The control of CO2 emissions and its economic impact: An AGE model for a german state

Since it is believed that CO₂ is responsible for 55% of the greenhouse effect, a CO₂ levy is now under consideration in several countries. For an assessment of the macroeconomic implications of an integrated energy and environmental policy we employ an applied general equilibrium model (AGE) since all sectors of an economy and all private households contribute to CO₂ emission. Our model is a temporary equilibrium model with capacity extension under adjustment costs and with abatement activities for SO₂ and NO_x emissions.The model of consumer behavior will result in a system of consumer demand functions for non-durables as well as for durable goods. The simulations show the cost of inefficiency in resource allocation if CO₂ taxes differ between industries and households. We finally present the marginal cost curve of CO₂ emission reduction.     

Climate policy in Western Europe and avoided costs of air pollution control

Abatement of CO₂ emissions will be accompanied by reduced air pollutant emissions such as particulate matter (PM), SO₂, and NO_x. This, in turn, will reduce the need for end of pipe (EOP) pollution control technologies to meet future air quality targets. This dynamic could put more stringent air quality goals within reach, and increase the political feasibility of climate policy. This paper presents a CGE model that has been modified to include the emissions and EOP abatement of PM, SO₂, and NO_x from stationary sources in the EU-17. Emissions of pollutants are modeled as fixed-factor complementary inputs to their associated source. Abatement in each sector is modeled as a substitution between the pollutants and discrete abatement technologies, each of which is sector-specific and characterized by a marginal abatement cost and technical capacity constraint. Scenarios are run to 2020, to assess the costs and co-benefits of simultaneous air quality and climate policies. We find that under the Kyoto Protocol in 2010, the welfare cost of pollution control is reduced by 16% compared to the baseline, effectively offsetting the cost of CO₂ abatement by 15%. The co-benefit results depend heavily on policy choices, and their magnitude relative to total costs is likely to decline as greenhouse targets become more ambitious. In our scenarios, pollution control cost savings range from 1.3 to 20% in 2020, yielding a climate cost offset range of 0.2 to 3.9%. The CO₂ credit imports allowed by the EU via the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) offer a total savings of $9.7bn in 2020, but only need to be compensated by an additional $0.3–0.4bn in domestic pollution control from stationary sources.     

CO2 abatement policy with learning-by-doing in renewable energy

This paper analyzes the implications of CO₂ abatement when there is endogenous technological change in renewable energy. A multi-sector numerical general equilibrium model for Denmark is proposed to reflect two basic assumptions about technological progress in renewable energy. First, there is learning-by-doing and unit costs of production are a decreasing function of cumulated output. Second, technological progress only benefits new vintages of capital. The learning-by-doing process is calibrated to match current projections for technological progress in wind-based electricity. The implications are a marked reduction in the total and marginal cost of abatement and a decline in the optimal level of near-term abatement.     

Methane and Nitrous Oxide Emissions from Agriculture in the EU: A Spatial Assessment of Sources and Abatement Costs

Agriculture significantly contributes to emissions of greenhouse gases in the EU. By using a farm-type, supply-side oriented, linear-programming model of the European agriculture, the baseline levels of methane and nitrous oxide emissions are assessed at the regional level in the EU-15. For a range of CO₂-equivalent prices, we assess the potential abatement, as well as the resulting optimal mix of emission sources in the total abatement. Furthermore, we show that the spatial variability of the abatement achieved at a given carbon price is large, indicating that abatement cost heterogeneity is a fundamental feature in the design of a mitigation policy. The cost savings permitted by market-based instruments relative to uniform standard are shown to be large.     

Joint implementation under asymmetric information and strategic behavior

Joint Implementation (JI) under the Framework Convention on Climate Change means that countries could partly offset their national abatement commitments by investing in CO₂ abatement projects abroad. JI is introduced as a mechanism for achieving a certain global abatement target less costly by separating the commitments from the implementation of measures. This paper studies the design of a JI contract when the investor has incomplete information about the foreign firm which carries out the JI project (the host). Asymmetric information leads to a decrease in the potential cost savings from JI. Furthermore, private information held by the potential host firm could give the firm a significant positive utility of participating in JI projects. The possibility of being a host for a JI project in the future can prevent potential host firms from investing in profitable abatement projects today. The paper analyzes the impact on emissions of CO₂ of strategic behavior among potential hosts for JI projects.     

