicts that deregulation of an industry leads to governance adaptation. Deregulation of the Japanese banking business in the 1980s offers an interesting case study in this framework, as Japanese banks fell into serious solvency problems in the post-deregulation 1990s. This paper investigates whether ineffective governance was responsible for the plight of Japanese banks. The sample is 384 corporations that were listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange between 1983 and 1990, which includes 59 banks. One of the findings is that bank shareholders allowed more diffuse ownership structure after deregulation, which demonstrates that the agency theory did not hold for shareholders of Japanese banks.     

Social aspirations in European banks: peer-influenced risk behaviour

We test a sample of 3,586 banks from 33 European countries to determine whether performances above or below a social aspiration level (median performance of peer banks) influence banks’ aggregate risk levels. Our results are consistent with the behavioural theory of the firm and prospect theory in that we find that bank performance below a bank’s social aspiration level is followed by increased aggregate risk, i.e. risk-taking behaviour in the subsequent year. Although under-performing banks tend to be risk-takers, large banks and banks with high aggregate risk levels tend to limit the increase in their aggregate risk levels.     

ARE SOME BANKS TOO LARGE TO FAIL? MYTH AND REALITY

At the time of the Continental Illinois National Bank insolvency, bank regulators considered some commercial banks "too large to fail" (TLTF) and were reluctant both to legally fail such banks and to impose pro rata losses on any of the uninsured creditors of these insolvent banks and their parent holding companies. This policy was introduced due to widespread fears that large bank failures would set off a domino effect bringing down other banks and possibly even the macroeconomy as it did during the 1930s. Also, because these banks are considered special in that they provide money and credit to their communities, many feared that their failure could reduce greatly the availability of these services.
This paper analyzes the validity of these fears by examining both theory and the historical record. It concludes that neither theory nor history provides strong support for either fear. In addition, the paper finds that the costs of regulatory forbearance granted to insolvent banks and their creditors greatly exceed the alleged benefits. It also reviews how policy makers apply the TLTF principle in practice. The paper concludes that the policy has been modified progressively over time so that some large banks now are declared legally insolvent and all creditors of bank holding companies—and some uninsured creditors of the banks themselves—incur losses. One may reasonably expect that TLTF will be modified further as the large societal costs become more evident to the public and regulators alike.     

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE BANKING IMPUTATION IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

The banking problem in the National Accounts arises because interest rates paid by banks on deposits are generally lower than the rates charged for loans and service charges levied by banks are generally less than the cost of the banking services provided. This paper offers two explanations for such observations: first there is the new neo-classical theory of private banking and central banking which suggests that they arise because of distorting “taxes” levied by regulating central banks. Second there is the Keynesian theory which accounts for the observations by the fact that the public good services of monetary stabilization supplied directly by the central banks and indirectly by private banks cannot be priced. Both theories account for the empirical observations giving rise to the banking problem. Neither theory lends support to the banking imputation currently carried out in most National Accounts.     

利率市场化能解决小微企业融资难问题吗*——基于行为金融学视角的分析

本文研究了银行信贷集中问题的成因,讨论了利率市场化背景下小微企业融资问题难的解决思路。本文首先以行为前景理论和心理账户理论为基础,考察授信者行为因素对银行授信决策的影响,以探讨小微企业融资困境形成和银行信贷集中问题产生的机制。然后本文讨论了分析信贷集中和小微企业融资问题所依赖的假设和变量,从收益和风险两个方面对商业银行信贷决策做出了研究。研究发现利率市场化改革可以有效缓解小微企业融资难和信贷资金集中于大中型企业的问题。     

资本监管、资本充足率与银行市场均衡

基于用均衡稳定性理论和博弈理论对银行资本监管的有效性进行分析,其结果表明,资本充足率的提高与商业银行经营风险的降低并没有必然的联系,但资本监管对于银行市场均衡的稳定性可以发挥决定性作用;对我国商业银行而言,由于内部风险计量技术仍不完善,资本充足率很难成为市场有效信号,因而资本监管的效率必然是低下的。