The effects of wind generation capacity on electricity prices and generation costs: a Monte Carlo analysis

We use Monte Carlo analysis to examine the potential of increased renewable generation to provide a hedge against variability in energy prices and costs. Fuel costs, electricity demand and wind generation are allowed to vary and a unit commitment and economic dispatch algorithm is employed to produce cost-minimizing generation schedules under different levels of installed wind capacity. Increased wind capacity reduces the mean and the variance of production costs but only the variance of electricity prices. Wind generators see their market revenues increase while consumer payments and fossil generator profits do not considerably vary as wind capacity increases. Risk aversion is captured by considering the conditional value-at-risk for both consumers and producers. The optimal level of wind generation increases as risk aversion increases due to the potential of wind to act as a hedge against very high electricity prices in high fuel price scenarios.     

Do Incentive Rates Provide Consumer Value? An Empirical Assessment from Ontario’s Electricity Distribution Sector

Abstract:

This article discusses empirical evidence regarding the theoretical claims that Incentive Rate regulation for electricity distribution creates greater consumer value than Cost of Service in terms of consumer rates. Institutional economists have identified a problem with IR in that it gives an incentive not to reduce consumer costs but to reduce adequate spending on asset maintenance. The Ontario electricity distribution sector combines both forms of regulation which creates an unusual opportunity to test the claims of increased consumer value by comparing the unit average revenues in years in which rates were set by CoS with those in which they were set by IR. The application of a t-test to data from 2011 to 2015 results in the acceptance of the null hypothesis at a 95% confidence level. The analysis concludes that there is no support for the claim that IR results in lower revenues collected from consumers.     

SAVING ENERGY THROUGH BETTER INFORMATION: A NEW ENERGY PARADIGM?

For the past 40 years, governments, utilities, and private companies have developed increasingly efficient appliances for household use and governments have initiated policies to encourage the deployment of these technologies. To the credit of these activities, we have improved the efficiency of electricity use in the United States, but it has not been enough to overcome the increasing demand from proliferation of electricity‐using devices. In addition, penetration rates for some types of efficient equipment have remained relatively low in certain regions. U.S. electricity demand thus continues to grow. In this paper, we argue that to achieve significantly greater efficiency improvements needed to meet future demand for energy services, we should provide more information to consumers about their energy use and give them more control over this use. While more studies are needed to assess just how far these types of measures can take us, there is enough evidence to show that with better information, consumers often make choices that reduce energy use.     

Evaluating wind-following and ecosystem services for hydroelectric dams in PJM

Hydropower can provide inexpensive, flexible fill-in power to compensate for intermittent renewable generation. Policies for hydropower dams maintain multiple services beyond electric generation, including environmental protection, flood control and recreation. We model the decision of a hydroelectric generator to shift some of its power production capacity away from the day-ahead energy market into a “wind-following” service to smooth the intermittent production of wind turbines. Offering such a service imposes both private and social opportunity costs. Since fluctuations in wind energy output are not perfectly correlated with day-ahead energy prices, a wind-following service will necessarily affect generator revenues. Seasonal wind patterns produce conflicts with the goal of managing rivers for “ecosystem services”—the maintenance or enhancement of downstream ecosystems. We illustrate our decision model using the Kerr Dam in PJM’s territory in North Carolina. We simulate the operation of Kerr Dam over a three-year period that features hydrologic variability from normal water years to extreme drought conditions. We use an optimization framework to estimate reservation prices for Kerr Dam offering wind-following services in the PJM market. Wind-following may be profitable for Kerr Dam at low capacity levels during some time periods if ecosystems services are neglected and if side payments, or reserves-type payments, are provided. Wind-following with ecosystem services yields revenue losses that typically cannot be recovered with reserves market payments. Water release patterns are inconsistent with ecosystem-services goals when Kerr Dam dedicates significant capacity to wind-following, particularly in drought years.     

Life insurer efficiency and state regulation: evidence of optimal firm behavior

Proponents of an optional federal charter for life insurers argue that the current state-based system of insurer regulation increases insurer costs and reduces their revenues and profits. This study examines the impact of multi-state regulation on life insurer cost, revenue and profit efficiency. The main findings suggest that insurer cost efficiency is inversely related to the number of states licensed and directly related to total assets, after controlling for geographic concentration, insolvency risk and other firm-specific characteristics. Further, the results support the expectation that insurer expansion into additional states is optimal in that the additional regulatory and other costs associated with operating in more states are offset by higher revenues to the extent that insurer profit efficiency is not affected. A robustness test is conducted using an indicator variable for New York licensed insurers to examine the relation between regulatory stringency and insurer efficiency. This test confirms the results, even in the presence of the more stringent regulation of New York. These findings are consistent with the expectation that any regulatory cost savings that result from an optional federal charter, or single regulator, will be passed along to insurance consumers in a competitive insurance market.     

