密封拍卖机制下的道德风险问题研究

本文以拍卖理论共同价值模型为基本分析框架,通过引入卖方委托代理关系,讨论了密封拍卖机制下竞买人信息寻租以及代理人道德风险对拍卖期望收入的影响。本文的主要结论包括:就控制道德风险而言,第二价格密封拍卖优于第一价格密封拍卖;拍卖品共同价值的大小决定了线性报酬激励合同的效果;特定情况下,竞买人的信息寻租行为有助于提高集体福利。     

佣金支付策略对拍卖结果的影响

在SIPV模型下,分别给出当佣金由买方、卖方以及买卖双方共同支付时,投标人的均衡出价策略、买卖双方及拍卖行的期望收益,得出佣金由卖方支付时投标人出价更积极,但三种情况下投标人的均衡期望收益是完全相同的;而佣金由卖方支付时卖方获得的期望收益更低,拍卖行在此时获得更高的期望收益;当佣金由买卖双方共同支付时,拍卖行更愿意将卖方的支付比例设置的高一些;考虑到保留价的设置时,卖方支付佣金时最优保留价设置最高,另外是买方支付佣金时的情形,不考虑佣金支付时最优保留价设置最低。     

不同一口价组合拍卖机制下的卖方收益比较研究

随着电子商务的发展,作为网上拍卖方式之一的一口价拍卖逐渐盛行起来。网上一口价拍卖打破了时间和空间的限制,因而被广泛应用于组合拍卖中。笔者针对目前拍卖网站所采用的两种不同拍卖规则:固定一口价和持久一口价,在独立私人估价模型下分析比较了上述两种规则下的卖方期望收益。     

腐败与反腐败的博弈经济分析

腐败与反腐败一直是公众关注的话题。腐败对经济发展和社会公平都是一个很大的威胁。目前,我国公务员腐败现象较为严重,政府反腐的力度也很大。公务员腐败有多方面的原因,既有政治体制方面的因素,也有利益驱使等其他方面的原因。本文从政府、寻租人和公务员的概率因素出发,通过博弈分析方法分析三者的期望效用,得到他们的最优策略,最后根据模型分析的结论,提出反腐的政策建议。     

社会地位、非期望效用函数、资产定价和经济增长

本文利用非期望偏好结构 ,讨论消费和资产收益的时间序列行为。在这种递归偏好结构中 ,投资者积累财富不仅仅为了消费 ,也为了财富所带来的社会地位 ,我们研究这一假设对消费、投资组合策略、证券市场价格以及经济增长的影响 ,并利用所得到的定价方程讨论风险溢金问题。     

如何让人说真话

维克里的二级密封价格拍卖机制。 设想你有一件古董要卖,但不知道谁愿意出最高的价格。如果你去问每个人愿意出多少钱,他们一般会撒谎。解决的办法是让每个人把愿意出的价格写在纸上装入信封交给你,所有信封打开后,出价最高的的人得到那件古董,但实际支付的价格以出价第二高者的出价为准。     

最优拍卖理论及其实践述评

拍卖是机制设计理论的典型应用之一.最优拍卖所要解决的核心问题是卖者如何在不同的交易环境下通过有效的机制设计实现最大的期望收益.维克里的收益等价定理是拍卖理论的发展基石,但是收益等价定理依赖于独立私人估价假设,这些假设条件过于苛刻在现实中难以满足.因此,研究如何在独立私人估价假设不成立时实现最优拍卖就成为拍卖理论演进的基本线索.本文将沿着这一线索对最优拍卖理论及其实践加以评述,并揭示拍卖理论在中国的经济改革和发展中所具有的重要应用价值.     

第一、第二密封价格拍卖的最优投标人数研究

文章基于拍卖者的视角,通过建立投标者报价策略模型,进一步研究第一、第二密封价格升价拍卖(as-cending auction)的最优投标人数及拍卖机制配置效率问题,发现参与投标的人数越多,投标者报价越高,拍卖者的货币收入越大,拍卖品配置给估价最高者的概率越大,在投标者为理性人的假定条件下,无论竞争如何加剧投标者报价都低于其估价;进一步地拍卖作为具有单方市场垄断力的稀缺资源配置方式,其最优配置效率的实现在于投标者的充分竞争。     

设计链联盟的信用博弈分析

设计链作为产品研发的发展趋势,其联盟活动中的信用问题是影响设计链正常运转的重要因素之一。从混合战略博弈角度,推导出混合战略均衡时设计链参与企业的期望效用公式,进而指出设计链参与企业的信用等级直接受到两方面因素的影响,即联盟活动所带来的最大收益和合作企业保守信用的概率。最后,给出建立规范、高效的设计链信用机制的几点建议。     

次高标拍卖:解决特许权拍卖过程中过度竞争问题的最优机制

一、引　言对 于自然垄断性很强的公用事业 ,各国政府习惯上采取管制手段来改善资源配置。但由此带来的问题是 ,缺少市场竞争压力的垄断经营商总是效率低下。为此 ,德姆塞兹 (Demsetz)曾建议取消政府管制 ,对公用事业的特许经营权实行公开的竞争性拍卖 ,提高垄断经营者的经营效率。采用的拍卖方法主要是英式拍卖和第一价格密封拍卖 (投标 ) ,通常按要求的服务费率或补贴数额进行报价 ,报价最低者获胜 ;也可按特许费用报价 ,报价最高者获胜。两种报价方式本质是一样的 ,旨在减少特许企业的垄断利润 ,降低服务费率。中标企业被授予一段时期的经营特许权 ,经营期满再重新进行投标。特许经营权拍卖制度现已运用于西方各国的有线电视、自来水、电信、铁路等公用事业领域。我国一些城市也开始在自来水、出租车、公交线路等行业推行这一制度。对于处于经济转型时期的我国来说 ,这一制度推行的难点不在于解决原有特许企业的资产转让和合同期限问题 ,而在于如何避免投标过程中的过度竞争。一些企业为了争取中标 ,不顾亏损进行报价 ,不但使得竞标过程难以甄别最有效率的企业 ,而且中标企业还经常采取降低服务质量或要求政府提高费率等手段 ,减少不正常标价所造...     

