Impact of Taxes and Benefits on Inequality among Groups of Income Units

This paper analyzes the redistributive impact of the fiscal system and simultaneously explains how each tax and benefit instrument satisfies the principles of vertical and horizontal equity within and across different groups of income units. The decompositions of the redistributive effect are based on new axioms concerning the vertical and horizontal equity of the overall fiscal system, including taxes and benefits. The method is based on pairwise comparisons of income units and the “micro” concepts of income supremacy change, deprivation from reranking, and income distance change. The decomposition results provide more detailed insights into the income redistribution process than is typical in the literature. This is illustrated by an empirical application of the method to the Croatian scheme of personal income taxes and non‐pension social benefits, in which households are divided into two groups, those with and those without children.     

ON EQUITY ASPECTS OF IMPERFECT INCOME REDISTRIBUTION

We develop a theoretical analysis of the impact of imperfect targeting, participation costs and incomplete take-up upon the level of progressivity, vertical equity, horizontal inequity and redistribution exerted by state benefits. An illustration using the distribution of British Supplementary Benefits (now Income Support) indicates that progressivity is roughly untouched, vertical equity and horizontal inequity are increased, and total income redistribution is slightly increased by these redistributive imperfections in 1985 Britain.     

The dual nature of public goods and congestion: the role of fiscal policy revisited

Abstract The role of fiscal policy is examined when public goods provide both productive and utility services. In the presence of congestion, the consumption tax is shown to be distortionary. Optimal fiscal policy involves using consumption‐based instruments in conjunction with the income tax. An income tax‐financed increase in government spending dominates both lump‐sum and consumption tax‐financing. Replacing the lump‐sum tax with an income tax to finance a given level of spending dominates introducing an equivalent consumption tax. These results contrast sharply with the literature, where the consumption tax is generally viewed as the least distortionary source of public finance.     

Equity in Poverty Program Evaluations

Poverty‐reducing programs often use indicators other than household income to transfer resources to the poor which has important implications in terms of equity of the program. This paper offers a decomposition methodology to analyze the horizontal and vertical equity components of a redistribution policy for subgroups defined according to policy‐relevant characteristics. Our measures are derived by comparing the cost of inequality in terms of equally distributed equivalent poverty gaps in the pre‐transfer income and post‐transfer income distributions. An application to the poverty‐reducing program Oportunidades in Mexico in 2006 reveals that the use of indicator variables more strongly correlated with pre‐transfer incomes in rural households can improve the redistributive effect while it also points out the difficulties of the program in targeting different levels of support among the poor, both within and between groups.     

School Finance Induced Migration and Stratification Patterns: The Impact of Private School Vouchers

This paper introduces a general equilibrium model of public school finance that includes: (i) multiple school districts that finance local public schools via property taxes set by majority vote; (ii) multiple neighborhoods within school districts where each neighborhood is characterized by a quality level of housing; (iii) local public schools that are obligated to admit all interested students who reside within the school district; (iv) private schools that function as clubs of parents who share the cost of the private school equally and who can choose to exclude others; (v) an educational production process that depends on both per pupil spending and average peer quality within the school; and (vi) individual peer quality levels that are correlated with the socioeconomic status of households. Since it allows for various degrees of imperfect stratification of residents across communities, the model is well suited for investigating empirically relevant migration forces induced by school finance reform proposals. The abstract model itself, however, is too complex to yield many analytic results. A computational counterpart to the model isnb therefore developed, calibrated to data, and utilized for policy experiments. In particular, the impact of vouchers in the context of different types of prevoucher educational finance systems is investigated, and it is found that migration patterns in general would cause vouchers to benefit public schools in poor communities while hurting public schools in wealthy communities.     

The effect of state education finance reform on total local resources

Both the federal government and the states use intergovernmental grants to try to change the composition of local spending across different programs, as well as the distribution of resources across localities. Many states are now under court order to use state education grants to reduce local disparities in education spending. While a substantial body of literature suggests that these court orders increase the level and progressivity of state education spending, there is little evidence on their broader effects on the total resources available not just for schools in low-income districts, but for other programs across all localities. We find that states finance the required increase in education spending in part by reducing their aid to localities for other programs, particularly for wealthier areas. Thus, while court-ordered school finance equalizations do increase total state aid to localities for education, they do so at the expense of drawing state intergovernmental aid away from programs like public welfare, health, hospitals, and general services. These findings provide insight into the effectiveness of using earmarked funds to achieve redistribution.     

