Trade,Strategic Environmental Policy,and Global Pollution

This paper examines the effects of international trade in a model with global pollution that accumulates over time because of production emissions in each country. If countries cooperatively determine their environmental policies, autarky and free trade in the absence of trade costs generate the same optimal solution. By contrast, if environmental policies are determined noncooperatively, the effects of trade on global pollution and welfare are ambiguous because policy games can result in multiple equilibria. Although trade increases both the lower and upper bounds of the pollution stock, whether trade expands the range of possible steady‐state pollution levels is ambiguous. The analysis then extends to consider trade costs.     

International production fragmentation,trade in intermediate goods and environment

This paper examines the implications of growing international production fragmentation-induced trade in intermediate goods on environmental quality. Specifically, by making use of a general equilibrium framework, this paper explores the link between trade in intermediate goods and pollution in a setting of endogenous environmental policy. The paper shows that international trade in intermediate goods, through an increase in the number of components available to the international producers, affects the level of pollution and environmental quality. Specifically, developed countries may reduce pollution at the cost of more pollution in developing countries.     

Trade and Global Pollution in Dynamic Oligopoly with Corporate Environmentalism

This paper examines the effects of international trade in the presence of dynamic oligopolistic competition where the stock of global pollution has a negative welfare effect and the oligopolists' objectives may include society's pollution damage as well as private profits. In a symmetric case where the number of firms, emission coefficient, and firms' environmental consciousness are the same in two countries, an opening of trade unambiguously improves each country's welfare in the short run. In the long run, however, trade increases the stock of global pollution and hence, whether opening of trade is beneficial depends on the parameters of the economy. If there are asymmetries between countries, the short‐run gains from trade in both countries are not necessarily guaranteed, because trade liberalization may increase output in one country and reduce it in the other. Moreover, free trade may result in lower pollution stock than under autarky.     

Environmental regulation and trade pattern：a case of China

As a growing number of countries, including both developed and developing countries, have in recent yearstaken environmental regulation at different levels, a question of great concern has been raised： can the regulation alterthe existing trade volume and trade pattern, and ultimately drive pollution-intensive industries to countries with low-levelregulations or even those without regulations at all？ Starting from the three different propositions concerning therelationship between environmental regulation and trade pattern, this paper applies cointegration analysis and errorcorrection model to empirically testing the relationship between environmental regulation and trade in China during theperiod of 1985-2005. Our empirical results indicate that in the short run the collection of pollution discharge fees bearsa positive impact on the export share of clean products of total exports. Thus, higher pollution discharge fees raise theratio of clean products exports to total exports. This further indicates that more stringent environmental regulationpromotes the exports of clean products. In the long run pollution discharge fees are positively correlated with the exportshare of clean products but negatively associated with their import share. Such correlations imply that environmentalregulation tends to facilitate the international specialization in line with comparative advantages.     

Regulated Firms with Transboundary Pollution: Does International Competition Improve Efficiency?

We consider a model of strategic trade and environmental policies with transboundary pollution. A regulated monopoly produces in each country and emits pollution. Under complete information, opening borders leads to a reallocation of the production from the large country to the small one. Total production increases, leading to an increase in the total level of pollution. The creation of a common market sometimes leads to a deterioration of total welfare. Under asymmetric information, the international competition generated by the common market decreases the informational rents of the firms, thereby reinforcing the potential gain to open markets to international competition.     

Testing creative destruction in an opening economy

This paper analyses the relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth using a Schumpeterian framework of technological innovation and applies it to sector‐level South African data. The framework examines direct and indirect effects of trade liberalization on productivity growth. Indirect impacts operate through a differential impact of trade liberalization on firms conditional on their distance from the international technological frontier. Results confirm positive direct impacts of trade liberalization. Results confirm also that the greatest positive impact of trade liberalization will be on sectors that are close to the international technological frontier and that experienced a low level of product market competition before liberalization.     

Strategic Environmental Policy under Free Trade with Transboundary Pollution

We analyze the effects of trade liberalization on environmental policies in a strategic setting when there is transboundary pollution. Trade liberalization can result in a race to the bottom in environmental taxes, which makes both countries worse off. This is not due to the terms of trade motive, but rather the incentive, in a strategic setting, to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution. With command and control policies (emission quotas), countries are unable to influence foreign emissions by strategic choice of domestic policy; hence, there is no race to the bottom. However, with internationally tradable quotas, unless pollution is a pure global public bad, there is a race to the bottom in environmental policy. Under free trade, internationally nontradable quotas result in the lowest pollution level and strictly welfare‐dominate taxes. The ordering of internationally tradable quotas and pollution taxes depends, among other things, on the degree of international pollution spillovers.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTAL TAXES UNDER INTERNATIONAL DUOPOLY

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in the absence of explicit trade policies when both governments and firms act strategically. We demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady‐state equilibrium in a dynamic environmental tax game is lower than that in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behaviour of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the beginning of policy competition, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax. This implies that it is important to set cooperative environmental taxes in the beginning of policy competition because non‐cooperative environmental taxes in the dynamic game result in the race‐to‐the‐bottom, which does not lead to environmental improvement.     

