A contribution to the empirics of press freedom and corruption

We test the relationship between aggregate press freedom and corruption performing a modified extreme bounds analysis. We also test the relation among different forms of restrictions to press freedom using previously unexplored disaggregated data. Our results support the theoretical view that restrictions to press freedom leads to higher corruption. Furthermore, we obtain that both political and economic influences on the media are strongly and robustly related to corruption, while detrimental laws and regulations influencing the media are not. In all cases the evidence indicates, although not conclusively, that the direction of causation runs from a freer press to lower corruption.     

Corruption in America

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions.     

Is corruption grease,grit or a gamble? Corruption increases variance of productivity across countries

The effect of corruption on economic growth has attracted interest in empirical development economics. The conventional view of corruption as impediment for growth has been challenged by the ‘grease-on-the-wheels’ hypothesis. We take a new perspective on the issue and suggest corruption as macro risk, referred to as a ‘gamble’ hypothesis. Using cross-country data and two alternative indicators of corruption, we find corruption to be a significant driver of heteroscedasticity in total productivity. This supports the new gamble hypothesis. We also note some misleading interpretations in the previously published frontier applications. To avoid these shortcomings, we apply a flexible semi-nonparametric estimator.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM VERSUS POLITICAL FREEDOM: CROSS‐COUNTRY INFLUENCES ON CORRUPTION*

Using a well‐known index of corruption, this paper examines the determinants of corruption for a large sample of countries. Specifically, the present study brings empirical evidence to bear on the question of whether economic freedom or political freedom serves as a deterrent to corrupt activity. In particular, does greater economic freedom or greater political freedom yield a more ‘clean’ society? Our results show that greater economic freedom seems to matter more in this regard. Examining different components of economic freedom, we find that not all these components are equally effective in reducing corruption. For instance, monetary policy seems to have a stronger influence on the level of corrupt activity in a country than fiscal policy. Robustness of these findings is checked and policy implications are discussed.     

Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption?: Cross-country quantile regression estimates

We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.     

Do existing corruption levels matter in controlling corruption? : Cross-country quantile regression estimates

We examine the determinants of corruption using recent cross-sectional data for nearly one hundred countries. While the causes of corruption have drawn economists' interest in recent years, our main contribution is to examine the corruption determinants throughout the conditional distribution of corruption across nations. Are there different causes of corruption in highly corrupt nations compared to the least corrupt countries? For instance, we examine whether greater democracy and more economic freedom consistently reduce corruption among the most and the least corrupt. Our results for the significant determinants support some findings in the literature, but also provide new conclusions. In many cases, quantile regression estimates are quite different from those from OLS regressions. Among the most corrupt nations, larger governments and greater economic freedom do not appear to reduce corruption, but greater democracy seems to alleviate it. Our results suggest that some current corruption control policies may be reconsidered, especially among the most corrupt and least corrupt nations.     

ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER

This study uses a cross-country panel to examine the determinants of corruption, paying particular attention to political institutions that increase accountability. Even though the theoretical literature has stressed the importance of political institutions in determining corruption, the empirical literature is relatively scarce. Our results confirm the role of political institutions in determining the prevalence of corruption. Democracies, parliamentary systems, political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower corruption. Additionally, common results of the previous empirical literature, related to openness and legal tradition, do not hold once political variables are taken into account.     

Climate,diseases, and the origins of corruption

It has been commonly observed that tropical countries tend to suffer from intense corruption and underdevelopment. This study provides an explanation for this long-standing disparity across the world based on variation in the intensity of ultraviolet radiation (UV-R). The central hypothesis is that UV-R is positively associated with the (historical) prevalence of eye diseases, which significantly shortens work-life expectancy as a skilled worker. This helps shape the worldwide distribution of corruption by affecting the incumbents' window of opportunity. Using data for up to 139 countries, I consistently find empirical support for the positive relationship between UV-R and corruption. The main findings withstand accounting for numerous alternative explanations for international differences in corruption levels. Employing individual-level data from the World Values Survey, I document suggestive evidence that exposure to UV-R is linked to surveyed respondents' tolerance towards corrupt activities. Furthermore, a subnational analysis for China lends credence to the cross-country evidence.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Economic uncertainty and corruption: evidence from a large cross-country data set

A vast amount of research has considered numerous causes and correlates of corruption. Also, there have been many studies of the consequences of various forms of uncertainty. However, exploration of the nexus between economic uncertainty and corruption appears scarce. After providing an intuitive and heuristic linkage between general economic uncertainty and corruption, this article uses a large cross-country data set to augment a fairly standard model with simple proxies for uncertainty and to investigate how economic uncertainty might affect the prevalence of corruption. In addition, a quantile-regression framework is used to judge how the strength of various covariates may differ with the level of corruption. Seven main points emerge from the estimates. First, economic uncertainty is associated positively with corruption, and the relation seems to be robust across measures of uncertainty and corruption. Second, quantile-regression estimates indicate considerable parametric heterogeneity across the distribution of corruption. Third, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita has the expected corruption-mitigating role. Fourth, increased political rights and civil liberties also appear to lower corruption. Fifth, greater government consumption is associated with lower corruption. Sixth, while the hyperinflation dummy lacks significance in most OLS regressions, its significance varies across the distribution of corruption. Seventh, neither police force nor government subsidies shows significance, but transition economies have more corruption.     

