Competitive balance in a quasi-double knockout tournament

In 2001, the All-Ireland Gaelic Football competition changed from being a singleknockout tournament to a quasi-double knockout competition. Similar natural experiments in economics and operational research theory suggest such a change should reduce the competitive balance in the competition. Using a Hirschmann–Herfindahl Index measure of concentration and a bootstrapping approach, we confirm that the new structure leads to a less competitive outcome and, importantly, this outcome is less uncertain. Our bootstrapped results show that in the long run, with larger samples, there is less competitive balance in the new competition structure than in the older structure competition structure. Finally, we also consider a stochastic dominance approach to evaluating the change in tournament structure, but the low power due to the presence of ties in our small sample leads to an inconclusive outcome.     

Stochastic dominance and decomposable measures of inequality and poverty

In this paper, we characterize some new links between stochastic dominance and the measurement of inequality and poverty. We show that: for second-degree normalized stochastic dominance (NSD), the weighted area between the NSD curve of a distribution and that of the equalized distribution is a decomposable inequality measure; for first-degree and second-degree censored stochastic dominance (CSD), the weighted area between the CSD curve of a distribution and that of the zero-poverty distribution is a decomposable poverty measure. These characterizations provide graphical representations for decomposable inequality and poverty measures in the same manner as Lorenz curve does for the Gini index. The extensions of the links to higher degrees of stochastic dominance are also investigated.     

Rate-of-return dominance and efficiency in an experimental economy

Summary. One of the main challenges for monetary economics is to explain the use of assets that are dominated in rate-of-return as media of exchange. We use experimental methods to study how a fiat money might come to be used in transactions when an identically marketable, dividend-bearing asset, a consol, is also available. Our experimental economies, which have an overlapping generations structure, have the property that the only stationary rational expectations equilibria (SREE) require exclusive use of the consol as the medium of exchange. In a baseline treatment, agents use the consol exclusively, as would occur in an SREE. However, in other treatments, we observe episodes of rate-of-return dominance,with consistent use of fiat money as a medium of exchange. The results show that two properties of our economies are associated with the rate of return dominance anomaly. The first is a history of trading with fiat money, prior to the introduction of the consol. The second is the timing of the dividend payment; when the dividend payment follows the execution of trades between generations, hoarding of the consol occurs on the part of the old, who earn dividends by hoarding. In our economies, settling transactions with a dividend-bearing asset does not improve allocations over those resulting from trading with fiat money. Received: July 11, 2002; revised version: July 25, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"We thank Anne Villamil, participants in the 2000 Purdue University Conference on Monetary Economics, the Summer 2000 meetings of the Economic Science Association, and a referee, for very helpful comments. We thank the Krannert School of Management and the Purdue University Center for International Business, Education and Research for financial support and Vivian Lei for research assistance. We also thank Ron Michener for referring us to the historical account of the early introduction of money into the American colonies, as reported by Benjamin Franklin. Correspondence to: G. Camera     

Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note

We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.      

On forward induction in money-burning games

Summary. We first consider money-burning games studied by Ben-Porath and Dekel [6]. We show that iterative weak dominance and extensive form rationalizability yield the same unique outcome in this class of games. This result suggests that weak dominance captures the forward induction logic implied by extenisve form rationalizability. Next, we consider an example of entry model by Arvan [1] to demonstrate the power of forward induction. In this example, despite the presence of multiple equilibria, forward induction chooses a unique outcome. Received: January 25, 2000; revised version: January 5, 2001     

Measuring the severity of unemployment

A social-welfare (illfare) function framework is applied to compare two demographic groups as to the severity of their unemployment experience. This is based on the assumption that for each individual the disutility of unemployment is an increasing and convex function of spell length. The very concept of spell length and its distribution, however, is not unambiguous. In contrast to previous literature which focuses exclusively on the interrupted spell length in a stock of unemployed, we stress the usefulness of the concept of complete spell length in a cohort of unemployed. We establish an equivalence relationship between second-degree dominance in the cohort and first-degree dominance in the stock. For specific illfare functions the disutilityU(x) when applied to the cohort and the disutilityU(x) when applied to the stock will produce the same value of aggregate welfare (illfare).     

