论开展电力排污权交易的几个关键问题及挑战

排污权交易强调用市场配置环境资源,改变了政府配置环境资源的管理传统,这将引起环境管理体制和运行机制的全面调整。文章从创造政策环境、建立和电力市场相适应的排污权交易市场、制订中长期总量目标等制度层面分析了我国开展电力排污权交易需要具备的5个前提条件,并针对当前环境管理面临的挑战进行了探讨。     

将环境负荷应用于排污权交易政策研究

排污权交易在承认环境容量资源有限的前提下,允许各排污单位对环境资源的使用权进行交易,它能够很好地协调经济发展和环境保护的关系,是一项成本效益比高的环境保护经济手段。以二氧化硫的排放控制为例,分析探讨如何在排污权交易中应用环境负荷控制方程确定交易的总量目标。     

排污权交易:渐呈蓬勃之势

正排污权交易是近年来广受关注的一项环境经济政策,旨在通过市场手段解决资源环境优化配置问题。我国对排污权交易的探索始于20世纪80年代,试点工作真正开始于上世纪90年代,但是进展缓慢。"十一五"以来,排污权交易试点探索加快,原国家环保总局(现环保部)联合财政部"自上而下"推进排污权交易国家试点与地方"自下而上"自发开展排污权交易试点探索交互进行,渐呈蓬勃之势,积累了较为丰富的试点实践经验,同时,排污权交易     

排污权交易：渐呈蓬勃之势

排污权交易是近年来广受关注的一项环境经济政策,旨在通过市场手段解决资源环境优化配置问题。我国对排污权交易的探索始于20世纪80年代,试点工作真正开始于上世纪90年代,但是进展缓慢。“十一五”以来,排污权交易试点探索加快,原国家环保总局（现环保部）联合财政部“自上而下”推进排污权交易国家试点与地方“自下而上”自发开展排污权交易试点探索交互进行,渐呈蓬勃之势,积累了较为丰富的试点实践经验,同时,排污权交易试点探索也逐步进入“深水区”。     

鄱阳湖流域内企业排污权的市场交易模式研究

排污权交易作为一种现代市场化治污防控重要手段,在污染物总量和种类得到控制的前提下,可以通过市场机制促进排污权交易双方效益最大化,实现社会环境资源的优化配置和经济增长方式的转变。以行政区域为界实施的排污权交易制度和污染物随自然区域扩散的特点对排污权交易的实施带来了一定困难,文章认为以流域管理为基础,按自然地理区域经济发展水平不同,讨论了不同地区同类污染物排放的成本差异,在考虑了排污权交易市场的公平与效率的基础上,分析了鄱阳湖流域内排污权交易市场的供求状况,建立了该流域排污权交易平台的交易模式和交易流程,并对合理完善排污权交易给出了如下政策建议:完善机构设置,发挥综合决策功能;完善排污权交易的分配制度;构建现代化排污权电子交易平台;完善企业排污主体的责任制度体系。     

妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈分析

结合污染物的总量控制和排污许可证制度,我国已经进行了十多年的各类排污权交易试点工作。但是,排污权交易却至今未能形成一个全国统一的环境政策。本文利用制度分析框架从制度结构与不完全合约的角度对此进行分析,并认为妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈主要是排污权交易制度结构的缺陷。     

妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈分析

结合污染物的总量控制和排污许可证制度.我国已经进行了十多年的各类排污权交易试点工作.但是,排污权交易却至今未能形成一个全国统一的环境政策.本文利用制度分析框架从制度结构与不完全合约的角度对此进行分析,并认为妨碍我国排污权交易政策实施的制度瓶颈主要是排污权交易制度结构的缺陷.     

排污权交易市场因何步履蹒跚?

排污权有偿使用和交易的推进对未来产业结构调整、环境管理转型、环境资源市场配置、总量减排精细化管理等都具有显著的促进作用。截至2021年底,全国大部分省份已经开展了排污权交易工作,但整体进展缓慢。覆盖的污染物类型和企业主体较为有限,并且仍以一级市场政府发放排污权为主,二级市场企业之间的排污权交易尚不活跃。     

排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的传导机制研究

从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现：排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。     

湖北省开展二氧化硫排污权交易的设想

本文分析了湖北省二氧化硫排放现状;并运用经济学有关基本原理,介绍了排污权交易的基本程序和做法;最后,以湖北省自身的环境与资源状况为切入点,从总量控制、实施基础、开展领域和保障措施等方面,提出了湖北省开展二氧化硫排污权交易的基本思路.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

国际海运碳交易机制下减排产品供给企业竞争策略——基于船东减排产品类型偏好

以国际海运碳交易机制的实施为背景,在考虑船东对减排产品类型偏好具有差异的情况下,基于Hotelling模型,研究提供不同类型减排产品企业之间的竞争策略。通过分析Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈的均衡结果,得到船东对某类减排产品偏好的增加,会促进该类减排产品的价格上涨,市场份额扩大和收益增加。并且,在Stackelberg博弈中,主导企业获得较Nash博弈下更大的收益,而跟随企业的收益变化取决于船东减排偏好与减排产品成本之间的关系。     

