中国自然垄断产业规制改革方向初探

长期以来,由于规模经济等原因,我国自然垄断部门一直处于政府的严格规制下,但这一格局已严重影响了相关产业的发展。现代经济理论通过成本可加性来定义自然垄断,证明政府规制并非全部必要;同时,现实中由于信息不对称、利益集团影响等原因,政府规制往往也不能达到预期的效果。针对这些问题,文章对我国规制改革的方向进行分析,提出逐渐实现激励性的规制,改变体制培育市场竞争条件,区分产业中不同性质业务已实现有效竞争等措施。     

电信规制改革的国际比较

1970年代以来,随着电信技术的迅速发展和电信产业的迅速扩张,发达国家掀起了电信规制改革的浪潮。文章回顾和分析了英美等发达国家电信规制改革的历程,而各国受制度环境、电信市场竞争结构以及电信产业发展程度等因素的影响,其各自的电信规制改革过程及规制模式各具特点。在确保稳定提供基础电信服务和促进电信竞争的基本目标下,行为规制的趋同性、产业组织规制的非对称性以及监管体制的路径依赖性构成了全球电信规制改革的主要特征。     

中国自然垄断产业规制改革方向初探

长期以来,由于规模经济等原因,我国自然垄断部门一直处于政府的严格规制下,但这一格局已严重影响了相关产业的发展.现代经济理论通过成本可加性来定义自然垄断,证明政府规制并非全部必要;同时,现实中由于信息不对称、利益集团影响等原因,政府规制往往也不能达到预期的效果.针对这些问题,文章对我国规制改革的方向进行分析,提出逐渐实现激励性的规制,改变体制培育市场竞争条件,区分产业中不同性质业务已实现有效竞争等措施.     

自然垄断行业的政府规制经济学研究

对干处在经济转轨阶段的我国而言，“规制取消论”并不可取。全盘取消规制只会陷入制度真空。既作为政府规制工具，同时又是政府规制对象的国有经济不宜全盘退出自然垄断领域，但国有经济独霸自然垄断行业天下的局面不会再继续，竞争的引入不可避免。规制框架重构是现实的选择。思路是：规制重点要转变，设租性规制要剔除，规制真空要填补，对规制者的规制要加强。     

寻租对政府官员激励机制的扭曲及规制研究

在社会主义市场经济的初期,租金以及寻租活动的客观存在造成政府官员与寻租人的合谋及政府官员的设租与榨租,从而扭曲了政府官员的激励机制,出现寻租性腐败行为。政府官员进行设租或榨租行为,既有制度本身不完善的原因,又受到自身有限理性的制约。因此,应从正式制度与非正式制度两方面进行规制,减少政府干预,把政府干预控制在一个适度的、规范的、符合现代市场经济制度的范畴之内,控制在公开、公正、公平竞争的市场环境的合理边界上。     

电信业为什么要放松规制

在世界范围内 ,电信业改革的政策趋势是放松规制、引入市场竞争机制 ,本文从经济学理论上具体分析了实行这种政策的原因。一是对电信业规制的传统根据的完全或部分消失 ,二者电信规制的失败。     

转轨时期中国规制俘获指数——方法论与设计

作为世界范围内普遍存在的一种现象,规制俘获在规制经济学研究中占有重要地位.俘获行为的隐蔽性造成了长期以来相关实证研究的缺乏,围绕这一理论也产生了争论.通过对21世纪以来的有关规制俘获测评方法进行综述和评价,指出这些方法都未能有效辨别、区分腐败与俘获这一相似概念.从政府与私人关系的角度,重新定义俘获与腐败作为比较分析的基准,探讨了俘获与腐败在研究角度、产生条件、作用方式和影响结果等方面的差异性,结合我国转型时期的特点,构建出俘获指数综合指标测评体系.通过俘获指数可以对我国转轨时期的规制俘获现象进行有效识别,从而为我国规制政策评估和修正提供科学的依据.     

对我国电力工业体制改革中规制侵占和行业租问题的分析及政策建议

文章在对我国电力工业体制改革是渐进式变革界定的基础上 ,分析了现行体制改革中如何解决规制侵占及行业租等方面的问题 ,并从中得出了我国电力工业体制改革进一步发展的原则。     

规制经济学理论研究综述

本文详细介绍了规制经济理论发展、演化的脉络。对传统的规制公共利益理论、规制俘虏理论、规制经济理论及其主要代表人物的观点予以评述 ;重点介绍了信息不对称和目标不一致情况下的激励规制理论及其经典模型。     

高等教育产业经济规制研究综述

高等教育的发展,对我国的社会发展和经济建设的顺利进行具有重要的意义.20世纪90年代以来,我国学术界对高等教育产业经济规制的研究有了新的进展.文章从高等教育产品的属性、高等教育市场的垄断性、高等教育产业的经济规制原因及其建议等四个方面对高等教育产业经济规制进行了总结,并作出了的评述.     

Monetary Rules and Deficit Shocks

Modern theory on interest rate rules is based on the representative agent framework with infinite-horizon consumers, thereby ignoring redistributions of the fiscal burden across generations due to deficit shocks. We show how the ‘Taylor principle’ relies on this restrictive assumption. In a dynamic New Keynesian general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, the existence of a unique stable rational expectations equilibrium may also occur under a passive monetary policy. However, active monetary policy is still required to stabilize the economy in response to fiscal shocks. Thanks are due to an anonymous referee, Andrea Costa, Jordi Galí and Giancarlo Marini for very useful comments and discussions. Financial support from CNR and the FIRB project is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules

We consider a probabilistic approach to collective choice problems where a group of agents with single-peaked preferences have to decide on the level or location of a public good. We show that every probabilistic rule that satisfies Pareto efficiency and "solidarity" (population-monotonicity or replacement-domination) must equal a so-called target rule.     

Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be suboptimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade‐off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.     

Policy Rules and Monetarist Arithmetic

This note demonstrates the existence of an important equilibrium path overlooked in the literature on monetarist arithmetic. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is possible when the interest‐elasticity of money demand exceeds unity. In this case, tight money may lead to a transitory increase in seigniorage, the retirement of government debt, and lower inflation in both the short run and the long run. The set of equilibrium paths is sensitive, however, to the form of the policy rule. Pleasant monetarist arithmetic is not an equilibrium if the policy rule fixes the share of the fiscal deficit financed by seigniorage. Both pleasant monetarist arithmetic and the tight‐money paradox are equilibrium paths when the government's commitment to low money growth is conditional on inflation remaining below its previous level.     

Bertrand Games and Sharing Rules

We consider asymmetric Bertrand games with arbitrary payoffs at ties or sharing rules, and identify sufficient conditions for the zero-profit outcome and the existence of Nash equilibria. Subject to some technical conditions on non-tied payoffs the following hold. If the sharing rule is strictly tie-decreasing all players but one receive zero equilibrium payoffs, while everybody does so if non-tied payoffs are symmetric. Mixed (pure) strategy Nash equilibria exist if the sharing rule is (norm) tie-decreasing and coalition-monotone. I would like to thank Fernando Branco, the audience at Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona), ISEG (Lisbon), University of Mannheim, ESEM 2003 (Venice), EARIE 2005 (Porto), two anonymous referees, and the editor Dan Kovenock for very useful comments. This research received financial support under project POCTI/ECO/37925/2001 of FCT and FEDER.