The Change in Productive Efficiency in Telecommunications in the United States

The question addressed here is whether the adoption of incentive regulation, which has become an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the USA, has resulted in a change in the technical efficiency of local exchange carriers in the USA. After providing an overview of the nature of incentive regulation, a methodology for measuring technical efficiency and its change is introduced. This is a multiple-output/multiple-input distance function approach to measuring technical efficiency. The results of implementing this approach for 19 local exchange carriers for the 1988-2001 period indicate that in the production of local service, intrastate toll/access service, and interstate access to local loops, there was no change in technical efficiency between the 1988-1990 period and the 1991- 2001 period, something that incentive regulation was specifically designed to promote.     

Technical efficiency,allocative efficiency,and the impact of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers (LECs). After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. The results indicate that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the forin of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation. A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning in 1985. It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation. It is more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.JEL classification: L51, L96     

PRICING REGULATIONS AND NETWORK TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on technology deployment, as evaluated using two technology deployment metrics, among the population of local exchange carriers in the USA between 1988 and 2001. The regulatory schemes are disaggregated into five categories, permitting examination of heterogeneity among regulatory schemes. The results show that the rate of return method and the other intermediate incentive schemes implemented have had a negative impact on technology deployment. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms’ technology deployment. These results highlight the importance of appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to adopt the new and important technologies that have been developed.     

REGULATIONS AND STRATEGY: EVIDENCE ON ADVERTISING

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firms’ advertising spending among the population of local exchange carriers in the United States telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the hybrid rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have a negative relationship with advertising spending. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes has had a positive and significant impact on firms’ advertising spending. These results highlight the importance of incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to be market oriented and strive for superior performance.     

INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM DESIGN AND FIRM GROWTH: EXPERIENCES FROM TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR REGULATION

ABSTRACT**: This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on firm growth among the population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1988 and 2001. The results show that the rate of return method and other intermediate incentive schemes have had a negative impact on firm growth. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms’ growth. These results highlight the importance of proper and appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to strive for superior performance.     

REGULATION AND JOB CREATION: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The study evaluates the impact of changes in price regulation, an important institutional feature of firms’ environments, on average human resource deployment levels among the United States local exchange telecommunications companies using contemporary historical data between 1988 and 2001. The data permit a natural experiment approach for the evaluation. Firms regulated via rate of return approaches have employed significantly less staff. These employment levels have been 15 percent lower than that of firms regulated via incentive regulation. The study is a direct test of a principal dynamic capabilities idea that firms reconfigure resources in the face of environmental changes to retain their competitive advantages. These results signify the importance of designing regulations possessing requisite incentive properties in enhancing firm level employment and support the key premises of the dynamic capabilities perspective.     

The impact of incentive regulation on productivity in the US telecommunications industry: A stochastic frontier approach

This paper investigates whether the substitution of price cap regulation (PCR) and other forms of incentive regulation for traditional rate of return regulation (RRR) has had a measurable effect on productivity growth in the US telecommunications industry. A stochastic frontier approach is employed to compute the efficiency change, technological progress, and productivity growth for 25 LECs over the 1988-1998 time periods. By examining the relationship between the change in productivity growth and regulatory regime variables and other control variables, we find that PCR has a significant and positive effect, both in contemporaneous and lagged specifications.     

Information technology,efficiency and productivity: evidence from Korean local governments

This study evaluates the performance of Korean local government by measuring their technical efficiency (TE) and total factor productivity (TFP) growth and, more importantly, examining the impact of information technology (IT) on this performance. The study is different from received analysis in that a unique measure of the state of IT–the Informatization Index–is used to investigate the impact of IT on both TE and TFP growth. Empirical analyses are conducted on data from 222 Korean local governments for the period 1999 to 2001. In particular, data envelopment analysis techniques are applied to calculate TE scores and TFP growth rates for sampled local governments. The empirical findings confirm the positive impact IT has in improving technical efficiency and accelerating productivity growth. The estimated coefficients are correctly signed (with other regional characteristics controlled for) when TE scores and TFP growth rates are regressed on the Index. In addition, the findings indicate that economies of density are present in the production of local public services.     

