Sr掺杂PbTiO3陶瓷致密化及其介电性能研究

采用高温-高压法(HPHT)合成了Sr掺杂PbTiO3(Pb1-xSrxTiO3简称为PSTO)体陶瓷,利用XRD、阿基米德法、阻抗分析等手段研究了Sr掺杂量(x=0.1、0.3、0.5、0.7)、氧处理工艺(温度、时间)对不同高压合成条件下的PSTO样品的晶体结构及其介电性能的影响;实验结果表明采用高压低温法可以制备出达到理论密度92%以上的Sr掺杂PbTiO3(Pb1-xSrxTiO3)体陶瓷.在居里温度以下随着x的增大,样品的c轴减小而a(b)轴增大,c/a减小,晶胞体积收缩.而随着x的增大,晶体的相对介电常数εr呈上升趋势.短时间退火可以改善高压合成样品的介电性能.     

浅谈热电企业的内部管理创新——以合肥热电集团为例

城市热电联产属于能源的阶梯利用,而能源综合利用效率较高,通过热电联产实现集中供热的综合热效率可达80%,而分散的小型锅炉的热效率仅50%左右。推进热电联产、集中供热是国家能源合理分配和利用的一项重要措施,已列入国家发改委鼓励发展项目,同时也是城市能源建设的一项基础设施,是城市现代化的一个重要标志。国家积极鼓励推进发展热电联产,如颁布的《大气污染防治法》、《节约能源法》、     

八达公司坚持节能环保优先

浙江八达金华热电有限公司于2003年5月由碌金华市热电厂改制后设立．是金华市区重点扶持优势企业。公司现有职工356人，总资产1．26亿元，拥有总装枧容量39000千瓦汽轮发电机组4台．最大供热能力150吨／时．担负着金华市区59家企事业单位的蒸汽供应和部分居民小区的热水供应任务，近几年来．面对社会经济快速发展、能源供应日趋紧张、煤炭价格不断上涨的生产经营形势．热电公司坚持以科技为支撑，以管理为手段，大力发展热电联产，积极开展挖潜增效，较好地发挥了热电联产企业的环保节能优势．有力地促进了循环经济的发展。[编者按]     

长和：应运而生助节能

在2004年时的湖州织里经济开发区，在建热电厂前1吨／时以上燃煤锅炉有28台，共125吨蒸发量，大部分属于工业企业，特别是印染、纺织企业，随着企业生产发展和规模扩大，有呈逐年上升的趋势，这种情况下如不加以引导，将形成烟囱林立、污染环境的后果。随着工业的发展，还有一些用热大户在开发区落户，因此在经济开发区内建设一座集中供热、热电联产的热电厂是非常必要和及时的，同时也符合国家当前有条件的地方实现集中供热、热电联产这一产业政策。湖州织里长和热电有限公司正是在这一背景下应运而生。     

35t／h链条锅炉炉膛结焦及省煤器超温现象治理

黑龙江岁宝热电有限公司金京热电分公司是小型热电联产企业，该分公司2号锅炉为济南锅炉厂生产的35t／h链条炉。锅炉型号为YG-35／3．82(39)-M型锅炉，运行时一直存在炉膛结焦、省煤器及省煤器出口集箱超温，锅炉出口烟温高，锅炉效率低的问题。为此黑龙江岁宝热电有限公司委托哈尔滨航天热能工程公司针对卜述问题进行改造，于2001年用了一个半月的时间完成了对炉膛受热面、省煤器的     

浙江节能不能没有热电

面对国际油价的飙升和减少温室气体排放的压力,欧盟对节约能源高度重视。在欧盟委员会发布的能源效率行动计划中,提出到2020年减少一次能源消费20％的节能目标,并减少温室气体排放20％,对此,欧洲有关机构对热电联产的节能潜力进行评估,结果表明：仅热电联产一项技术可完成1／3的欧盟节能目标,每年可减少CO2排放1亿吨。     

多任务委托代理模型下经营者管理协同激励机制研究

3.中国矿业大学,北京100083)摘要:借助委托-代理模型,针对经营者的业务和人员的两种管理活动,研究在知识经济社会,人员管理重要性不断增加的前提下,所有者最优激励机制设计和优化的问题。表明:随着人员管理的重要性上升,经营者业务管理相对有效的企业,激励强度将下降,总确定性等价将减小;而经营者人员管理相对有效的企业,激励强度将上升,总确定性等价将增加。同时对知识经济时代"以人为本"的企业管理方法的有效性做出了一种解释。     

采用液氢超导技术建设能源高速公路的设想

据美国能源信息署提供的数字，2001年美国全年的能源消耗为96000万亿Btu(英国热量单位)，大约相当于全球能源消耗的1／3。而美国人口只占全球的5％．人均能源消耗达3．33亿Btu。目前美国的能源主要由煤、然气、石油、核聚变和可再生能源构成。随着人口的增加和工业全球化的发展，预计到2030年美国的能源消耗将增加1倍，而到2100年则将增加4～5倍。     

