基于外部性内部化与国家意愿支付的脱硝电价定价研究

本文从外部性内部化理论和费用效益理论出发,提出按照国家意愿支付确定脱硝电价,并在研究国家意愿支付与脱硝边际成本的变动规律基础上论证了该脱硝电价算法的合理性。接着,构建了基于国家意愿支付的脱硝电价模型,在分析2004年我国电力行业脱硝成本与脱硝环境效益的基础上,对脱硝电价进行了案例研究,对在实践上如何计算脱硝电价做了有益的尝试。     

关于脱硝电价成本测算与试行政策研究

节能减排一直是现代经济社会发展的重点内容，火电厂脱硝改造也成为社会上下热点关注的话题。本文针对现阶段我国脱硝电价政策试行的情况。以及脱硝电价试点存在的问题进行分析，提出了一些个人观点，希望对我国脱硝电价的进一步改造和完善的实施有所帮助。     

基于可持续发展的电价政策体系研究

近年来,我国已出台的电价政策存在一定的缺陷,而且也不能有效覆盖变化了的(厂、网分开)的电力行业。主要表现在:煤、电价格联动未能充分地反映电力的燃料成本变化,上网电价以基于经营期成本回收方法的单一电量制为主,不能适应变化了的电力行业结构。调节性能好的水电及抽水蓄能电价仍实行单一电量制,使该类电源的功能不能合理发挥。销售电价总水平监管尚未执行任何规范性方法,仍处于"相机抉择"状态,调整不及时、不到位,电价结构不合理,"交叉补贴"更加严重。针对这些问题,本文提出了完善我国电价政策体系的对策建议。     

电力市场中计及实时电价的电力系统运行风险管理新策略

针对电力市场中用户对实时电价的反应,本文提出一种计及实时电价的电力系统运行风险管理新策略。该策略在评估电力系统运行风险的基础上,对实时电价进行调节,并以电价为信号,刺激用户采取合理的用电结构和方式,从而增强电力系统运行的可靠性。该方法只是弥补了传统方法无法考虑系统运行可靠性的不足,而并非颠覆传统的电价管理方法,所以二者具有很好的衔接性。最后,通过对IEEPRTS测试系统的可靠性进行计算分析,验证了所提算法的有效性。     

基于电价营销策略的峰谷分时电价及可中断负荷电价研究

电价营销是电力市场营销策略的重要手段,本论在分析各地区的电价营销经验的基础上提出了具体改进意见和实施措施,对于推进我国电价营销具有一定的借鉴意义。     

中国居民阶梯电价的设计

作为一种特殊的非线性定价机制,阶梯电价能兼顾多重经济和社会目标已经得到了充分的论证,目前关于阶梯电价的争议主要在于其所包涵的三组参数的设计。而在电价上涨周期中,阶梯电价的设计最重要的是要维护社会福利和保障公平支出,以及弥补电力企业的成本,即建立公平的偿付机制。文章首先在对我国居民收入和电力消费数据分析的基础上,认为四档的阶梯电价更符合我国的实际,并采用最大熵模型来估计居民电力需求的分布函数,并根据覆盖率来计算各阶梯的边界电量,进而根据国际经验给出每档的边际电价。文章设计的阶梯电价的方案具有较强的操作性,且能够进一步对阶梯方案进行初步的评估,因此具有较强的实践意义。     

电价改革的思考

价格改革是电力市场化改革的核心。伴随电力工业体制改革和电力市场的发展，现行电价政策、制定电价的方法等已越来越不适应新形势的要求，暴露出了诸多弊端，在一定程度上已阻碍了电力工业的健康发展。如何进行电价改革是大家关注的问题。     

中国居民电价承受能力研究

2010年10月9日,国家发改委就《居民生活用电实行阶梯电价的指导意见》向社会公开征求意见。居民阶梯电价的制定首要考虑的就是居民电价的承受能力。通过比较分析法和投入产出价格模型,深入研究中国居民电价的承受能力,得出如下结论：总体来看,中国居民对电价具有一定的承受能力,电价变动不超过5％,对中国居民消费物价指数的影响不大。各省居民对电价的承受能力差异较大,中国城镇居民高收入户的承受能力约为最低收入户的3倍多。     

我国脱硝电价政策设计研究

脱硝电价政策是重要的NOx控制政策,厘清我国脱硝电价政策的运行实施流程,是进行脱硝电价政策改革设计的重要前提。文章通过总结我国脱硝电价政策设计的实施框架、执行模式,以及补贴标准的制定方法,提出现行的脱硝电价政策存在补贴标准"一刀切"、各部门协作执行效率较低、相关鼓励措施不够完善等问题,认为基于"区域调整系数"的分区补贴模式是较为公平、可行与科学的补贴标准制定方法。     