Efficiency and performance in gas distribution. Evidence from Brazil

This article analyses the current state of the gas distribution industry in Brazil, by identifying the main factors that determine its efficiency. In order to test the performance of the industry, we have calculated the firms’ technical efficiency during the period 2001–2009. We analyse whether some economic and technological factors as consumer density, load factor or regulation, among others, have affected the performance of this industry. We show that companies serving markets with different customer characteristics (diversification) have reached higher levels of efficiency and evolved faster. Moreover, the private ownership and price cap regulation are more efficient in relation to public ownership and cost of service regulation. These findings are important to support the improvement of the regulation of gas distribution in the Brazilian states.     

FDI Contribution to Technical Efficiency in the Tunisian Manufacturing Sector: Evidence from Micro-panel Data

This paper investigates the contribution of FDI to firms’ technical efficiency based on a two-stage empirical method. Using panel data for 674 firms belonging to the Tunisian manufacturing sector and observed over the period 1997–2001, a bootstrap procedure is applied to correct for serial correlation affecting DEA technical efficiency scores estimated in a first stage. Results obtained from second-stage regressions show that FDI presence at the firm level has a positive effect on its technical efficiency. However, horizontal FDI spillovers are not evidenced while sectoral export activity represents a potential source of technology spillovers for local firms.     

环境管制政策的比较分析

命令控制型的环境管制政策能较快地控制污染排放,但缺乏效率,且不利于技术创新,激励型的环境管制政策具有成本低、技术创新激励性强的特点.基于此,近年来世界各国对激励型的环境管制政策日益重视.我国未来环境管制政策的设计应更多地引入市场机制,强化环境政策对技术进步的激励作用,并适度结合命令控制型的环境管制工具.     

Incentive regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States: Some lessons

Summary and Conclusions This paper has reviewed the approach to incentive regulation in the United Kingdom and the United States. The United Kingdom approach has typically relied on pure PCR, incorporating much sharper incentives for efficiency and lower transactions costs, but it makes the company more of a hostage to the regulator. The United States approach, which is grounded or even mired in the legal system, gives up efficiency incentives in an attempt to avoid making the companies the hostages of regulatory reneging.²⁷ The papers in this Issue illustrate the broad scope of incentive regulation, from the purer forms of PCR to a number of variations and mixtures of PCR with other forms of regulation. The interesting theoretic results and the importance of achieving practical solutions in incentive regulation underscore the importance of the problems and approaches raised in this Issue.     

Fiber in the backbone! The impact of broadband adoption on firm growth in network markets

This article examined the relationship between the adoption of technology, via the deployment of broadband, on revenue growth, which is an important measure of financial performance, of the deploying firms using panel data for all of the major local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry from 1988 to 2001. The sector is an important network market context where the implications of deployment have substantial salience. The results show a positive relationship between broadband deployment and carriers’ revenue growth. This result implies that encouraging the adoption and deployment of broadband technologies in addition to the benefits of the consumers and firms at the receiving end of the new technology create the potential for better financial performance for the deploying firms. These results also imply that steps that can be taken to provide incentives that will hasten the further deployment of broadband will result in gains in financial performance within the sector.     

The Impact of State Incentive Regulation on the U.S. Telecommunications Industry

We examine the impact of state incentive regulation on network modernization, aggregate investment, revenue, cost, profit, and local service rates in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1986 and 1999. We find evidence of greater network modernization under price cap regulation (PCR), earnings sharing regulation (ESR), and rate case moratoria (RCM) than under rate of return regulation (RORR). Costs are generally lower under RCM. Costs are also lower under ESR and PCR when local competition is sufficiently intense. Some local service rates for business customers are lower under PCR. Revenue, profit, aggregate investment, and residential local service rates do not vary systematically under incentive regulation relative to RORR.     