公共支出结构对收入不均等影响研究——基于公共服务均等化视角分析

收入不均等影响到社会公平与经济发展,而收入公平分配是政府的主要责任,也是政府公共支出的依据之一.影响收入分配不均等的因素有很多,其中由于政府相应责任缺位,公共支出结构偏向,使得公共支出中基本公共服务支出不足是其主要原因.本文实证分析得出公共支出总量与结构严重影响基本公共服务供给,进而影响着收入不均等的水平,成为社会公平和稳定的重要因素.政府应从制度上进行公共支出改革,规范督促地方政府优化公共支出结构,不断提高对民生支出的主动性,逐步缩小基本公共服务的差距,缩小收入不均等的水平.     

Political economy of income distribution dynamics

Income distribution varies considerably across countries; it tends to become more equal with development in some countries, but just the opposite occurs in other countries. This paper provides a theoretical investigation of the persistent differences in income distribution across countries over time. Motivated by the relationship between income distribution and public spending at different school levels for a broad range of countries over the past 30 years, the analysis centers on the role of public education where specific investments interact with political involvement by different socio-economic groups. Socio-economic groups may form lobbies to influence education policy making. The formation of lobbies is endogenous. Persistent inequality is caused by persistent lobbying efforts of the wealthy that lead to an allocation of public education spending more biased toward them.     

Social security, public education and the growth-inequality relationship

We study how the relationship between economic growth and inequality depends upon the levels of funding of two of the largest government programs, public education and social security. We do this in the context of an overlapping generations economy with heterogeneous agents where the government collects a tax on labor income to finance these programs. We show that in our model an increase in government spending on social security reduces income inequality and can have a non-monotonic effect on growth. When the initial level of social security funding is low, as is the case in most poor economies, then its increase will enhance growth. When its funding level is high as is typical for developed countries, we show that its further increase can slow down growth while reducing income inequality. These results obtain regardless of whether the increase in social security funding is financed by a tax increase or by cutting the public education budget. We also find that the effects of increasing the level of public education expenditures or the overall size of the government budget (holding the budget composition fixed) are characterized by similar non-monotonic growth-inequality relationships.     

Are Public and Private Social Expenditures Complementary?

Most analyses of social protection are focussed on public arrangements. However, social effort is not restricted to the public domain; all kinds of private arrangements can be substitutes to public programs. OECD data indicate that accounting for private social benefits has an equalising effect on levels of social effort across a number of countries. This suggests complementarity between public and private social expenditures. But their distributional effects differ. Using cross-country data, we find a negative relationship between net public social expenditures and income inequality, but a positive relationship between net private social expenditures and income inequality. We conclude that changes in the public/private mix in the provision of social protection may affect the redistributive impact of the welfare state.Part of Leiden Social Security Incidence Project. Revised version of a paper presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal (March 10–14, 2004), and at the 60th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, Milan, Italy (August 23–26, 2004). The usual disclaimer applies.     

A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform

A recent education policy Turkish government is wishing to undertake is to shut down all private supplementary education centers (SECs) unless SECs manage to convert into a private school. With this policy, the government is willing to increase equality of opportunity among students. We show quantitatively that the policy, in fact, leads to a decrease in equality of opportunity since SECs are given the option to convert into private schools. We use a political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously set income, choose among a continuum of private schools differentiated by tuition and a public school. Households choosing the public school can privately supplement their child's education spending in any amount. Public school is free of charge, and its spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households. Income tax rate is determined by majority voting. Achievement of a child depends only on educational spending. We calibrate the model's parameters by matching certain targets from 2013 Turkish data. We then exogenously restrict the supplemental education spending to zero in a counterfactual experiment. We find that variance of achievement (or inequality of opportunity) increases by 23.51% and mean achievement decreases by 1.74%.     

中国卫生筹资的再分配效应

利用2006年中国健康与营养调查(CHNS)数据和类似于税收再分配的分解方法,将卫生筹资的再分配效应分为三部分:累进效应、水平平等效应和再排序效应。卫生筹资增加了收入不平等,表现出了亲富人的再分配,主要原因在于水平不平等和再排序效应,如果相同收入的人群进行相同的卫生支付,再分配效应将会降低64%,另一原因在于卫生筹资系统的累退性。在同为从穷人到富人的再分配中,农村卫生筹资亲富人的再分配程度高于城市;农村卫生筹资的累退程度大于城市;农村卫生筹资的水平不平等小于城市。     

Distributional Effects of Fiscal Consolidation

If public goods and transfers are relatively more valuable to the poor, the elderly poor stand to lose from public debt reduction achieved through spending cuts. When long–term surpluses produced by debt reduction are recycled into higher provision of public goods and transfers, future generations of poor could gain. If future surpluses are recycled through lower labour taxes, working households in the future would be positively affected. The impact of debt reduction on vertical equity is ambiguous, yet inter– rather than intragenerational equity is likely to pose the greatest obstacle to fiscal consolidation. Based on majority voting by self–interested households, debt reduction is unlikely to occur.
JEL classification : D 91; E 62; H 23; H 63     

Old‐age Social Security versus Forward Intergenerational Public Goods Provision

This paper introduces an overlapping‐generations model with earnings heterogeneity and borrowing constraints. The labour income tax and the allocation of tax revenue between social security and forward intergenerational public goods are determined in a bidimensional majoritarian voting game played by successive generations. The political equilibrium is characterized by an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where low‐income and high‐income individuals form a coalition in favour of a lower tax rate and less social security while middle‐income individuals favour a higher tax rate and greater social security. Government spending then shifts from social security to public goods provision if higher wage inequality is associated with a borrowing constraint and a high elasticity of marginal utility of youth consumption.     

