悬赏广告的法经济学分析

本文通过描述案例 ,对悬赏广告进行法经济学分析 ,认为悬赏广告实质上是失主向不特定人发出的、由拾得人承诺的、涉及权利交易的契约 ;在现实生活中 ,悬赏广告的出现和增多 ,是适应变化的现实需要而实施的制度创新 ;这一创新能促进人们之间的合作 ,产生合作剩余、增加社会福利或减少损失 ;但是悬赏广告作为一种新的制度或契约 ,从其产生到被普遍接受是一个长期的变迁过程 ,为节省交易费用 ,提高制度运行效率 ,需要国家从法律上加以确认。因此 ,本文建议进行相关法律的修改或创新 ,从而国家也成为联合创新这一新制度的主体之一。     

论悬赏广告法律性质

悬赏广告的性质在理论上一直是一个争议的问题。实践中 ,法院判决因悬赏广告发生争议时的理论依据也不相同。1 999年实施的《中华人民共和国合同法》对此没有明确规定。但随着因悬赏广告发生的争议越来越多 ,准确地给悬赏广告定性无论在理论上还是实践中都具有重要意义。文章通过对有关悬赏广告性质的不同学说的分析 ,论证了悬赏广告的性质不是要约 ,而应为单方法律行为的观点     

基于产业结构调整的我国收入分配差距研究

产业结构与收入分配之间存在着紧密联系,不同的产业结构导致不同的劳动生产率,由此导致不同的收入分配格局。本文以马克思主义经济学的相关理论为基础,分析了收入的来源以及收入分配差距的形成路径,以此构建了理论模型,并进行了实证分析。实证分析结论显示,现阶段应以提高劳动力素质和改善生产条件为手段进行产业结构调整,以此形成更多可以用于分配的经济剩余,进而缩小居民收入分配差距。     

要素间相对稀缺程度的变化与企业产权演进逻辑

现有的企业产权配置理论是在不完全契约框架下通过比较要素的“特性”展开讨论的,然而从要素间在质的规定性上进行比较,本身具有不可比性。如果将企业看成是由多个要素所有者为取得合作收益而结成的特别合约,那么,各个要素所有者博弈企业的权益,其“谈判势力”的大小不在于他们各自所拥有的要素在性质上的特别之处,而在于供求量对比中显现出的各个要素的相对稀缺程度高低。要素的相对稀缺程度决定要素所有者间“谈判势力”大小,由此决定企业“剩余索取权”和“剩余控制权”的分配。这一结论能够逻辑一致性地、历史地、动态地解释企业的产权结构及其演进逻辑。     

企业家社会责任的历史使命性

市场经济条件下,发生在狭义生产过程的不平等分配,其经济利益关系性质,最终要由生产力剩余是否用于雇佣劳动者未来发展利益的社会积累来界定。雇佣劳动者公共利益的存在、生产力形成的内在规定性、社会积累形式的不可自由选择性、社会生产力发展规律的基本要求,决定了企业家负有不可推卸的社会责任。这种社会责任具有历史使命的责任高度。     

经济学家对剩余认识的分歧说明了什么

自魁奈提出"纯产品"学说以来,经济学家对剩余认识的分歧一直难以弥合,这是由他们对剩余研究的目的决定的,但万变不离其宗的是,研究剩余的来源或源泉都是为了给剩余的归属即剩余的占有找到更"合理"的出路,与剩余的真正来源无关.由他们所戴的理论有色眼镜所决定,经济学家把剩余的来源分为劳动说、创新说、不确定性说和监督说.劳动说体现的是社会公平正义,创新说注重的是激励,不确定性说强调了企业家的责任,监督说意在减少偷懒.只要我们不怀任何偏见,这些不同的学说就会为解决目前的经济发展与收入分配矛盾提供有效的思路和方法.     

