对企业国有产权交易投招标模式的分析

企业国有产权是我国国有资产的重要组成部分,规范企业国有产权转让行为,有利于加强企业国有产权交易的监督管理。现有监管体制下,可以拍卖、招投标、协议转让以及国家法律、行政法规规定的其他方式进行交易。针对实践中国有产权交易模式存在的问题,对投招标模式进行了分析,提出了交易程序中应注意的问题。     

企业国有产权转让的程序及规范盲点

为减少和避免国有产权转让过程中国有资产的流失,实现国有资产的保值增值,从2004年2月《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》开始实施,到2009年6月颁布《企业国有产权交易操作规则》,国务院国资委已经相继出台了一系列关于国有产权转让管理的法规与制度,规范和完善了国有产权转让的程序、进场交易、资产评估等事项.本文将针对当前企业国有产权转让的操作程序及产权转让过程中的规范盲点进行讨论.     

企业国有产权转让的程序及规范盲点

为减少和避免国有产权转让过程中国有资产的流失,实现国有资产的保值增值,从2004年2月《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》开始实施,到2009年6月颁布《企业国有产权交易操作规则》,国务院国资委已经相继出台了一系列关于国有产权转让管理的法规与制度,规范和完善了国有产权转让的程序、进场交易、资产评估等事项。本文将针对当前企业国有产权转让的操作程序及产权转让过程中的规范盲点进行讨论。     

规范企业国有产权交易需要探索的几个问题

2003年底,国务院国资委和财政部联合颁布《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》(以下简称《办法》),并于2004年2月1日起正式实施。这对规范企业国有产权交易,促进国有经济布局和结构的战略性调整,防止国有资产流失等具有重要意义。但是,该《办法》作为我国首个规范企业国有产权交易的部门规章,其本身具有起步性和探索性     

中央

国资委国有产权转让设定八大“禁区” 日前《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》颁布,明确规定了国有产权转让中的八大“禁区”。 这八大“禁区”是:未在产权交易机构中进行交易的;越权擅自转让企业国有产权的;故意隐匿应当纳入评估范围的资产,     

国有资产监管机构选择确定产权交易机构的原则

企业国有产权交易进入市场后,产权交易机构在其中如何发挥作用,是企业国有产权交易能够规范、顺利实施的关键环节。因此,国有资产监管机构在选择确定产权交易机构时必须遵循一定的原则,使产权交易市场在规范中发展,在发展中规范。     

我国国有资产协议转让与拍卖模式的比较分析

我国国有资产流失问题与资源的非优化配置密切相关,而解决国有资产流失问题的关键是要选择一种最适合国有产权交易的资源分配方式。我国国有资产产权交易的协议转让方式中,拍卖机制更能提高国有企业产权的卖方期望收益,我国国有产权交易的实证数据也证明了这一点。但我国资产拍卖在实践中仍存在一些缺陷,政策支持力度也很有限。应积极推动我国国有资产拍卖交易市场的建立与完善,逐步完善产权交易所内部组织,实现国有资产交易的产业政策目标。     

“三位一体化”的产权交易模式研究

研究发现,协议转让、招投标和拍卖三种主要转让方式在我国国有产权交易实践中不是独立的、相互排斥的。相反,它们结合成具有前后继起性的“三位一体化”交易模式：三种转让本质上是一个交易的三个环节,具体推进到哪一步取决于交易的竞争程度。本文从产权供求双方的现实约束及相应的行为假定对该模式及其运作机理、特点作了解释,发现它是一个有效的交易模式,在此基础上,对由该模式下的非“价高者得”原则所推出的“国有资产流失论”进行分析,最后提出该模式需要进一步解决的问题。     

企业国有产权进场交易的难点及对策

根据国务院国资委、财政部2004年2月颁发的《企业国有产权转让管理暂行办法》的规定:“企业国有产权转让应当在依法设立的产权交易机构中公开进行,不受地区、行业、出资或者隶属关系的限制”。进场交易作为企业国有产权进行交易的一项制度被正式确立。据国务院国资委统计,2004年我国企业国有产权进场交易率为85%,上海市国有产权进场交易率为100%,广东省为96%,北京市为90%,四川省为87.4%,江西省为87%。交易规则、交易市场日趋完善,全社会对进场交易的认同度也在逐渐提高。但从实际操作上看,也确实存在一些难点问题需要解决。这些问题解决不好…     

基于电力交易对象选择的双边合约交易机制研究

针对电力双边市场中交易对象不唯一的现象,文章提出了合作博弈论下基于交易伙伴选择的双边交易及电价形成机制,分析了一对多和多对多双边电力市场中的独立及交叉合约交易。文中运用核仁法模拟上述双边电力交易过程,分配交易利润,再由价格利润公式算出交易电价。用该方法来模拟电力双边交易中赋予市场参与者以选择交易对象的权利,还通过缩短交易时间减少了交易风险和交易成本。最后用算例对所提出的模型进行了验证。     

Insurance,self-control,and contract flexibility

We study a competitive insurance market in which some consumers have too optimistic expectations regarding their future use of preventive measures. When contracts are long-term and inflexible, such naive consumers would increase the costs of insurance for low-risk consumers. The competitive insurance market therefore offers flexible contracts that allow for switching between different tariffs. Sophisticated consumers choose a partial insurance tariff and remain low-risks. Naive consumers choose the same tariff, but later switch to full insurance, and become high-risks. If there are sufficiently many naive consumers, they pay a transfer to sophisticated consumers (so that high-risks subsidize low-risks). In contrast, there are no such transfers when contracts are short-term. The model generates novel implications for the time frame of insurance contracts and insurance requirements.     