几种采暖方式的分析评价

随着我国供热事业的不断发展，各种客观制约条件的变化，生产技术能力的提高，采暖方式日趋多样化，人们面临的选择越来越多。如热电联产采暖方式，区域锅炉房集中供热采暖方式，热泵采暖方式和地热采暖方式等。面对如此众多，各具特点的采暖方式，人们该如何评价其优劣性，对一个实际的工程问题该如何选择适宜的采暖方式，这就需要对每种采暖方式的全系统进行仔细的分析研究，然后才能全面的予以评价比较。     

安徽汽车产业价值创新战略及其启示

文章对安徽汽车产业价值创新战略的成功实施进行总结性研究,认为安徽汽车产业价值创新战略包括五个方面:(1)不断拓展生存空间;(2)注重技术创新,提供全新而优越的价值;(3)加快产业整合步伐,突破现有资源和能力的限制;(4)追求使用价值最大化,满足大众市场的核心需求;(5)不断提高服务水平。最后,文章概括了安徽汽车产业价值创新战略成功实施的四个方面的启示:(1)选择与安徽汽车产业相适应的企业文化;(2)选择与安徽汽车产业相适应的激励机制;(3)选择与安徽汽车产业相适应的员工职业生涯规划;(4)选择与安徽汽车产业相适应的自主技术创新。     

ARE ATHLETES DOPED? SOME THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Sports fans all over the world have recently witnessed an increasing number of spectacular doping cases, leading to considerable annoyance in the public. However, our knowledge regarding the prevalence of doping is still quite limited, leading some people to speculate that (nearly) all professional athletes are doped and possibly even have to be doped to be good enough to compete successfully in highly selective tournaments. On the other hand, particularly representatives of the sports associations pretend that since the number of positively tested athletes remains small, there are only a few "black sheep," while in general, the world of sport is clean and fair. In the recent past, a number of theoretical models have been developed that can be empirically tested, which, in the end, may lead to the formulation of policy recommendations (ranging from higher sanctions to legalizing doping). We review the more important models and present anecdotal as well as some quantitative empirical evidence on the prevalence as well as the determinants of doping. ( JEL K42, L83, M52)     

Budget constraint of a firm and economic theory

Summary Firms in reality are subject to budget constraints which general equilibrium theorists have paid little attention. Using Morishima (1950, 1992) model, this paper deals with firms that are subject to budgets pertaining to sales and investment decisions, and proves the existence of a general equilibrium. We show that an economy with firms subject to budgets does not necessarily satisfy the efficiency proposition, and clarify how the total profit maximum condition in the Arrow-Debreu (1954) type economy ensures an efficiency in a limited dynamic sense.The author is grateful to Professors J. Iritani, H. Nagatani, and K. Urai who gave useful comments on occasions of Saturday Workshop on Economic Theory and Mathematics. He is also grateful to Professor M. Kaneko for his useful comments on an earlier version of the paper Kuga (1993), to which this article is closely related.     

Endogenous uncertainty in a general equilibrium model with price contingent contracts

Summary This paper views uncertainty and economic fluctuations as being primarily endogenous and internally propagated phenomena. The most important Endogenous Uncertainty examined in this paper is price uncertainty which arises when agents do not have structural knowledge and are complelled to make decisions on the basis of their beliefs. We assume that agents adopt Rational Beliefs as in Kurz [1994a]. The trading of endogenous uncertainty is accomplished by using Price Contingent Contracts (PCC) rather than the Arrow-Debreu state contingent contracts. The paper provides a full construction of the price state space which requires the expansion of the exogenous state space to include the state of beliefs. This construction is central to the analysis of equilibrium with endogenous uncertainty and the paper provides an existence theorem for a Rational Belief Equilibrium with PCC. It shows how the PCC completes the markets for trading endogenous uncertainty and lead to an allocation which is Pareto optimal. This paper also demonstrates that endogenous uncertainty is generically present in this new equilibrium.This research was supported in part by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei of Milan, Italy, and by the National Science Council of Taiwan. The authors thank Carsten K. Nielsen for valuable suggestions.     

Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority

The usefulness of the public-choice approach for a better understanding of international organizations can be demonstrated by applying it to the analysis of the structure and functions of a new international organization, the International Sea-Bed Authority, established in 1994, after two decades of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim to control the oceans' mineral resources beyond the limits of national jurisdictions (which have been proclaimed by the U.N. Assembly common heritage of mankind). First, the reasons for establishing this organization, whose basis is the common heritage of mankind nature of ocean resources, are examined under two aspects: 1) definition and protection of property rights; 2) environmental control of sea-bed mining activities. Secondly, the organization's decisionmaking system is presented, including such features as the assembly, council with chamber voting, finance committee with decision by consensus, features that balance the voting power of members and protect those countries that bear the financial responsibility for the budget. Finally, some comments are offered about more general aspects of the theory of international organizations: the bureaucracy (and diplomacy) of these organizations as well as the interdependence among international organizations, which opens the way to forms of international logrolling and makes it advisable for countries not to exit from these organizations, even when they have no primary interest in them.     

