Does economic freedom increase income inequality? Evidence from the EU countries

This paper examines the relationship between economic liberalization and income inequality in the EU using panel data for the 2000s. The empirical evidence suggests that economic freedom is strongly related to income inequality. However, not all areas of economic freedom affect income distribution similarly. Government size is robustly associated with inequality, and also when controlling for potential endogeneity in a dynamic panel data analysis. Regulation is linked to income inequality as well, whereas legal system and sound money have no significant effects on income distribution. In the case of freedom to trade internationally, the relationship differs between old (EU-15) and new (former socialist) EU countries.     

Inequality and Participative Democracy: A Self-Reinforcing Mechanism

During the last three decades, a notable increase in economic inequality is observed, accompanied by a decline in people's engagement in politics and electoral participation. This is an unsatisfactory phenomenon as it undermines the legitimacy of democratic representation. This negative association is produced by a complex salient mechanism. This study aims at investigating this issue. Using data from a panel of 28 OECD and European countries, this paper identifies a two-way causal relationship between inequality and political participation. The results show that greater income inequality alienates and discourages people from engaging with common affairs, thus leading to lower political participation. Yet, lower electoral participation leads towards a less equitable distribution of income. Hence, this study reveals a self-reinforcing mechanism where the unequal distribution of income leads to political exclusion, which in turn leads to more inequality.     

Do liberalization and globalization increase income inequality?

Using the Standardized World Income Inequality Database, we examine if the KOF Index of Globalization and the Economic Freedom Index of the Fraser institute are related to within-country income inequality using panel data covering around 80 countries 1970–2005. Freedom to trade internationally is robustly related to inequality, also when adding several control variables and controlling for potential endogeneity using GMM. Social globalization and deregulation is also linked to inequality. Reforms towards economic freedom seem to increase inequality mainly in rich countries, and social globalization is more important in less developed countries. Monetary reforms, legal reforms and political globalization do not increase inequality.     

Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

Exchange rates and fundamentals: A bootstrap panel data analysis

This study attempts to re-examine the Granger non-causality from exchange rates to observed fundamentals based on the present value model of Engel and West (2005). To this end, we employ the bootstrap panel Granger non-causality analysis, which allows us to untangle the causal nexus between exchange rates and fundamentals in panel data. Among the main results, it is found that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence across the members of the panel is strongly rejected, indicating that the bootstrap critical value is required in conducting the panel Granger non-causality test. The null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from the fundamentals to exchange rates is significantly rejected, implying that the monetary approach of exchange rate determination is a useful benchmark to understand the evolution of the exchange rate. Empirical evidences also show that exchange rates Granger-case the fundamentals, supporting the view that exchange rates are determined as the present value that depends in part on observed fundamentals.     

The Meritocratic Elite vs. the Common Man: Income Inequality in the Affluent OECD Countries

Our goal is to highlight the relationship between vested interests of the meritocratic elite and the deteriorating situation of the common man. We provide an example of rising income inequality in selected OECD countries over the past thirty years. Income inequality is growing, despite the increase in labor productivity based on technological progress, which we prove by using robust panel regression models. Our findings could be explained by the effect of “extreme meritocracy” that describes a situation in which wages for “the working rich” are growing faster than their productivity, and creating wage stagnation for the middle-class workers.     

ECONOMIC FREEDOM AND INCOME INEQUALITY REVISITED: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL ERROR CORRECTION MODEL

We investigate the causal relationship between income inequality and economic freedom using data from U.S. states over the period 1981 to 2004 within a panel error correction model framework. The results indicate bidirectional causality between income inequality and economic freedom in both the short and the long run. These results suggest that high income inequality may cause states to implement redistributive policies causing economic freedom to decline. As economic freedom declines, income inequality rises even more. In other words, it is quite possible for a state to get caught in a vicious circle of high income inequality and heavy redistribution. (JEL D63, H11)     

