Interrogating Sickonomics,from Diagnosis to Cure: A Response to Hodgson

Hodgson's review of our books argues against us that marginalism neither adopted methodological individualism nor excluded the social from economics. Thus, he finds a partial solution to sickonomics in abandoning the term methodological individualism and using both structures and individuals as analytical starting point(s), revisiting Marshallian marginalism dressed up in socio-institutional clothing. He also denies any relationship between the current malaise in economics and the marginal revolution, as we claim, focusing exclusively on institutional developments since the Second World War. We show Hodgson is either partial or wrong on all of these counts. Firstly, his alternative to methodological individualism is untenable. Secondly, institutions, although implicitly present in Marshallian and Walrasian economics, play no substantive analytical role and as such are superfluous. Finally, although institutional factors help explain the sickness of modern economics (in addition to socioeconomic, ideological, political, and intellectual factors), the intellectual roots of this decay lie in the conceptual framework established around the marginal revolution.     

Can neoclassical economics become social economics?

This essay has both a general and a specific purpose. Its general purpose is to pose the question: Can neoclassical economics be social economics? Its answer to this general question is: Yes, but only if it abandons its methodological soul; that is, by abandoning methodological individualism, positivism, and ahistoricism, and expressly and systematically adopting a methodological perspective which is holistic, normative, and historical. Its specific purpose is to identify and examine the major elements in the economics of one leading figure in the historical development of neoclassical economics who self-consciously attempted to combine, to paraphrase Schumpeter, a neoclassical head with a social economics heart: Alfred Marshall.     

Time-bound concepts in the catholic social teaching of the 19th and early 20th centuries

This essay has both a general and a specific purpose. Its general purpose is to pose the question: Can neoclassical economics be social economics? Its answer to this general question is: Yes, but only if it abandons its methodological soul; that is, by abandoning methodological individualism, positivism, and ahistoricism, and expressly and systematically adopting a methodological perspective which is holistic, normative, and historical. Its specific purpose is to identify and examine the major elements in the economics of one leading figure in the historical development of neoclassical economics who self-consciously attempted to combine, to paraphrase Schumpeter, a neoclassical head with a social economics heart: Alfred Marshall.     

What economic agents do: How cognition and interaction lead to emergence and complexity

Kohn (The Cato Journal, 24(3):303–339, 2004) has argued that the neoclassical conception of economics—what he terms the “value paradigm”—has experienced diminishing marginal returns for some time. He suggests a new perspective is emerging—one that gives more import to economic processes and less to end states, one that bases behavior less on axioms and more on laboratory experiments. He calls this the “exchange paradigm”. He further asserts that it is the mathematization of economics that is partially at fault for leading the profession down a methodological path that has become something of a dead end. Here I suggest that the nascent research program Kohn has rightly spotted is better understood as distinct from its precursors because it is intrinsically dynamic, permits agent actions out of equilibrium, and treats such actions as occurring within networks. Analyzing economic processes having these characteristics is mathematically very difficult and I concur with Kohn’s appeal to computational approaches. However, I claim it is so-called multi-agent systems and agent-based models that are the way forward within the “exchange paradigm,” and not the cellular automata (Wolfram, A new kind of science, 2002) that Kohn seems to promote. Agent systems are generalizations of cellular automata and support the natural abstraction of individual economic agents as software agents.     

Methodological interactionism: Theory and application to the firm and to the building of trust

Recent insights from the “embodied cognition” perspective in cognitive science, supported by neural research, provide a basis for a “methodological interactionism” that transcends both the methodological individualism of economics and the methodological collectivism of (some) sociology and is consistent with insights from social psychology. It connects with a Mengerian exchange perspective and Hayekian view of dispersed knowledge from Austrian economics. It provides a basis for a new, unified social science that integrates elements from economics, sociology, social psychology, and cognitive science. This paper discusses the roots of this perspective, in theory of cognition and meaning, and illustrates its application in a summary of a social–cognitive theory of the firm and an analysis of processes by which trust is built up and broken down.     

