内幕交易的经济学分析

本文探讨了中国市场的内幕交易理论,在此基础上提出了4个可检验的假说:(1)内幕交易在中国必定存在;(2)内幕交易在中国比成熟市场更加严重;(3)重大事件中内幕交易的严重程度和管理层付出呈正比关系;(4)内幕交易多围绕利好消息。利用1078个并购重组事件和其他上市公司重大事件为样本,本文运用事件研究法,证实了上述假说。在此基础上,提出了中国内幕交易立法和监管的思路。     

内幕交易的经济学分析

本文探讨了中国市场的内幕交易理论，在此基础上提出了4个可检验的假说：(1)内幕交易在中国必定存在；(2)内幕交易在中国比成熟市场更加严重；(3)重大事件中内幕交易的严重程度和管理层付出呈正比关系；(4)内幕交易多围绕利好消息。利用1078个并购重组事件和其他上市公司重大事件为样本，本文运用事件研究法，证实了上述假说。在此基础上，提出了中国内幕交易立法和监管的思路。     

中国资本市场20年内幕交易行为案例综述

文章对1994-2015年中国证券监管机构和司法机关查处的内幕交易案件的特征进行了档案式归纳分析.研究发现,中国资本市场内幕交易案件呈现以下特点:(1)对内幕交易的处罚以行政处罚为主,民事赔偿基本处于缺位状态.(2)内幕交易违规主体以法定内幕人为主,但有向非法定内幕人扩散的趋势,且呈现裙带化、复杂化、公职化等特点;并购重组领域仍是内幕交易发生的“重灾区”;内幕交易的利益驱动力强,违法获利金额高.(3)内幕交易稽查执法力度不断增强,案件办理效率显著提升,但内幕交易处罚力度偏轻,威慑力不强.(4)从时间序列上看,不同时期的执法环境不同,执法效果也不同,但整体的内幕交易执法力度和效率均呈快速上升态势.此外,随着我国证券市场的发展,内幕交易的具体行为模式不断发生变化并呈现出新特点、新趋势,这对内幕交易行为监管提出了新挑战.因此,文章还深入剖析了两类具有代表性的新型内幕交易行为的特点,并提出了相应的监管对策.     

中国证券市场内幕交易研究

我国证券市场的内幕交易活动一直比较猖獗,对证券市场的健康发展产生了很大的负面作用。文章认为发生在我国的内幕交易类型主要有分红型内幕交易、并购型内幕交易及重大经营事件型内幕交易,内幕交易泛滥的原因在于相关法律法规的缺失、执法不严以及证券交易实名制的形同虚设。文章认为应该制定专门的反内幕交易法规、实施辩方举证制度,改革上市公司信息披露与重大事件审批制度、严格推行证券账户实名制,采用集体诉讼制度等措施,以有效地遏制内幕交易的泛滥。     

内幕交易监管：国际经验与中国启示

内幕交易违反了金融市场的公平原则,降低了资本市场的效率,但是由于其金融交易的特殊性,使得它在监管上存在一定的难度。本文在梳理内幕交易行为的理论基础、对内幕交易监管的争议进行讨论的基础上,从内幕人认定、内幕信息认定、内幕交易行为认定、防范措施以及法律制裁与救济等五个不同的维度对美国、日本、欧盟和我国的内幕交易法律制度进行比较分析,从而总结我国法律在内幕交易规制方面的不足,并相应地提出改进的建议。     

谈关联交易、内部交易与内幕交易

分析了内部化理论,以及在此基础上以金融控股集团为背景对内部交易、关联交易与内幕交易三个术语进行了新的界定与比较。指出内部交易与关联交易的合理性与内幕交易的违法性。     

证券市场内幕交易的行为动机研究

2007年中国资本市场进入了全流通时代,全流通下内幕交易可能会比股权分置时更加严重,如何有效防范大股东和机构投资者利用信息优势、资金优势、控制权优势进行内幕交易,是全流通下内幕交易监管防范面临的主要挑战。本文从内幕交易的行为动机及其影响因素展开研究,借鉴Becker(1968)"犯罪经济学"的研究框架及行为金融学的相关理论,选取了相应影响因素的度量指标,架构了内幕交易行为动机模型。然后基于问卷调查的模拟数据,运用结构方程模型对影响内幕交易行为动机模型中各个变量之间的逻辑关系和内在影响机制进行了实证研究,得出富有价值的研究结论,并据此给出相应的政策建议。     

中国的城乡移民-我们知道什么,我们还应该知道什么?

该文综述了中国农村到城镇迁移问题的经济学研究.综述主要的关注点有四个:(1)城乡分割和移民的演化;(2)对于农村到城镇迁移的解释;(3)迁移与劳动力市场演变的互动关系,特别是劳动力市场的分割、劳动力市场的柔性和工资差距;(4)今后进一步研究的方向.     

中国的城乡移民-我们知道什么,我们还应该知道什么?