Individual behavior of first-price auctions: The importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets

This article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the Nash equilibrium predictions of the first-price sealed-bid auction. A subject faced in 100 auctions always the same resale value and competed with computer-simulated bids. The design used between-subjects variation and involved information feedback as the treatment variable. Earlier experimental work on first price auctions has frequently reported an overbidding relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium. Our data provide evidence that overbidding can be fostered by the standard information feedback in auction experiments, which, after each auction, reveals the winning bid only. By means of learning direction theory we explain the individual bidding dynamics in our experiment. Finally we apply impulse balance theory and make long run predictions of individual bidding behavior.     

Open vs. sealed-bid auctions: testing for revenue equivalence under Singapore's vehicle quota system

Using data from the auction of vehicle quota licenses in Singapore, we study if revenue equivalence holds when the auction format was switched from a sealed-bid format (May 1990 to June 2001) to an open bidding format since July 2001. Our econometric analysis indicates the change in auction format led to a change in bidding behavior. On average, the quota license premium under the open bidding format is about US$1000 (about 7.5% of the Category E license price in June 2001) lower, compared to the forecast level that would have prevailed if there had been no change in the auction format.     

Deterring collusion with a reserve price: an auction experiment

Experimental Economics - We experimentally compare collusive behaviors in first-price sealed-bid auctions without and with a reserve price. Before the auction begins, a bidder may offer a bribe to...     

Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

In the general symmetric auction framework of Milgrom and Weber (1982) it is shown—as a new manifestation of thelinkage principle—that the all-pay sealed-bid auction yieldshigher expected revenue than the standard first-price sealed-bid auction. This raises the question why sealed-bid auctions of the standard first-price variety are observed in practice whereas the all-pay variety is not.     

All equilibria of the Vickrey auction

This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness.     

An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction

In spring 2000, the British government auctioned off licences for Third Generation mobile telecommunications services. In the preparation of the auction, two designs involving each a hybrid of an English and a sealed-bid auction were considered by the government: A discriminatory and a uniform price variant. We report an experiment on these two designs, and also compare the results to those with a pure English auction. Both hybrids are similar in efficiency, revenue differences disappear as bidders get experienced. Compared to the discriminatory format, the pure English auction induces more entry.     

An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction

We provide an ascending auction that yields an efficient outcome when there are many identical units for sale and bidders have interdependent values and downward-sloping demand. Our ascending auction both extends and generalizes Ausubel 's (2004) and yields the same outcome as Perry and Reny 's (2002) generalization of Vickrey 's (1961) sealed-bid auction. There are two key features of our auction. Bidders are permitted both to express different demands against different bidders, as well as to increase their demands. The equilibrium strategies are closely related to the familiar „drop out when price equals value” strategy of the English auction.     

Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

The sealed-bid first-price auction of a single object in the case of independent privately-known values is the simplest auction setting and understanding it is important for understanding more complex mechanisms. But bidders bid above the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium theory prediction. The reasons for this “over bidding” remain an unsolved puzzle. Several explanations have been offered, including risk aversion, social comparisons, and learning. We present a new explanation based on regret and a model that explains not only the observed over bidding in sealed-bid first-price auctions, but also behavior in several other settings that is inconsistent with risk aversion. The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation.     

Explaining Overbidding in First Price Auctions Using Controlled Lotteries

In this paper, we study the behavior of individuals when facing two different, but incentive-wise identical, institutions. We pair the first price auction with an equivalent lottery. Once a subject is assigned a value for the auctioned object, the first price auction can be modeled as a lottery in which the individual faces a given probability of winning a certain payoff. This set up allows us to explore to what extent the misperception of the probability of winning in the auction is responsible for bidders in a first price auction to bidding above the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction. The first result we obtain is that individuals, even though facing the same choice over probability/payoff pairs, behave differently depending on the type of choice they are called to make. When facing an auction, subjects with high values tend to bid significantly above the bid they choose in the corresponding lottery environment. We further find that in both the lottery and the auction environments, subjects tend to bid in excess of the bid predicted by the risk neutral model, at least for intermediate range values. Finally, we find that the difference between the lottery behavior and the auction behavior is substantially, but not totally, eliminated by showing the subjects the probability of winning the auction.     

The effect of corruption on bidding behavior in first-price auctions

When the owner of an object sells it through an auction run by an agent of hers, corruption may appear. In a first-price auction, corruption can make honest bidders more or less aggressive, or their behavior can remain unchanged. We identify sufficient conditions for each of the three possibilities. We analyze the effects of corruption on efficiency, bidders’ welfare and expected revenue. Our results apply as well to the situation—unrelated to corruption—where one of the bidders is granted a right of first refusal.