The Impact of Company Human Resource Policies on Social Skills: Implications for Training Sponsorship, Quit Rates and Efficiency Wages

The concept of a firm's human capital is reconsidered to include both the technical and the social skills of its workforce. Technical skills are defined by the ability to turn inputs into outputs, and measured by the productivity of unit labour effort. Social skills are defined by the propensity to behave in a manner conducive to the firm's objectives. In other words, social skills are constituted as the norm of effort contribution to which an individual assents, and are measured by observed motivation and behaviour. The existence for firms of a labour management function is proposed and supported, relating social skills to human resource policies. Implications for the labour market are that: (i) firms pay for general training and, at the same time, wages do not necessarily increase with training; (ii) human capital acquisition may not lead to an increase in quitting, even controlling for wages; (iii) human resource policies substitute for efficiency wages or for employee monitoring; and (iv) economies with high organisational commitment have low equilibrium unemployment rates.     

Broad-based intangibles as generators of growth in Europe

This paper analyzes broad performance-based measures of intangibles in European Union countries to find new sources of growth and shows that intangible capital (IC)-driven growth was halted in European industries during the 2008–2013 financial crisis period. Much of this IC, such as purchased organizational, research and development (R&;D) and information and communication technology capital, is unaccounted for in systems of national accounts, so that total IC investment is 29.6% of value added, with R&;D having the lowest gross domestic product share at 5.0%. On average, deteriorating IC growth has decreased labor productivity by ?2.9% annually. Policies fostering multifactor productivity growth have been strongly biased and have ignored the loss of those skills necessary for long-term growth. During 2008–2013, innovation thus failed to compensate for Europe’s dwindling fixed-capital-intensive manufacturing and job losses, but broad-based IC offers a roadmap for recovery by relying on an increasing role for IC-producing services.     

Overcoming environmental scarcity,inequality and structural imbalance in the world economy

The world economy faces two major threats: increasing environmental degradation and a growing gap between rich and poor. The root cause is that natural resources—or natural capital—is underpriced, and hence overly exploited, whereas human capital—the skills embodied in the workforce—is insufficient to meet demand. This outcome has three important consequences. First, all sectors of an economy will use too much natural resources relative to skilled labor. Second, the skilled workers throughout the economy will have higher real incomes and thus will be better off. Third, wealth inequality will increase, as the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers widens. Addressing this structural imbalance requires correcting the two underlying distortions, which are the chronic under-pricing of natural capital and the under-investment in human capital. This must be accompanied by a new suite of policies to provide improved incentives for more balanced wealth creation.     

Effects of Public Infrastructure on Cost Structure and Productivity in the Private Sector

This paper examines the effects of public infrastructure on the cost structure and productivity in the private sector in Australia. Translog cost functions incorporating public capital infrastructure are estimated for the aggregate private sector as well as for seven broad industry groups using annual time series data for 1968/69–1995/96. The effects of public infrastructure on productivity are measured in terms of both cost-saving and output-augmenting measures. The empirical results suggest that public infrastructure has a positive and significant impact on productivity in private sector industries. Public capital serves as a substitute for both private capital and labour. The rates of return to public capital are significant and vary over the sample period.     

Temporary hires and innovative investments

The flexicurity approach claims a positive effect of flexible labour on firm performance, also through an increased ability to innovate. Critics consider it a deregulation of the labour market, decreasing investment in human capital and innovation. We contribute to this broad debate providing an estimate of the relationships linking innovative investment, substitution investment, permanent hires and temporary hires. In particular, we aim at affirming or denying that innovative investments are accompanied by a specific kind of workforce, being it stable or flexible. In doing so, we contribute to bridge the gap among two quite separate strands of literature, as existing literature usually analyses capital and labour separately. Estimating a nonlinear recursive equation system we highlight a significant increase in the likelihood of hiring on a permanent base when the firm innovates; this holds till 2008. Afterward, during the crisis, innovating firms are more likely to hire using temporary contracts instead, a possible signal of a cost saving strategy adopted in a loose labour market by firms still able to innovate. Furthermore, both permanent and temporary hires never depend on increases in labour costs; however, substitution investment increases when labour cost increases, maybe in an attempt to increase labour productivity through a more efficient capital equipment.     

