Culture and the demand for non-life insurance: Empirical evidences from middle-income and high-income economies*

This paper investigates the impact of culture on non-life insurance expenditure using a panel dataset covering 27 middle-income countries and 40 high-income countries in the period 1980–2014. Based on the two-step system GMM estimator, it is found that several cultural dimensions such as masculinity, uncertainty avoidance and power distance significantly explain the spending on non-life insurance in middle-income countries, while masculinity is the only cultural factor that significantly explains spending on non-life insurance in high-income countries. Traditional drivers of the demand for non-life insurance, such as per capita income, economic freedom and urbanization, also behave differently comparing between the two income-based groups of countries. These findings provide useful recommendations for business firms and policymakers around the world, especially transitional economies, to promote and sustain the development of the non-life insurance sector, which is an important engine for growth and prosperity.     

Why aren't developed countries saving?

National saving rates differ enormously across developed countries. But these differences obscure a common trend, namely a dramatic decline over time. France and Italy, for example, saved over 23% and 19% of national income in 1970, but only 9% and 4% respectively in 2008. Japan saved almost 33% in 1970, but only 7% in 2008. And the U.S. saved around 11% in 1970, but only 1% in 2008. What explains these international and intertemporal differences? Is it demographics, government spending, productivity growth or preferences?For the U.S. and France, whose saving behavior we study, preferences appear to be an important factor. American and French societies are placing increasing weight on the welfare of those currently alive, particularly contemporaneous older generations. Government spending also appears to be one of the reasons why France is saving at much lower rates. These conclusions emerge from estimating two models in which society makes consumption and labor supply decisions in light of uncertainty over future government spending, productivity, and social preferences. The two models differ in terms of the nature of preference uncertainty and the extent to which current society can control future societies' spending and labor supply decisions.     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

WHO SUPPORTS REDISTRIBUTION?*

Using an original data set, we investigated the determinants of individual preferences over income redistribution in Japan. Although income level is negatively correlated with support for redistribution, it does not explain much; there are other important factors that relate to dynamics and uncertainty, such as income risk. Even after controlling for income, both risk‐averse individuals and those who expect to be unemployed in the future favour greater redistribution. Interaction of ageing and mobility prove important. The relatively poor elderly, who presumably have few prospects of upward mobility, strongly support greater redistribution, whereas younger people are less sympathetic to such a policy.     

Preferences for redistribution in the land of opportunities

This paper explores how individual preferences for redistribution depend on future income prospects. In addition to estimating the impact of individuals' socioeconomic background and of their subjective perceptions of future mobility, we employ panel data to construct ‘objective’ measures of expected gains and losses from redistribution for different categories of individuals. We find that such measures have considerable explanatory power and perform better than ‘general mobility’ indexes. We also find that preferences for redistribution respond to individual beliefs on what determines one's position in the social ladder. Ceteris paribus, people who believe that the American society offers 'equal opportunities are more averse to redistribution.     

Stochastically independent randomization and uncertainty aversion

Summary.   This paper proposes a preference-based condition for stochastic independence of a randomizing device in a product state space. This condition is applied to investigate some classes of preferences that allow for both independent randomization and uncertainty or ambiguity aversion (a la Ellsberg). For example, when imposed on Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) preferences in a Savage framework displaying uncertainty aversion in the spirit of Schmeidler [27], it results in a collapse to Expected Utility (EU). This shows that CEU preferences that are uncertainty averse in the sense of Schmeidler should not be used in settings where independent randomization is to be allowed. In contrast, Maxmin EU with multiple priors preferences continue to allow for a very wide variety of uncertainty averse preferences when stochastic independence is imposed. Additionally, these points are used to reexamine some recent arguments against preference for randomization with uncertainty averse preferences. In particular, these arguments are shown to rely on preferences that do not treat randomization as a stochastically independent event. Received: February 10, 2000; revised version: March 30, 2000     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Diaspora and government welfare spending: Do migrant remittances increase public social protection?