Benchmarking and firm heterogeneity: a latent class analysis for German electricity distribution companies

In January 2009, the German Federal Network Agency introduced incentive regulation for the electricity distribution sector based on results obtained from econometric and nonparametric benchmarking analysis. One main problem for the regulator in assigning the relative efficiency scores is unobserved firm-specific factors such as network and technological differences. Comparing the efficiency of different firms usually assumes that they operate under the same production technology, thus unobserved factors might be inappropriately understood as inefficiency. To avoid this type of misspecification in regulatory practice, estimation is carried out in two stages: in the first stage observations are classified into two categories according to the size of the network operators. Then separate analyses are conducted for each subgroup. This article shows how to disentangle the heterogeneity from inefficiency in one step, using a latent class model for stochastic frontiers. As the classification is not based on a priori sample separation criteria it delivers more robust, statistically significant, and testable results. Against this background, we analyze the level of technical efficiency of different subgroups from a sample of 200 regional and local German electricity distribution companies for a balanced panel data set (2001–2005). Testing the hypothesis if larger distributors operate under a different technology than smaller ones, we assess if a single step latent class model provides new insights to the use of benchmarking approaches within the incentive regulation schemes.     

Index to Volume 52, 2000

In an efficiency wage economy with variable profits, a shift from payroll to employment taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant at the initial wage. However, unemployment will rise if firms are constrained to zero profits in the long run and if tax revenues are constant. This reversal of employment effects occurs because the shift in taxes reduces wages. This implies a budget deficit. Hence, taxes will have to be raised if revenues are held constant. If the firm's profits cannot change, the tax increase will cause some firms to close down and unemployment will rise. Thus, the predicted employment consequences of changes in the tax structure depend on assumptions about the time horizon and budget constraint.     

The 2001-3 electricity distribution price control review in the Netherlands: regulatory process and consumer welfare

The outcome of the first electricity distribution price control review in The Netherlands did not deliver the savings initially suggested by the regulator (DTe). During the course of the first 3-year regulatory period, DTe revised the X-Factors four times. The impact on tariffs has been substantial. DTe initially announced in 2000 that savings would be equivalent to 25% of electric distribution revenues ( 2bn). However, final X-Factors in May 2003 resulted in savings of 10% of revenues. The total cost to consumers—when compared to the most probable outcome—has been 140 mln (7% of total revenues).      

AGENCY COSTS OF THIRD-PARTY FINANCING AND THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CHANGE ON UTILITY COSTS AND FACTOR CHOICES

ABSTRACT ** :  Beginning in 1999, the Canadian Province of Ontario undertook restructuring and tried to implement performance based regulation for local electricity distribution utilities. Regulatory parameters were based on productivity research covering 1988–1997 that found little productivity difference by size, but wide variations in costs, factor mix, financing, and returns to capital among utilities. While some utilities questioned their ability to improve efficiency, other observers maintained many utilities were over-capitalized, especially from third-party financing paid by customers for connection/development charges; these observers noted that rates, profits, and valuations would be inflated. Despite its pervasive use, we can find no literature dealing with the implications of third-party funding. We assess the effects and adjustment dynamics of regulatory and financing changes on costs, factor mix, and performance.     

Helping "light green" consumers walk the talk: Results of a behavioural intervention survey in the Swiss electricity market

While many consumer surveys show very positive attitudes towards renewable energy, the share of consumers actually purchasing green electricity is still in the single-digit percent range in most countries. What can be done to help consumers with positive attitudes towards green electricity to “walk the talk”, i.e. to behave consistently with their preferences? We developed a psychological model based on the theory of planned behaviour (TPB) to design a large-scale behavioural intervention survey with 1163 Swiss electricity consumers. Our results show that by providing information targeted at the key factors influencing the intention to purchase green electricity, namely attitudes towards purchase, social norms and perceived behavioural control, a significant increase in green electricity market share can be achieved. Our results show that price is not the only barrier to purchasing green electricity, and that information to increase the perceived benefit of buying green electricity as well as targeted communication to overcome inertia among retail electricity consumers are equally important factors.     

The Impact of the EU ETS on Prices,Profits and Emissions in the Power Sector: Simulation Results with the COMPETES EU20 Model

This paper analyses the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) on electricity prices, in particular on wholesale power markets across the EU. To study this impact, this paper discusses the major results of a bottom-up modelling analysis of the implications of emissions trading for the performance of the wholesale power market in 20 European countries. The analyses show that a significant part of the costs of (freely allocated) CO₂ emission allowances is passed through to power prices, resulting in higher electricity prices for consumers and additional (‘windfall’) profits for power producers, even in cases of full auctioning. In addition, they show that the ETS-induced increases in power prices depend not only on the level of CO₂ prices but also on the structure of the power market, i.e., the incidence of market power, and the price responsiveness of power demand. Finally, the analyses show that the internalization and pass-through of carbon costs are crucial elements in a policy regime to reduce CO₂ emissions by both changing the mix of power generation technologies and lowering total electricity demand.     

