RESTRUCTURING U.S. FEDERAL FINANCIAL REGULATION

Despite changes over the past 70 yr, the U.S. federal financial regulatory system remains rooted in the reforms of the 1930s. The institutions governed by this system have, nevertheless, continued to evolve. Today, regulation of large, multiproduct, internationally active financial organizations poses challenges for a system designed largely to regulate smaller, distinct, locally based organizations. Reform of the regulatory system, however, is not an easy task—complex issues regarding deposit insurance, the role of the central bank, and the dual banking system must be addressed. In the absence of a crisis, however, regulatory restructuring will not likely generate much political interest . ( JEL G28)     

Quantitative analysis of health insurance reform: Separating regulation from redistribution

Two key components of the recent U.S. health reform are a new regulation of the individual health insurance market and an increase in income redistribution in the economy. Which component contributes more to the welfare outcome of the reform? We address this question by constructing a general equilibrium life-cycle model that incorporates both medical expenses and labor income risks. We replicate the key features of the current health insurance system in the U.S. and calibrate the model using the Medical Expenditures Panel Survey dataset. We find that the reform decreases the number of uninsured more than twice and generates substantial welfare gains. These welfare gains mostly come from the redistributive measures embedded in the reform, rather than from the regulatory changes.     

Self-Regulation and Government Oversight

Self-regulation is a feature of a number of professions. For example, in the U.S. the government delegates aspects of financial market regulation to self-regulatory organizations (SROs) like the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers. We analyse one regulatory task of an SRO, enforcing antifraud rules so agents will not cheat customers. Specifically, we model contracting/enforcement as a two-tier problem. An SRO chooses its enforcement policy: the likelihood that an agent is investigated for fraud and a penalty schedule. Given an enforcement policy, agents compete by offering contracts that maximize customers' expected utility. We assume that the SRO's objective is to maximize the welfare of its members, the agents. We show that the SRO chooses a more lax enforcement policy—meaning less frequent investigations—than what customers would choose. A general conclusion is that control of the enforcement policy governing contracts confers substantial market power to a group of otherwise competitive agents. We also investigate government oversight of the self-regulatory process. The threat of government enforcement leads to more enforcement by the SRO, just enough to pre-empt any government enforcement.     

金融改革实验区金融创新与监管动态响应机制研究——基于美国金融创新产品的衍生逻辑视角

温州金融改革实验区的设立及随后深圳推出系列金融创新举措开启了我国金融实验区改革的序幕。在金融实验区,围绕引导民间资本进入规范化的金融体系以更好服务中小微企业孕育了一条凸显金融创新的资金流动链条。美国金融创新体系中以房地产市场为基础的金融创新衍化逻辑尤为典型,但该衍化链条蕴藏的金融监管对创新响应失衡引发了流动性逆转联动着金融危机的爆发,之后掀起全球金融监管改革潮。鉴于此,本文借鉴美国金融创新衍化的经验,弥补其不足,并结合当前国际金融监管趋势,在金融实验区搭建了金融创新与监管间"一种理念,两种响应"的动态响应机制,以期在防范金融风险的基础上使金融创新能够更好服务实体经济。     

The equity price channel in a New-Keynesian DSGE model with financial frictions and banking

This paper studies the role of the equity price channel in business cycle fluctuations, and highlights the equity price channel as a different aspect to general equilibrium models with financial frictions and, as a result, emphasizes the systemic influence of financial markets on the real economy. We develop a canonical dynamic general equilibrium model with a tractable role for the equity market in banking, entrepreneur and household economic activities. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using U.S. data over the sample period 1982Q01–2015Q01. We show that a dynamic general equilibrium model with an equity price channel well mimics the U.S. business cycle. The model reproduces the strong procyclicality of the equity price. The equity price channel significantly exacerbates business cycle fluctuations through both financial accelerator and bank capital channels. Our results support the increasing emphasis on common equity capital in Basel III regulations. This is beneficial in terms of financial stability, but amplifies and propagates shocks to the real economy.     

Speculative and hedging interaction model in oil and U.S. dollar markets with financial transaction taxes

Our article develops a game theory model of interaction between speculative and hedging behaviors in the oil and US dollar markets, in the presence of a severe taxation on speculative financial transactions. From this microeconomic analysis, we derive a regulatory policy. This policy has two consequences at the macro level: on one hand, it has a certain stabilizing effects on oil and US dollar markets, limiting the number of speculative transactions and their size; on the other hand, it induces the speculators to find agreements with real economic agents, which are profitable for both parts. Moreover, we propose that the tax is mostly re-directed to support the real economy. So, the aim of this paper appears twofold: by using Game Theory, we suggest to a pair of economic agents a way to gain in a market, also in presence of a hard taxation on the financial transactions, proposing, at the same time, to normative authority, a method to limit the instability of oil and U.S. Dollar markets and to help real economy. Our idea, at the micro-economic level, is to exploit the hedging actions to obtain a profit, limiting, at the same time, at a macro-level, the speculative attacks on oil and U.S. Dollar markets. These goals are reached by the introduction of well designed financial transactions tax. In particular, we focus on a real economic subject (Multinational Air) and on an investment bank (Bank). The solutions collectively efficient are determined, at a micro-level, by certain agreements between the two economic subjects. Specifically, after an agreement which allows to obtain the maximum collective profit of the interaction, we propose and analyze four different possible fair divisions of this gain, by adopting the Kalai–Smorodinsky method.     

