Increasing returns to savings and wealth inequality

In this paper I present an explanation to the fact that in the data wealth is substantially more concentrated than income. Starting from the observation that the composition of households' portfolios changes towards a larger share of high-yield assets as the level of net worth increases, I first use data on historical asset returns and portfolio composition by wealth level to construct an empirical return function. I then augment an Overlapping Generation version of the standard neoclassical growth model with idiosyncratic labor income risk and missing insurance markets to allow for returns on savings to be increasing in the level of accumulated assets. The quantitative properties of the model are examined and show that an empirically plausible difference between the return faced by poor and wealthy agents is able to generate a substantial increase in wealth inequality compared to the basic model, enough to match the Gini index and all but the top 1 percentile of the US distribution of wealth.     

Lineage networks,urban migration and income inequality: Evidence from rural China

This work focuses on the role that Chinese lineage networks can play in alleviating income inequality in rural villages through their effect on migration from rural to urban areas. Unique panel data from rural China identifies lineage networks (ancestral hall and genealogy) and provides detailed information on income and migration experiences. Our key finding is that lineage networks increase migration for all social groups by lowering costs, and this pattern is more salient for the poor. Consequently, this population accumulates greater wealth, which decreases income inequality in origin villages. The estimation results remain robust to both the inclusion of exogenous subsamples and an instrumental variables strategy using the effect of historical natural disasters on current lineage ancestral hall or genealogy. The analysis in this paper, coupled with an emerging empirical literature on networks and migration, provides a new perspective on how income inequality in a fast-growing economy varies with access to social networks.     

Does consumption inequality track income inequality in Italy?

This paper presents stylized facts on labor supply, income, consumption, wealth, and several measures of consumption and income inequality drawn from the 1980–2006 Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) conducted by the Bank of Italy. The SHIW provides information on consumption, income and wealth, and a sizable panel component that allows econometricians to estimate sophisticated income, consumption, and wealth processes and to analyze labor market and portfolio transitions. We find that over the sample period income inequality is higher and has grown faster than consumption inequality. Most of the increase in income inequality is related to an increase in the degree of earnings' instability rather than to shifts in the wage structure. We suggest that, in particular, the labor market reforms of the 1990s and 2000s are the most plausible explanation of the increased earnings inequality.     

Automation and inequality with taxes and transfers

Declines in low-skill labour shares are reviewed, and a stylised model is constructed to examine their determinants and future implications. A retrospective analysis of US shocks suggests that technological change has contributed more to raising income inequality and the wealth to GDP ratio than other changes. An anticipated future twist away from low-skill labour toward the capital, combined with population growth, risks high unemployment rates. Productivity growth at twice the pace since 1990 limits this, though inequality persists. Analysis shows that a generalisation of the US ‘earned income tax credit’ system with consumption tax outperforms alternatives of the ‘universal basic income’.     

Life-Cycle Saving in the United States, 1900–90

This paper examines how the proportion of US saving that represents life-cycle accumulation changed over the last century. As individuals retire earlier and live longer than before, the expected length of male retirement has increased by more than six-fold since 1850. According to life-cycle models of saving, this means that the proportion of lifetime income saved for retirement should rise over time. I estimate that the fraction of lifetime income saved for retirement tripled between 1900 and 1990. In contrast to such an increase in the estimated retirement saving, the actual aggregate household saving rates exhibit a relatively stable long-term tendency during the 20th century. Based on this result, I argue that the relative contribution of the life-cycle saving to US wealth accumulation increased substantially, perhaps two to three times, over the last hundred years.     

Redistributive policy,inequality and growth

Does redistribution increase inequality? Is inequality harmful for growth? Both questions have recently been addressed in a number of single-tax models. In this paper, I examine the relationship between policy, growth and inequality when income and inherited wealth can be taxed at different rates. In the model, parents accumulate human capital and a return-bearing, storable good in order to increase the quality of their children. Inequality arises because the learning ability of children is stochastic. Redistributive labor income taxation has a negative impact on short- and long-run growth while taxation of inherited stocks increases growth. Effects of both taxes on income inequality are ambiguous. A switch from income to inheritance taxation may increase average utility of all generations involved. I calculate a structure-induced equilibrium of the political process by means of a stochastic simulation of the model. In the short run initial wealth-inequality can stimulate growth, while initial inequality of the endowment with human capital is harmful for growth.     