自愿减排对构建国内碳排放交易市场的作用和对策

自愿减排指自愿碳减排市场中,个人、企业、政府为了对自己排放的温室气体作出抵偿,力图实现"碳中和",而购买碳信用额的一种交易模式。目前,我国尚未形成真正意义上的碳排放交易市场,自愿减排是建立碳排放交易市场前的有力尝试,具有重要意义。从自愿碳减排的角度,分析了自愿碳减排在建立国内碳排放交易市场中的重要作用,结合自愿碳减排现状,分析其不足之处并提出了相应的对策。     

Agreeing on Efficient Emissions Reduction

We propose a simple contest‐based mechanism providing incentives to reduce harmful emissions to their efficient level without infringing upon productive efficiency. Participation in the most stylized form of the scheme is voluntary and individually rational; all rules are mutually agreeable and are unanimously adopted if proposed. The scheme balances its budget and requires no principal. In a perhaps more realistic stochastic output version, which could potentially inform policy decisions, we show that the transfers required by the efficient mechanism create a mutual insurance motive that can serve as an effective rationale for the (gradual) formation of international environmental agreements.     

Voluntary Agreements and Non-Verifiable Emissions

If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court,voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry may bewelfare-improving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreementsdiffer from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimummay be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is notattainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, beassociated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base.     

The Ethics of Emissions Trading

This article defends three ethical arguments against emissions trading. The first argument alleges that emissions trading is morally objectionable, because it ‘commodifies’ the atmosphere. The second argument involves various objections to attaching prices to units of emissions – loosely speaking, the objection is to pricing that which is priceless or should not be priced. The third argument turns on the idea that if a large cut in emissions is to be made by society overall, everyone should ‘do their bit’ by making a particular kind of sacrifice rather than paying others to do it instead. Some general conclusions concern the limitations of confining the analysis to idealised emissions trading, the difficulty in separating ‘economistic’ thinking about policy delivery from policy choice and the need to focus questions of justice on consumers rather than on producers.     

Club Convergence in Carbon Dioxide Emissions

We examine convergence in carbon dioxide emissions among 128 countries for the period 1960–2003 by means of a new methodology introduced by Phillips and Sul (Econometrica 75(6):1771–1855, 2007a). Contrary to previous studies, our approach allows us to examine for evidence of club convergence, i.e. identify groups of countries that converge to different equilibria. Our results suggest convergence in per capita CO₂ emissions among all the countries under scrutiny in the early years of our sample. However, there seem to be two separate convergence clubs in the recent era that converge to different steady states. Interestingly, we also find evidence of transitioning between the two convergence clubs suggesting either a slow convergence between the two clubs or a tendency for some countries to move from one convergence club to the other.     

Green Technology and Optimal Emissions Taxation

Unless an active environmental policy exists, firms have no incentive to engage in abatement or environmental R&D so policy design is of paramount importance. This design heavily depends on the way R&D spillovers operate. There are two distinct types of R&D spillover: output spillover and input spillover. An input spillover operates on the expenditure toward pollution reduction, whereas an output spillover manifests as the achieved abatement. Under optimal emissions taxation, significant differences arise due to this distinction, in particular, when the spillover operates on R&D inputs. In an oligopolistic setting, the result is higher R&D expenditure, but also higher aggregate emissions and, consequently, higher emissions taxes. By contrast, when spillovers occur in R&D output, there is a U‐shaped relationship between the optimal tax and the spillover, showing a trade‐off between the optimal tax rate and spillovers when these are low. In terms of the relative effectiveness of different R&D organization setups, combining emissions taxes with R&D cooperation, this paper shows that under low levels of R&D spillover R&D cooperation gives higher emissions reductions, whereas when spillovers are high this is not the case.     

Carbon Trading with Imperfectly Observable Emissions

The Kyoto Protocol foresees emission trading but does not yet specify verification of (uncertain) emissions. This paper analyses a setting in which parties can meet their emission targets by reducing emissions, by investing in monitoring (reducing uncertainty of emissions) or by (bilaterally) trading permits. We derive the optimality conditions and carry out various numerical simulations. Our applications suggest that including uncertainty could increase compliance costs for the USA, Japan and the European Union. Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union might be able to gain from trading due to higher permit prices. Emissions trading could also lower aggregate uncertainty on emissions.     

Accounting for Australian Carbon Dioxide Emissions*

This paper provides an accounting for carbon dioxide emissions arising in Australia by final demand deliveries responsible, using input-output andprimary energy input data for 1982-83. Commodities are ranked by emissons per unit and total emissions. It is shown how the methodology employed usefully structures analysis of emissions reductions options, and can compute the system wide implications of specific measures in terms of total emissions. It is established that emissions arising in producing for export are approximately the same as emissions attributable to imports.