Next generation workforce

The health care industry has become a very complex business. CQsts are rising and resources such as funding and human capital are diminishing. Human capital resources are about to reach true crisis proportions. The vital workforce we have counted on is expected to begin thinning as large numbers of Boomers retire. Not only does this deplete the workforce from a pure numbers perspective, but it also affects intellectual capital and institutional memory. Generational trends and characteristics have affected the workforce environment and will continue to do so as another generation continues to enter the workforce. Generation Y, also tagged Nexter, offers core values that can bring positive changes to the health care workforce. Technology continues to change at lightning speed. Embracing new technology and using it to refine the way we do business will help deliver success. Meaningful strategic plans are needed to change the model of business delivery and employee care in our future workforce.     

A simple economic theory of skill accumulation and schooling decisions

We propose a model of schooling that can account for the observed heterogeneity in workers' productivity and educational attainment. Identical unskilled agents can get a degree at a cost, but becoming skilled entails an additional unobservable effort cost. Individual labor can then be used as an input in pairwise production matches. Two factors affect students' desire to build human capital: degrees imperfectly signal productivity, and contract imperfections generate holdup problems. Multiple stationary equilibria exist, some of which are market failures characterized by a largely educated workforce of low average skill. Policy implications are explored.     

The Tyranny of Concepts: CUDIE (Cumulated, Depreciated, Investment Effort) Is Not Capital

The cost of public investment is not the increment to the value ofpublic capital. Unlike with private investors, there is no plausiblebehavioral model in which every dollar that the public sectorspends as ``investment' creates economically valuable ``capital.'While this simple analytic point is obvious, it has so far beenuniformly ignored in the empirical literature on economic growth,which uses—at best—cumulated, depreciated, investmenteffort (CUDIE) as a proxy for capital stocks. However, particularlyfor developing countries the difference between investment costand capital value is of first-order empirical importance: governmentinvestment is half of more of total investment, and calculationspresented here suggest that in many countries government investmentspending has created little useful capital. This has implicationsin three broad areas. First, none of the existing empirical estimatesof the impact of public spending has identified the productivityof public capital. Even where public capital has a potentiallylarge contribution to production, public-investment spendingmay have had a low impact. Second, it implies that all estimatesof total factor productivity in developing countries are deeplysuspect as there is no way to empirically distinguish betweenlow growth because of investments that create no factors andlow growth due to slow productivity growth. Third, multivariateregressions to date have not adequately controlled for capitalstock growth, which leads to erroneous interpretations of regressioncoefficients.     

The Quality of Manufactured Products in Britain and Germany

This paper is concerned with the relation between workforce skills and high-quality production. Detailed investigations of specific products sampled from three industries indicate that the average British-made product embodied fewer quality-features than its German-made counterpart, and that Britain produces little of top-quality grades—in contrast to a strong German presence at that end of the market. These findings were based on factory visits and discussions with trade experts in both countries. Two broad aspects of workforce skills which contribute to higher-quality production were identified: (1) the skills relevant at the design-interface between consumer demand and production realities, and (2) the skills relevant to small and medium-sized batch-production of specialised varieties. Existing comparisons based on official statistics of production and prices do not take adequate account of differences in product-quality. Based on a close matching of quality-grades of ten sampled products, proper adjustment for quality differences across countries would substantially increase estimates of the German real productivity advantage in manufacturing (to around 50% over Britain), and raise estimates of real income per head for Germany to some 40% over Britain.     

信息化水平对生产率的直接效应和间接效应——劳动力技能结构的中介作用

构建了关于信息化水平、劳动力技能结构以及生产率的理论框架,探讨了信息化水平对生产率的直接和间接影响,以及劳动力技能结构在其中的中介作用,并利用中国省际面板数据对理论框架进行验证。结果表明:信息化水平对生产率同时具有直接影响和间接影响;信息化水平对生产率的直接影响呈现出动态的阶段性特征,两者之间存在U形关系,信息技术对生产率的促进作用只有在信息化水平达到一定程度后才能显现;信息化水平对生产率的间接影响通过劳动力技能结构的中介作用来实现:信息化水平的提升对低技能劳动者有明显的挤出效应,并带来了中、高技能劳动力需求上升,导致劳动力技能结构升级,从而促进劳动生产率以及资本生产率的提高;劳动力技能结构在信息化水平与全要素生产率之间的中介作用不显著。要使信息化更好地发挥作用,必须匹配较高水平的人力资本,劳动者需要进行持续学习与提升,以适应不断变化的社会需求。     