Stationary measures for some Markov chain models in ecology and economics

Summary. Let continuous, exists in for x in . Let be an i.i.d. sequence from F and X₀ be a nonnegative random variable independent of . Let be the Markov chain generated by the iteration of random maps by . Such Markov chains arise in population ecology and growth models in economics. This paper studies the existence of nondegenerate stationary measures for {X_n}. A set of necessary conditions and two sets of sufficient conditions are provided. There are some convergence results also. The present paper is a generalization of the work on random logistics maps by Athreya and Dai (2000).Received: 20 March 2002, Revised: 4 December 2002, JEL Classification Numbers: C22, D9.The author wishes to thank Professor Mukul Majumdar and the referees for several useful suggestions.     

Concavity assumptions in regulatory models and the capital waste controversy

Sherman (1992, 197) concludes that the wasteful use of capital [by a rate-of-return constrained monopolist] is motivated to avoid an inelastic region of demand. Previous analyses of capital waste by regulated firms often employ models with concavity restrictions on the profit and production functions. Here we demonstrate that these conventional assumptions in Averch-Johnson type models require demand to be everywhere elastic, ruling out the avoidance motive emphasized by Sherman. Although these highly restrictive assumptions are suitable for studying inefficient input mix, they are inappropriate when considering investment in unproductive capital.This note is based on the appendix to my doctoral dissertation completed at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and supervised by John W. Mayo. Useful comments were also made by Ross Eriksson of The University of Tennessee, David Kaserman of Auburn University, David Mandy of the University of Missouri, and an anonymous referee. All conclusions and opinions expressed herein are mine and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI) or any organization associated with NRRI.     

中国上市公司费用“粘性”行为研究

费用“粘性”指当费用随着业务量的变化而变化时 ,其边际变化率在不同的业务量变化方向上的不对称性。本文讨论了费用“粘性”的内容和目前对此的理论解释 :“契约观”、“效率观”和“机会主义观”。通过对 1 995年 1 2月 3 1日前上市的 2 92家公司从1 994— 2 0 0 1年的数据进行的分析 ,本文发现 :(1 )中国上市公司确实存在费用“粘性”。同美国上市公司相比 ,中国上市公司向下调整费用的速度要慢许多 ,这很可能是由于中国企业管理水平的低下和经理层代理成本的高昂。 (2 )费用“粘性”确实在以后的会计期间出现反转。在时间跨度拉长的情况下费用的“粘性”明显降低 ,这说明中国上市公司的经营管理还有一些效率 ,但是效率尚不够高。 (3 )效率观所隐含的“宏观经济增长”和契约观所隐含的“资本密集型”两个变量对费用“粘性”的增强效果不显著 ,这也许说明目前中国上市公司的经理层行为包含了“机会主义观”的因素。     

Environmental Goods and the Distribution of Income

The paper presents a (theoretical) investigation of the distributional impacts of environmental commodities. It introduces an appropriate framework, defines concepts for measuring benefits and examines the determinants of benefit incidence within this setup. Its emphasis is on methodology and on recognizing the relevant economic variables and information. It turns out that in an equal-preference model the magnitude of the income elasticity of marginal willingness to pay for an environmental good is the crucial variable determining progressivity. It is related to a number of other elasticities which are more easily accessible to an empirical estimation.     

Economic and political competition in neoclassical and evolutionary perspective

Neoclassical welfare economics still looms large in the discipline of public choice. Particularly, by constructing analogies of political competition fundamental shortcomings of old neoclassical paradigms found their way into a new theory of political economy. Especially the failure to deal with the problem of limited knowledge and with the role of institutions obscured fundamental differences between political and economic systems of coordination and control. Hence, I propose a non-neoclassical perspective, using Hayekian concepts like competition as a discovery procedure or spontaneous order to develop an alternative agenda for many fields of public choice. I shall first outline a critique of neoclassical equilibrium settings in economics and in similarly constructed models of democracy. Then various properties of economic and political institutions, the competition of ideas and institutional competition among jurisdictions will be discussed in an evolutionary perspective. Not surprisingly, these applications reveal some similarities to central themes of constitutional political economy.     

Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions

Summary We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the independent private value model. We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same minimum and if this minimum is not a mass point of any of these distributions, then a Nash equilibrium of the first price auction exists. We then modify the first price auction game by adding a closed interval of messages. Every bidder has to send a message with the bid he submits. These messages are used in the resolution of the ties. The winner of the auction is chosen randomly among the highest bidders with the highest value of the message among the highest bidders. In the general case, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for this augmented first price auction.I wish to thank Mamoru Kaneko and a referee for their comments on an earlier draft.