FDI对中国环境影响的实证研究——基于省际面板数据的分析

随着各国贸易与投资规模的扩大和环境污染的加剧,外商直接投资引入量和东道国环境的关系问题日益获得人们的重视,逐渐成为国际社会关注的焦点问题。本文主要研究FDI对我国环境污染的影响效果,通过利用连续16年的省际面板数据分区域建立实证模型,分析两者之间的关系。研究结果表明,FDI与我国各个经济区域的环境污染状况关系密切,而影响方向、程度却各不相同。     

加快环境成本内部化,积极应对反生态倾销

战略性环境政策论者认为,如果一国试图实现社会福利的最大化,就会使边际减污成本小于污染的边际损害,在不完全竞争的世界中,一国会在战略上扭曲其环境政策,以支持其产业在国际市场上的竞争,从而论证了生态倾销的可能性。本文基于对生态倾销及反生态倾销的理解,针对我国传统贸易模式中生态倾销的现状进行分析,提出我国应加快环境成本内部化,积极宣传环保理念,利用反生态倾销的机会调整我国出口结构,采取妥善措施,达到环境保护和自由贸易的平衡,积极应对新一轮贸易挑战。     

Trade,Growth, and Environmental Quality*

This paper examines linkages between international trade, environmental degradation, and economic growth in a dynamic North–South trade game. Using a neoclassical production function subject to an endogenously improving technology, North produces manufactured goods by employing labor, capital, and a natural resource that it imports from South. South extracts the resource using raw labor, in the process generating local pollution. We study optimal regional policies in the presence of local pollution and technology spillovers from North to South under both non‐cooperative and cooperative modes of trade. Non‐cooperative trade is inefficient due to stock externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet do not benefit North. Both regions gain from improved productivity in North and faster knowledge diffusion to South regardless of the trading regime.     

Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy

The paper analyzes environmental tax policy reform using a competitive model of world trade that includes production‐generated environmental damage (pollution) and trade tariffs. The authors examine the feasibility of Pareto‐improving multilateral reforms of environmental taxes, and show that any environmental tax reform that is mutually welfare‐improving when compensating lump‐sum transfers are assumed is also welfare‐improving when a suitable tariff reform (but no transfers) is combined with the tax changes. Several specific reform proposals are developed. These results expand the feasible set of mutually improving policy proposals for international policy initiatives.     

Environmental Pollution in an Open Economy*

This paper attempts to analyze an interaction between international trade and domestic environmental pollution. A country engaging in international trade biases its domestic economic structure toward exportable sectors. The bias thus caused has a significant impact on the quality of the environment. It will be shown that a country can and should control international trade activities as a means of dealing with pollution problems. One of the paper's main purposes is to give a warning to a country which expands its international trade activities without taking serious consideration of its domestic environment.     

International trade performance and concentration in British industry

This paper reports the results of a cross-sectional analysis for 97 industries at the Minimum List Heading level, of their international trading performance 1970–77 and the influence of industrial structure on this. It is shown that, on average, import penetration increased faster than the export ratio for the industries analysed. Investigation of the relationship between industrial concentration and international trade suggest that in the majority of the analyses, especially where the relation between prior concentration change and subsequent with a performance was concerned, higher or increasing levels of concentration were associated with a weaker international trade performance. On the basis of this it is argued that more attention needs to be paid to international trade as a performance rather than merely a structural phenomenon in industry, the reasons for the relatively disappointing performance need to be investigated in more detail, the risk of a decline in internaional trade performance needs to be taken into account in formulating competition policy, especially with respect to mergers and the investigation of dominant firms.     

环境成本内在化对发展中国家的影响及对策

随着世界经济的发展和全球范围内环境保护浪潮的兴起,可持续发展已经成为国际社会的共识,环境成本内在化则是一种必然趋势,发展中国家的环境污染和过度使用的状况已经非常严重,如果不及时治理,会危及生存和发展.由于各国经济发展水平不一,发展中国家的环境标准相对较低,内在化的外部成本增长率较小,产品的国际竞争力较强,利润的增长率较大,被发达国家认为是"生态倾销",被贸易保护主义者利用;目前,制定一套有理、有度、有节、操作性强,能被广泛接受的国际准则来规范和推动环境成本内在化十分必要,特别是发展中国家更应积极地采取对策,协调贸易发展与环境保护的关系.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.     

Environmental standards as strategic outcomes: A simple model

This paper analyses the strategic nature of choice of environmental standards considering both local and global pollution under alternative regimes of international trade. It also compares and contrasts the strategic equilibrium environmental standards and levels of pollution, local and global, with the world optimum levels. It shows that, in case of open economies, environmental standards can be either strategic substitutes or strategic complements. On the contrary, in case of closed economies, environmental standards are always strategic substitutes. It also shows that the strategic equilibrium environmental standards in case of open economies are higher than the world optimum in certain situations. Whereas, in absence of international trade, countries set, in equilibrium, lower environmental standards than the world optimum.     

Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

The Empirics of Comparative Advantage: Overcoming the Tyranny of Nonrefutability

I assess the empirical evidence on comparative advantage. I argue that the Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek (HOV) relationship is not a refutable general‐equilibrium proposition. Consequently, the empirical Heckscher–Ohlin literature has been suffering from the tyranny of nonrefutability. The trade‐governing principle of comparative advantage, the Ricardo–Haberler–Deardorff (RHD) theorem, yields a refutable general‐equilibrium prediction about the pattern of international trade and allows for a theory‐based assessment of the magnitude of the gains from trade. The recent experimental evidence on Japan's nineteenth‐century opening‐up to world trade provides a strong case for the hypothesis that comparative advantage governed Japan's international trade in its early trading years. The aggregate gains from that trade are estimated to be no larger than 9% of Japan's GDP.