The New Economics of Labor Migration: Beware of Neoclassicals Bearing Gifts

Abstract

Until the emergence of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) in the 1980s, migration scholars were largely divided into two main theoretical camps, viz. the neoclassical and historical-structural approaches to migration. Against this background, the NELM presented itself as a theoretical ‘third way’ between the two latter approaches, and purported to reconcile agency and structure in a way previously unachieved by either of them. While those pretensions gained a fair amount of acceptance and popularity, this paper argues that they are fundamentally misleading, and that the NELM is little more than a slightly more sophisticated avatar of the neoclassical approach to migration, whose fundamental weaknesses it has not, and cannot, shed. This paper further argues that, in so doing, the NELM effectively constitutes migration theory's own instance of economics imperialism, i.e. the attempt to advance the fundamental tenets of neoclassical economics (methodological individualism and the assumption of optimizing rationality) within the context of the study and interpretation of various social phenomena. In order to put forth these arguments, this paper provides a summary presentation of the standard neoclassical theory of migration, the historical-structural heterodoxy and the NELM; highlights why it is that the NELM should be regarded as a ‘reworked’ version of the neoclassical theoretical framework and discusses its inception in the context of the ‘information-theoretic revolution’ in economics; and argues for a new and improved ‘historical-structural synthesis’ as a more satisfactory alternative to both the NELM and the standard neoclassical theory.     

Why Need is “A Word We Cannot Do Without” in Economics

Economists in the neoclassical tradition do their best to avoid using the word “need.” Social economists have traditionally been more open to discussions of need. Philosophic discussions of need are also scarce but nevertheless helpful. This essay will argue that need is “a word we cannot do without” in economics, and not only in social economics. Need is objective, satiable, and absolute, by contrast with want or preference as it is defined in neoclassical economics. With this clarification, 1) it is reasonable that public policy should consider need as well as want and aim to satisfy some needs, and 2) for some purposes, such as the economics of health care, conventional demand cannot be understood without the concept of need. Thus, even the narrower purposes of neoclassical economics cannot be achieved without clarifying and using the concept of need, in addition to the more usual motivational assumptions of neoclassical economics.     

Social Economics and Evolutionary Institutionalism Today

This paper discusses theoretical and methodological elements that constitute social economics. It also considers those elements for evolutionary (Veblenian) institutional economics. It investigates how these “heterodoxies” may further converge. Such convergence would probably not trigger a complete unification, but lead to a broadly defined common research program and a strategy for joint “heterodox” survival, in face of the ranking game of the neoclassical “mainstream” and of the dominant powers supporting it as the discipline providing ideological legitimization. A common denominator of “heterodoxies” in terms of real-world orientation, direct interdependency and interaction of agents (social decision situations), appropriate complexity, and the treatment of values is drafted. Theoretical concepts discussed include complex and open systems, individual agency, institutions, embeddedness, networks, social reform, and process orientation. Formal methodological developments considered are complex modeling, game theory, or computer simulations. We arrive at a more formal common basis, which we term socio-economics. We also consider the relations of evolution and institutions, the institutional dichotomy, and the theory of institutional change. The monism of the “market” of the “mainstream” turns out to dissolve into the institutional diversity of real-world network forms, which helps explaining real-world forms of markets, hierarchies, or spatial clusters. Focuses of “heterodox” convergence will have to be the related “microfoundations” and “macrofoundations” projects, integrating an interdisciplinary “naturalistic” approach to genetic-cultural co-evolution of cooperation, and social reform. While modern socio-economics makes “heterodoxies” leading in economic research, their future still appears open between ideological cleansing and extinction through the mainstream, and proactive paradigmatic pluralism.     

Market failure vs. system failure as a rationale for economic policy? A critique from an evolutionary perspective

This paper reconsiders the explanation of economic policy from an evolutionary economics perspective. It contrasts the neoclassical equilibrium notions of market and government failure with the dominant evolutionary neo-Schumpeterian and Austrian-Hayekian perceptions. Based on this comparison, the paper criticizes the fact that neoclassical reasoning still prevails in non-equilibrium evolutionary economics when economic policy issues are examined. This is more than surprising, since proponents of evolutionary economics usually view their approach as incompatible with its neoclassical counterpart. In addition, it is shown that this “fallacy of failure thinking” even finds its continuation in the alternative concept of “system failure” with which some evolutionary economists try to explain and legitimate policy interventions in local, regional or national innovation systems. The paper argues that in order to prevent the otherwise fruitful and more realistic evolutionary approach from undermining its own criticism of neoclassical economics and to create a consistent as well as objective evolutionary policy framework, it is necessary to eliminate the equilibrium spirit. Finally, the paper delivers an alternative evolutionary explanation of economic policy which is able to overcome the theory-immanent contradiction of the hitherto evolutionary view on this subject.     

