The Role of United Charities in Fundraising: The Case of Singapore

Abstract: Theory suggests that a united charity helps to economize on fundraising costs by reducing competition for donations among member charities. However, donors often cannot control the allocation of their donations, and charities may dislike the monitoring of their activities. This paper examines these and other issues relating to the Community Chest of Singapore. The results, based on analysis of financial positions and fundraising costs of a large number of charities, suggest that the Community Chest does possess important fundraising advantages. Thus charities in financial difficulties or in need of funds for additional programs tend to seek membership. However, organizations that value their autonomy and independence, and that are able to achieve low fundraising costs tend to remain as non‐members. Thus a monopoly agency raising funds for all charities in the future is unlikely in the case of Singapore.     

Goodwill bazaar: NGO competition and giving to development

This paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated NGOs. NGOs allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising, which attracts private donations. If the market size is fixed, the fundraising levels increase with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal number, depending on the efficiency of the fundraising technology. If the market size is endogenous and NGOs cooperate in attracting new donors, fundraising levels decrease with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs is smaller than the one that maximizes the welfare of donors and beneficiaries. If NGOs can divert funds for private use, multiple equilibria (with high diversion and no diversion of funds) appear.     

Leadership Giving in Charitable Fund-Raising

Why do charities often begin new capital fund drives by announcing a large contribution by a single wealthy donor? This paper explores the possibility that such “leadership giving” provides a signal to all other givers that the charity is of high quality. The dilemma is that if the lead giver can deceive others to believe the charity is of higher quality than it truly is, then these followers will make larger contributions, which will benefit the leader. Hence, the leader must give an unusually large amount to convey a credible signal of the quality. This sets up a war‐of‐attrition game for who will pay the cost to signal the quality. Since the wealthy have the lowest opportunity cost of providing the signal, they, in equilibrium, move first to provide the signal of quality with exceptionally large gifts.     

Fundraising and Optimal Policy Rules

This paper develops a simple spatial model of fundraising, in which charities select a target population to solicit donations. First, we show that in a competitive charity market without any intervention, the number of charities in the market and/or the overall net funds raised by charities may be suboptimal. Next, we analyze whether a social planner can prevent such shortcomings and show that a regulatory mechanism can be designed to achieve socially desirable outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature, our model does not necessarily produce monopoly as the optimal market structure. We show that if fixed costs associated with establishing charities are sufficiently low, then the optimal market structure is not a monopoly. Given the importance of the trade‐off between the volume and variety of charitable services, we argue that this result may be of particular interest to policy makers.     

Economic evaluation of healthcare technology improving the quality of social life: the case of assistive technology for the disabled and elderly

Public investments in healthcare technology for the disabled and elderly to improve the quality of social life have been vigorous, but the economic evaluation of the assistive technology is still lacking. Under this circumstance, the purpose of this study is to analyse the socio-economic value of developing assistive technologies with the potential to improve the quality of social life, especially for disabled and elderly individuals. Based on a survey of 400 respondents, the spike model, a special form of the contingent valuation method (CVM) is applied to assess the value of assistive technologies. In Korea, a household’s willingness-to-pay (WTP) for the development of assistive technologies is US$4.26 per year, on average, in the form of a government-levied tax; although many people express zero WTP for the development of these technologies, people with higher household savings, higher levels of education and higher levels of charity donations have a higher WTP for the development of assistive technology. We conclude that although assistive technologies have considerable economic value many people express zero WTP for the development of these technologies. Therefore, political and social educational efforts are necessary to reach social consensus on the government investment in such technologies.     

Corporate Social Responsibility in the work place

We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers’ motivation. In our experiment, a gift exchange game variant, CSR is captured by donating a certain share of a firm’s profit to charity. We are testing for CSR effects by varying the possible share of profits given to charity. Additionally, we investigate the effect of matching mission preferences, i.e., a worker preferring the same charity the firm donates to. Our results show that, on average, workers reciprocate investments in CSR with increased effort. Matching mission preferences also result in higher effort, independently of the extent of the CSR investment.     

On the disequilibrium dynamics of sequential monetary economies

The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamic behavior of a sequential monetary exchange economy. Transactions take place sequentially against non-equilibrium prices, there is quantity rationing, and credit or cash are the only means of exchange. Agents have optimistic or pessimistic expectations about quantity constraints that represent their beliefs about future trading opportunities.In the credit model the agents incur debts along the transition path towards equilibrium, while in the cash-in-advance model convergence takes place without the occurrence of any debts or claims. The credit mechanism is shown to act as a ‘soft’ correction mechanism on credit fluctuations, while the cash-in-advance constraint acts as a ‘hard’ negative feedback effect driving the prices back towards a neighborhood of a monetary cash-in-advance equilibrium.     

