Remittances and deforestation in developing countries: Is institutional quality paramount?

This study examines the impact of remittance inflows on deforestation in developing countries. We also investigate the role of institutional quality in enhancing remittances’ effect in reducing deforestation. Our results suggest that overall remittances reduce deforestation. We show that remittances’ reduction effect on deforestation is greater in middle-income countries than in low-income countries. Considering institutional quality, our findings suggest that, for the entire sample, and in low- and middle-income countries, control of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness and rule of law act to reduce deforestation. Moreover, institutional quality enhances the impact of remittances on reducing deforestation in the entire sample and in middle-income countries. In contrast, in low-income countries, institutional quality does not complement remittances to reduce deforestation.These results imply that, to reduce deforestation rates, the focus should not only be on economic development, but to an even greater extent, on institutional quality.     

Is corruption in China “out of control”? A comparison with the US in historical perspective

This paper compares corruption in China over the past 15 years with corruption in the US between 1870 and 1930, periods that are roughly comparable in terms of real income per capita. Corruption indicators for both countries and both periods are constructed by tracking corruption news in prominent US newspapers. Several robustness checks confirm the reliability of the constructed corruption indices for both countries. The comparison indicates that corruption in the US in the early 1870s, when its real income per capita was about $2800 (in 2005 dollars), was 7–9 times higher than China’s corruption level in 1996, the corresponding year in terms of income per capita. By the time the US reached $7500 in 1928, approximately equivalent to China’s real income per capita in 2009, corruption was similar in both countries. The findings imply that, while corruption in China is an issue that merits attention, it is not at alarmingly high levels, compared to the US historical experience. In addition, the paper articulates a theoretical framework within which the relationship between corruption and economic development can be understood. The model is used to explain the “life-cycle” of corruption in the development process–rising at the early stages of development, and declining after modernization has taken place. Hence, as China continues its development process, corruption will likely decline.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

Financial development,control of corruption and income inequality

This paper examines the effect of financial development and control of corruption on income inequality in 21 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over the period 1985–2011 using the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. The empirical results show that financial development measures have positive impact on income inequality, which suggest that financial development increases income inequality. On the other hand, the coefficients of control of corruption are negative and significantly related to income inequality which implies that corruption control reduces income inequality. Further, the interaction of the financial development and the control of corruption is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. Equally the interaction of the financial development and transparency index (an alternate measure of corruptibility) is found to be negatively and significantly related to income inequality. These findings suggest that the control of corruption and transparency in governance are crucial in reducing income inequality in SSA.     

Corruption in America

We use a data set of federal corruption convictions in the U.S. to investigate the causes and consequences of corruption. More educated states, and to a smaller degree richer states, have less corruption. This relationship holds even when we use historical factors like Congregationalism in 1890 as an instrument for the level of schooling today. The level of corruption is also correlated with the level of income inequality and racial fractionalization, and uncorrelated with the size of government. There is a weak negative relationship between corruption and economic development in a state. These results echo the cross-country findings, and support the view that the correlation between development and good political outcomes occurs because education improves political institutions.     

Economic Reform and Corruption: Evidence from Panel Data

The notion that economic reform can reduce corruption remains prevalent in the policy agenda of international financial institutions, especially of the World Bank. Economic reforms have, therefore, been carried out throughout various parts of the world to improve the performance of the economies. Using data from 94 low‐ and middle‐income nations for the period 1996–2015, this study employs static and dynamic panel analysis to examine whether economic reform undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's reform programs negatively affects corruption. Our findings suggest that enhancing government effectiveness (i.e. independence of civil service from political pressure, provision of quality public services, effective policy formulation and the government's commitment to such policies) and improving public rights and civil liberties could be some of the most promising policies in terms of fighting corruption. The role of economic development and growth in real per capita income is also found to be significant in some of the specifications. However, the assertion that economic reform can reduce corruption is rejected in all the specifications. We rather find evidence that economic reforms negatively affect the ability of democracy to fight corruption, although on a slim margin. The central theme of the implications of our findings is that in combating corruption, social, institutional and legal means are far more important than economic means. The finding thus is compatible with the World Bank's effort in the later years to introduce governance and democracy as effective tool against corruption.     