Wealth and Consumption in Australia

We revisit the evidence on the effect of changes in household wealth on consumption using a panel of Australian states. We find that a one per cent increase in the value of housing wealth increases consumption by about 0.16 per cent in the long-run, with half of the response occurring within two quarters. The size of this response has been stable over time and largely reflects changes in spending on motor vehicles, durable goods and other discretionary items. We then run counterfactual scenarios using the Reserve Bank of Australia's macroeconometric model, MARTIN, to assess the macroeconomic effects of changes in household wealth. We show that increases in household wealth supported household spending between 2013 and 2017, when growth in disposable income was weak.     

TRENDS IN HOUSEHOLD WEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, 1962–83 AND 1983–89

Using the 1983 and 1989 Surveys of Consumer Finances, I find evidence of sharply increasing house-hold wealth inequality over this period. Whereas mean wealth increased by 23 percent in real terms, median wealth grew by only 8 percent. The share of the top one-half percentile rose by five percentage points, while the wealth of the bottom two quintiles showed an absolute decline. The Gini coefficient increased from 0.80 to 0.84. Almost all the growth in real wealth accrued to the top 20 percent of wealthholders. In contrast, the degree of wealth inequality was almost identical in 1983 as in 1962, and real wealth growth was more evenly distributed across the wealth distribution. There is also evidence that the sharp increase in wealth inequality from 1983 to 1989 was due to a correspondingly sharp rise in income inequality, the increase of stock prices relative to housing prices, and relatively slow inflation.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.     

Volunteering and life or financial shocks: does income and wealth matter?

Volunteering is a dominant social force that signals a healthy state. However, although the literature on volunteering is extensive, knowledge on how life’s discontinuities (life and financial shocks) affect volunteering is limited because most studies work with static (cross-sectional) data. To reduce this shortcoming, we use longitudinal data from Australia (HILDA) that track the same individuals over time to assess how individuals from different income and wealth groups respond to life and financial shocks with respect to volunteering. Although both income and wealth can act as buffers against life shocks by providing stability and reducing vulnerability – which decreases the need to actually change behaviour patterns – we observe more heterogeneity than expected and also stickiness at the lowest income levels. Response delays in post-shock volunteering also suggest that volunteering habits may be driven and influenced by strong commitment and motivation that are not shattered by life or financial shocks. In fact, the amount of time spent volunteering tends to increase after negative income shocks and decrease after positive income shocks.     

The effects of economic growth on income inequality in the US

The paper analyzes the relation between growth and income inequality in the US during the post-war years (1953–2008). We show that the income of the top income groups is more sensitive to growth, defined broadly as current growth and changes in expectations of future growth, compared to the income of the lower income groups. We provide evidence that this increased sensitivity arises for two reasons: (a) the top income groups receive a large portion of their income from wealth, which is more sensitive to growth than labor income and (b) the top income groups receive a large portion of their labor income in the form of pay-for-performance (equity compensation), which is also sensitive to growth. Consequently, we conclude that growth and income inequality are positively associated.     

Labour-supply impacts of effective welfare programme parameters: a reanalysis

We quantify the impact of effective welfare programme parameters on the labour supply of single female household heads – the primary group of welfare recipients in the USA. Our panel of data is derived from the US Census Bureau's Current Population Survey for the years 1979 to 1990 inclusive. Behavioural impacts from a range of economic variables are consistent in sign with predictions made by economic theory. We find that effective welfare gurantee levels and the effective tax rate on earned income both significantly decrease labour supply. The marginal effects of these welfare programme parameters are economically small: a US$1000 increase in the expected welfare guarantee level reduces annual labour supply by about 36 hours; a 10 percentage point increase in the effective tax rate on earned income reduces annual labour supply by about 7.5 hours.     

The long run relationship between private consumption and wealth: common and idiosyncratic effects

We investigate the long run relationship between private consumption, disposable income and wealth approximated by equity and house price indices for a panel of 15 industrialized countries. Consumption, income and wealth are cointegrated in their common components. The impact of house prices exceeds the effect arising from equity wealth. The long run vector is broadly in line with the life cycle permanent income hypothesis, if house prices are allowed to enter the relationship. At the idiosyncratic level, a long run equilibrium is detected between consumption and income, i.e. the wealth variable can be excluded. The income elasticity in the idiosyncratic relationship is significantly less than unity. Hence, the presence of wealth effects in consumption equations arises from the international integration of asset markets and points to the relevance of risk sharing activities of agents. Without sufficient opportunities, an increase in national saving rates would be expected, leading to a lower path of private consumption expenditures.     