Keynes against Kalecki on economic method

In the past twenty years, there has been considerable debate on the “coherence” of post Keynesian economics, in view of post Keynesian economists’ ambitions to develop a paradigmatic alternative to neoclassical economics. Given the growing importance of methodological aspects in this discussion, this article addresses the differences of approach to economic theory between the fathers of the two most important strands in post Keynesian economics. We thus focus on Keynes’s criticism of Kalecki’s theory of the business cycle and the tensions between Keynes’s logical approach and Kaleki’s formal modeling. We show that in criticizing Kalecki’s theory, Keynes made use of the same methodological criticism (based on detecting logical fallacies in reasoning) he had employed to attack both the classical theory and contemporary “pseudo-mathematical” models. After illustrating these fundamental differences between Keynes and Kalecki about the proper way of doing economics, we draw some conclusions on the possible future evolution of post Keynesian economics.     

Foucault on the Marginal Revolution in Economics: Language and the Cartesian Legacy

Scholars have long debated the ‘revolutionary’ character of the ‘Marginal Revolution’ in economics, focusing on theoretical foundations, methodological devices, social context and political aspects. This article offers a new perspective by investigating ontological and epistemological conditions of that intellectual movement. This requires, in turn, a characterization of those conditions, for which purpose we will draw on Foucault's configurations of thought into ‘epistemes’ in The Order of Things. Although not mentioning those conditions, there have been few references in economics to Foucault's approach. They have mainly claimed that he neglected its importance because he did not see it as a ‘revolution’ in The Order of Things. It is argued here that he actually considered it a ‘revolution’ in The Archaeology of Knowledge. A revision of Foucault's account provides some ideas regarding deep philosophical conditions of the emergence of neoclassical theory and defies some usual interpretations of the circumstances that led to the mathematization of economics. The main conclusion is that its revolutionary character did not stem from a change of ontological beliefs, but—just as many historians of economics have defended—it was a methodological revolution. This study suggests a reinterpretation of that event, claiming that it resulted from a new conception of language and a crisis of Descartes's project of a mathematical unifying science. Going beyond that debate, these reflections proffer ideas that deserve an appraisal in economics.     

The economics of ageing and the political economy of old age

Economic discussion of ageing has been largely neoclassical in approach. Ageing has become a specialism within population economics, which is itself a specialism within the neoclassical mainstream. An alternative view has come from authors in sociology and social policy, who have produced their own ‘political economy of old age’. In contrast with neoclassical individualism, sociological depictions of ageing have stressed the social construction of old age and the structured dependency of the elderly. Non-neoclassical economists have had little to say about ageing, despite some relevant work in the early days of Keynesianism. This paper argues that a combination of structural ideas from sociology and disequilibrium ideas from Keynesian and non-neoclassical economics can provide a suitable framework for the economics of ageing.     

Overcoming Contemporary Mythology: An Essay

Over the last 35 years, a free market, laissez faire program has increasingly dominated perceptions as to what constitutes correct economic theory and policy. Most adherents of this program trace its origins to Adam Smith, and claim that its dominant position is the result of superior theory.

The argument here is that Adam Smith is not the theoretical ancestor of modern laissez faire economics, and that there are fundamental differences between Smith’s position on laissez faire and that of conventional neoclassical theory. A difference between “soft” and “hard” laissez faire is made, where Smith represents the former position; neoclassical theory the latter. Further, and more important, it is argued that the current laissez faire program is an outgrowth of a political program instituted in the 1930’s and financially supported in the present era by conservative foundations to promote an ideological framework that permits the development of specific governmental (and non-governmental) actions.     

