Is central bank conservatism desirable under learning?

In a New Keynesian model, we consider the delegation problem of the government when the central bank optimally sets discretionary monetary policy taking account of private expectations formed through adaptive learning. Learning gives rise to an incentive for the central bank to accommodate less the effect of inflation expectations and cost-push shocks on inflation and induces thus a deviation from rational expectations equilibrium. However, discretionary monetary policy under learning suffers from an excessively low stabilization bias. To improve the social welfare, the government should appoint a liberal central banker, i.e., set a negative optimal inflation penalty that decreases with the value of learning coefficient. The main conclusions are valid under both constant- and decreasing-gain learning.     

Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective

This paper investigates the performances of an inflation targeting regime in a learning economy framed as an Agent-Based Model (ABM). We keep our ABM as close as possible to the original New Keynesian (NK) model, but we model the individual behaviour of the agents under procedural rationality à la Simon. Accordingly, we assume that their behaviour is guided by simple rules of thumb – or heuristics – while a continuous learning process governs the evolution of those rules. Under these assumptions that also allow the emergence of agents heterogeneity, we analyze the dynamics of the economy without assuming rational expectations, and study the role that a central bank, implementing an inflation targeting regime via a monetary policy rule, can play in the orientation of these dynamics. Consequently, our main goal is to analyse the interplay between the learning mechanisms operating at the individual level and the features and performances of the inflation targeting regime. Our results point to the prime importance of the credibility of central bank's inflation target regarding macroeconomic stabilisation, as well as the beneficial role played by that target as an anchoring device for private inflation expectations. We also establish the potential welfare cost of imperfect public information and contribute to the current debate on optimal monetary policy rules under imperfect common knowledge and uncertainty.     

Optimal price‐level drift under commitment in the canonical New Keynesian model

Abstract In both the canonical and many extended versions of the New Keynesian model, optimal monetary policy under commitment implies price‐level stationarity as long as expectations are rational. We show that this is no longer the case if the central bank and private agents make decisions before observing current shocks. The optimal amount of price‐level drift in response to unexpected innovations to inflation is quantitatively important. This result has important implications for monetary policy, including the design of the optimal loss function for the central bank if it cannot commit to its future policies.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

The BMW Model: A New Framework for Teaching Monetary Economics

Abstract: Although the IS/LM-AS/AD model is still the central tool of macroeconomic teaching in most macroeconomic textbooks, it has been criticized by several economists. Colander (1995) demonstrated that the framework is logically inconsistent, Romer (2000) showed that it is unable to deal with a monetary policy that uses the interest rate as its operating target, and Walsh criticized that it is not well suited for an analysis of inflation targeting. The authors present a framework that develops the Romer approach into a very simple but, at the same time, comprehensive macroeconomic model. In spite of its simplicity, it can carry the main insights of the New Keynesian macroeconomics to an intermediate level and deal with issues like inflation targeting, monetary policy rules, and central bank credibility.     

Expectation traps in a new Keynesian open economy model

This paper illustrates that the presence of a money demand distortion in an otherwise standard new Keynesian open economy model results in multiple discretionary equilibria that arise in the form of expectations traps. If private sector inflation expectations become sufficiently unanchored, the model predicts that a monetary authority can easily be trapped into validating these expectations, thereby pushing the economy to a lower welfare equilibrium. Given the ease with which expectation traps arise in the presence of international linkages, the main result presented here suggests that maintaining well-anchored inflation expectations is a critically important policy goal for central banks in open economies.     

Inflation targeting and exchange rate volatility smoothing: A two-target,two-instrument approach

This paper introduces a strategy to model a small open economy, whose central bank has established two simultaneous policy objectives: an inflation target, and a maximum limit for nominal exchange rate volatility. In line with the Tinbergen–Aoki condition, the monetary authority establishes two policy instruments, one for accomplishing each target: the monetary policy rate, and the stock of foreign exchange reserves. Monetary policy analysis is built around a non-microfounded augmented New Keynesian DSGE model estimated through Bayesian techniques for the Guatemalan economy. It is found that each instrument is efficient in accomplishing its own target. Nevertheless, a coordinated effort is required for central bank policymakers before employing both instruments simultaneously, in order to avoid sending mixed signals to economic agents about its monetary policy stance, and endanger the achievement of its inflation target.     