The Dynamic Relationship Between Corruption–Inflation: Evidence From Panel Vector Autoregression

This paper aims to explain the mixed causality nexus between corruption and inflation. For that, we apply a panel vector autoregression model on a large sample of 180 countries over the period 1996–2014. Using two corruption indexes and subsample estimations, results provide evidence that the inflation–corruption nexus is bidirectional. The causal effect is more important from corruption to inflation. Interactions remain significant but heterogeneous across subsamples with different income levels. The corruption effect is persistent only in low–middle income economies and its adverse effect on inflation is weaker in high‐income economies. The two‐way relationship between inflation and corruption reflects the inability to control inflation and the situation of the poverty trap in some countries.     

政府规模和法治水平有助于提升服务贸易发展水平吗——来自G20国家面板数据分析

本文构建政府规模和法治水平影响服务贸易发展的一般性分析框架，结合G20国家的面板数据，实证检验了政府规模、法治水平与服务贸易发展之间的关系，并对实证结果进行稳健性检验。研究发现：政府规模在促进服务贸易发展上存在明显双路径传递效应，即政府规模通过两种不同渠道影响服务贸易发展；法治水平显著抑制服务贸易发展，其可能原因是法治水平作为经济发展的制度要素，也存在边际收益递减规律；部分G20国家臃肿的法治体系与其服务贸易创新发展的需求不相适应。针对时间影响的稳健性结果和针对收入影响的稳健性结果表明，随着政府规模或法治水平等制度安排日渐稳固，经济因素则成为推动服务贸易发展的主要动力。     

HUMAN WELL-BEING EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL CAPITAL

We examine the effects of income, institutions, and social capital—proxied by the level of corruption and ethnic tensions—on literacy and life expectancy in Africa. Random effects estimates show that income has a robust positive influence. GMM estimates indicate that corruption reduces the effectiveness of institutions in promoting literacy. However, this effect is not monotonic; improvements in the corruption index within the high corruption range reduce the effectiveness of institutions, while continuous improvement within the low corruption range enhances the effectiveness of institutions. Similarly, ethnic tensions reduce the effectiveness of institutions. Based on these findings, we conclude that social capital and institutions can complement each other. ( JEL O11, O17, Z13)     

Redistribution,trade and corruption: an empirical assessment

ABSTRACT

This article explores the role of institutional quality in the trade and inequality nexus. Does corruption shape the relationship between trade and inequality through its impact on redistribution? Our answer to this question builds on the hypothesis that trade raises inequality and that governments may want to intervene through appropriate redistribution schemes that aim at taxing the gains from trade in a way that offsets the negative effects of trade on inequality. Moreover, we argue that this mechanism may be distorted by corruption and bad institutions in general. Quite to the contrary to common wisdom, we find that trade reduces inequality in countries with high institutional standards by means of a low level of corruption but increases inequality in countries with low levels of institutional quality.     

Corruption and growth: Historical evidence, 1790–2010

We use a newly assembled indicator of corruption from Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) to examine the effects of corruption on economic growth. The V-Dem indicator is coded for almost all contemporary and historical polities since the year 1900 and, for some countries, since the French Revolution. This global dataset allows us to exploit long-run, slow-moving variation within countries for identification, circumventing many of the difficulties faced by previous studies based on cross-section data or short panels. We present robust evidence of a negative effect of corruption on steady-state growth. Yet, we find that corruption interacts with political regime type, giving rise to heterogeneous effects. In particular, corruption is found to be significantly more deleterious for growth in democracies than in autocracies. Since corruption tends to be decentralised in democracies and centralised in autocracies, these findings are in line with theories of the ‘industrial organisation’ of corruption. We find little to no evidence that institutional weaknesses along other dimensions (state capacity, regulatory quality, property rights protection) make corruption any less harmful for growth, casting doubt on the thesis that corruption may ‘grease the wheels’ of dysfunctional institutions. Our findings provide a rationale to target anti-corruption efforts to young democracies.     

Financial Liberalization and Institutional Development

This study empirically analyzes the effects of de jure financial openness on institutional quality as captured by indicators on investment risk, corruption level, impartiality of judiciary system, and the effectiveness of bureaucracy. We show that a higher degree of financial openness improves institutional quality mainly by reducing investment risks. We also study the effect of a single liberalization reform. Again, we find evidence for the beneficial impact of financial liberalization with the exception of corruption. We additionally show that the benign consequences of financial opening for the institutional development are even larger if financial liberalization is supported by simultaneous political liberalization, while financial deregulation in former socialist countries tends to worsen institutional quality.     