知识经济时代人力资本参与企业剩余分配方法的探讨

从知识经济时代人力资本应当参与企业剩余分配的理论依据出发,从风险承担贡献大小、人力资本价值、单边分享和稀缺性等方面,对人力资本参与企业剩余分配的方法进行探讨。     

销售中的企业道德价值与对组织的承诺

作者在本文中对在销售中的企业道德价值与对组织的承诺作了探讨。他们（1）讨论了作为企业文化一个组成部分的企业道德价值；（2）考察了关于组织承诺的文献；（3）假定了企业道德价值与对组织承诺之间的明确关系；（4）通过检测来自1200多名代表销售经理、市场研究人员和广告机构经理等分样本的专业销售人士的数据，经验性地验证了这一关系。本研究成果为企业道德价值与对组织的承诺之间的明确联系提供了强有力的证据。在前面的研究表明了组织承诺与特定利益之间存在强有力联系的前提下，而且还是一个至关重要的组织问题。     

广告对收入再分配的影响初探

随着社会经济的发展和信息时代的来临，广告在社会经济生活中的作用变得越来越重要了。本文从宏观经济的角度出发，分析了广告福利的概念及其特征，论述了广告对收入再分配的影响，将广告福利的转嫁与财政税收进行比较，讨论了广告福利转嫁过程的特征，并指出其现实意义和未来可能的研究方向。     

一个货币量值的宏观经济模型

本文以剑桥增长公式和收入支出为基础,构建了一个基于货币量值变量的宏观经济模型,讨论企业行为模式和货币银行体系的融资约束如何决定宏观经济的长期增长趋势.论证了在需求起决定作用的市场经济中,宏观变量可能存在数个不同的稳定增长状态,其中一些是"刀锋增长路径",另一些则是经济长期收敛的对象.当前的投资资产比决定未来趋向于其中哪一个,而利息率、储蓄率和收入分配的变化可以改变这些稳定增长状态.最后本文根据以上分析给出了本模型的政策含义.     

How do conventions evolve?

The paper argues that, even in the absence of bureaucratic inertia, the transition from one convention to a superior one can be blocked. Because of the self-reinforcing mechanism generated by coordination effects, the economy can be locked-in to an Pareto-inferior convention. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, convention appears to be an evolutionary stable strategy. We show that the endogenous diffusion of a superior convention is possible but requires the presence of some social or cultural differentiation in order that coordination effects can be localized. The social or cultural links provide no information about the structure of the game, but help people to coordinate themselves by providing external points of reference. We construct a model where matching between agents respects a certain localization of interactions related to social or cultural similarity. These results are used to enlighten the surprising success of japanese labor management in US and UK transplants.     

Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory

This paper addresses the following issue: if a set of agents bargain on a set of feasible alternatives ‘in the shadow’ of a voting rule, that is, any agreement can be enforced if a ‘winning coalition’ supports it, what general agreements are likely to arise? In other words: what influence can the voting rule used to settle (possibly nonunanimous) agreements have on the outcome of consensus? We model the situation as an extension of the Nash bargaining problem in which an arbitrary voting rule replaces unanimity. In this setting a natural extension of Nash's solution is characterized.     

Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution

The paper examines the behaviour of "evolutionary" models with ɛ-noise like those which have been used recently to discuss the evolution of social conventions. The paper is built around two main observations: that the"long run stochastic stability" of a convention is related tothe speed with which evolution toward and away from the convention occurs,and that evolution is more rapid (and hence more powerful) when it mayproceed via a series of small steps between intermediate steady states. Theformal analysis uses two new measures, the radius and modified coradius, tocharacterize the long run stochastically stable set of an evolutionary modeland to bound the speed with which evolutionary change occurs. Though notuniversally powerful, the result can be used to make many previous analysesmore transparent and extends them by providing results on waiting times. Anumber of applications are also discussed. The selection of the riskdominant equilibrium in 2×2 games is generalized to the selection of½-dominant equilibria in arbitrary games. Other applications involvetwo-dimensional local interaction and cycles as long run stochasticallystable sets.     