The propagation of U.S. shocks to Canada: Understanding the role of real financial linkages

This paper examines the role of financial frictions in affecting the transmission of U.S. real and financial shocks to Canada using a dynamic stochastic general‐equilibrium model with an active banking sector and financial frictions. We find that the U.S. banking and interbank markets can be a potentially important source of variability of Canadian output and inflation—consistent with the financial crisis. The presence of both the demand and the real supply sides of credit in the model help to capture the stylized facts of both the domestic and the international business cycles.     

The impact of political institutions on U.S. state bond yields during crises: evidence from the 2008 credit market seizure

This study examines how political institutions mediate bond market reactions to severe economic crisis, based on U.S. states’ experience of the 2008 credit market seizure. Following severe fiscal shocks, political institutions assume greater importance in assessing risk characteristics of state bonds. The bond market reacts most strongly to two factors: public sector union strength in a state and the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature. We suggest that the identity of political institutions becomes increasingly important, during periods of economic crises, when credit markets might expect that political systems can no longer delay stabilisations and must deliver policy.     

中国证券市场监管的博弈分析

通过建立证监会、上市公司之间的博弈模型,分别利用一般的静态博弈和委托-代理模型研究其策略影响和监管效果。分析结果表明,上市公司出于自身利益最大化的目的,决定是否造假的因素有公司自身的财务状况、造假的预期收益和被查处的预期损失、证券市场造假的环境等。监管者实际监管的强度和对违规行为处罚的力度对于上市公司违规行为有着非常大的影响。     

Marx and Resource Scarcity: An Institutionalist Approach

Turkey has recently reshaped its own institutional structure by establishing Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs). However, the political authority has not desired to delegate the political property rights to IRAs. Although IRAs is de jure established, the political conflicts occuring during the evolution of the traditional-patrimonial state to the regulatory state de facto impede IRAs to institutionalize. This paper observes recent policy changes during the transition and lessons from the energy regulation in Turkey. So, the paper reveals whether the change in the regulatory institutional structure of Turkey is an effective policy in terms of transition to the institutions of capitalism.     

Review essay

Regulatory reforms which are implemented in many developing countries after market reforms constitute a conflict-ridden process generating complex tensions between governments, independent regulatory agencies, international institutions and private interest groups. By criticising the mainstream a-historical approaches, which reduce those tensions to the reluctance of interest-maximising politicians to delegate power, this article locates current reforms within the historical context of the trajectory of neoliberalism. In the case of Turkey, rather than undertaking comprehensive regulatory reform, the governments of the 1980s implemented ad-hoc strategies within the existing system, which corroded and de-legitimised the old institutional structures and facilitated market reforms. Yet, the same strategies created an institutional structure producing its own vested political and economic interests which gave its specific colour to the form and pace of current regulatory reform. The article derives insights from the Turkish case in order to re-think the crucial relation between politics and regulation, and between choices available to and constraints faced by policy makers and to re-conceptualise the role of unintended consequences by refuting any ideal typical understanding of neoliberalism.     

Incentive regulation,service quality,and standards in U.S. electricity distribution

The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993–1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible endogeneity of the regulatory regime, the data and model indicate that incentive regulation is indeed associated with significantly longer duration of service outages, although not necessarily more frequent outages. Importantly, this quality reduction is offset in cases where regulation incorporates service quality standards. We also examine the causal chain connecting incentive regulation, cost expenditures, and service quality. We conclude that careful design of quality standards can allow incentive regulation to achieve cost savings without quality degradation.     

