国有企业改制效果的实证研究

本文通过对1998至2003年间全部国有企业和规模以上非国有企业的数据进行分析来研究我国国有企业改制的效果。我们不仅考察了改制对企业经济效益的影响,而且考察了改制对企业社会效益指标的影响。此外,我们还分析了改制影响经济效益的渠道、国有控股和非国有控股的差别、以及改制效果的可持续性。本文的主要发现是:改制后企业经济效益显著提高,并且主要来自于代理成本的降低,表现为管理费用率的下降;改制带来了一定的社会成本,但和国际经验相比程度不是很大;国有控股改制社会效益较好,而非国有控股改制经济效益较好;改制效果在一定期间内持续。     

FDI在行业内与行业间的出口溢出效应分析——基于中国微观企业面板数据的实证研究

基于中国2004—2007年的微观企业面板数据,本文研究了FDI对同行业和上下游行业的内资企业出口增长的贡献。通过采用面板数据的个体固定效应模型以及Heckman样本选择纠正模型,我们发现了FDI具有正向的行业内和行业间出口溢出效应。除此之外,我们还分别考察了内资企业的所有制结构以及外资是否出口对FDI出口溢出效应的影响。     

女性就业人员比重和劳动收入份额——基于中国省级面板数据的分析

近10年来,我国大部分省级单位的女性就业人员比重都有所下降。对我国1996-2006年省级面板数据的估计结果表明,我国女性就业人员比重的下降有利于劳动收入份额上升。该结果对不同的样本范围和模型设定具有很强的稳健性。该结果反映了我国经济发展与经济转型中的女性就业难问题。女性就业人员比重对劳动收入份额的正面影响在中西部地区更大。     

就业保护制度对非正规就业的影响——来自中国省际面板数据的证据

本文基于2000~2013年省级面板数据,在采用差值法估算全国及各省非正规就业规模的基础上,应用动态面板模型考察了就业保护制度对非正规就业的影响,研究发现:全国与各省城镇非正规就业率都呈现出大幅增加趋势,就业结构表现为非正规化;最低工资制度及社会保险制度对非正规就业产生了显著的负向作用;以"民工荒"到来的2004年作为分界点进行分样本检验,结果显示"民工荒"到来后并不改变上述结论,而且还发现,"民工荒"到来后最低工资制度对非正规就业的负向作用变小,而社会保险制度对非正规就业的负向作用变大。     

我国劳动分配比例的变动趋势与影响因素——基于中国省级面板数据的分析

本文分析了我国劳动分配比例的变动趋势与影响因素,并运用1996-2006年省级面板数据估计了一个计量模型,估计结果表明,我国劳动分配比例下降的根本原因是二元经济条件下的巨大就业压力、不断提高的劳均资本和人力资本、工会在保护劳动者权益方面的缺位.该结果对不同的模型设置和样本选择具有很强的稳健性.进一步的研究还发现就业压力和劳均资本对劳动分配比例的负面影响在低发展水平组更大.     

我国最低工资的就业效应及其作用机制——基于建筑业面板数据的研究

本文运用我国30个省、市、自治区建筑业1995～2006年的面板数据,研究发现最低工资对我国建筑业就业存在显著的负效应,大致为最低工资每增长10个百分点,将导致建筑业就业水平下降1.3个百分点.进一步地,本文基于中介效应模型探讨最低工资就业效应的作用机制,研究发现最低工资的就业负效应主要是以直接效应的形式表现的,即企业以减少或冻结招聘甚至减员来应对最低工资增长的冲击;同时,最低工资还通过促使企业用资本替代劳动、提高劳动生产率方式间接导致就业岗位的减少.而由于我国技术工人比例显著偏低,因此企业无法用技术工人替代相对不经济的普通操作工人的办法来应对最低工资增长.     

空间外部性与地区工资差异:基于动态面板数据的实证研究

本文基于中国282个地级行政区域1999—2004年的面板数据,通过使用动态面板数据的计量方法对地区市场潜能、就业密度与其工资水平之间的关系进行了实证检验。我们发现,在控制住其他影响因素后,市场潜能外部性对地区工资水平存在显著为正的影响,而就业密度对工资水平的影响却是非线性的,只有就业密度高于某个"门槛"值时,它对工资水平的偏效应才显著为正。     

工艺创新会抑制就业吗?——来自中国制造企业工艺专利的实证

以中国制造行业159家上市公司2001-2012年的面板数据为样本,从专利数据中分离出工艺专利,实证研究中国制造企业工艺创新对就业的影响。结果显示,工艺创新在整体上具有积极的就业效应,对技术人员数量的促进作用高于对生产人员的促进作用,从而证实了工艺创新有助于扩大企业需求,促进就业。     

空间外部性与地区工资差异：基于动态面板数据的实证研究

本文基于中国282个地级行政区域1999-2004年的面板数据,通过使用动态面板数据的计量方法对地区市场潜能、就业密度与其工资水平之间的关系进行了实证检验。我们发现,在控制住其他影响因素后,市场潜能外部性对地区工资水平存在显著为正的影响,而就业密度对工资水平的影响却是非线性的,只有就业密度高于某个“门槛”值时,它对工资水平的偏效应才显著为正。     

工艺创新会抑制就业吗？

以中国制造行业159家上市公司2001-2012年的面板数据为样本,从专利数据中分离出工艺专利,实证研究中国制造企业工艺创新对就业的影响。结果显示,工艺创新在整体上具有积极的就业效应,对技术人员数量的促进作用高于对生产人员的促进作用,从而证实了工艺创新有助于扩大企业需求,促进就业。     

