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1.
In this paper, we identify the conditions under which a strategy is weakly dominated if and only if it is not sequential best response. In addition, we explore the implication for extensive form rationalizability.  相似文献   

2.
We study implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium by bounded mechanisms. (An undominated Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in which no agent uses a weakly dominated strategy. A mechanism is bounded if every dominated strategy is dominated by some undominated strategy.) We identify necessary conditions and sufficient conditions for such implementation. These conditions are satisfied in virtually all economic environments, and are also satisfied by interesting correspondences from the social choice literature. For economic settings, we provide a particularly simple implementing mechanism for which the undominated equilibrium outcomes coincide with those obtained from the iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 022, 025, 026.  相似文献   

3.
An action is robustly rationalizable if it is rationalizable for every type who has almost common certainty of payoffs. We illustrate by means of an example that an action may not be robustly rationalizable even if it is weakly dominant, and argue that robust rationalizability is a very stringent refinement of rationalizability. Nonetheless, we show that every strictly rationalizable action is robustly rationalizable. We also investigate how permissive robust rationalizability becomes if we require that players be fully certain of their own payoffs.  相似文献   

4.
In an extensive form game, an assessment is said to satisfy the one-deviation property if for all possible payoffs at the terminal nodes the following holds: if a player at each of his information sets cannot improve upon his expected payoff by deviating unilaterally at this information set only, he cannot do so by deviating at any arbitrary collection of information sets. Hendon et al. (1996. Games Econom. Behav. 12, 274–282) have shown that pre-consistency of assessments implies the one-deviation property. In this note, it is shown that an appropriate weakening of pre-consistency, termed updating consistency, is both a sufficient and necessary condition for the one-deviation property. The result is extended to the context of rationalizability.  相似文献   

5.
We study the strategic interaction between a new good producer and a remanufacturer who use advertising campaigns to compete for a dominant share of the market for a certain good. Each firm chooses one of three possible strategies for running its advertising campaign. The two rival firms care only about capturing a dominant share of the relevant market. Hence, if a firm expects to capture dominant market share with probability p ∈ [0, 1], then its payoff in the game we study is also p. Our analysis leads to four results. First, we provide the normal form representation of the game between the new good producer and the remanufacturer. Second, we specify the game in matrix form. Third, we indicate what happens at each stage of the elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Finally, we show that the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies yields a clear and unique prediction about the outcome of the advertising game.  相似文献   

6.
Continuous-time game dynamics are typically first order systems where payoffs determine the growth rate of the players? strategy shares. In this paper, we investigate what happens beyond first order by viewing payoffs as higher order forces of change, specifying e.g. the acceleration of the players? evolution instead of its velocity (a viewpoint which emerges naturally when it comes to aggregating empirical data of past instances of play). To that end, we derive a wide class of higher order game dynamics, generalizing first order imitative dynamics, and, in particular, the replicator dynamics. We show that strictly dominated strategies become extinct in n-th order payoff-monotonic dynamics n   orders as fast as in the corresponding first order dynamics; furthermore, in stark contrast to first order, weakly dominated strategies also become extinct for n?2n?2. All in all, higher order payoff-monotonic dynamics lead to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies, thus providing a dynamic justification of the well-known epistemic rationalizability process of Dekel and Fudenberg [7]. Finally, we also establish a higher order analogue of the folk theorem of evolutionary game theory, and we show that convergence to strict equilibria in n-th order dynamics is n orders as fast as in first order.  相似文献   

7.
The present note analyzes the simultaneous ascending-bid auction with arbitrarily many asymmetric bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.We would like to thank seminar participants at UC Davis, in particular Klaus Nehring and Louis Makowski for comments. Financial support by the Alexander–von–Humboldt Foundation through a Feodor–Lynen grant and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB Transregio 15, “Governance and Efficiency of Economic Systems” is gratefully acknowledged.  相似文献   

8.
The replicator dynamics are generalized to allow for strategy-specific barriers to learning. The resulting dynamics satisfy neither payoff monotonicity nor payoff positivity, but do satisfy weak payoff positivity. It is shown that initial states from which trajectories converge to a rest point under the replicator dynamics may yield trajectories which approach a stable limit cycle under the generalized replicator dynamics. Furthermore, strategies which are strictly dominated by other pure strategies may survive indefinitely along such nonconvergent paths.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73.  相似文献   

9.
The power of ESS: An experimental study   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
Abstract. Our experimental design mimics a traditional evolutionary game framework where players are matched pairwise to play a symmetric 33 bimatrix game that has two Nash equilibria. One equilibrium is an evolutionary stable state, or ESS; the other is an equilibrium in dominated strategies. Our primary experimental result is the observation that the ESS becomes extremely attractive when subjects have minimal information about the payoff functions, although the dominated equilibrium assures the highest equilibrium payoff. The attractiveness of the ESS is only moderate when players are completely informed about the 33 payoff matrix. Correspondence to: S.K. Berninghaus  相似文献   

10.
This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The (best) response of a coalition is defined to be an operator from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. A strategy is epistemic coalitionally rationalizable if it is consistent with rationality and common certainty that every coalition is rational. A characterization of this solution set is provided for operators satisfying four basic properties. Special attention is devoted to an operator that leads to a solution concept that is generically equivalent to the iteratively defined concept of coalitional rationalizability.  相似文献   

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