An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection

The equilibrium nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz's insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting. Insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised: profitable competitors' contracts are imitated and loss-making contracts are withdrawn. Occasionally, a firm experiments by withdrawing or innovating a random set of contracts. We show that Rothschild and Stiglitz's candidate competitive equilibrium contracts constitute the unique long-run market outcome if innovation experiments are restricted to contracts which are sufficiently “similar” to those currently on the market.     

The effect of land tenure governance on technical efficiency: evidence from three provinces in eastern China

This study aims to identify the mechanisms through which land tenure governance affects the technical efficiency of grain production in an integrated framework and to examine the impacts of the public governance, village self-governance, and relational governance of land tenure on the technical efficiency of contracted land and rented-in land. Farm-level survey data collected from Liaoning, Jiangxi, and Jiangsu provinces covering the years of 2014 and 2015 is used for the empirical analysis. The findings indicate that (i) public governance associated with land certification significantly increases the technical efficiency of grain production; (ii) village self-governance and administrative land reallocations can serve as substitutes for the land rental market in optimizing the distribution of land resources and improving technical efficiency; and (iii) compared to multi-year transfer contracts, both annual and open-ended transfer contracts have negative impacts on technical efficiency.     

Limited attention and the optimal incompleteness of contracts

A decision-maker's limited attention is allocated between writingnew contracts and directing current contracts. More time spentwriting a new contract makes the contract more complete. A morecomplete contract performs better and generates higher returns.The optimal allocation of attention implies two types of contracts,relational and market. A relational contract, which is directedperiodically, is optimally less complete than a market contract,which is not directed. The completeness of relational contractsdecreases with the ability to direct contracts, since changingcircumstances can be dealt with later. In addition, the completenessof relational contracts increases with the ability to writenew contracts, since more complete relational contracts aredirected less frequently and leave more time for writing newcontracts. The optimal allocation of attention to relationalcontracts is socially efficient even though it does not maximizethe discounted expected returns of the firm.     

Strategic Innovation with Complete and Incomplete Labour Market Contracts

In a model of strategic R&D competition between two firms that negotiate with independent unions we show that: (i) incomplete labour market contracts may Pareto-dominate complete labour market contracts (ii) even when complete contracts Pareto-dominate incomplete contracts, economies can get stuck in the incomplete contract equilibrium. These conclusions provide additional strategic reasons why complete labour market contracts may not be used—even if they were feasible. We propose two testable predictions to discriminate between complete and incomplete contracts: (i) the variance of wages is lower with complete contracts; (ii) the variance of employment is higher under complete contracts.     

Information, bilateral negotiations, and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how firms choose between using a centralized market and bilateral negotiations to recruit new personnel. In the market firms interact with several workers but do not have information about workers’ behavior in the past. In the bilateral negotiations firms negotiate bilaterally with prospective workers and learn about workers’ performance in previous jobs. We show that the interaction between social preferences, the incompleteness of contracts and the existence of information about a worker’s past performance provides an explanation for firms forgoing market opportunities and bilaterally negotiating with a worker. We observe that approximately 30% of all job contracts were bilaterally negotiated when these contracts are incomplete as opposed to only 10% when contracts were complete. The surplus from trade is higher when incomplete contracts can be bilaterally negotiated, which can be attributed to the presence of information.     

THE FOOTBALL PLAYERS' LABOR MARKET: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE MAJOR EUROPEAN LEAGUES

The growing economic importance of professional football and the recent fundamental changes in the regulatory regime governing the football players' labor market together with the availability of detailed information on player salaries, transfer fees and contract lengths have convinced an increasing number of economists from all over Europe to devote their attention to the operation of that particular market. The following paper reviews the available evidence on the various dimensions of that market (remuneration, transfers, contracts and mobility) and points out some promising directions for further research.     

Electricity demand estimation using proxy variables: some reservations

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of asymmetric information upon labour market decisions. First, in the face of uncertainty concerning person-specific information, self-selection employment contracts develop which induce ‘sorting’ within the labour market. Second, we show the existence of a smaller share in investment in specific human capital for those who accept the self-selection contract relative to those who refuse such contracts. Thus, the earnings of those who accept such contracts are less responsive to changes in specific human capital than the earnings of those who refuse these contracts. Third, we applied the model to the market for professional teachers in British Columbia, Canada. The results of the empirical tests were shown to be consistent with the hypotheses proposed. In addition, once we controlled for the level of and the distribution to human capital the Public–Independent earnings differential fell from 64.3% to 23.9%.     

Coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts

We study the length of agreements in a market in which infinitely-lived firms contract with agents that live for two periods. Firms differ in the expected values of their projects, as do workers in their abilities to manage projects. Worker effort is not contractible and worker ability is revealed during the relationship. The market dictates the trade-off between sorting and incentives. Short- and long-term contracts often coexist: The best firms always use short-term contracts to hire high-ability senior workers, firms with less profitable projects use short-term contracts to save on the cost of hiring junior workers, whereas intermediate firms use long-term agreements to provide better incentives to their workers. We relate our results to the optimal assignment literature that follows Becker (1973).     

Matching markets with adverse selection

This paper considers a market with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and Stiglitz (Quart. J. Econ. 90 (1976) 629). The major departure from existing approaches is that we model a decentralized market that is open-ended and constantly refilled by new participants, e.g., by new workers and firms in the case of a labor market. The major novelty of this approach is that the distribution of types in the market becomes an endogenous variable, which is jointly determined with equilibrium contracts. As frictions become small, we show that the least-cost separating contracts are always supported as an equilibrium outcome, regardless of the distribution of types among entrants. Moreover, we derive conditions under which this outcome is also unique.