该文综述了中国农村到城镇迁移问题的经济学研究.综述主要的关注点有四个:(1)城乡分割和移民的演化;(2)对于农村到城镇迁移的解释;(3)迁移与劳动力市场演变的互动关系,特别是劳动力市场的分割、劳动力市场的柔性和工资差距;(4)今后进一步研究的方向.     

我国A股市场资产重组中的内幕交易

本文以上市公司的重大资产重组停牌公告为研究对象,以沪市A股中选取的44个股票为样本,通过事件分析法检验了此类事件中是否存在内幕交易行为,结果发现,重大资产重组停牌公告前上市公司的股价出现异常波动,存在较严重的信息泄露及内幕交易行为。     

公司治理与内幕交易监管效率研究

内幕交易通常被各国证券监管部门认定为一种非法的证券交易行为,许多证券市场都引入了内幕交易监管法律制度。本文的研究目的是从公司治理角度来分析哪些因素影响着国内内幕交易监管效率,分析国内监管能否有效遏制内幕交易行为,并从公司价值角度探讨了特定公司治理背景下内幕交易行为能否受到市场自然的惩戒。由此,本文提出了改善监管效率的相关建议。     

Contractual restrictions on insider trading: a welfare analysis

Summary. This paper analyzes the welfare effects of permitting firms to negotiate contractually the right to allow corporate insiders to trade shares in the firm on private information. A computational framework is employed to (i) analyze formally the effects of insider trading on managerial investment choice, the informational efficiency of stock prices, and the welfare of all investor types; and (ii) examine the effectiveness of various compensation schemes (such as stock and insider trading rights) to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. I show that shareholders will typically choose not to grant insider trading rights to managers. This decision is socially optimal. Received: September 23, 2000; revised version: December 12, 2000     

管理者交易的市场择时能力对市场有效性的影响

管理者卖出和买入公告对股票市场具有一定的影响,以管理者卖出交易和买入交易为公告样本进行实证分析,检验公告当日及给定事件期超额收益的显著性.结果显示:卖出公告样本反对半强式有效假说,管理人能够“卖高”,获得超额收益；而买入公告样本支持半强式有效假说,管理者不能够“买低”,在公告日和事件期都不能获得超额收益.     

The effects of insider trading on insiders effort in good and bad times

We analyze the effects of insider trading on insiders' effort decisions and on the value of firms. We consider a situation in which the final output of a firm and the productivity of managerial effort will depend on whether the firm is in a good or a bad state. When the state is not verifiable, the managerial contract cannot be made explicitly contingent on it: consequently, a contract that does not allow for insider trading would lead to the insiders' facing the same incentive scheme in good and bad times. Under a contract that allows for insider trading, however, insiders will buy shares on receiving (ahead of the market) good news and will sell shares on receiving bad news; consequently, they will end up facing different incentive scheme in good and bad times. Whether this effect is desirable depends on how the marginal productivity of managerial effort in good times compares with that in bad times. In particular, we show that allowing insider trading may improve managers' effort decisions and consequently may increase corporate value and benefit shareholders.     

融券制度与内部人寻租——来自准自然实验的经验证据

内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。     

Insider trading legislation and corporate governance

This paper analyzes the impact of insider trading legislation on corporate governance. In a context where large, dominant shareholders can monitor underperforming companies, managers have an incentive to give early warnings about adverse developments to dominant shareholders. This information is effectively a bribe to induce dominant shareholders to sell their stock and refrain from intervention. If insider trading is unregulated, dominant shareholders collude with management at the expense of small shareholders. The optimal regime forces the company to disclose all material information to the market. Private contracting between companies and shareholders leads to optimal insider trading regulation only if initial shareholders can enter a binding commitment, otherwise large shareholders and managers recontract at the expense of small shareholders. Enforcement also matters. European Union legislation requires inside information to be precise. Such a narrow definition creates a grey zone, where information is private but cannot be classified as inside information. As a result the effectiveness of corporate governance and firm value are reduced. Regulation in the US that treats shareholders with a stake exceeding 10% as insiders is potentially harmful.     

Equity Purchases by Insiders and the Filing of Antidumping Petitions

The paper presents the first analysis of insider trading in the context of public policy implementation. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proscribes trading by corporate insiders upon material information that is not yet in the public domain. Although the SEC interprets what constitutes material information, it has historically focused on earnings, mergers, and acquisitions. Using a panel of US firms from 1985–87, the authors disclose a significant relationship between the filing of an antidumping petition and insider buying in the two months preceding the filing month. This suggests that the SEC should expand its focus to include public policy.     

Information–driven trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra–Day Data

Many observers argue that informed and insider trading is widespread in the emerging financial markets of transition countries, yet rigorous treatment of this issue has been virtually non–existent. The current paper estimates the extent of informed trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) using intra–day transaction data. Our estimates confirm that the average share of informed trading is equal to 0.32, which is high relative to developed markets and varies considerably among stocks. Using the Easley et al. (1996) approach on the very best segment of the PSE we obtained a high average probability of informed trading. Since data used in this study cover the period after the major attempts to improve market regulations, our results indicate that the PSE needs further strengthening to recover credibility and to become a real source of corporate financing. JEL classification: G14, G15.