Charitable giving among females and males: an empirical test of the competitive altruism hypothesis

We conduct a real-effort task experiment where subjects’ performance translates into a donation to a charity. In a within-subjects design we vary the visibility of the donation (no/private/public feedback). Confirming previous studies, we find that subjects’ performance increases, that is, they donate more to charity, when their relative performance is made public. In line with the competitive altruism hypothesis, a biology-based explanation for status-seeking behavior, especially male subjects increase performance in the public setting.     

ESTIMATING THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM BENEFITS OF LARGE CHANGES IN SPATIALLY DELINEATED PUBLIC GOODS*

The purpose of this article is to report a new approach for measuring the general equilibrium willingness to pay for large changes in spatially delineated public goods such as air quality. We estimate the parameters of a locational equilibrium model and compute equilibria for alternative scenarios characterizing the availability of public goods within a system of communities. Welfare measures take into consideration the adjustments of households in equilibrium to nonmarginal changes in public goods. The framework is used to analyze willingness to pay for reductions in ozone concentrations in Southern California between 1990 and 1995.     

Dynamic control of a monopolist’s product and process innovation with reference quality

ABSTRACT

Our main purpose is to investigate the dynamic control problem of a monopolist’s product and process innovation under reference quality. The main features of this article are: (i) a monopolist dealing with customer behaviour in the spirit of the principle of behaviour economics determines the product price, and carries out the activities of product and process innovation; (ii) the consumers’ demand depends on price, product quality and reference quality, and adopts an additive separable demand function form. Our main results show that under the cases of the monopolist optimum and the social planner optimum, (i) there exists an unique stable, which is a saddle-point steady-state equilibrium; (ii) the change rates of the monopolist’s investments in product and process innovation are increasing with the reference quality, while the monopolist’s steady-state investments in product and process innovation are decreasing with the reference quality; (iii) as the memory parameter increases with other parameters kept constant, it is very likely that the monopolist’s investment in process innovation be greater than the investment in product innovation; and (iv) the social incentive towards both investments in product and process innovation is always larger than the private incentive characterizing the profit-seeking monopolist.     

我国慈善组织能力建设:问题及对策

慈善是具有扶危济困作用的公共管理事业,其已日渐成为当代中国社会保障体系的重要组成部分,并有着广阔的发展空间。总体而言,我国目前慈善组织的能力建设水平偏低,这严重影响着慈善事业的发展。文章自公共管理视角对慈善组织能力要素中存在的各种问题分别进行了探讨,并提出了完善慈善组织能力建设的具体思路。     

风险投资家人力资本特征与风险投资基金募集关系研究

风险投资家人力资本特征与其基金募集结果密切相关。以145个风险投资募资团队和252个募资团队领导者为研究样本，分析人力资本特征与风险投资基金募资结果的关系。结果发现，募资规模与募资团队海外背景、整体教育程度显著正相关，与募资团队平均任期显著负相关，与团队领导者海外背景、管理职业背景显著正相关；募资团队海外背景显著有利于外资基金募集；募资团队整体人力资本特征对基金募集的影响高于团队领导者人力资本特质。该成果拓展了对风险投资基金募集的研究，为风险投资机构培养与选拔募资人才及团队提供了理论依据。     

Performance Pay and Adverse Selection*

It is well known in personnel economics that firms may improve the quality of their workforce by offering performance pay. We analyze an equilibrium model where worker productivity is private information and show that the firms’ gain from worker self‐selection may not be matched by a corresponding social gain. In particular, the equilibrium incentive contracts are excessively high‐powered, thereby inducing the more productive workers to exert too much effort and increasing agency costs stemming from the misallocation of effort.     

Dishonesty and charitable behavior

We examine in the laboratory how having the opportunity to donate to a charity in the future affects the likelihood of engaging in dishonest behavior in the present. We also examine how charitable donations are affected by past ethical choices. First, subjects self-report their performance on a task, which provides them with an opportunity for undetected cheating. In the second stage they can donate some of the money earned in the first stage to a charity. Only subjects in the treatment group know about the opportunity to donate in the second stage. We find that more subjects cheat if they know they can donate some of the money to charity. We also find that subjects in treatment end up donating less to charity and that both honest and dishonest subjects donate less in treatment. We propose a new hypothesis that explains these results: past violations of social norms numb one’s conscience, leading to more antisocial behavior.     