EXTREME EVENTS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

This article studies the implication of extreme shocks for monetary policy. The analysis is based on a small‐scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages where shocks are drawn from asymmetric generalized extreme value distributions. A nonlinear perturbation solution of the model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. Under the Ramsey policy, the central bank responds nonlinearly and asymmetrically to shocks. The trade‐off between targeting a gross inflation rate above 1 as insurance against extreme shocks and targeting an average gross inflation at unity to avoid adjustment costs is unambiguously decided in favor of strict price stability.     

Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58     

Monetary policy and commodity terms of trade shocks in emerging market economies

Commodity terms of trade shocks have continued to drive macroeconomic fluctuations in most emerging market economies. The volatility and persistence of these shocks have posed great challenges for monetary policy. This study employs a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to evaluate the optimal monetary policy responses to commodity terms of trade shocks in commodity dependent emerging market economies. The model is calibrated to the South African economy. The study shows that CPI inflation targeting performs relatively better than exchange rate targeting and non-traded inflation targeting both in terms of reducing macroeconomic volatility and reducing the losses of a non-benevolent central bank. However, macroeconomic stabilisation comes at a cost of increased exchange rate volatility. The results suggest that the appropriate response to commodity induced exogenous shocks is to target CPI inflation.     

Inflation,oil price volatility and monetary policy

In a fully micro-founded New Keynesian framework, we characterize an analytical relationship between average inflation and oil price volatility by solving the rational expectations equilibrium of the model up to second order of accuracy. The model shows that higher oil price volatility induces higher levels of average inflation. We also show that when oil has low substitutability in the production function, the higher the weight the central bank assigns to inflation in the policy rule, the lower the level of average inflation is. The analytical solution further indicates that, for a given level of oil price volatility, average inflation is higher when marginal costs are convex in oil prices, the Phillips Curve is convex, and the degree of relative price dispersion is higher. The evolution of inflation during the 70s and 80s is consistent with the prediction of the model.     

Trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability objectives

Ten years after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, most advanced economies have recovered and global economic growth has taken hold. However, partly due to accommodative financial conditions, financial risks are on the rise while inflation remains subdued. This revives the debate on the role of monetary policy in containing financial risks. This paper provides a framework to investigate trade-offs between macroeconomic and financial stability when the central bank has a financial stability objective. Relying on a New Keynesian model with an endogenous financial bubble, our simulations suggest that a central bank attempting to “lean against the wind” may face trade-offs between inflation/output stability and financial stability. We therefore argue that the interest rate should be used for achieving traditional macroeconomic goals, and a second, macroprudential instrument should complement the policy rate to tackle financial risk accumulation.     

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES FOR MODEL ROBUSTNESS

Using a New Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine the accountability issue in a framework of delegation where government and private agents are uncertain about the central bank's preference for model robustness. We show that, in the benchmark case of full transparency, the optimal inflation targeting weight (or penalty) is decreasing with the preference for robustness. Departing from the benchmark equilibrium, the central bank has then incentive to be less transparent in order to reduce the optimal inflation targeting weight and thus to become more independent vis‐à‐vis the government. We also find that greater opacity will increase the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification to the inflation shock but will decrease that of output‐gap. Since macroeconomic volatility could be increased or decreased under more opacity, there could exist in some cases a trade‐off between the level and the variability of inflation (and output gap). Persistent inflation shocks could be associated with a higher inflation targeting weight as well as a higher sensibility of inflation and output gap to the inflation shock but a lower sensibility of model misspecification.     

Inflation forecasting using the New Keynesian Phillips Curve with a time-varying trend

Does theory aid inflation forecasting? To address this question, we develop a novel forecasting procedure based upon a New Keynesian Phillips Curve that incorporates time-varying trend inflation, to capture shifts in central bank preferences and monetary policy frameworks. We generate theory-implied predictions for both the trend and cyclical components of inflation, and recombine them to obtain an overall inflation forecast. Using quarterly data for the Euro Area and the United States that cover almost half a century, we compare our inflation forecasting procedure against the most popular time series models. We find that our theory-based forecasts outperform these benchmarks that previous studies found difficult to beat. Our results are shown to be robust to structural breaks, geographic areas, and variants of the econometric specification. Our findings suggest that the scepticism concerning the use of theory in forecasting is unwarranted, and theory should continue to play an important role in policymaking.     

