From Social Theory to Explaining Sickonomics: A Response to Dimitris Milonakis and Ben Fine

This response shows that, in their reply to my critique of their work, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis generally maintain the impression that there is a single, widely accepted definition of methodological individualism, but they do not identify it. They assert that social structures (undefined but seemingly specified to exclude law and institutions) have ‘analytical priority’ and logically (but tacitly) imply that individuals should have no part in the analysis of social or economic phenomena. They mischaracterise Hodgson's (2011) position on Marshall by quoting just one part-sentence out of context. Fine, Milonakis and Hodgson agree that the intellectual roots of the predominance of technique over substance in modern economics can partly be traced to the 1870–1900 period, but disagree on what they are.     

金融危机救助中的预期管理——美国次贷危机救助的经验启示

本文在对现代金融市场中的预期的含义、性质和特征进行把握的基础上,分析了预期在金融危机形成、爆发以及扩散和蔓延过程中的作用,进而对金融危机救助的过程中预期管理的必要性、预期管理的主体和相应的政策工具进行了初步分析.最后,从预期管理的角度,对美国在此次金融危机救助中采取各项政策措施的得失和启示进行了分析.     

Interrogating Sickonomics,from Diagnosis to Cure: A Response to Hodgson

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ideological, political, and intellectual factors), the intellectual roots of this decay lie in the conceptual framework established around the marginal revolution.     

Joint Implementation: Strategic Reactions and Possible Remedies

This paper investigates the promising proposal of Joint Implementation (JI) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. This was ultimately the only concrete outcome of the Conference on Climate Change in Berlin, albeit restricted to a pilot phase. The basic idea, given the public's awareness of global warming, sounds economically plausible: The industrialized countries, the only ones required to stabilize and lower carbon emissions, can search for cheaper reductions of greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries and economies in transition. However, this proposal leads to strategic reactions by developing countries reinforced by the fact that this cheating coincides with the interest of the industrialized country. In short, this proposal will lead to cheating (given asymmetric information) and will thus produce largely faked reductions in emissions. On the constructive side, an efficient mechanism retaining the spirit of JI is derived, which deters strategic reactions. This differs from a usual principal-agent problem through an additional hierarchical layer: a global authority (e.g. the Conference of Parties on Climate Change), an industrialized country and a developing country. The unavoidable loss that is even associated with an optimal scheme due to strategic, behavioural reality (the first best optimum is unattainable, except at the top) leads, of course, to much less glamorous predictions in emission reductions. Moreover, the implicit subsidization scheme focuses and favours on already 'efficient' partners.     

Remedies for Microsoft

Thewisestsolutionwouldbeforthecompanyitselftoembraceabreak-upItmayhavecomeasashocktotheInaretsbutfewotherscanhavebeensmprisedthatMicrosofwasthisweekfoundguilty.TheJudgeintheantitrustcaseagainstthesoftwarefirmruledthatitwasamonopolythathaddemonstratedaPatternofabuse,done"violencetothecompetitiveprocess"and"placedanoppressivethumbonthescaleofcompetitivefortune,therebygUareteeingitscontinueddondnance".ThestrengthoftheverdictsuggeststhathoPesofanegotiat-edsettlementwerealwaysslim.Tooofteninthep…     

A Damage-Revelation Rationale for Coupon Remedies

This article studies optimal remedies in a setting in whichdamages vary among plaintiffs and are difficult to determine.We show that giving plaintiffs a choice between coupons to purchaseunits of the defendant's product at a discount and cash—acoupon-cash remedy—is superior to cash alone. The optimalcoupon-cash remedy offers a cash amount that is less than thevalue of the coupons to plaintiffs who suffer relatively highharm. Such a remedy induces these plaintiffs to choose coupons,and plaintiffs who suffer relatively low harm to choose cash.Sorting plaintiffs in this way leads to better deterrence becausethe costs borne by defendants (the cash payments and the costof providing coupons) more closely approximate the harms thatthey have caused.     