Playing Cournot although they shouldn’t

Summary. In this note, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment in a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric cost. Risk dominance considerations allow to select a unique equilibrium in which the low-cost firm is the Stackelberg leader. The data, however, do not support the theory as simultaneous-move play is modal. Average output choices are in line with the Cournot equilibrium. This suggests that Cournot is a much more robust predictor for competition in markets than theory suggests.Received: 14 October 2002, Revised: 1 December 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D43. Correspondence to: Hans-Theo Normann     

Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games

For the class of 2×2 matrix games with two strict Nash equilibria the paper introduces an equilibrium refinement called incentive monotonicity. It selects the risk-dominant equilibrium if interests are conflicting, while it remains silent in games with common interests. These results suggest that the equilibrium-selection problem might be more difficult in games with common interests, which is certainly the case if risk dominance and payoff dominance go in opposite directions.     

Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play

This paper presents results from a series of experiments designed to test the impact on subject behavior of changes in the risk dominance and payoff dominance characteristics of two player coordination games. The main finding is that changes in risk dominance significantly affect play of the subjects, whereas changes in the level of payoff dominance do not. Observed history of play also has an important influence on subject behavior, both when subjects are randomly rematched after each game and when they remain matched with the same individual for a sequence of games.     

Satisficing and optimality in 2×2 common interest games

Summary. The paper studies the evolution of cooperation when satisficing players repeatedly play a symmetric two-by-two game of common interest. We show that if initial aspiration levels are sufficiently close to the efficient payoff and aspiration adjusts at a sufficiently slow speed then the unique long run state will be the efficient outcome. In the special case of coordination games, the more tension there is between payoff dominance and risk dominance, the longer it takes for the system to lock into the payoff dominant outcome. Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: November 19, 1997     

Which is a better investment choice in the Hong Kong residential property market: a big or small property?

The relationship between property size and property investment yield is an interesting issue in the real estate market. Previous studies usually use the mean–variance criterion to compare the return-risk profiles of the yields of different property sizes in the United States. However, this criterion has a few shortcomings. This article provides the first attempt to use a stochastic dominance approach to analyse this issue. We adopt two powerful stochastic dominance tests to compare the yields of five property size classes in the Hong Kong residential property market. In our study, we analyse two possible investment outcomes: (1) investors could not rent out their properties, and thus they would gain/lose from the appreciation/depreciation of residential property prices; (2) investors could also gain from rental incomes. Our empirical results provide strong evidence to show that the yields of smaller property classes stochastically dominate the yields of bigger property classes, suggesting that buying smaller properties is a better investment choice in the Hong Kong residential property market.     

Measuring systemic risk with regime switching in tails

This paper motivates the importance of modeling nonlinearities in measuring systemic risk. I capitalize this motivation by generalizing the CoVaR approach proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) to allow it switching between a high and a normal risk regime filtered from data.. Considering the U.S. large bank holding companies (BHCs), this paper shows that modeling regime changes in tails is capable of capturing both amplification and mean-reversion effects of an adverse shock to a bank's balance sheet on the banking system. Using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test statistics with and without bootstrapping, I perform the significance test to identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), and the stochastic dominance test to rank the identified SIFIs. The stochastic dominance test raises the concern that the CoVaR measure underestimates systemic risk contributions for SIFIs but overestimates for non-SIFIs. Finally, applying the BHCs' characteristics and housing market price to forecast the regime-switching systemic risk out-of-sample, I obtain from 4- and 8-quarter-ahead horizons a desirable countercyclical, forward-looking measure of systemic risk.     

Adaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance

This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For games satisfying the weak single crossing condition, the set of strategies that survive iterated weak dominance is small in that its bounds are pure strategy Nash equilibria. The results hold regardless of the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72.     