企业改制模式和改制绩效——基于企业数据调查的经验分析

本文以上世纪90年代后半期的企业调查数据为基础,通过建立经济计量模型来研究公有企业的改制绩效,通过相应的技术处理消除企业的各种先天因素或改制前固有的优势,试图测试改制是否能够确实激发出显著的效率效应。分析发现,向私有产权方向改制的企业效率得到显著提高;不同的改制模式是改制绩效的重要决定因素,经营者持大股从效率上来讲是最优的改制方式,而平均分配的股份合作制的改制方式则具有较差的业绩效果。我们还讨论了其原因,以及为什么中国现阶段特定制度环境下最优的公司治理结构是大股东控股。我们认为给定当前制度背景下,最佳的改革方案之一是股权向经营者集中,股权合理定价。因为只有市场的初次分配是有效率的,才能得到收入再分配的源泉。在此基础上,国家可通过各种税收设计,进行较为公平合理的收入再分配。     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

POLITICAL SELECTION OF FIRMS INTO PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMS. EVIDENCE FROM ROMANIAN COMPREHENSIVE DATA

Exploiting a unique institutional feature of early Romanian privatization, when a group of firms was explicitly barred from privatization and another was partially privatized by management–employee buyouts, we test how politicians select firms into privatization programs. Using comprehensive firm data, we estimate the relation between preprivatization firm characteristics – the information known to politicians at the time of decision‐making – and the effect of privatization on employment, efficiency, and wages. With the estimated coefficients we simulate the effect of privatization on non‐privatizable and privatizable firms. We find that politicians expected privatization to increase employment in the privatizable group by 7%–10%, while to decrease it in the non‐privatizable group by 10%–30%, depending on the first‐stage estimation method, ordinary least squares with or without matching. We do not find such discrepancies in the expected change in firm efficiency; the simulated efficiency effect of privatization is large and positive for both groups of firms, and it is 52%–65% for non‐privatizable and 41%–43% for privatizable firms. The analysis does not support the hypothesis that wages played an important role in privatization decisions. Our study suggests that employment concerns played the key role in selecting firms for privatization, even if efficiency gains had to be sacrificed.     

PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: TECHNOLOGY AND GENDER IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

This paper examines the impact of privatization on gender discrimination in China across firms with different technology intensities. Using a comprehensive firm‐level survey, the paper identifies gender wage‐productivity differentials by directly estimating the relative productivity levels of workers from the production function of firms. The panel structure of the survey is taken advantage of by following firms that were fully state‐owned in the initial year, and distinguishing them from firms that were later privatized. The main results show that privatization was associated with an increase in relative productivity of female workers in high technology industries, and a reduction in relative productivity of female workers in low technology industries. Time varying coefficient results suggest that the improvements in gender outcomes in high technology industries may not be maintained in the long run as the relative wage and productivity ratios tend to deteriorate, potentially due to low supply of highly educated female workers. At the same time, outcomes in privatized low technology industries increase over time, lowering the wage and productivity gaps between male and female workers. (JEL J16, J31, P20)     

Priorities and sequencing in privatization: Evidence from Czech firm panel data

While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.     

Presence of foreign investors in privatized firms and privatization policy

This paper investigates how the presence of foreign investors in privatized firms affects privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly. We find that an increase in the stockholding ratio of foreign investors in a privatized firm increases the optimal degree of privatization, whereas an increase in the penetration of foreign firms in product markets reduces it. These results imply that the degree of openness of financial markets and that of product markets have contrasting implications for the optimal privatization policy.     

Privatization and Management Incentives: Evidence from the United Kingdom

This article examines whether privatization affects managementincentives and provides an estimate of the magnitude of thechange. Using data from large firms in the United Kingdom, wefind no relationship between compensation and financial performancein state-owned firms, both before and after corporate governancereforms. In contrast, we find a strong sensitivity in privatizedfirms both immediately and in more mature privatized firms drivenlargely by stock options and shareholding. For more mature privatizedfirms, compensation and dismissal sensitivities are complementarywith our estimates, suggesting a £443,000 increase inmanagement returns for a one standard deviation improvementin firm performance. This estimated incentive intensity is higherthan in established publicly traded firms. Our results supportthe theoretical focus on incentives in the dominant theoriesof state and private ownership.     

Fire the manager to improve performance?Managerial turnover and incentives after privatization in the Czech Republic

This paper analyses the effect of the introduction of managerial incentives and new human capital on enterprise performance immediately after privatization in the Czech Republic. We find weak evidence for the presence of managerial incentives: only from 1997, 3 to 4 years after privatization, does poor performance significantly increase the probability of managerial change. Nevertheless, replacing the managing director in a newly privatized firm improves subsequent performance. This indicates that the privatized firms operate below potential under the incumbent management. We show that the institutional framework matters as well: managerial turnover improves performance only if the management is closely interconnected with the board of directors and thus holds effective executive authority.     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

Privatization in PolandWhat was the government trying to achieve?1

This article uses the sequencing of privatization to infer the objective pursued by the Polish government in the privatization of its large manufacturing firms in the second half of the 1990s. We construct a model of mixed oligopoly and use it to evaluate the privatization process; our analysis is based on the assumption that firms which furthered the government's objective function the most would be chosen to be privatized first. Based on the features of the firms that were chosen for early privatization, our empirical analysis suggests that welfare maximization was more important than the desire to maximize the revenues from privatization and the government's budget or to minimize employment losses.