Institutional transformation and the origins of world income distribution

This paper presents an attempt to quantify institutional changes and examine the respective effects of de jure and de facto political institutions on the path of long-run economic growth and development for a large panel of countries in the period 1810–2000. Using factor analysis, latent indices of de jure and de facto political institutions are constructed by exploiting several existing institutional datasets. The empirical evidence consistently suggests that societies with more extractive political institutions in Latin America, South Asia, Middle East and Eastern Europe have achieved systematically slower long-run economic growth and failed to catch-up with the West. The evidence confirms the primacy of de facto institutional differences over de jure institutions in causing differential growth and development outcomes over time. It also explains why highly concentrated political power and extractive political regimes inhibited the path of economic growth by setting persistent barriers to the engagement in collective action. In the long run, institutional differences account for up to two thirds of within-country development path and up to 83% of between-country development gaps.     

Does greater income inequality cause increased work hours? New evidence from high income economies

We explore the extent to which individual's allocation of time between labour and leisure is affected by the consumption standards of the rich. Utilizing a panel data methodology and panel Granger causality tests we investigate the relationship between income inequality and work hours for a cluster of 24 high-income OECD countries over the period 1990–2015. Four alternative measures of income inequality are considered. We find that greater income inequality is associated with longer work hours indicating stronger concern for conspicuous consumption rather than conspicuous leisure. Even though the resulting estimates lend support to the theoretical framework on consumption emulation, the generated evidence also appears to be in line with a Duesenberry's and Frank's expenditure cascading approach. The ambiguity however arising from the Granger Causality tests appears to lead – to a certain extent – to different conclusions about the direction of causality or whether a causal relationship does even exist. It is therefore imperative that caution should be exercised when interpreting the direction of the causal dimension.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

CAN GREATER ATTENTION TO WOMEN'S RIGHTS HELP ADDRESS INCOME INEQUALITY?

We investigate the relationship between women's economic, social, and political rights with the level of income inequality. We use dynamic panel estimation to check our hypothesis that that strong rights for women translate into higher participation in economic productive activities, improve income and education and support for future generations, thus reducing the overall income inequality in the economy. We further look at how a country's overall economic performance and the status of women's education alter the relationship. The relationship is strengthened if countries are either in the higher‐income spectrum or have higher levels of female educational attainment. (JEL O1, I00, H00)     

ICT and income inequality: a cross-national perspective

The importance of information and communications technology (ICT) for economic growth and development is widely researched and seemingly well understood, but the effect of such investments on income inequality is less well documented. On the one hand, improvements in infrastructure are expected to expand economic opportunities for previously underserved populations. On the other hand, ICT growth may exacerbate inequality due to differential access and skill premiums. We use panel data from 109 countries during the period 2001–2014 to examine the empirical connection between ICT and income inequality in a cross-national context. Our results suggest that the effect of ICT on income inequality depends both on the specific type of ICT and on the measure of income inequality. In addition, the magnitude of ICT’s effect on income inequality is comparable to that of more traditional forms of economic infrastructure. Finally, we find that the association between ICT and income inequality is conditional on other economic and political characteristics.     

Endogenous institutional change after independence

Independence from colonial rule was a key event for both political and economic reasons. We argue that newly independent countries often inherited sub-optimal institutional arrangements, which the new regimes reacted to in very different ways. We present a model of endogenous changes in property rights institutions where an autocratic post-colonial elite faces a basic trade-off between stronger property rights, which increases the dividends from the modern sector, and weaker property rights that increases the elite's ability to appropriate resource rents. The model predicts that revenue-maximizing regimes in control of an abundance of resource rents and with insignificant interests in the modern sector will rationally install weak institutions of private property, a prediction which we argue is well in line with the experience of several developing countries.     

Media freedom and democracy in the fight against corruption

Democratization and media freedom have been suggested as useful tools in the fight against political corruption, but so far their interplay in this fight has received scant attention. We present a game theoretic model which allows for varying quality of media freedom and democratic institutions. The model predicts, among others, that democratization and media freedom are complements in the fight against political corruption. We test our theoretical predictions using differences-in-differences estimations and panel data covering 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. We find evidence of causal effects of democratization and media freedom on corruption, and that the two are complements. Our main results hold after controlling for income, country fixed effects, and continent-specific time-varying shocks.     