Stochastic dominance and behavior towards risk: The market for Internet stocks

Internet stocks registered large gains in the late 1990s, followed by large losses from early 2000. Using stochastic dominance theory, we infer how investor risk preferences have changed over this cycle, and relate our findings to utility theory and behavioral finance. Our major findings are as follows. First, risk averters and risk seekers show a distinct difference in preference for Internet versus “old economy” stocks. This difference is most evident during the bull market period (1998–2000) where Internet stocks stochastically dominate old economy stocks for risk seekers but not risk averters. In the bear market, risk averters show an increased preference for old economy stocks, while risk seekers show a reduced preference for Internet stocks. These results are inconsistent with prospect theory and indicate that investors exhibit reverse S-shaped utility functions.     

GDP competition and corporate investment: Evidence from China

This study examines whether and how macroeconomic performance competition is related to investment at firm level. We use GDP competition as a proxy of dynamic macroeconomic conditions. We find that the effect of GDP competition on firm investments is significantly positive. We also find that GDP competition destroys investment efficiency significantly, especially by increasing overinvestment. Further tests show that GDP competition is more likely to affect the investment decisions of firms controlled by governments and firms located in regions with low marketization. In addition, our analyses reveal that the provincial officials facing competitive pressure are more likely to be promoted if firm investments accelerate. We use alternative proxies to measure GDP competition and find similar results that support our inference. Our findings support the notion that GDP competition of governments distorts investment behaviour. The present paper also elucidates investment problems and dilemmas faced by emerging economies.     

Belief in the opponentsʼ future rationality

For dynamic games we consider the idea that a player, at every stage of the game, will always believe that his opponents will choose rationally in the future. This is the basis for the concept of common belief in future rationality, which we formalize within an epistemic model. We present an iterative procedure, backward dominance, that proceeds by eliminating strategies from the game, based on strict dominance arguments. We show that the backward dominance procedure selects precisely those strategies that can rationally be chosen under common belief in future rationality if we would not impose (common belief in) Bayesian updating.     

Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias

Decision makers have a strong tendency to retain the current state of affairs. This well-documented phenomenon is termed status quo bias. We present the probabilistic dominance approach to status quo bias: an alternative is considered acceptable to replace the status quo only if the chances of a (subjectively) severe loss, relative to the status quo, are not too high. Probabilistic dominance is applied and behaviorally characterized in a choice model that allows for a range of status quo biases, general enough to accommodate unanimity, but also standard expected utility maximization. We present a comparative notion of “revealing more bias towards the status quo” and study its implications to the probabilistic dominance model of choice. Lastly, the model is applied to the endowment effect phenomenon and to a problem of international portfolio choice when investors are home biased.     

Medical Dominance and Institutional Change in the Delivery of Health Care Services

This paper puts the theory of medical dominance, as it understood as a sociological theory of historical change, into a broader theory of institutional change of the delivery of medical care. The application of medical dominance theory to three institutional contexts (Australia, USA, and Canada) is reviewed. The possibility of progressive institutional change in the delivery of medical care is addressed, as well as the type of technological innovation that might accompany such institutional change. The concept of medical dominance is useful to explain the dominant characteristics supporting the institution of medical practice. However, an explanatory theory of the evolution of health care delivery should be linked to the instrumentally warranted standards for medical care. These standards are then discussed.

A concentration index for differentiated products: the case of religious competition

In the past, scholars have used a Herfindahl–Hirschman Index using denominational market shares to measure the competitiveness of religious markets. However, this approach ignores both the imperfect substitutability between denominations and the degree of competition within denominations. These two shortcomings make the current index a suspect measure of religious competition; it often falsely identifies which market micro-economists would generally consider the more competitive one. We develop a new religious competition index that incorporates intra-denominational competition and creates a ‘substitutability parameter’ to better specify the appropriate degree of inter-denominational competition. While the model developed in this article applies specifically to religious markets, our index of competition could be expanded to other economic markets where such a substitutability parameter is meaningful.