Corruption clubs: empirical evidence from kernel density estimates

A common finding of many analytical models is the existence of multiple equilibria of corruption. Countries characterized by the same economic, social and cultural background do not necessarily experience the same levels of corruption. In this article, we use Kernel Density Estimation techniques to analyse the cross-country distribution of corruption. Particular emphasis will be given to the question whether the distribution of corruption shows more than one peak. We find that most of the estimated densities exhibit twin peaks. We also provide some evidence on the intra-distribution dynamics and the persistence of corruption. We find the group of countries classified within the two ‘clubs’ to be very stable. Corruption is a highly persistent phenomenon. Substantial changes in the economic, political and cultural environment of countries within the ‘corruption club’ are required before a significant decline of corruption is to be expected.     

The nexus between corruption and academic freedom: An international investigation of the underlying linkages

Studying a relatively under-researched aspect in economics, this paper examines the nexus between corruption and academic freedom. Our main hypothesis is that greater corruption undermines academic freedom and we test this hypothesis using data for 104 nations from 2012 to 2018. Our results support the main hypothesis, and this finding also generally holds across alternative aspects of academic freedom. Another contribution of this work lies in dissecting the direct and indirect (through corruption) effects of various drivers of academic freedom. Finally, additional insights are gained by considering different dimensions of academic freedom and how they are impacted by corruption.     

Corruption and corporate leverage in an emerging economy: The role of economic freedom

This study investigated the effects of corruption and economic freedom on corporate leverage. We also evaluated how economic freedom shapes the effect of corruption on corporate leverage. Using a sample of Vietnamese firms covering a nine-year period from 2010 to 2018, we find evidence that increased control of corruption has a significant positive impact on firm leverage, whereas the opposite is true for economic freedom. This effect is robust to alternative measures of control of corruption as well as advanced estimation methods, such as firm-fixed effects and quantile regressions. Our results also reveal that the positive impact of corruption controls on corporate leverage is more pronounced for firms with high economic freedom. Econometrically, our findings indicate that firms with better control over corruption prefer debt financing, as demonstrated by their higher leverage ratio.     

腐败、经济增长与环境污染的 库兹涅茨效应:以二氧化硫排放数据为例

目前，国内文献关于腐败、经济增长与环境污染相互关系的研究还不充分，将三者置于同一整体框架下的研究能为理解和验证腐败与环境之间的关系提供直接的证据。本文在传统的EKC模型中考虑腐败因素，利用1995-2011年的中国省级面板数据研究腐败、经济增长与环境污染三者之间的关系，验证了腐败对经济增长以及腐败和经济增长对环境的影响。结果表明：(1)腐败阻碍了经济增长；(2)经济增长与环境污染之间呈倒“U”型关系，我国仍处于经济增长越快，环境污染越严重阶段；(3) 腐败能够在一定程度上通过弱化经济增长从而对环境污染有负向作用，但这并不意味着腐败是解决环境污染的手段，政府不能通过阻碍经济增长来解决环境污染问题。     

Cultural Dimension of Corruption: A Cross-Country Survey

This study investigates whether culture plays a major role in determining the corruption levels of countries. The cultural dimensions of Hofstede’s model and the worldwide level of corruption provided by the Corruption Perceptions Index were used. A cross-country survey of 98 countries was conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Three of the six main components of Hofstede’s model were found to have a significant influence on corruption, namely power distance, individualism-collectivism, and long- versus short-term orientation. National culture may explain the level of corruption in each of the countries. About half of the level of corruption in countries is explained by the national culture. Governments must acknowledge the role of culture in order to adopt the most appropriate policy decisions to fight corruption.     

Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption

Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.     

The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis

This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption. Interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption. Economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment. Democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low.     

金融结构、银行发展与经济增长

虽然关于金融发展与经济增长关系的研究已经著作颇丰,但金融结构和长期的经济增长之间是否存在相关关系,以及这种关系是通过何种机制实现的,却一直缺乏深入研究。通过实证分析,我们发现,金融结构的差异并不能有效地解释不同国家之间的经济增长差异。而进一步的分解分析还表明,在金融体系的内部,银行信贷对经济增长的作用要明显强于市场渠道,其基本的实现机制是:银行的发展增强了私人部门信贷的可获得性,同时银行具有事实上比股市更为重要的融资地位,从而在长期的经济增长中扮演了更为重要的角色。     

Endogenous economic freedom and the wealth of nations: evidence from a panel of countries, 1996–2011

Indexes of economic freedom measure the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The authors find a considerable scope for improvement in Index of Economic Freedom, created by Heritage Foundation, since not all components of index have equal effect on economic well-being. Contrary to Heritage methodology the authors tackle the aggregation bias and highlight that each index component contributes differently to the level of economic freedom and subsequently to the level of income per capita. The level of fiscal freedom and monetary freedom exert the strongest influence on the overall index of economic freedom. Authors present the new endogenous cross-country ranking of 135 countries from Instrumental Variable-Two Stage Least Squares (IV-2SLS) empirical specification which removes the inconsistencies arising from the arbitrary assumption of the equivalent effect of each component on the overall index and, hence, the level of real income per capita.     

Does corruption impede economic growth in Pakistan?

The present study reinvestigates the impact of corruption on economic growth by incorporating financial development and trade openness in growth model in case of Pakistan. We have used time series data over the period of 1987–2009. We have applied structural break unit root test to test the integrating order of the variables. The structural break cointegration has also been applied to examine the long run relationship between the variables.The long run relationship between the variables is validated in case of Pakistan. We find that corruption impedes economic growth. Financial development adds in economic growth. Trade openness stimulates economic growth. The causality analysis has exposed the feedback effect between corruption and economic growth and same inference is drawn for trade openness and corruption. Trade openness and economic growth are interdependent. Financial development Granger causes economic growth implying supply-side hypothesis in case of Pakistan.