Bargaining over loan contracts with signaling

This paper combines a sequential bargaining game between an enterprise and a fixed number of banks with a signaling game through which the enterprise reveals her project quality as well as her market-speed on the lending market. We characterize subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium loan contracts that are supported by separating perfect Bayesian equilibria in the signaling game. In contrast to existing models of lending markets, low-quality investment projects might be rewarded with more favorable equilibrium loan contracts than high-quality projects. Also in contrast to existing models, an increase in the competitive pressure between banks reduces the aggregate welfare in our model. The reason is that more favorable loan conditions come with a greater incentive for the ‘strong’ entrepreneur to distinguish herself from her ‘weak’ counterpart through socially wasteful signaling costs.     

Employment,labor supply and real wages in market disequilibrium

The purpose of this paper is to provide estimates of a disequilibrium labor market model which has been fitted to the US private non-farm sector and to the manufacturing sector. After examining the rationale of the ‘minimum’-type disequilibrium model, we reject it in favor of a formulation suggested by Chow. The latter provides not only a wage adjustment mechanism, but also a quantity adjustment mechanism and treats wages and quantities symmetrically. The empirical findings for both sectors support the disequilibrium formulation employed and reject the equilibrium hypothesis for the labor market.     

Planning capital-labor substitution and intertemporal equilibrium with a non-linear multi-sector growth model

A non-linear multi-sector model, postulating sectoral production functions and price-responsive demand functions linked around an input-output matrix in a general equilibrium framework, is used to simulate capital-labor substitution on a growth path characterized by intertemporal equilibrium. It demonstrates how the ‘temporary equilibrium’ or ‘sequential temporary equilibrium’ form of models that allow substitution can be extended into an intertemporally indecomposable equilibrium model without abandoning interaction between prices and quantities in the determination of technology and demand. The model is applied to the analysis of the impact of changes in real-wage growth on the characteristics of the equilibrium growth path of the Turkish economy with special attention given to the employment problem.     

On General and Specific Transfers for Child Support in Divorce

In a post-divorce equilibrium under joint legal custody of a child the paper compares the effect of two different transfer schemes, a general purpose transfer scheme and a specific purpose transfer scheme, from non-custodial parent to the custodial parent of the child on his/her welfare. Surprisingly, it finds that the marginal effects are neutral. The result contributes to the policy framework by suggesting that the lawyers/courts can choose the two alternatives equivalently in settling the child custody cases in a post-divorce situation. The paper also characterizes such transfer schemes and proves that the schemes can never restore the child’s welfare at the ‘happy marriage’ equilibrium level.

     

Product and process innovations in the life cycle of an industry

Filson [Rev. Econ. Dyn. 4 (2001)] uses industry-level data on firm numbers, price, quantity and quality along with an equilibrium model of industry evolution to estimate the nature and effects of quality and cost improvements in the personal computer industry and four other new industries. This paper studies the personal computer industry in more detail and shows that the model explains some peculiar patterns that cannot be explained by previous life-cycle models. The model’s estimates are evaluated using historical studies of the evolution of the personal computer industry and patterns that require further model development are described.     

Assessing the employment effects of the German welfare reform – an integrated CGE-microsimulation approach

The purpose of this article is to quantify the employment effects of the recent German welfare reform. The key element of this reform was to merge the coexisting transfer systems Social Assistance (SA) and Unemployment Assistance (UA) into one unified benefit (Arbeitslosengeld II – ALG II). We also consider a second reform scenario that is intended to further improve the labour supply incentives of low-skilled workers. Our methodological contribution is to use an integrated CGE-microsimulation model. In adopting such an approach, we are able to combine the advantages of microsimulation studies by accounting for the large amount of heterogeneity in terms of households’ preferences and budget constraints with the advantages of an applied general equilibrium model. The latter permits us to identify potential general equilibrium repercussions through changes in wages and unemployment. The simulations indicate that the introduction of ALG II results in a negligible increase in employment of only 45?000 individuals. In contrast, a cut in benefit levels combined with a decrease in transfer withdrawal is shown to produce somewhat larger employment effects of about 190?000 individuals.