The design of optimal climate policy with air pollution co-benefits

This paper develops a model of an optimal regulatory program for greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions that accommodates the benefits due to reductions of co-pollutants including: sulfur dioxide (SO₂), nitrogen oxides (NO_x), volatile organic compounds (VOC), and fine particulate matter (PM_2.5). Employing per ton damage estimates for the co-pollutants produced by an integrated assessment model, co-pollutant damage estimates per ton carbon dioxide equivalent (CO₂e) are developed for over 10,000 sources of GHGs in the lower 48 states including both transportation sources and electric power generation. For coal-fired electric power generation, the co-pollutant damages are larger in magnitude than recent peer-reviewed estimates of the marginal damage for GHGs. The co-pollutant damage per ton CO₂e varies considerably across source types and source location. The paper estimates the welfare gain from adopting a policy that encompasses the spatially variant co-pollutant damage to be between $1 million and $85 million annually. The range depends on the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. The paper also shows that a distortionary aggregate emission cap reduces the advantage of differentiated policy. Provided an excessively strict cap, the spatially differentiated policy may reduce aggregate welfare. This result has important implications for GHG policy in the United States; although co-pollutant benefits of abating GHGs have been shown to be significant in magnitude, tailoring climate policy to reflect these source-specific co-benefits is not necessarily socially beneficial. This bolsters arguments for upstream policy designs.     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.      

Heterogeneous capital stocks and the optimal timing for CO2 abatement

Some recent research suggests benefits to a delayed CO₂ emission reduction strategy. If the target level of atmospheric CO₂ concentration can be achieved in spite of delay, several factors suggest economic benefits to a delay strategy. However, the analyses that lead to these conclusions typically ignore or underestimate the significant heterogeneity in the turnover rate of society's capital stock. This research explores the relationship between the turnover rate of capital stocks and the delay decision using a model and empirically estimated abatement costs. The results suggest that under many different assumptions, an early start at CO₂ abatement for long-lived capital stocks would be economically optimal.     

Who Should Abate Carbon Emissions? A Note

Economists commonly believe that failure to equalize the marginal cost of carbon abatement across countries implies a loss of global efficiency. Chichilnisky and Heal [(1994), Economic Letters 44, 444] first challenged this consensus a decade ago, demonstrating that, in general, efficiency does not require equalizing marginal abatement costs. This note revisits that important debate. It provides the missing intuition behind Chichilnisky and Heal’s surprising result, explains what critical assumption gives rise to their result, and clarifies the role a social welfare function plays in their model. The implications of Chichilnisky and Heal’s result are increasingly important, given international debate over the preferential role given to developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol and the role those countries will play in future climate negotiations.     

Marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture, cost effectiveness, and the EU non-ETS burden sharing agreement

We propose a quantitative assessment of the marginal abatement costs (MAC) of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture and analyze the implications of the non-ETS burden-sharing agreement (BSA) for this sector. This assessment is based on MAC reduced forms, the generic specification of which enables simple parameterization and numerical computations. Such MAC curves are parameterized for each Member State using the outputs of a detailed model of the European agricultural supply. They are then used to compute total and marginal abatement costs involved by the BSA targets, as well as the cost-effective effort sharing, the corresponding emission price and abatement costs. The main findings are: (i) flexibility mechanisms such as a cap-and-trade system for agricultural emissions could reduce the total costs of meeting the 10% EU abatement target by a factor two to three relative to the strict implementation of each country's target, (ii) the corresponding equilibrium emission price is found to be 32-42 €/tCO₂eq depending on the assumption regarding business-as-usual emissions, and (iii) a cap-and-trade system with allowances based on the BSA targets would involve substantial transfers from EU-15 countries to New Member States, an important share of which being made of ‘hot air’.     