Environmental Tax Reform and Growth: Income Tax Cuts or Profits Tax Reduction

This study investigates how recycling revenues, which are generated by environmental taxes, affect growth through different types of tax cuts. A growth model with creative destruction (Aghion and Howitt Econometrica 60(2):323–351,1992, Aghion and Howitt The economics of growth, 2009) is modified to include the production of final output as a source of pollution. This paper demonstrates that introducing an environmental tax, accompanied by either an income tax cut or a profits tax reduction, increases the output growth rate. The analysis also shows that, if technological change is resulted from deliberate activities of economic agents, the reduction of the profits tax rate for an intermediate monopolist is more growth-enhancing than an income tax cut since a profits tax reduction directly promotes R&D activities.     

Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks

We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it is biased and to some extent accounts also for the incumbent’s downstream profits. We show that increasing the incumbent’s ownership share increases total output if the upstream firm’s bias is sufficiently small, while otherwise effects are ambiguous. Stronger regulation that reduces the bias without changing ownership shares generally increases total output. We also endogenize the bias and show that it can depend non-monotonically on the ownership share.     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

Risky procurement with an insider bidder

Procurement auctions carry substantial risk when the value of the project is highly uncertain and known only to insiders. This paper reports the results from a series of experiments comparing the performance of three auction formats in such complex and risky settings. In the experiment, every bidder knows the private value for the project but only a single insider bidder knows the common-value part. In addition to the standard second-price and English auctions we test the “qualifying auction,” a two-stage format commonly used in the sale of complex and risky assets. The qualifying auction has a fully “revealing” equilibrium that implements the revenue-maximizing outcome but it also has an uninformative “babbling” equilibrium in which bidders place arbitrarily high bids in the first stage. In the experiments, the latter equilibrium has more drawing power, which causes the qualifying auction to perform worse than the English auction and only slightly better than a sealed-bid second-price auction. Compared to the two other formats, the English auction is roughly 40% more efficient, yields 50% more revenues, avoids windfall profits for the insider, while protecting uninformed bidders from losses.     

Can green consumerism replace environmental regulation?—a differentiated-products example

This paper assumes that consumers are willing to pay an extra premium for a good if it has a low impact on the environment. We examine if a little dose of such idealistic behavior has a large impact on the market equilibrium, and to what extent it can replace the environmental regulation. The analysis is carried out in a model with product differentiation, where consumers differ in their preferences for product quality. Consumers’ willingness to pay the environmental premium may be uniformly or non-uniformly distributed. Green consumerism will only be modestly influential in both cases, despite the fact that product differentiation leads to relaxed competition and increased profits, and thereby creates leverage.     

Measuring microenterprise profits: Must we ask how the sausage is made?

A large share of the World's poor is self-employed. Accurate measurement of profits from microenterprises is therefore critical for studying poverty and inequality, measuring the returns to education, and evaluating the success of microfinance programs. However, a myriad of problems plague the measurement of profits. This paper reports on a variety of different experiments conducted to better understand the importance of some of these problems, and to draw recommendations for collecting profit data. In particular, we (i) examine how far we can reconcile self-reported profits and reports of revenue minus expenses through more detailed questions; (ii) examine recall errors in sales, and report on the results of experiments which randomly allocated account books to firms; and (iii) asked firms how much firms like theirs underreport sales in surveys like ours, and had research assistants observe the firms at random times 15–16 times during a month to provide measures for comparison. We conclude that firms underreport revenues by about 30%, that account diaries have significant impacts on both revenues and expenses, but not on profits, and that simply asking profits provides a more accurate measure of firm profits than detailed questions on revenues and expenses.     

On the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.     

Spatial Competition with an Outside Good and Distributed Reservation Prices

In this paper, we analyze spatial competition within the framework of a Hotelling model with quadratic transportation costs and an outside option. The new feature of our approach is that consumers are uniformly distributed not only along the Hotelling line but also with regard to reservation prices. It turns out that in this particular model, duopolists always locate their shops exactly at the first and third quartile of the consumer distribution – i.e., at the socially optimal locations. Moreover, with uniformly distributed reservation prices, less than seventy percent of the consumers buy the good, and profits are less than fifteen percent of those in the standard model without an outside option. Received February 7, 2001; revised version received March 27, 2002 Published online: November 11, 2002