This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of migrant remittances on welfare spending. It empirically examines the influence that remittances have on public social protection (SP) expenditures using macrolevel panel data on a sample of 38 high‐ and middle‐income countries over the period 2005–2014. The paper finds that remittances have a negative influence on public SP expenditures, suggesting that they serve as a private substitute to public SP. The results highlight the importance of remittances to government welfare spending and sustainable development.     

Do China's people favour redistribution? Evidence from an incentivized experiment

From 1949, China's leaders brought their country through three decades of income and wealth compression, which was followed by more than three decades of sharply rising inequality. What preferences do China's people hold regarding what price (if any) is worth paying for greater equality? We conduct a laboratory decision‐making experiment mimicking aspects of a macro‐political–economic environment, using Chinese undergraduate student subjects. We find that our subjects have qualitatively similar tastes for equality as their counterparts in parallel US and European experiments; for example, most are willing to sacrifice some payment for more equality of earnings among other participants, and their willingness to do this is stronger when inequalities originate randomly versus based on performance. Considering the cases permitting direct comparison between Chinese and US subjects’ choices, redistributive choices tend to be a bit higher in China if the participant pays no direct cost and a bit lower if he or she pays such a cost, but the two distributions of decisions differ significantly in under 14% of conditions. Survey data too suggests preferences for a more equal income distribution in China than in other East Asian countries, suggesting a possible impact of the Chinese Communist Party dominance in education and media.     

The Impact of Power Equality,Income, and the Environment on Human Health: Some Inter‐Country Comparisons

Economic studies on environmental degradation generally have a narrow focus on per capita income as an explanatory variable, and often fail to distinguish among the various types of environmental quality or damage. This paper addresses both problems by examining the effect of relative equality in the distribution of power on environmental outcomes, and making a clear distinction between health‐related environmental outcomes and so‐called ‘environmental amenities,’ only the latter of which should correlate strongly with income. This paper introduces a national index of power equality that is derived from related socioeconomic variables, and studies its effects on individual country achievement in addressing environmental quality and population health. This model is applied to a data set of 180 countries, as well as to subgroups of the entire country set. Employing disability‐adjusted life expectancy and the population child mortality rate as two health proxies, this paper finds that power equality in most cases positively influences population health, and that power equality is in every case no worse and in some cases better than per capita income at explaining population health.     

Optimal welfare and in-work benefits with search unemployment and observable abilities

This paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system and social assistance in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation. The relationship between welfare benefits and the optimal level of in-work benefits is U-shaped. This explains why in-work benefits are called for both in countries that grant low welfare benefits and countries that provide high welfare benefits. An earned-income tax credit optimally induces all agents to look for work if job search is cheap and effective, agents are not very risk averse, and the least-skilled agents are relatively productive.     

An experimental study on individual choice, social welfare, and social preferences

We experimentally study subjects’ compliance with dominance relationships of income distributions in a ranking task. The experiment consisted of four different treatments: Lottery, individual choice, social preferences, and social planner. Our results suggest that people's risk attitudes do not adequately reflect their inequality attitudes. Uninvolved social planners exhibit randomization preferences, while self-interested social planners are generally more inequality averse and try to avoid extreme outcomes.     

Culture,financial crisis and the demand for property,accident and health insurance in the OECD countries

Culture has been known to play an important role in explaining differences in consumption behaviour across countries. Yet, we know very little how it affects spending on non-life insurance products. This paper attempts to shed some light on how cultural characteristics impact the demand for property, accident and health insurance, focusing on the OECD countries in the period 2000–2017. We find, via the system generalized method of moment estimations, that cultural characteristics such as individualism, long-term orientation, masculinity and uncertainty avoidance were the drivers of the expenditure on property insurance, whereas long-term orientation, uncertainty avoidance and hypometropia explained accident and health insurance spending across the OECD countries. In the presence of the global financial crisis, cultural effects on property insurance spending turned out to be relatively minor, with the exception of individualism. These findings provide valuable information for non-life insurance companies, consumers and policy makers in the OECD countries.     

Status quo bias,multiple priors and uncertainty aversion

Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full-dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors. We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.     

Can social spending cushion the inequality effect of globalization?

