Western Rules for Eastern Banking

The article outlines the most significant changes in the banking sector and traces its possible future path in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in the context of competing banking models. The main conclusion is that despite the transition the orientation of the banking sector will be towards the government sector (including the central bank). The new network of financial interrelations that emerged during transition is characterised by the banking sector's significant net defensive position and creditor passivity. Although CEE countries are developing their financial systems in line with a universal banking model the aggregate balance sheets of their banking sectors reveal a structure that is more in line with other proposed models. Financial relations between households, the corporate sector and the state sector intermediated by the banking sector reveal a severe retreat of banks from the corporate sector in favour of maintenance of government and central bank operations.     

The Role of Non-monetary Trade in Russian Transition

The appearance of significant non-monetary trade in the Russian transition of 1992-98 has been differently interpreted by analysts and observers. Some have seen barter as a symbol of passive resistance to reforms while others have blamed reformist policies for its development. We argue that non-monetary trade is best understood as a natural response of companies to market imperfections remaining from Soviet times. We provide an overview of market institutions that existed at the onset of the transition and conclude that market infrastructure was under-developed (especially trade and finance-related institutions). This fact became obvious after the liberalisation of trade in 1992. When the Central Bank of Russia stopped issuing direct credit to enterprises, newly established commercial banks were unable to fill the gap. Firms had to develop alternative means of financing trade and non-monetary trade was one of them. In our opinion barter, while an inefficient mode of trade, also played a positive role in the transition. Its high transaction costs offered ample opportunities to earn profits from trade and financial intermediation. The latter mushroomed as a result and at the time of the 1998 default the Russian economy had sufficiently developed trade, financial and legal systems to afford a switch from barter to money trade.     

The State Budget Compilation Process in Russia: Institutional Framework and Practice

This article clarifies the institutional framework and practice of the state budget compilation process in Russia, taking the 2001 federal budget as an example. The budget was the first one compiled under the new national financial system, including the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, which came into force in January 2000. The Budget Code is greatly superior to the preceding one, in the socialist era, which regulated Russia's financial activities during the initial phase of the transition period. Under the new legal system the 2001 budget was drafted by the Ministry of Finance, approved by the government, submitted to the Federal Assembly, discussed at the State Duma and finally approved by the Federation Council. A detailed analysis of this process shows that a certain order is emerging in the budget compilation process due to the comparatively amicable relationship between the government and the Federal Assembly and because of the establishment of the new legal system, including the Budget Code. The new financial system, however, has many problems, indicating that Russia will not be able to accomplish institutional changes in this field all at once.     

The Politics of Shadow Money: Security Structures,Money Creation and Unconventional Central Banking

ABSTRACT

For the first time in the history of central banks, the Federal Reserve has been pursuing monetary policies which allow shadow banks to access its reserves. The paper examines these policies in an analysis based on the concept of security structure. The aim is to facilitate a better understanding of complex institutional arrangements which convert credit claims into money or enable them to simulate the money-form. As the financial crisis reached its peak in September 2008, the Fed was not able to contain the impact precisely because the security structure existing between banks and the Fed did not extend to the shadow banking system, which had meanwhile become thebackbone of the global financial system. To address this situation, the Fed initiated new security structures that were designed to also give players in the shadow banking system access to liquidity and collateral. The concept ‘security structure’ serves as an analytical tool to explore dynamic forms of safety and liquidity generation and to distinguish between credit expansion and money creation. It also helps to differentiate between three qualitatively different stages of security: central bank money, quasi-money and shadow money. In this way, it foregrounds the politics of (shadow) money creation.     

Public credit and liquidity in James Steuart's Principles

Abstract

The aim of this article is to shed new light on the monetary and financial theory of James Steuart (1767) through his examination of the speculative bubbles of 1720: that is, the John Law System in France and the South Sea Bubble in England. In contrast to most contemporary writers – particularly David Hume and Adam Smith – Steuart had a balanced opinion about these two financial experiments. On the one hand, Steuart considered them worthwhile, since they were attempts at public debt restructuring by reducing its expense and increasing its liquidity. Moreover, according to Steuart, a well-managed public debt favours the liquidity of both banks and the financial market. These worked together for the growth of wealth. However, on the other hand, Steuart claimed that the failure of these experiments was due to: (i) a poor management of money; (ii) a violation of credit rules and its corollary, the weakness of banks; (iii) the adoption of contestable dividend and financial information policy. This article presents Steuart's proposals for creating the liquidity of both banks and the financial market via a well-managed public debt.     

