The economic analysis of offender’s choice: Old and new insights

The economics of crime has followed the basic Becker model (1968), according to which a criminal act results from a rational decision based on cost-benefit analysis. This paper surveys some extensions to Becker’s model, by giving some emphasis to earlier work that tries to explain differences in offender’s choice across places. At the end, the paper analyses the contribution of Steven Levitt (the new Gary Becker), which has stimulated an empirical renaissance in the economic analysis of crime. His new book (co-author Dubner) Freakonomics (2005) offers a new argument in understanding why crime fell in the 1990s in the USA. I am very grateful to an anonymous referee for his valuable comments, which improved the final version of this paper. I would also like to thank Steven Levitt for sending me his unpublished work. The usual disclaimer applies.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Sunspot-like equilibria in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions

In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.     

Menger’s causal-realist analysis in modern economics

Carl Menger pioneered a unique theoretical research method which served as the foundation of the early Austrian school of economics. Menger’s causal-realist analysis was revived and formalized just before and after World War 2 by Ludwig von Mises as the “praxeological method.” Murray Rothbard, a student of von Mises’, utilized the method in formulating a comprehensive system of economic theory in his treatise, Man Economy, and State published in the early 1960s. Rothbard’s treatise became the foundational work for the “Austrian revival” in the 1970s. In this paper, we address several issues related to the role of Menger’s method in modern economics. First, ample evidence is adduced that von Mises and Rothbard each expressed a surprising ambivalence with respect to his own work in relation to the early Austrian school. Second, von Mises viewed Rothbard’s treatise as beginning a new epoch in economic theory. Third, contrary to the conventional view, a careful analysis of his treatise shows that Rothbard drew heavily on the contemporary neoclassical literature in developing his theoretical system and that his intent was never to set up a heterodox movement to challenge mainstream economics. Rather, his main aim was to consistently apply the praxeological method to rescue economics from what he considered the alien methodology of positivism, which was imported into economics after World War 2. Lastly, I will tentatively suggest that the term “Austrian economics” as the designation for the intellectual movement that coalesced in the early 1970s may now have outlived its usefulness. This term, which initially served an important strategic purpose in promoting the revival of the broad Mengerian tradition, may have come to obscure the meaning and importance of the praxeological research paradigm that Menger originated.     

Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models

The paper analyzes the endogenous formation of a financial intermediary, modelled as a multi-lender coalition, as the trade-off between economies of scale in monitoring and a ‘cost’ associated with the partial loss of control over the investments the multi-lender coalition makes. In contrast with previous contributions (e.g., Williamson in J Monet Econ 18:159–179, 1986), the model can account for the coexistence of financial intermediation and direct lending (a non-trivial equilibrium). We prove the existence of such non-trivial equilibria and provide a complete characterization of them. In particular, the stronger the diversity of opinions, the smaller the coalition size is. I owe Pierpaolo Battigalli and Larry Samuelson a special debt for their insightful comments and encouragements. I am also grateful to the co-editor, Stephen Williamson, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments. I also like to thank Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch, Guillaume Carlier, Pascal Courty, Martin Hellwig, Bart Lipman, Jean-Marc Tallon and Anne Villamil for helpful discussions. Finally, I thank the THEMA, University Cergy-Pontoise, where part of this paper was written, for their hospitality.     

Giffen behavior independent of the wealth level

We demonstrate that a well-behaved utility function can generate Giffen behavior, where “well-behaved” means that its indifference curves are smooth, convex, and closed in a commodity space; the resulting demand function of each good is differentiable with respect to prices and income. Moreover, we show that Giffen behavior is compatible with any level of utility and an arbitrarily low share of income spent on the inferior good. This contrasts sharply with the common view that the Giffen paradox tends to occur when households’ wealth levels are low. Comments from Murray C. Kemp, Binh Tran-Nam, Ngo Van Long, Masao Oda, Noritsugu Nakanishi, and Chiaki Hara have greatly improved the paper. We have also benefited from discussions with Koichi Hamada, Satya Das, Takashi Kamihigashi, Tomoyuki Kamo, Toru Kikuchi, Katsufumi Fukuda, Yu-chin Chen, Fahad Khalil, Takeshi Nakatani, Kazuo Nishimura, Ken-Ichi Shimomura, and Stephen J. Turnovsky. We thank the anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. Iwasa would like to acknowledge financial support from Research Fellowships of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science for Young Scientists. Professor Koji Shimomura passed away on February 24, 2007. This paper was completed after his untimely death.     