电价改革有望破冰

<正>为理顺电价关系,促进节能减排,进一步推进电价改革,2009年11月20日,国家发改委经商国家电监会、国家能源局,出台了电价调整方案,将全国非民用销售电价每千瓦时平均提高2.8分,各地区,各行业电价调整标准有所差异。     

理顺价格机制彻底解决电荒

近年来,随着我国经济高速发展,能源需求日益增加,“电荒”现象愈演愈烈。主要原因是由于价格机制不顺,包括电网与电源企业利益分配失衡,火电与新能源价格、电煤与煤电价格、高油价与电价、电价与CPI等机制的不协调。只有理顺价格机制,才能彻底解决电荒危机。     

双参考价格范围的价格判断试验研究

传统的价格判断模型考虑常规目标价格状态的判断,然而在不规范的市场中,商品良莠不齐,消费者常常面对超低的商品价格,按照传统的价格判断模型,消费者不会接受这种超低价,然而现实情况却不是如此。消费者为什么接受了怀疑的交易,面对超低价格,消费者如何判断价格的吸引力?笔者将对传统价格模型进行扩展,通过试验验证新的价格判断模型,用以解释以上问题。     

Strategic Choice of the Price Structure and Entry Deterrence Under Price Cap Regulation

This paper shows that a price‐capped firm under the threat of entry in some of the markets it serves can strategically manipulate its price structure to deter entry. In doing so, the regulated firm uses the price cap constraint as a commitment device to an aggressive pricing behaviour in case of entry. A (dynamic) price cap generally entails that the prices allowed today are a function of the previous‐period prices and that the tighter is the constraint on each price, the larger is the quantity sold of this good in the previous period. Hence, the regulated firm may strategically choose its price structure before entry to place a tighter regulatory control on the prices set in the (potentially) competitive markets and to make it optimal to charge in these markets – in case of entry – prices so low that entry is unprofitable.     

Price effects of independent transmission system operators in the United States electricity market

In 1996, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sought to “remove impediments to competition in the wholesale bulk power marketplace and to bring more efficient, lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” through a series of market rules. A product of these rules was the establishment of regional transmission organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs) charged with facilitating equal access to the transmission grid for electricity suppliers. Whether these changes in market structure have succeeded in achieving FERC’s goal to provide “lower cost power to the Nation’s electricity consumers” remains an open question. This paper utilizes a panel data set of the 48 contiguous United States and a treatment effects model in first differences to determine whether there have been changes in delivered electric prices as a result of the establishment of ISOs and RTOs. To avoid the confounding effects of electric restructuring, the model is estimated with the full panel data set, and then again without the states that have restructured their electric markets. This estimation shows that electricity prices fall approximately 4.8 % in the first 2 years of an ISO’s operation and that this result is statistically significant. However, this result is dependent on the presence of states that restructured their electricity markets. When these restructured states are removed from the data set the price effects of RTOs become indistinguishable from zero. The paper concludes that rate agreements are the principal source of the observed decrease in prices and that RTOs have not had the desired effect on electricity prices.     

基于小波自适应支持向量机的短期电价预测

电价预测对于发电商、供电企业以及市场监管者都具有重要的意义。提出一种小波自适应支持向量机预测模型,先将电价时间序列作小波分解得到低频和高频分量,再采用自适应调整法,自动地为支持向量机选择较好的参数对电价小波分量逐一预测,最后通过小波重构得到电价最终预测结果。实例证明前述方法得到的预测精度高于BP、RBF、SVM等传统预测模型。     

Discriminatory Price Auctions in Electricity Markets: Low Volatility at the Expense of High Price Levels

A pay-as-offered or discriminatory price auction (DPA) has been proposed to solve the problem of inflated and volatile wholesale electricity prices. Using the experimental method we compare the DPA with a uniform price auction (UPA), strictly controlling for unilateral market power. We find that a DPA indeed substantially reduces price volatility. However, in a no market power design, prices in a DPA converge to the high prices of a uniform price auction with structural market power. That is, the DPA in a no market power environment is as anti-competitive as a UPA with structurally introduced market power.     

Dynamic Model for Market Competition and Price Rigidity

This article presents a price floor model in which durability, unit costs and production period are factors in explaining price rigidity. This article elaborates that cost structure plays an essential role in resolving the inconclusive relationship between market concentration and price rigidity. When the industry is characterized by decreasing returns of scale, the degree of price flexibility decreases as market competition intensifies. The reverse is true when the industry exhibits increasing returns of scale. The factors that cause price rigidity also foster price adjustment asymmetry and price adjustment lag. During times of recession, the model exhibits upward price flexibility as costs increase, but downward price rigidity as costs decrease. Even under forward-looking expectations, the way in which firms adjust prices could look as though they have adaptive expectations. If price stickiness is a characteristic of market competition, then public policies determined by price level could be too drastic for firms in competitive markets.     

An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.