Benchmarking and firm heterogeneity: a latent class analysis for German electricity distribution companies

In January 2009, the German Federal Network Agency introduced incentive regulation for the electricity distribution sector based on results obtained from econometric and nonparametric benchmarking analysis. One main problem for the regulator in assigning the relative efficiency scores is unobserved firm-specific factors such as network and technological differences. Comparing the efficiency of different firms usually assumes that they operate under the same production technology, thus unobserved factors might be inappropriately understood as inefficiency. To avoid this type of misspecification in regulatory practice, estimation is carried out in two stages: in the first stage observations are classified into two categories according to the size of the network operators. Then separate analyses are conducted for each subgroup. This article shows how to disentangle the heterogeneity from inefficiency in one step, using a latent class model for stochastic frontiers. As the classification is not based on a priori sample separation criteria it delivers more robust, statistically significant, and testable results. Against this background, we analyze the level of technical efficiency of different subgroups from a sample of 200 regional and local German electricity distribution companies for a balanced panel data set (2001–2005). Testing the hypothesis if larger distributors operate under a different technology than smaller ones, we assess if a single step latent class model provides new insights to the use of benchmarking approaches within the incentive regulation schemes.     

Interstate switched access demand analysis

The breakup of the Bell System in 1984 led to the adoption by the Federal Communications Commission of a system of tariff charges that are paid to local exchange carriers by business and residential telephone subscribers, and interexchange carriers such as AT&T. These charges are designed to recover the costs associated with providing access to the public switched network to complete interstate calls. This system is known as the FCC Access Charge Plan. Flat-rate fees, named Subscriber Line Charges, are imposed on telephone subscribers, while usage-based charges are billed to interexchange carriers. These are called Carrier Common Line and Traffic Sensitive rates. Since CCL and TS rates are based on network usage, forecasts of switched access demand are required to set them properly.This paper presents an econometric model of interstate switched access demand developed and utilized by AT&T to produce forecasts of 1988 demand in connection with the Annual 1988 Access Tariff Filings. The model is estimated in a state-level pooled cross-sectional time-series framework, with dynamics introduced via polynomial distributed lags on price and income. It represents an extension of the econometric demand model developed and used by the FCC a year earlier to determine a reasonable forecast of 1987 Carrier Common Line switched access demand. Estimated demand elasticities and forecasts are provided. The model forecasts are also compared to those from other models.     

Measuring embodied technical change in the US local telephone industry

This study attempts to measure the rate of embodied technical change by using a short-run variable cost function that contains arguments for labour and capital quality. In this short-run variable cost model, the expansion of the amount of physical capital increases variable costs due to more maintenance outlays, and then it leads to improvements in capital quality. When a measure of competition is included as a proxy for organizational efficiency, improvements in labour and capital quality explain more than two-thirds of productivity growth. The degree of returns to scale and the shadow cost of capital input in the embodiment cost model are presented as well. The study is based on pooled time-series and cross-section data of eight US local exchange carriers.     

Measuring efficiency in the public sector using nonparametric frontier estimators: a study of transit agencies in the USA

Transit agencies in the USA must provide service under increasing operating constraints. Using data from 1989–1993, technical efficiency among these firms is estimated and characteristics indicative of differential efficiency in transit agencies are identified. This paper verifies the robustness of the second step regression results to the choice of efficiency measure by comparing results of the two step regressions using a pair of non-parametric efficiency estimators. It is discovered that the structure of government subsidy to this industry negatively affects not just cost efficiency, but technical efficiency as well. Furthermore, maintenance appears to be an important component of operational efficiency in this industry.     

Regional technical efficiency and technology gaps in rural China: evidence from CHIP surveys

This paper uses household-level datasets called Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) surveys to investigate the regional technical efficiency, technology gap, and their determinants in rural China. A metafrontier production function approach is employed to fit the values of the technical efficiency and the technology gap ratio of rural households in six regions of China. The findings indicate that the technical efficiency improved remarkably from 1988 to 2002, but the technology gap ratio among regions changed slightly in the same period. The findings also show a negative relationship between the technology gap ratio and the regional technical efficiency for all regions except the northwest that has the lowest value of both the technical efficiency and the technology gap ratio. Next, the Tobit model is employed to discern the sources of efficiency and technology gaps. The results show that quality of agricultural labor, agricultural infrastructure, natural conditions, and farmer's political status have significant effects on farms' technical efficiency and technology gap ratio.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.