Institutional Determinants of Financial Development in MENA countries

Developed and well regulated financial markets are usually seen as a precondition for an efficient allocation of resources and can foster long term economic growth. This paper explores the institutional determinants for financial development in the countries of the Middle East and North African (MENA) region. Institutional conditions are from the International Country Risk Guide. Panel‐econometric techniques are applied to assess the development in the banking sector and the stock market. As a main finding, institutional conditions are important in both financial segments, even after controlling for standard macroeconomic determinants and fixed effects. For the banking sector, corruption seems to be most decisive. For the stock market, the impact of corruption and law and order appear to be relevant. While per capita income and inflation do not seem to play a vital role, openness to foreign trade is quite important for all areas of financial development. Hence, overall, faster real economic integration is of key policy priority to improve financial development as a condition for higher GDP growth. Better law and enforcement practices and anti‐corruption policies are strategies to accompany this process.     

Corruption and assortative matching of partners in international trade

Although the effects of corruption on bilateral trade are well-documented, its impact on the composition of trading partners remains unexplored. In this paper, we argue that corruption in a country imposes asymmetric costs on its trading partners depending on their characteristics. Consequently, as the level of corruption in a country changes, its trade flows from some of its trading partners change more than others, depending on their characteristics, changing the composition of its trading partners. We focus on two characteristics of trading partners: (1) the level of corruption and (2) membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention). Using the gravity model, we find evidence of a negative assortative matching in international trade with respect to corruption. We find that corruption in a country is negatively associated with trade flows from high-corrupt countries and is positively associated with trade volume from signatories of the OECD convention. Our results suggest that future studies on this topic should consider controlling for institutional dissimilarities between the trading partners as it has implications for bilateral trade costs.     

Natural resources, democracy and corruption

We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that resource rents lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980-2004 and 124 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust across different samples, and to the use of various alternative measures of natural resources, democracy and corruption.     

Government size,democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation

Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. In an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, this study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of the democracy in each country. Using annual data of 82 countries between 1995 and 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if the democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As robustness checks, the estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results reveal that our main findings are robust. Furthermore, to address endogeneity problems, we conduct the instrumental variables estimation and the system generalized method of moments estimation, the results of which also support our primary findings. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to perform government interventions without aggravating corruption.     

Corruption in space: A closer look at the world's subnations

Corruption levels differ not only between but also within countries. In this paper we analyze spatial interdependencies in corruption levels for a large sample of 1232 subnational regions from 81 countries. Based on a spatial autoregressive model, which controls for country-fixed effects and corrects for spatial autocorrelation in the error term, we find that a subnational region's corruption level is positively correlated with neighboring subnational regions' corruption levels. Extending the core model and allowing for heterogeneous spatial effects, we find that most spillovers among subnational regions occur within national borders. Moreover, in particular high income subnational regions and subnational regions with relative low corruption levels tend to spill in space. This is due to their high degree of connectivity in terms of economic, sociocultural and political exchange with other subnational regions. Our estimation results underline the importance to consider not only a subnational region's own characteristics, but also spatial interdependencies when implementing efficient anti-corruption policies at the local level.     

National levels of corruption and foreign direct investment

We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant.     

Relationships between corruption,political orientation,and income inequality: evidence from Latin America

This research sheds light on the analysis of the impact of corruption and political orientation on income distribution in Latin America. Although it has been theoretically demonstrated that corruption worsens the income distribution, the empirical evidence has yielded ambiguous results based on biased estimates not considering a measurement error in the estimation of inequality. This article fills this gap by correcting the previous measurement error bias in the fixed-effects estimation. Additionally, political orientation and its relationship with income inequality are also investigated. The sample covers 18 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2012. Results reveal that corruption increases income inequality.     

An Empirical Study of the Impact of Corruption on Environmental Performance: Evidence from Panel Data

This paper extends the empirical debate on the effects of corruption on environmental degradation by considering a recently available measure of environmental quality, the Environmental Performance Index. This indicator is more comprehensive than the measures of air pollutant emissions commonly used in the literature and, in particular, can also capture the impact of pollution on human health. This allows for a better understanding of the actual effects of a wide range of human activities on the ecosystem. From a panel data analysis, two regularities emerge. First, corruption deteriorates the overall environmental quality. This effect is robust and persistent. Second, our findings highlight the improvement of environmental quality as income rises, even at an initial level of development. This is not in contradiction with the EKC hypothesis because an increase in income levels provides positive externalities on the whole environmental quality by compensating the mere negative effects induced by industrialization on the emission levels. As a consequence, in emerging economies, policies fighting corruption and enhancing development are very likely to improve the environmental performances.