International trade and technical progress: the role of capital good imports in Portugal>

This paper develops an empirical analysis of the relationship between sectoral openness to capital good imports and technological sophistication. Input-output data from Portugal are used to demonstrate a strong relation between capital imports and sectoral technological levels as measured by vertically integrated labour coefficients. Both regression and non-parametric analyses are used. Such a relationship demonstrates the necessity of breaking out of the long-held focus on one-time exchange gains by trade theorists. It is argued that productivity gains from trade resulting from transfers of technology are primary gains of great importance and must be incorporated into theoretical work on trade. The paper also demonstrates a strong connection between a sector's capital imports and the technical training of the workforce of the sector. This suggests a relation between a sector's level of technology and its ability to make further advances through capital imports embodying advanced foreign technology. Sectors (countries) need technically trained workers in order to achieve a successful transfer. Interestingly, it is found that while Portugal clearly utilized trade with its more developed trading partners to augment its technology, this was not enough to avoid a technological divergence from its more developed neighbours. Several reasons for this are posited.     

Which skills contribute most to absorptive capacity,innovation and productivity performance? Evidence from the US and Western Europe

ABSTRACT

Skills are widely recognised as central to absorptive capacity, that is, firms’ ability to identify and make effective use of knowledge, ideas and technologies that are generated elsewhere. But identification of the specific levels of education and skills that contribute most to the development of absorptive capacity is often hampered by the use of skill measures as proxies for absorptive capacity itself. Drawing on a cross-country industry-level dataset, we retain separate measures of key components of absorptive capacity, namely, skills, R&D investments and openness to foreign trade and investment. We then estimate a system of structural equations in order to evaluate the extent to which different levels of skill contribute to innovative output (measured by growth in patenting) and subsequently to growth in productivity. We find important roles for both high-level skills and upper intermediate (technician-level) skills in converting the knowledge sourcing opportunities provided by openness into innovative output. In final stages of production (making use of innovative output), productivity growth in countries near to the technological frontier is enhanced not just by high-level and upper intermediate skills but also by the skills of the workforce as a whole.     

A behavioral model of the economic long wave

This paper presents a simple model of the economic long wave. The model is based on the System Dynamics National Model. Since 1975 the National Model has provided an increasingly rich theory of the economic long wave. The theory relates capital investment, employment and workforce participation, monetary and fiscal policy, inflation, productivity and innovation, and even political values. The model presented here focuses on capital investment. The structure of the model is shown to be consistent with the principles of bounded rationality. The behavior of the model is analyzed, and capital self-ordering is shown to be sufficient to generate long waves. The model complements the National Model by providing a representation of the dynamic hypothesis that is amenable to formal analysis and is easily extended to include other important mechanisms that may influence the nature of the long wave.     

GROWTH IN EURO AREA LABOR QUALITY

Composition of the euro area workforce evolves over time and in response to changing labor market conditions. We construct an estimate of growth in euro area labor quality over the period 1983–2005 and show that labor quality has grown on average by 0.47 percent year-on-year. Labor quality growth was significantly higher in the early 1990s than in the 1980s. This strong increase was driven mainly by an increase in the share of those with tertiary education and workers in prime age. Growth in labor quality moderated again toward the end of the 1990s, possibly reflecting the impact of robust employment growth resulting in the entry of workers with lower human capital. The contribution of labor quality to labor productivity has increased over time, accounting for up to one fourth of euro area labor productivity growth. The results point to a lower contribution of total factor productivity to euro area growth.     