Global distribution and dynamics of economic freedom: Non-parametric approach

The paper exploits the distributional dynamics and structural changes in the endogenous distribution of economic freedom across countries over time by utilizing the Rosenblatt–Parzen Kernel density estimator compared to the original distribution based on the methodology proposed by the Heritage Foundation. We utilize the distribution of economic freedom as a tool to identify which policies enhanced the overall level of economic freedom. We develop the distribution of endogenous economic freedom by decomposing effects of economic freedom on the level of income per capita in IV–2SLS estimation framework for a panel of 134 countries to identify the effect of institutions of economic freedom on the level of per capita income. Structural estimates indicate that improvements in the monetary, fiscal, and labor freedom exert the strongest direct effect on the level of economic freedom and indirect effect on the level of real income per capita. Our study demonstrates considerable differences between the original and endogenous distributional dynamics of economic freedom over time. In exploiting the non-parametric setting of endogenous economic freedom, we identify a recent emergence of twin-peak distribution across countries where developing nations have improved the level of economic freedom considerably compared to the initial year.     

The moderating role of culture on the benefits of economic freedom: Cross-country analysis

The implementation of pro-market policies and institutions is often suggested for enhancing a country's development. However, implementing pro-market policies and institutions has a mixed track record. Some have ascribed the bad results to the neglect of people's predispositions, often described as culture. In this study, we argue that successful implementation of pro-market policies and institutions requires that large parts of the population know how to use the resulting freedom in a way that can bring long term benefits. A panel analysis on a sample of 67 countries from 1970 to 2019 confirms this theoretical argument. We find that Long Term Orientation increases the effect of economic freedom on income per capita, whereas Uncertainty Avoidance weakens the positive relationship between economic freedom and income per capita. The policy implication is that the introduction of free market policies and institutions will particularly foster economic development in long-term oriented societies and in societies with low Uncertainty Avoidance.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM: A SURVEY

A large literature has found positive associations between economic freedom and income, growth, and a variety of other desirable outcomes. This paper surveys the literature that seeks to explain the causes of economic freedom. Some of the most consistent findings in this literature are that current levels of economic freedom are strongly correlated with past levels; freer countries have more difficulty continuing to improve their economic freedom; democracy and political freedom are positively associated with economic freedom; and inequality is negatively related. (JEL E02, E14, O17, O43, P1)     

Why is Income Inequality Increasing in the Developed World?

We address empirically the factors affecting the dynamics of income inequality among industrialized economies. Using a panel for 32 developed countries spanning the last four decades, our results indicate that the predictions of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem concerning the effects of international trade on income inequality find support in the data if we concentrate on imports from developing countries as a trade measure, as theory would imply. We find that democratization, the interaction of technology and education, and changes in the relative power of labor unions affect inequality dynamics robustly.     

Income Taxation and the Diversity of Consumer Goods: A Political Economy Approach*

After‐tax income inequality has risen since the mid‐1990s, as increases in market income inequality have not been offset by greater fiscal redistribution. We argue that the substantial increase in the diversity of consumer goods has mitigated mounting political pressures for redistribution. Within a probabilistic voting framework, we demonstrate that if the share of diversified goods in the consumption bundle increases sufficiently with income, then an increase in goods diversity can reduce the political equilibrium tax rate. Focusing on OECD countries, we find empirical support for both the model's micro‐political foundations and the implied relation between goods diversity and fiscal policy outcomes.     

Economic downturns,inequality, and democratic improvements

This paper explores the extent to which discrete improvements in the democratic quality of political institutions can be explained by income inequality. Empirical tests of this relationship have generally yielded null results, though typically test an unconditional relationship. Guided by a theoretical nuance of the “new economic view” of democratization and using an instrumental variable strategy, we re-examine the relationship conditional on the state of the macroeconomy. We demonstrate that the more unequal are societies, the higher the probability of experiencing democratic improvements following economic downturns. Following growth periods, higher income inequality has a slight negative or null effect on the likelihood of democratic improvement. The conditional result provides a simple explanation for why previous literature has found largely null results concerning inequality and democratization and offers additional evidence in support of the new economic view.