Financial Instability and the Credit Crunch of 1966

In an article in this journal, Edwin Dickens criticizes the financial instability hypothesis of Hyman Minsky. He contends that ''financial instability theorists'' explain the financial crisis in the US in 1966 as due to the forced sale of securities by commercial banks, but that the 1966 crisis was not due to such sales. Therefore, he says that Minsky's financial instability hypothesis is contradicted. In contrast, this article argues that the 1966 crisis was initiated by the sale of securities by banks, but that such a development was not due to increased financial fragility, and thus was not a necessary aspect of the financial instability hypothesis. While the specifics of the 1966 crisis are somewhat of an exception, the general pattern of financial crisis in the postwar period in the US is powerfully explained by Minsky's financial instability hypothesis.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

The financial and economic performance of social banks

ABSTRACT

The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This article analyses the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality, and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000–2014. We also analyse the relative impact of the global financial crisis on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.     

Formation of the non‐state sector and privatisation in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

In this paper, we take a detailed look at one Polish bank's experiences with financial sector reforms focusing on a bank-led enterprise-restructuring plan that linked directly bank privatization and recapitalization to bad-debt workouts. Based on personal interviews and original statistical data, we evaluate the performance of Bank Depozytowo-Kredytowy (BDK) in promoting financial and operational restructuring of its clients. We found that BDK continued to provide soft lending to keep four old military‐industrial companies afloat and actually increased its exposure to these companies during the program. The five success stories among BDK's clients were companies that had external agents other than the bank promoting and monitoring their operational restructuring. From our case study of BDK, we conclude that, while banks may play a role in financial restructuring of their clients, their ability to affect operational restructuring is quite limited. Moreover, stateowned banks are particularly vulnerable to incentive problems when dealing with large state-owned enterprises that may be too big or too political to fail.     

Financing of innovation: national development banks in newly industrialized countries of East Asia

Abstract

Contemporary literature on innovation tends to overlook the issue of financing, whereas financial history suggests that banks have been essential to financing of new industries. Emerging literature ondevelopment banking, although inspiring, remains focused on financing policies. The article aims to rearticulate a coevolutionary nature of industrial and financial interests, following the works of Schumpeter and Minsky, by looking at the 4 cases of national development banks, tasked with long-term financing of industries, from newly industrialized countries of East Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. The study suggests that innovation in finance, as well as organizational innovation in financial institutions, represent essential elements of financing of innovative activities. Further, organizational innovation in financial institutions, such as development banks, might signify a disposition to face uncertainty, which characterizes economic and technological unknowns inherent in financing of innovation.     

国有商业银行风险与效率的制度经济学分析

国有商业银行改革进程中出现共有产权的模糊性,由此积累了较大的金融风险,阻碍了向现代商业银行转制以及效率激励机制的形成。解决这一难题的关键在于重新划定公共领域的产权界限,真正取消政府通过模糊产权设租,优化银行剩余控制权与索取权的配置结构,根据专有性理论引入银行家创新激励机制,明确政府权威的监督功能。     

Institutional Analysis of Banks and Personal Loan Companies: Lesson from Poland

Abstract:

The purpose of the article is to explain changes in the behavior of individuals, their actions, choices and ways of thinking that took place under the influence of banking and personal loan companies in Poland. The hypothesis adopted here is that mistakes made in the lawmaking process in Poland caused a number of adverse social changes, which affected the poorest part of society. The article is devoted to legal norms which banks started to apply as prudential regulations after the financial crisis from 2008 to 2015. In 2016, new important legal regulations were introduced which slightly changed the image of the market described in the article. The article describes the results of the author’s research concerning far-reaching social consequences of the regulations introduced at that time. Such consequences include people already in the lowest-income levels of society falling further into poverty, as well as loss of trust in the state as an institution failing to protect all of its citizens.     

Credit Policy in times of Financial Distress

This essay evaluates two central bank policy tools, capital requirements and lending of last resort, designed to avert financial panics in the context of endowment economies with complete markets and limited borrower commitment. Credit panics are self-fulfilling shocks to expected credit conditions which cause transitions from an optimal but fragile steady state to a suboptimal state with zero unsecured credit. The main findings are: (i) Countercyclical reserve policies protect the optimal equilibrium against modest shocks but are powerless against large shocks. (ii) If we ignore private information and central bank inefficiencies, this class of models bears out Bagehot’s 1873 claim in Lombard Street: panics are averted if central banks stand ready to lend at a rate somewhat above the one associated with the optimal state.     