Technology and the services sector: The hidden competitive challenge

Information technology has always played an important role in the services sector of the U.S. economy. In recent years, however, services industries have stepped up their acquisitions of computers, telecommunications equipment, and other such products dramatically. As a result, the broad segment of the economy that can be classified as services providers now owns about 84% of the total U.S. stock of information technology items. Moreover, relative to goods-producing industries, a much larger proportion of the services sector's capital budgets is spent on information technology, revealing a significantly greater dependence by services on such technology as a factor of production. This reliance underscores technology's strategic importance in the United States' competitive challenge. With services now the predominant mode of economic activity in the United States, a productivity payback from information technology is absolutely essential to keep the economy on a longer term path of sustainable growth.So far, the services sector has little to show for its spending binge on technology. Quite simply, massive investments in information technology have failed to boost national productivity growth in the present decade. Furthermore, with manufacturing productivity now on the rebound, problems in the services sector loom increasingly large in the United States' broader competitive struggle. It is certainly not too late. New and creative applications of information technology could still enhance the productivity performance of the services sector's predominantly white-collar work force. Until that payback begins to occur, however, the role of technology spending will be under growing suspicion [3, 8, 9].In what follows, an attempt is made to provide a detailed industry-by-industry assessment of services sector spending on information technology. By way of background, the broad contours of capital formation in services industries are first examined over the post-World War II era.     

An assessment of the impact of EU funds through productivity boosts using CES functions

The economic effects of European Funds on recipient countries are not without controversy. We propose to study this issue focusing on the productivity coefficients of CES production functions in a multisectoral, interdependent general equilibrium model. We adopt the calibration techniques typically used in computational general equilibrium modelling to estimate a numerical improvement in the productivity coefficients of the CES functions. The array of different funds belongs to two broad categories associated with the two types of primary factors, labour and capital, that determine the output. Once we estimate the change in productivity coefficients in labour and in capital, we introduce them into a computable general equilibrium model and simulate their effects, all else being equal, in order to quantify their likely economy-wide effects.     

The impact of public capital on the US private economy: new evidence and analysis

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of public capital on the productivity of the US private sector. Using a production function approach, we estimate the impact of public investment on private capital productivity, specifically addressing the empirical critiques of earlier studies. We find evidence of a cointegrating relationship in a dynamic specification of an empirical model that includes public infrastructure as a factor of production, indicating the existence of a long‐run relationship between the US public capital stock and the productivity of the private capital stock. The results are used to explore how the decline in the growth rate of the public capital stock would have affected the performance of the private sector.     

HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND CONTINUOUS TRAINING: EVIDENCE FOR EU COUNTRIES

This paper links data on continuous training from the EU Labour Force Survey (LFS) to information on skill levels and earnings from the EU KLEMS growth and productivity accounts, to examine the relative magnitudes of continuous workforce training versus human capital formation through the general education system in the European Union. The measurement methodology draws from the literature on measuring intangible investments by firms and sources of growth in an accounting framework. The results suggest that in the EU15 group of countries, intangible investments in continuous training represent just under 2 percent of GDP or about 35 percent of expenditure on general education. The share of GDP accounted for by training is less than a third as large in the new member states. A growth accounting method is employed to show that failure to account for continuous training leads to an underestimate of the impact of human capital on output growth in the EU.     

PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA OVER THE LONG RUN

The low pace of Latin American productivity growth in recent decades, despite extensive economic reforms, has yet to be understood in a longer‐run context where factors such as demographic changes, structural shifts, and investment levels can be taken fully into account. The OxLAD database provides comparable sectoral output and workforce series over 1900–2000 for the six leading economies in the region for the first time. Our analysis of this new dataset shows that: intersectoral resource reallocation reduced aggregate productivity growth in all three periods; total factor productivity growth was low throughout the century, and even negative in the closing three decades; and thus factor accumulation—investment in fixed capital and skilled labor—was the main source of productivity growth in Latin America during the twentieth century.     

结构转化、资本深化与农业劳动生产率提高——以上海为例的研究

本文集中分析农业劳动生产率提高的影响因素及影响机理,为此采用逻辑分析方法推演出"结构转化和资本深化是农业劳动生产率提高的基本方式"的结论。实证研究也显示,上海农业劳动生产率的优势主要源于其在结构转化和资本深化方面的优势,产业之间和产业内部的结构转化、农业内部和农业外部的资本深化确实提升了上海的农业劳动生产率,由此可引申出关于其他省区未来农业持续快速发展的若干政策建议。