Induced technological change and the attractiveness of CO2 abatement policies

This paper investigates the significance of induced technological change (ITC) for the attractiveness of CO₂ abatement policies. We use analytical and numerical general equilibrium models in which technological change results from profit-maximizing investments in R&D. We show that carbon abatement policies have very different impacts on R&D across industries, and do not necessarily raise the economy-wide rate of technological progress. Focusing only on the sectors with positive R&D impacts can lead to substantial underassessment of the GDP costs of CO₂ abatement policies. The presence of ITC implies lower costs of achieving a given abatement target, but it implies higher gross costs (costs before netting out environment-related benefits) of a given carbon tax. Gross costs depend importantly on the efficiency of R&D markets prior to the introduction of CO₂ policies.     

Taxation of multiple greenhouse gases and the effects on income distribution: A case study of the Netherlands

Current economic instruments aimed at climate change mitigation focus on CO₂ emissions only, but the Kyoto Protocol refers to other greenhouse gases (GHG) as well as CO₂. These are CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs and SF₆. Taxation of multiple greenhouse gases improves the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation. It is not yet clear, however, what the effect is of multigas taxation on the distribution of the tax burden across income groups. This paper examines and compares distributional effects of a CO₂ tax and a comprehensive tax that covers all six GHG of the Kyoto Protocol. The study concentrates on the Netherlands in the year 2000. We established tax rates on the basis of marginal abatement cost curves and the Dutch policy target. The distributional effects have been determined by means of environmentally extended input−output analysis and data on consumer expenditures. Our results show that taxation of multiple GHG improves not only the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation, but also distributes the tax burden more equally across income groups as compared to a CO₂ tax. These findings are relevant for the debate on the role of non-CO₂ GHG in climate change mitigation.     

Taxation of multiple greenhouse gases and the effects on income distribution: A case study of the Netherlands

Current economic instruments aimed at climate change mitigation focus on CO₂ emissions only, but the Kyoto Protocol refers to other greenhouse gases (GHG) as well as CO₂. These are CH₄, N₂O, HFCs, PFCs and SF₆. Taxation of multiple greenhouse gases improves the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation. It is not yet clear, however, what the effect is of multigas taxation on the distribution of the tax burden across income groups. This paper examines and compares distributional effects of a CO₂ tax and a comprehensive tax that covers all six GHG of the Kyoto Protocol. The study concentrates on the Netherlands in the year 2000. We established tax rates on the basis of marginal abatement cost curves and the Dutch policy target. The distributional effects have been determined by means of environmentally extended input−output analysis and data on consumer expenditures. Our results show that taxation of multiple GHG improves not only the cost-effectiveness of climate change mitigation, but also distributes the tax burden more equally across income groups as compared to a CO₂ tax. These findings are relevant for the debate on the role of non-CO₂ GHG in climate change mitigation.     

Abatement and Allocation in the Pilot Phase of the EU ETS

We use historical industrial emissions data to assess the level of abatement and over-allocation that took place across European countries during the pilot phase (2005–2007) of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme. Using a dynamic panel data model, we estimate the counter factual (business-as-usual) emissions scenario for EU member states. Comparing this baseline to allocated and verified emissions, we find that both over-allocation and abatement occurred, along with under-allocation and emissions inflation. Over the three trading years of the pilot phase we find over-allocation of approximately 280 million EUAs and total abatement of 247 Mt CO₂. However, we calculate that emissions inflation of approximately 73 Mt CO₂ also occurred, possibly due to uncertainty about future policy design features.     

Does Technological Innovation Really Reduce Marginal Abatement Costs? Some Theory,Algebraic Evidence,and Policy Implications

The existing literature models innovation in pollution control as a reduction in marginal abatement costs. We show that this assumption is inappropriate for production process innovations such as fuel switching. Algebraically, we examine the effects of different innovation types on marginal abatement cost curves, showing that some desirable innovations increase marginal abatement costs. Empirically, we estimate marginal abatement costs for sulfur dioxide by measuring the output distance function for electric power in Korea. Regression results confirm that production process innovations did raise marginal abatement costs in this case. One policy implication: economic instruments do not always provide stronger innovation incentives than command-and-control policies.      