Is Gerard Debreu a Deductivist? Commentary on Tony Lawson's Economics and Reality

Tony Lawson has argued that the methodology of neoclassical economics is deductivist: in constructing their formal models, economists hope to be able to provide explanations based on laws, as described by the deductive-nomological model of explanation. This article argues in contrast that neoclassical economics cannot be understood as following just one methodology. It is argued that neoclassicism exhibits two methodologies, one “official” and one tacit. The former is empiricist, and corresponds to the practice that has been described by Lawson. The latter, which can be called “hypothetico-deductive rationalism”, amounts to the position that knowledge of the world can be obtained without any empirical verification of one's assumptions, simply by exploring the implications of the assumptions one makes.     

From Social Theory to Explaining Sickonomics: A Response to Dimitris Milonakis and Ben Fine

This response shows that, in their reply to my critique of their work, Ben Fine and Dimitris Milonakis generally maintain the impression that there is a single, widely accepted definition of methodological individualism, but they do not identify it. They assert that social structures (undefined but seemingly specified to exclude law and institutions) have ‘analytical priority’ and logically (but tacitly) imply that individuals should have no part in the analysis of social or economic phenomena. They mischaracterise Hodgson's (2011) position on Marshall by quoting just one part-sentence out of context. Fine, Milonakis and Hodgson agree that the intellectual roots of the predominance of technique over substance in modern economics can partly be traced to the 1870–1900 period, but disagree on what they are.     

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

能源回弹效应最新研究进展:理论与方法

能源回弹效应是指能源效率提高并未达到预期节能效果的经济现象,其对能源、经济与环境系统协调与可持续发展产生了不利影响。自“Khazzoom-Brookes(K-B)假说”提出以来,学术界试图利用新古典经济学及新兴经济学分支学科理论探究回弹效应的机制,揭示回弹效应的影响因素,旨在完善回弹效应的分析框架,为回弹效应的实证检验奠定坚实的理论与方法论基础。基于此,本文首先在宏观和微观两个层面上总结了回弹效应的内涵界定,阐明了不同界定形式的适用性;然后依据回弹效应发展脉络,系统梳理了回弹效应在新古典经济学框架下的理论机制,以及在新兴经济学分支学科视角下的拓展性阐释;进而,对回弹效应的研究方法进行了归纳,探讨了不同方法的适用范围、优缺点及其修正或改进;最后,总结了能源回弹效应研究中存在的问题并对未来需要关注的方向进行了展望。     

Ecological economics in relation to democracy,ideology and politics

Two recent studies and policy documents are discussed in the present article. One is a UN report prepared by experienced politicians as input into the 2012 Rio de Janeiro Conference, the other a study about the ecological economics of biodiversity.The UN report is of interest in informing about the thinking of politicians and their recommendations for action. It is however a consensus report where more fundamental changes in perspectives are not considered but rather avoided. A number of ecological economists participated in the second study on biodiversity. They demonstrated consciousness about many of the critical arguments about Cost–Benefit Analysis but finally argued in favor of relying on the conceptual framework of neoclassical economics with its CBA. The present author is criticizing this idea of “mainstreaming” the economics of biodiversity contending that radical change in perspectives is needed.     

The Histonomic Approach to Economics: Beyond Pure Theory and Pure Experience

This article starts off with the distinction between logico-deductive and empirico-deductive approaches to economic theory. The logicodeductive approach, for instance neoclassical economics, uses an axiomatic framework that has only little empirical substance. The empirico-deductive approach, for instance, Ricardian economics, attempts to state economic theory as a “typical” structure of reality. It appears that the latter approach touches reality more closely and is more sensitive to intellectual enrichment and to substantial empirical evidence. However, both approaches operate within the basic assumption applied in classical physics, that theory must represent an invariant structure of reality—highlighting in this case economic phenomena that do not change over time. In the following, the induction issue is given new life, suggesting its validity under the non-conventional assumptions ofvariancy and time-asymmetry. A “histonomic” approach stressing the importance of making theoretical (-nomic) statements about economic phenomena that are basically historical (histo-) in their non-classical properties of variancy and time-asymmetry is favored.