发达和发展中经济体对华贸易救济的比较研究

本文在对发达经济体和发展中经济体对华贸易救济的特征差异进行分析的基础上,运用贸易救济指控指数和贸易救济涉案金额指数两项指标,进一步分析了其对中国出口贸易影响的差异,得出的结论是:发达经济体和发展中经济体在立案数量、措施选取、涉案行业、涉案金额、案件执行率和诉诸WTO等方面呈现出明显的特征差异,相对其在中国出口贸易中的地位而言,发展中经济体的贸易救济对中国出口贸易的影响大于发达经济体。     

An Economic Analysis of Australian Damage Remedies for Misleading Prospectuses: Trade Practices Act versus Corporations Law

Laws that address damages caused by deceptive or misleading prospectuses impact on the incentive issuers face to create such prospectuses, and hence impact on the level of investment. In Australia, it has been proposed to shift from a strict liability regime under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act to a due diligence regime under the Corporations Law. I argue that due diligence is inferior to strict liability for large firms, but in some cases may be preferred to strict liability for small firms. I conclude that due diligence—as a liability rule—increases the cost and complexity of legal action, rather than being a 'corporate law simplification' as intended by the Corporations Law Simplification Task Force. Compared to strict liability, it is more likely to result in greater demand for the services of lawyers and accountants than it is to improve the accuracy of reporting.     

小学教育本科生实践能力的现状调查与分析

建设小学教育本科专业的目的是培养高素质小学教师,而小学教育本科生的实践能力是高素质小学教师的重要内涵。课题组就小教本科生的教师基本技能、教学技能、教育技能、科研技能等方面设计了调查问卷,在江苏省设置小教本科专业的部分高校对500余名小教本科生进行了问卷调查,运用SPSS统计软件进行数据录入,对调查结果进行了统计、分析。     

论我国票据丧失补救措施的立法完善

票据是一种完全有价证券,票据权利的行使离不开对票据的占有。票据的丧失直接影响票据权利人票据权利的实现。为保护票据权利人的利益及维护交易的安全,各国票据法都规定了对票据丧失的补救措施,我国票据法也不例外,但其中有许多法律漏洞需要补充和完善。     

我国经营者集中的反垄断审查与执法者的“行为性救济”偏好分析——兼论专利密集领域的执法困境

防止经营者集中活动对市场竞争效率的潜在危害,是各国反垄断立法、执法的主要目标,结构性和行为性救济就是对这类行为的主要干预方式。本文利用手动汇总的经营者集中案件数据库(2008—2016年),对我国商务部反垄断局的救济决定及其行为化偏好进行了初步的计量检验,主要发现有:救济与否的决定与兼并案件关联市场的集中度、参与者市场份额、是否纵向兼并和股权收购的比例显著正相关;一个兼并活动被施加行为性救济的力度则与所在行业的网络特性、参与者的市场占有率和股权收购比例有关联。这表明,商务部的经营者集中救济行为基本上符合我国反垄断法设定的单边效应和协调效应原则。本文对专利密集型产业执法实践的案例分析,也揭示出在反垄断法执行权力分割配置的背景下,行为性救济低效或无效的事实和成因。基于此,建议统一和集中三个反垄断执法部门的权责范围,并制定公开、透明和可实施的救济机制,强化竞争中性原则的应用。     

Viewpoint: Canadian competition policy: progress and prospects

Abstract.  This paper discusses the state of competition policy – in particular the economics of competition policy – in Canada today and considers its prospects going forward. It argues that: (i) the importance of competition policy has become accepted widely in Canada and indeed throughout much of the world; (ii) competition policy design and enforcement is in general well done in Canada; (iii) economists, including many Canadians, have played a central role in the development of an efficient and effective competition policy in Canada and elsewhere; and (iv) competition policy in Canada is today facing very serious challenges, and economists should be concerned.     

Finance and inequality: Channels and evidence

We provide a framework to interpret the recent literature on financial development and inequality. In many developing countries, access to funding and financial services by firms and households is still very skewed. Recent evidence suggests that poor access does not only reflect economic constraints but also barriers erected by insiders. Inequality affects the distribution of political influence, so financial regulation often is easily captured by established interests in unequal countries. Captured reforms deepen rather than broaden access, as small elites obtain most of the benefits while risks are socialized. Financial liberalization motivated to increase access may in practice increase fragility and inequality, and lead to political backlash against reforms. Thus financial reforms may succeed only if matched by a buildup in oversight institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 748–773.