Using Non Market Valuation to Inform the Choice Between Permits and Fees in Environmental Regulation

The purpose of this short note is to open an exploration regarding the use of non market valuation to help guide the selection of economically efficient pollution control instruments. As long as non market valuation techniques can correctly estimate the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve, this information along with engineering cost estimates of the unit costs or slope of the marginal abatement cost will provide useful information to policy makers in choosing between fees and permits. An illustrative review of the literature suggests that both stated and revealed preference methods have estimated slopes of marginal benefit functions for reducing several pollutants. To investigate the efficiency of permits versus fees, an illustrative review of corresponding marginal abatement costs is also made. For air pollutants affecting visibility, the slope of the marginal benefit curve is far greater than the slope of the marginal abatement costs, suggesting permits as the efficient instrument. For nitrates in groundwater used for drinking, the marginal benefit curve is flatter than the rather steep marginal abatement cost, suggesting fees/taxes would be a more efficient economic instrument. We hope this note stimulates more emphasis in non market valuation on estimating the slope of the marginal benefit function to enhance environmental economists ability to make policy recommendations regarding the choice of pollution instruments for specific pollutants.      

Rethinking the optimal level of environmental quality: justifications for strict environmental policy

Traditional environmental theory suggests that the optimal level of a pollution emission occurs when the marginal damage created by the emissions is equal to the marginal cost of reducing the emissions. We argue that the benefits from reducing pollution should be much more broadly defined to include at least three other sources of benefits. First, we develop a game-theoretic model in which firms may under-invest in cost-saving ‘green technologies’. Second, we demonstrate that consideration of future damages and abatement costs leads to a lower current optimal pollution level than that obtained in traditional models. Finally, we show that ecological complexity creates indirect pathways by which greater pollution increases the likelihood of generating irreversible environmental damage. This broader definition of the benefits of pollution abatement yields an optimal level of pollution that may actually be less than the level at which conventionally-measured marginal damages are equal to marginal abatement costs. Thus, environmental policy should be stricter.     

Climate Policy,Uncertainty, and the Role of Technological Innovation

We study how uncertainty about climate change severity affects the relative benefits of early abatement and a portfolio of research and development (R&D) in lowering future abatement costs. Optimal early abatement depends on the curvature of the marginal benefit and marginal abatement cost (MAC) functions and how the uncertain parameter affects marginal benefits. R&D in a particular technology depends on whether uncertainty increases early abatement; whether investment lowers marginal costs for that technology; whether R&D lowers the slope of that technology's MAC function; and the shape of that technology's MAC function. We illustrate, focusing on the role of backstop technologies.     

Conventional and Islamic Banks’ Performance in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries; Efficiency and Determinants

This paper investigates the cost efficiency levels of the banking sectors of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries for the period from 2001 to 2015 and provides a comparison of conventional and Islamic banks. We obtain measures of efficiency using a stochastic frontier model and the meta-frontier approach. The evidence demonstrates that Islamic banks are less efficient and have a weaker level of production technology than conventional banks. The cost efficiency of banks varies significantly across the six Gulf countries and over time. We adopt the results drawn from the meta-frontier model that allow to take into account the differences between the studied countries, and empirically examine the bank-specific, financial, macroeconomic, and political determinants of banking efficiency. The results provide evidence of the differential effects of the selected variables on the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks. These variables affect the performance of the two types of banks in different ways and with different magnitudes.

     

General equilibrium effects of environmental policy: A CGE-modeling approach

Estimation of emission control cost functions is often carried out in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e., under the assumption that emission control measures have negligible effects on input and output prices. In this paper a computable general equilibrium model is used for simulation of the impact on factor prices and resource allocation of reductions of SO _infx ^sup- , NO _infx ^su- and CO₂-emissions. Thus the model includes markets for tradable emission permits, and the equilibrium prices of permits reflect the marginal costs of emission control. The results suggest that major emission reductions are likely to have general equilibrium effects, and thus that emission control cost functions that fail to take these effects into account may give a distorted picture of the economic impact of emission control.