Distributional Effects of Public Education in an Economy with Public Pensions*

We study how the allocation of government expenditures between two major outlays—education and pay‐as‐you‐go social security—affects human capital distribution in an economy with heterogeneous agents. We consider an overlapping generations economy where the government maintains both programs, and allocates tax revenues to finance them. In our model, human capital is one of the factors of production. It is itself produced as a combined result of public inputs and private inputs. Parents' decisions to invest time and material resources in education of their children are motivated by altruism, heterogeneous in its strength across the population, which leads to heterogeneity of incomes. We investigate the effect of an increase in public funding for education on the human capital distribution. We show that in this framework, contrary to some earlier results, increased spending on public education may lead to higher inequality. Our results depend crucially on the interaction of education funding with the social security budget and on the elasticity of substitution in the learning technology.     

Who benefits most from property assessment taxes? Evidence from Los Angeles County

Assessment caps on property taxes are often assumed to benefit affluent homeowners the most with little gains for low-income households. Quantile regression results for Los Angeles County show that on average effective property tax rates decrease by $1994 per year due to length of ownership in the 50th percentile because of California’s Proposition 13 assessment cap. There is evidence of both horizontal and vertical inequity across the entire sample. Low-income households do benefit from California’s assessment cap as they are typically infrequent movers but their effective tax rates decrease over time. However, the most affluent households by market value do not gain the most and there is no evidence of horizontal inequity for these homeowners. There is also no evidence of horizontal inequity for middle-income households. Property tax savings vary between $18,000 and $40,000, depending on the assessed value decile and percentage quantile.     

Individual preferences for public education spending: Does personal income matter?

Standard redistributive arguments suggest that the impact of household income on preferences for public education spending should be negative, because wealthier families are likely to oppose the redistributive effect of public funding. However, the empirical evidence does not confirm this prediction. This paper addresses this ‘puzzle’ by focusing on the role of the inclusiveness of the education system and the allocation of public spending between tiers of education in shaping the impact of income on preferences. By using data from the International Social Survey Programme (2006), we show that, when access to higher levels of education is restricted (low inclusiveness) and when the share of public spending on tertiary education is high, the poor are less likely to support public education spending. This result suggests that reforming the education system towards greater inclusiveness might contribute to increase political backing for public investment in education from the relatively poor majority of the population.     

Bonus pay for teachers,spatial sorting,and student achievement

Bonus pay policy for teachers in the U.S. is analyzed in this paper. We quantitatively argue that, because of the decentralized education finance system in the U.S., this policy may lead to higher teacher and household sorting across school districts. This then may lead to higher variance of achievement and lower mean achievement. Formally, we use an equilibrium political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous in exogenously set income, and teachers, heterogeneous in exogenously set quality, are endogenously allocated across two school districts. Public education expenditures, which includes teachers’ wage payment and non-teacher related education spending, are financed through local income taxation. Income tax rate in each district is determined via majority voting. Achievement depends on the efforts chosen by teachers and non-teacher related education spending. Teacher efficiency wage per unit of quality is determined at the national teacher labor market. We first calibrate our benchmark model by matching certain statistics from the U.S. data. Then in a computational experiment, we introduce bonus pay for teachers which rises with average achievement. We find that for the recently observed level of average bonus pay (6.59% of average base salary), variance of achievement is 2.46% higher and mean achievement is 1.79% lower than the benchmark. Variance of achievement reaches its peak when average bonus pay is 14.06% and then it starts falling. Also, mean achievement always falls as average bonus pay rises.     

SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE INTRAGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION OF LIFETIME INCOME IN JAPAN*

We investigate how social security redistributes lifetime income within the same generation in Japan, based on data from the micro data. The progressivity of Japan's state pension programme appears to be much more limited on a lifetime basis than on an annual basis. Given an ageing population, replacing the current Pay As You Go system with a simple one that consists of a flat benefit and a wage‐proportional premium, and has no maximum contribution, can be desirable in terms of both efficiency and intragenerational equity. The redistributive effects of income tax and consumption tax to finance the benefit are also examined.