What do Latin American inflation targeters care about? A comparative Bayesian estimation of central bank preferences

This paper employs Bayesian estimation to uncover the central bank preferences of the five Latin American inflation targeting countries with floating exchange rates: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. The target weights of each country’s central bank loss function are estimated using a medium-scale small open economy New Keynesian model with imperfect exchange-rate pass-through under either complete or incomplete international asset markets. Bayesian model comparison selects: (i) unambiguously the complete markets model version; (ii) the model specification with explicit concern for real exchange rate stabilization, with the exception of Peru. Our results suggest that the central banks of Mexico and Peru are closest to following a strict inflation targeting regime, whereas Brazil, Chile, and Colombia also assign a sizeable weight to output gap and real exchange rate stabilization. Finally, the estimated preference weights for each central bank are shown to credibly reflect their legal mandates.     

Monetary policy strategies in the New Normal: A model-based analysis for the euro area

A calibrated New Keynesian model of the euro area is used to evaluate the stabilization properties of alternative monetary policy strategies when the natural rate of interest is low (“new normal”) and the probability of reaching the effective lower bound (ELB) is non-negligible. Price level targeting is the most effective strategy in terms of stabilizing inflation and output and reducing the duration and frequency of ELB episodes. Temporary price level targeting is also effective in mitigating the ELB constraint, although its stabilization properties are inferior to those of price level targeting. Backward-looking average inflation targeting performs well and is preferable to inflation targeting. The effectiveness of these alternative strategies hinges upon the commitment of a central bank to keeping the policy rate “lower for longer” and is influenced by agents’ expectation formation mechanism.     

Sectoral inflation persistence and optimal monetary policy

This paper examines optimal monetary policy in a new Keynesian model with sectoral inflation persistence. It focuses on the welfare differential between timeless perspective (TP) and a purely discretionary monetary policy. Sectoral inflation persistence renders the central bank’s optimization problem more complicated under both cases of constant elasticity of substitution consumption index and generalized rule-of-thumb price setting. We find that there are substantial gains from employing a TP policy. This paper addresses the fact that this gain is robust with any changes in key structural parameters.     

Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters

Monetary policy analyses usually assume an atomistic private sector, thereby ignoring potential interactions between policy and wage-setting decisions. Yet, non-atomistic wage setters are a key feature of several industrialized economies. We study the economic consequence of non-atomistic agents and show that this qualifies previous results on the effects and desirability of a conservative central banker. In particular, the central bank aversion to inflation may have a permanent effect on structural employment, while no such effect emerges with atomistic agents.     

Destabilizing effects of a successful stabilization: a forward-looking explanation of the second Hungarian hyperinflation

Summary. The extreme severity of the second Hungarian hyperinflation is argued to be related to the unusual way in which the inflation was eventually stabilized. The historical features of this episode are represented in a general equilibrium model, which incorporates a transition from one monetary regime to another. During the inflation the government finances a fixed deficit with seigniorage revenue. After the stabilization the government budget is balanced and the central bank engages in a program of subsidized lending to the private sector. Stabilization is achieved by targeting a low inflation rate path through adjustments in the quantity of central bank lending. I show that under this stabilization policy (1) the dynamic equilibrium path of the economy is indeterminate and (2) arbitrarily high pre-stabilization inflation rates are possible. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998     

The nature and role of monetary policy when money is endogenous

This paper considers the nature and role of monetary policywhen money is modelled as credit money endogenously createdwithin the private sector. There are currently two schools ofthought that view money as endogenous: one has been labelledthe ‘new consensus’ in macroeconomics, and the otheris the Keynesian endogenous (bank) money approach. The paperfirst explores the analysis of monetary policy in the ‘newconsensus’ macroeconomic model, followed by an examinationof the effectiveness of monetary policy in that analysis. TheKeynesian view of endogenous money is discussed, and the rolefor monetary policy in a Keynesian endogenous monetary policyanalysis is considered, including discussion of the objectivesand instruments of monetary policy.