Charter value,risk-taking and systemic risk in banking before and after the global financial crisis of 2007-2008

ABSTRACT

We investigate how bank charter value affects risk for a sample of OECD banks by using standalone and systemic risk measures before, during, and after the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Prior to the crisis, bank charter value is positively associated with risk-taking and systemic risk for very large ‘too-big-too-fail’ banks and large U.S. and European banks but such a relationship is inverted during and after the crisis. A deeper investigation shows that such a behaviour before the crisis is mostly relevant for very large banks and large banks with high growth strategies. Banks’ business models also influence this relationship. We find that for banks following a focus strategy, higher charter value amplifies both standalone and systemic risk for large U.S. and European banks. Our findings have important policy implications and cast doubts on the relevance of the uniform more stringent capital requirements introduced by Basel III.     

The emerging Russian banking system1

Value-added in Russian banks grew by 43 per cent while GDP declined by 32 per cent in the early years of the transition in Russia. This paper offers explanations for the unusual success of the Russian banking sector and the determinants of individual bank performance. The evidence comes from balance sheet data for 563 Moscow banks and 160 regional banks on January 1, 1995 and January 1, 1996. Important factors include the Central Bank policy of channelling low-interest directed credits to state enterprises through banks, the ability of banks to obtain large-scale interest-free deposits, and the resulting high interest rate spreads in an environment of high inflation, and the extent to which banks were formerly part of the Soviet system.     

金融压力、所有制结构与银行风险承担——基于中国影子银行活动的实证研究*

2008年金融危机之后，监测与防范系统性金融风险、维护金融稳定成为各国监管机构的工作重点。本文构建了一个反映我国系统性金融风险的中国金融压力指数（FSIC）。基于此，本文研究不同所有制结构的商业银行将如何调整影子银行业务以应对系统性金融风险。实证结果表明，当金融压力上升时，相较于国有银行，非国有银行的风险承担水平显著上升。进一步研究发现，这一差异与两类银行对影子银行这一风险业务的调整有关。当金融压力上升时，国有银行会显著减少影子银行业务，而非国有银行的影子银行业务不会减少。本文提出了国有银行的双重职能这一观点来解释实证研究的发现。本文的研究结论对于指导我国金融市场化改革和防范系统性金融风险具有重要启示。     

Foreign banks and the business environment in transition: a cointegration approach

The contribution of foreign banks to the development of the financial sectors in emerging markets, and especially the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, is well-known. The purpose of this article is to focus on an area of foreign bank influence that has thus far only begun to emerge from the extant literature: the effect of foreign banks on the broader business environment in transition. In addition to improving financial intermediation and broader access to credit, has the presence of foreign financial institutions helped to shape a better business environment in the long-run? Or did foreign banks retard local institutional development and thus worsen the overall business environment? Using cointegration techniques across a sample of 21 diverse transition countries from 1983 to 2015, I find that foreign bank entry had a positive impact across business environment indicators, but with some indicators taking longer to influence than others. The policy implications are that business environments can be improved by facilitating foreign bank entry rather than restricting it.     

中国国有商业银行财务重组 的模式比较及政策约束

在国有商业银行改革中，财务重组既是改革的起点，也是制约其后续改革的重要因素。本文以损失承担与资金注入主体的变化为切入点，对1998年以来国有商业银行财务重组模式及其变迁作了比较制度分析，思考了其政策约束效应。本文的结论是在财政部和央行交替主导四大行财务重组的背景下，由于重组过度依赖国有商业银行自身，“好银行/坏银行”模式的实际效果受到抑制，进而导致国有商业银行财务重组并非实质完成。这已成为利率市场化、银行运营市场化及AMC转型等金融改革的现实约束因素。     

市场化转型、风险偏好与中国商业银行的盈利性

在控制了影响银行盈利性的主要宏观经济及其他个体特征变量的条件下,本文考察了样本期间内全要素生产率变化、国有控股、公开上市、市场势力及风险偏好等因素对中国商业银行盈利性的影响程度与方向。研究发现:在当前金融制度安排下,商业银行向以提升全要素生产率为核心的内涵式发展模式的转变,反而轻微地降低了银行的盈利性;国有控股与公开上市对银行的盈利性均具有正向影响;随着多元化竞争体系的形成,商业银行的盈利能力获得了大幅提升;而中国商业银行在经营活动中的风险态度越是谨慎,风险承担越是适度,其盈利性就表现得越好。在推进商业银行市场化转型的进程中,需要关注国家整体金融制度的顶层设计问题,同时有效控制银行的经营风险,以实现其盈利性的可持续增长。