What constitutes a convention? Implications for the coexistence of conventions

A model of repeated play of a coordination game, in which stage games have a location in social space and players receive noisy signals of the true location of their games, is reviewed. Sugden (1995) (The coexistence of conventions. J Econ Behav Organ 28:241–256) suggests that, in such a model, there can be a stationary state of convention coexistence only if interaction is non-uniform across social space. This paper shows that an alternative definition of conventions, which links conventions to actions rather than expectations, permits convention coexistence when interaction is uniform. To assess robustness, the concept of a global mutant is introduced, to which certain states of coexistence are robust.

Optimality of impulse harvesting policies

We explore the link between cyclical and smooth resource exploitation. We define an impulse control framework which can generate both cyclical solutions and steady-state solutions. Our model can admit convex and concave profit functions and allows the integration of different stock-dependent profit functions. We show that the strict concavity of the profit function is only a special case of a more general condition, related to submodularity, that ensures the existence of optimal cyclical policies. We then establish a link with the discrete-time models with cyclical solutions by Benhabib and Nishimura (J Econ Theory 35:284–306, 1985) and Dawid and Kopel (J Econ Theory 76:272–297, 1997). For the steady-state solution, we explore the relation to Clark’s (1976) continuous control model.     

Bargaining in a non-stationary environment

We study an alternating offers bargaining model in which the set of possible utility pairs evolves through time in a non-stationary, but smooth manner. In general, there exists a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. However, we show that in the limit as the time interval between two consecutive offers becomes arbitrarily small, there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Furthermore, we derive a powerful characterization of the unique (limiting) subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the circumstances under which Nash's bargaining solution implements this bargaining equilibrium. Finally, we extend our results to the case when the players have time-varying inside options.     

Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects

In many economic environments agents make costly and irreversible investments (in “guns”) that may enhance their respective threat payoffs but also shrink the utility possibilities set. In such settings, with variable threats and a variable utility possibilities set, it becomes possible to rank different bargaining solutions in terms of efficiency. We compare bargaining solutions within a class in which the influence of the threat point on the bargaining outcome varies across solutions. Under symmetry, we find that the solution in which the threat point is least influential—the equal sacrifice solution—Pareto-dominates the other solutions. Since the equal sacrifice solution puts the least weight on the threat point, norms against threats (that can be seen in many seemingly rhetorical pronouncements in adversarial relations) can mitigate some of the costs of conflict and therefore have efficiency-enhancing effects. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D30, D70, D72, K42.     

Private information, transferable utility, and the core

We consider transferable-utility, cooperative games, featuring differently informed players. Parties can exchange endowments or undertake joint production, but not pool information. Coalitional contracts must therefore comply with members’ private information. Qualitatively different shadow prices then arise: some for material endowments, others for knowledge. We focus on computable core solutions, generated by shadow prices. Such solutions obtain under standard regularity assumptions.     

Mutually acceptable courses of action

We offer a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. We introduce a new solution concept: a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an (incomplete) contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. We show that by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, our concept can be related to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, (rationalizable) self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. We are grateful to the editor and an anonymous referee for very useful and helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were circulated under the title “Towering over Babel: Worlds Apart but Acting Together”. We thank participants at the World Congress of Game Theory Society (2004), the International Conference on Game Theory (2004), the European Meeting (2004), and the Econometric Society World Congress (2005). Financial support from SSHRC and NSERC of Canada, and the National Science Council of Taiwan are gratefully acknowledged.     

Rationing and rationality

This paper investigates a simple three-good two-sector macromodel with fixed prices. In order to omit any ad hoc assumptions about the market outcomes we analyse the model as a game played by (fully) rational players. Whereas the notion of rationality underlying the concept of Nash equilibria implies a multiplicity of solutions (with different trades and different excess demands) the refined notion of uniformly perfect equilibria yields uniqueness. Interestingly, the unique solution implies excess demands differing from previously discussed suggestions. Accordingly, the amount of involuntary unemployment may here be different from those in former models even though transactions are the same. In principle, the model provides a reasonable basis to interpret the magnitude of excess demands, what seems important since excess demands serve as signals not only for markets but also for policy makers.