金融危机反思及金融产品消费者保护

美国在金融产品消费者保护领域有着较为完备的法律体系,但该保护体系在次贷危机中仍暴露出明显问题,金融产品消费者在危机中依然遭受了很大损失。因此,强化消费者保护被确认为美国金融监管改革的一项重要内容。本文从市场失灵和行为金融学角度剖析了金融消费者保护失效的根源,对国外金融监管体系的改革进展进行了深入研究,并结合实际提出了建设我国金融消费者保护体系的具体措施。     

美、日住房金融体系的功能比较及启示

本文从金融功能的角度比较分析认为,美国的住房金融体系以动员储蓄为核心功能,服务于美国经济增长的总体目标,其顺利运行的条件是资产证券化、发达的资本市场和美元强势地位,具有不可复制性;日本的住房金融体系以风险管理为核心功能,其政策性金融通过引导家庭自动分化,对整个住房金融体系风险控制和稳健运行作用重大。我国经济经过30多年的快速发展后,微观主体和住房属性都发生了显著变化,要优化住房金融的功能结构,防范"住专事件"和"次贷危机",促进住房市场持续健康发展。     

The effects of the monetary policy on the U.S. housing boom from 2001 to 2006

This paper presents a DSGE model to test the relative significance of monetary policy and financial market innovations in creating the U.S. housing boom between 2001 and 2006. The model generates a trajectory of house price that mimics the Case–Shiller index well when actual Federal Fund rates are taken as inputs. It fails to do so when the monetary policy follows the Taylor rule even if MBS are introduced. We identify several transmission mechanisms of monetary policy with an emphasis on the financial accelerator. The model predicts that banks’ lending standards will go down with the benchmark interest rate.     

Fiscal policy and capital mobility: the construction of economic policy rectitude in Britain and France

This research examines the regulatory response of the European Union to the global financial crisis, addressing the questions of whether, how and why the global financial crisis has changed the ‘old’ politics of financial services regulation in the EU and resulted in the emergence of a ‘new’ politics. It is argued that, with a good dose of political opportunism and ‘anti-free market’ rhetoric, a continental advocacy coalition sponsoring a ‘market-shaping’ regulatory approach has capitalised on the crisis, tipping the balance of regulatory power in the EU in its favour, as compared to the pre-crisis situation.     

Housing and credit market shocks: Exploring the role of rule-based Basel III counter-cyclical capital requirements

This paper examines the extent to which the Basel III bank capital regulation attenuates fluctuations in housing and credit markets and fosters financial and macroeconomic stability. We use a positive housing demand shock to mimic a housing market boom and a negative financial shock for credit squeeze and economic meltdown. The results show that the rule-based Basel III counter-cyclical capital requirement effectively attenuates fluctuations in housing and credit markets and prevents bubbles. In the case of a negative financial shock, it significantly reduces the magnitude of economic meltdown. Our analysis of the transition from Basel II to Basel III suggests that it is the counter-cyclical capital buffer that effectively mitigates the pro-cyclicality of its predecessor, while the impact of the conservative buffer is marginal. In contrast to the credit-to-GDP ratio, the optimal policy analysis suggests that the regulatory authority should adjust the capital requirement to changes in credit and output when implementing the counter-cyclical buffer. Future research could extend the study by comparing the effectiveness of the rule-based Basel III with other macroprudential tools in achieving financial and macroeconomic stability.     

Modeling the fat tails in Asian stock markets

We test whether stock returns in the Asian markets are characterized by infinite variance or just large variance, which has an important implication for the applicability of many financial models in Asian market data. Employing the extreme value framework, we find that the Asian index return distributions are fat-tailed but have finite variance. However, the tails of the distributions behave similarly to those in the U.S. and the MSCI World index returns, suggesting that any financial model or risk management tool that incorporates the second moment would work equally well for the Asian market data as it does for developed market data. We apply the Value-at-Risk method using Asian and U.S. data and find no significant difference in performance.     

Status Quo Conservatism,Placation, or Partisan Division? Analysing Citizen Attitudes Towards Financial Reform in the United States

Within the literature on financial governance a key question is why the 2008 financial crisis did not elicit a stronger regulatory reaction than it did – the ‘post-crisis stasis’ puzzle. We explore a neglected dimension of this puzzle: public attitudes toward financial regulation. Using a variety of survey data of the US public we find that there was persistent support for stronger financial regulation following the crisis, even support for radical reform in some instances, and support continued even after regulatory reform had been enacted. Despite such general sentiment, however, at nearly every stage public attitudes were highly conditional on partisan affiliation – a hugely consequential detail that meant that demand for reform was not channelled into more stringent policy but rather into a highly partisan, status quo protecting political machinery. Our analysis challenges notions of US public attitudes as either conservative in orientation or placated through modest reform, but also highlights the importance of domestic political constraints in shaping financial reform options despite majoritarian support for more robust reform.     

互联网金融规制与市场有效性改善*——来自中国网络借贷行业的证据

中国的互联网金融经历了一个先创新发展后监管规制的过程，本文通过对网络借贷行业的实证研究，分析监管规则的出台实施对新型互联网融资市场有效性的影响。实证结果表明，网络借贷平台资金的银行存管、持有ICP证等强制性规定缓解了投资者、平台企业与借款人之间的信息不对称，对克服早期平台间通过竞相承诺高回报率来吸引投资者导致的“柠檬市场”问题、对解决网贷市场上缺乏平台风险性高低有效信号的问题都起到了正向作用，有助于互联网融资市场的有效性提高。