Trust,ability‐to‐pay,and charitable giving

In the literature on privately provided public goods, altruism has been motivated by what contributions can accomplish (public goods philanthropy), by the pleasure of giving (warm‐glow philanthropy), or by the desire to personally make a difference (impact philanthropy). Underlying these motives is the idea that individuals trust that their donations reach their goal. We revisit these models but allow for distrust in the institutional structures involved. An important result we derive is that trust considerations determine whether crowding out is less or more than complete, and we thus open up possibilities in terms of the extent of crowding out not currently available. We also model socially motivated philanthropy when income‐heterogeneous donors take trust and ability‐to‐pay into account. With ability‐to‐pay in social motivation, an important result we obtain is that low‐income donors may contribute more than high‐income donors (in both absolute and percentage‐of‐income terms), giving a potential theoretical foundation to the frequently observed “U‐shaped” pattern of giving.     

Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers,Productivity, and Hours*

In this paper, we study the transmission mechanism of productivity shocks in a model with rule‐of‐thumb consumers. In the literature, this financial friction has been studied only with reference to fiscal shocks. We show that the presence of rule‐of‐thumb consumers is also very helpful when accounting for recent empirical evidence on productivity shocks. Rule‐of‐thumb agents, together with nominal and real rigidities, play an important role in reproducing the negative response of hours and the delayed response of output after a productivity shock.     

What We Owe Our Children, They Their Children, …

Egalitarian theorists, since Rawls, have in the main advocated equalizing some objective measure of individual well‐being, such as primary goods, functionings, or resources, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion, however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. By analyzing a society that survives for many generations, we demonstrate that equality of opportunity for some objective condition is incompatible with human development over time. We argue that this incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for welfare. Thus, “subjectivism” seems necessary if we are to hope for a society that can both equalize opportunities and support the development of human capacity over time.     

Super‐Majorites,One‐Dimensional Policies,and Social Surplus

In the setting of a one‐dimensional legislative bargaining game, we characterize qualified majority rules maximizing social surplus, that is, the sum of individual benefits. The simple majority rule maximizes social surplus when individual utilities are tent‐shaped. When the utilities are strictly concave, the surplus maximizing rule is a strict supermajority.     

Growth,R&D,and uncertainty

I develop and analytically solve the stochastic Romer model in which the creation of ideas is driven by a stochastic process. I show that higher uncertainty about R&D, through the reallocation effects of resources among sectors, slows down economic growth and deteriorates welfare. The results suggest that persistently high uncertainty tends to severely restrict the scope of sustained income growth.