Growth,mobility and social progress

We evaluate social progress on the basis of panel data on individual incomes by comparing the value of social welfare in the observed panel data to its value in a situation where individuals receive their first period income in each period. We derive necessary conditions for the welfare gain to be positive, and show how it can be decomposed in an effect of economic growth, a mobility effect and a cost due to aversion to time fluctuations given individuals’ ranks in the income distribution. The mobility effect, generated by reranking in the income distribution has two components: a cost due to time fluctuations in incomes and a benefit, due to equalization in time averaged incomes. We illustrate the analysis using CNEF data for Australia, Korea, Germany, Russia, Switzerland and the US. Our results indicate that the largest component of social progress is the equalization of time averaged income, induced by reranking. In countries with high growth (Australia, Korea and Russia), the growth effect is larger than the mobility effect, but in countries with low growth (Germany, Switzerland and the US), the opposite holds true. The poor performance of the US is explained by the large costs of income fluctuations and the way economic growth is distributed.     

Is wealth found in the soil or in the brain? Investing in farm people in Malawi

Should a typical developing country invest more in agriculture or education? At what stage of development is it optimal to invest more in each of these sectors? These are important questions that governments of developing countries grapple with when designing investment plans. In this paper, I propose a soil–human capital conceptual framework of development and use it to explain estimates of agricultural returns to schooling in Malawi. I use panel survey data for Malawi and rely on the exogenous education policy changes and spatial variation in access to schooling to identify effects of schooling on agricultural incomes. In addition, I correct for selection into income activities within a panel data and instrumental variables estimation framework. I find annual agricultural returns to schooling in Malawi of 3%–4% after correcting for selection and unobserved heterogeneity and 7% in the uncorrected specifications. I also find consistently higher returns to schooling in the nonagricultural sector for those not living in the village of birth and higher returns in the agricultural sector for those living in the village of birth. Given the size of the farm sector, wealth in Malawi is still in the soil, but that future growth in wealth depends on human capital investments.     

The dependence structure of income distribution

This article investigates the dependence structure of income distribution in the US by providing two approaches – one regression-based and the other copula-based – to reveal new information about income dependence. The system of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) is estimated for both quintile income shares and mean income growth by controlling for macroeconomic variables, and Kendall's tau statistics are derived for income dependence. Results from less restrictive copula models corroborate the regression-based results. However, income growth models do not support the common claim that the rich are getting richer while the poor are getting poorer. Income dependence patterns do not appear to be affected by business cycles, but Democratic and Republican presidential administrations have drastically different income dependence results.     

Capital in the Twenty-First Century: Reinterpreting the fundamental contradiction of capitalism

At a theoretical level this article discusses Piketty’s hypothesis that the distribution of income and wealth tends to become more concentrated over time when the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate of real output. We develop a post Keynesian model of growth and distribution showing that once capital is differentiated from wealth, the increase in income and wealth concentration actually occurs when the rate of valorization of financial and real estate assets is greater than the growth rate of real output, and that this situation may be triggered by financial liberalization.     

A test of the household income process using consumption and wealth data

The evolution of household income can be explained almost equally well by rival models. However, rival models have very different implications for other household behaviours, such as consumption. I therefore test between two prominent models in the UK using panel data on consumption and wealth, as well as income, over 1991–2006. To operate the test, I show that long-lived income shocks transmit far less than one-for-one through to consumption, and particularly so for younger households. I then compare these estimates of transmission with estimates of households’ ability to smooth shocks, captured by the data on wealth. Conditional on the suitability of the consumption model, my estimates provide evidence against the restricted income process (RIP) and in favour of an alternative heterogeneous income process (HIP). This finding also explains why cross-sectional consumption inequality grew slowly over the period even though the variance of long-lived shocks was high. Finally, I conclude that it is important to consider mean reversion of shocks when constructing life-cycle consumption models.     

Stock prices and money velocity: a multi-country analysis

What kind of information do stock prices offer for predicting velocity? This paper develops previous work by Milton Friedman for the US economy and shows that in a panel of 25 countries a wealth effect derived from the stock market has negatively influenced the ratio of nominal income to a broad definition of money. Taking quarterly data for the period 1961–1998, the relationship holds in Japan, the UK and Switzerland; in Italy a substitution effect (away from money) has also been operating. Overall, these empirical findings indicate the presence of systematic influences of stock price fluctuations on money velocity and suggest that the repercussions of asset inflation and deflation on the behavior of monetary aggregates should be monitored. First version received: July 1998/Final version received: November 2000