This paper examines whether social spending cushions the effect of globalization on within‐country inequality. Using information on disposable and market income inequality and data on overall social spending, and health and education spending from the ILO and the World Bank/WHO, we analyze whether social spending moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality. The results confirm that economic globalization—especially economic flows—associates with higher income inequality, an effect driven by non‐OECD countries. Health spending is strongly associated with lower inequality, but we find no robust evidence that any kind of social spending negatively moderates the association between economic globalization and inequality.     

损失规避与经济波动的福利成本研究

目前经济波动的福利成本研究均建立在基于消费的效用函数基础上，而引入收入波动后我们发现：收入波动导致的福利成本才是更为重要的因素。本文定义的偏好具有损失规避的特点，在比较温和的参数设定下，考虑了收入波动后得到的福利成本指标A在1．4％--13．4％之间，比此前各种技术方法得到的A值提高了1—2个数量级。采用中国转型期以来的统计数据，消除短期波动的福利效果等同于将消费的长期增长率再提高约0．25个百分点，这表明如能进一步稳定经济的运行，仍会带来可观的福利提升。     

Inequality and income: The mediating effects of social spending and risk

This paper estimates models of social spending, income risk, and per capita income levels using data from a post-war panel of OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. The objective is to test two theories about the pathway from inequality to per capita income. According to one theory, inequality reduces incomes because it induces social spending, which acts as a drag on the economy. The results here suggest, however, that inequality does not seem to induce social spending, and social spending does not seem to lower per capita incomes. According to a second theory, inequality causes upheaval which adds to the volatility of per capita income, which may reduce the level of per capita income. The results suggest, however, that volatility, measured here as the standard deviation of per capita income, has little measurable impact on either per capita income or social spending. The mainsprings of per capita income are more likely to be the traditional factors: the work force, human capital, and physical capital.
JEL classification: E6.     

The high road and the low road to international competitiveness: Extending the neo‐Schumpeterian trade model beyond technology

Extending the neo‐Schumpeterian trade model, we estimate a ‘social‐gap’ model for a group of 17 OECD countries over the period 1975–1995. We find that government spending on social protection, employment protection regulations, union density, strike activity, and income security in the labor market (all measured in ‘gap’ form) are statistically significantly related to changes in international competitiveness. Specifically, we find some support for a Calmfors–Driffil, nonlinear, relation between cooperative labor relations and social spending patterns on the one hand, and international trade (and inward foreign investment) competitiveness on the other, implying that countries with relatively stronger institutional arrangements have better international economic performance than countries in the middle of the scale of conflict and cooperation. Our results indicate that models focusing solely on innovative effort are misspecified, and may suffer from an omitted variable bias caused by the absence of consideration of other institutional factors influencing international trade and investment.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND SUBJECTIVE WELL‐BEING: DOES THE HEALTH OF OTHERS MATTER?

The importance of social comparison in shaping individual utility has been widely documented by subjective well‐being literature. So far, income and unemployment have been the main dimensions considered in social comparison. This paper aims to investigate whether subjective well‐being is influenced by inter‐personal comparison with respect to health. Thus, we study the effects of the health of others and relative health hypotheses on two measures of subjective well‐being: happiness and subjective health. Using data from the Italian Health Conditions survey, we show that a high incidence of chronic conditions and disability among reference groups negatively affects both happiness and subjective health. Such effects are stronger among people in the same condition. These results, robust to different econometric specifications and estimation techniques, suggest the presence of some sympathy in individual preferences with respect to health and reveal that other people's health status serves as a benchmark to assess one's own health condition.     

Heterogeneity in preferences for redistribution and public spending: A cross-country analysis

Political coordination and policy outcomes may be the result not only of the position of the ‘median voter’ in a political scale but also of the heterogeneity of preferences around the median. Depending on the level of government and the type of policy, such heterogeneity may lead to lower public spending and redistribution. We assess this issue empirically by analyzing the relationship between the distribution of preferences for redistribution and the amount of public expenditure at different levels of government and for several types of spending in 23 European countries. Our results suggest a negative and significant correlation between heterogeneity of preferences for redistribution and public spending that is stronger at the local level and for redistributive functions, independent of the median individual's preferences.