Individual autonomy in evolutionary game theory: defending Sugden against Ross’s accusation of eliminativism

In this paper, I provide a defence of Robert Sugden’s contribution to evolutionary game theory against Donald Ross’s accusation of eliminating the individual’s autonomy by denying the explanatory role of rationality, utility maximization and rational beliefs. In this regard, I claim that Sugden’s methodological remarks on evolutionary game theory do not imply a characterization of real agents as automata. On the methodological level, Sugden claims that it is not correct to conceive the empirical phenomenon of social evolution in terms of normative concepts, whose empirical status is not obvious. However, Sugden proposes a theory that explains the agent’s behaviour in terms of inductive reasoning, adaptive beliefs, salience and pattern recognition. The latter are psychological features that describe the way agents manage to self-determine their own actions. From these clarifications, I draw the conclusion that Ross’s critique misunderstands Sugden’s contribution both on the methodological and empirical level.     

Choosing Children’s Environmental Risk

A model of endogenous risk provides a foundation to study a parent’s child care decisions when the child could be exposed to an environmental hazard (e.g., toxic substance, foodborne pathogen). The parent invests in childcare quality and quantity to reduce the likelihood of a hazard exposure occurring and to reduce its severity if the exposure is realized. We supply conditions to sign unambiguously the effects on a child’s hazard exposure of an increased probability a parent fails to access or have command over a technique of exposure prevention or that a technique is ineffective in preventing exposure. Also, we consider these effects when the parent is unsure what a technique can do to reduce the child’s probability of exposure. We conclude public policies designed to encourage use of a particular childcare technique, if childcare quality and quantity are stochastic substitutes, can reduce parental use of other techniques. The net impact of the policy could increase the chance the child suffers. Although the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency provided financial support through Grant #R82871601, this research has not been subjected to the Agency’s required peer and policy review and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency. Thanks to the Economic Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for their funding support as well. Thanks to David Finnoff, Michael Caputo, the reviewers, and participants at the conference on Risk Perception and Valuation at University of Central Florida for their helpful comments. All views remain our own.     

Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach and the dangers of libertarian paternalism

The force of Sugden’s critique of Sen’s capability approach depends on the interpretation of the approach adopted. It is persuasive when public reasoning about what is good (or best) for people can justify policies which promote opportunity through (potentially objectionable) restrictions on liberty. Sunstein’s discussion of preference formation and politics shares key elements of Sen’s views. His proposals for democratic controls illustrate the potential danger Sugden signals about application of the capability approach. Sugden is also critical of paternalist views inspired by the findings of behavioural economics. One of these—Sunstein and Thaler’s ‘libertarian paternalism’—is a worrying extension of Sunstein’s earlier views and opens the door to a much wider range of interventions. Sugden rightly and forcefully resists it. His critique of the capability approach may, by contrast, be better seen as sounding a cautionary note than as an act of resistance.     

Religion in macroeconomics: a quantitative analysis of Weber’s thesis

Max Weber in 1905 claimed that Protestantism, and more specifically Calvinism, facilitated the rise of capitalism. This paper assesses the quantitative plausibility of his hypothesis by introducing religious beliefs into a dynamic general equilibrium model of development and growth. Through counterfactual exercises, the paper investigates whether differences between Catholics and Protestants most closely identified with the Protestant Work Ethic can account for long delays in the start of Industrialization observed between various countries and regions. The main finding is that these differences may possibly explain why Northern Europe developed before Southern Europe, but they cannot explain why Europe developed before Latin America.

Many of the tenets of Calvinism have had profound social implications–in particular, that thrift, industry, and hard work are forms of moral virtue and that business success is an evidence of God’s grace. Because these views helped to create a climate favorable to commerce, Calvinism played a role in the overthrow of feudalism and the establishment of capitalism. Microsoft Encarta

We thank Doug Gollin, Larry Neal, Richard Layton, as well as seminar participants at University of Wisconsin Madison and Vanderbilt University for their comments.