Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the United States

A well‐established literature argues that fiscal illusion increases the level of government expenditure. This article focuses on the proposition that fiscal illusion also influences the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are formed with reference to government reliance on high income elasticities of indirect tax revenues and on intergovernmental transfers. Predictions are tested with reference to the expenditures of 36 states in the United States from 1980 to 2000. Government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical when citizens systematically underestimate the cost of taxation.     

COMPULSORY VOTING AND GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Crain and Leonard (1993) examine the effects of compulsory voting on the scale of government spending. The purpose of this comment is twofold. First, problems in the Grain and Leonard's approach are identified. The choice of government consumption, rather than expenditure, as representative of government spending is inappropriate and the classification of non-voters as net beneficiaries of government spending is questionable. Second, the composition of government expenditure is examined. Cross-country data tentatively suggests that voters benefit, relative to non-voters, from government expenditures on defence and economic services while non-voters benefit from government expenditure on health.     

Intergovernmental transfers and procyclical public spending

This paper tests the predictions that (i) sub-central government expenditures are procyclical and (ii) sub-central government expenditures are likely to be more procyclical than central government spending. The predictions are based on the importance of ‘voracity effects’ and on the proposition that they are systematically more pervasive if spending is financed by intergovernmental transfers. Evidence from 23 OECD countries between 1995 and 2006 indicates that sub-central government spending is more procyclical than central government expenditure.     

Tax Expenditures on Health in Australia: 1960–61 to 1988–89

Commonwealth government tax expenditures arise because departures from the tax structure produce favourable tax treatment of particular types of activities or taxpayers. Such tax concessions can be used in the same way as direct expenditures to give effect to government policies, and in fact are often used as substitutes for direct expenditures. Although estimates of tax expenditures on health in more recent times are readily available, this form of subsidisation of the health sector has not been used heavily since the introduction of Medicare in 1984. It is for the period spanning the 1960s and the 1970s, when tax expenditures were a much more important source of health care finance, that consistent estimates are lacking. This article presents estimates of the revenue cost of income tax concessions for health in Australia over the period 1960–61 to 1988–89 and integrates these estimates into the currently available health expenditure statistics. It is concluded that failure to allow for tax expenditures on health when analysing public expenditures on health in Australia can lead to misleading conclusions about the net fiscal impact of changes in the Commonwealth's health expenditure policy. In particular, the fiscal effect of introducing Medihank in 1975 is significantly lower if account is taken of changes to tax concessions on health occurring at the same time. Likewise, the net cost of the introduction of Medicare in 1984 is overstated by measures based on direct outlays alone.     

Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence

We present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting.     

Do voters demand responsive governments? Evidence from Indian disaster relief

Using rainfall, public relief, and election data from India, we examine how governments respond to adverse shocks and how voters react to these responses. The data show that voters punish the incumbent party for weather events beyond its control. However, fewer voters punish the ruling party when its government responds vigorously to the crisis, indicating that voters reward the government for responding to disasters. We also find evidence suggesting that voters only respond to rainfall and government relief efforts during the year immediately preceding the election. In accordance with these electoral incentives, governments appear to be more generous with disaster relief in election years. These results describe how failures in electoral accountability can lead to suboptimal policy outcomes.     

THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND TAXATION IN THE U.S., 1989 AND 2000

We assess the effects of government expenditures and taxation on household economic well-being in the United States in 1989 and 2000. Net government expenditure is estimated as the difference between government expenditures incurred on behalf of the household sector—transfers and public consumption—and the taxes paid by that sector. We incorporate the estimates of net government expenditures into a wealth-adjusted measure of income. We find that overall inequality in our income measure is considerably reduced by net government expenditures. Results from decomposition analysis show that the inequality-reducing effect of net government expenditures owed more to expenditures than to taxes.     

Provincial government expenditures in Canada: an empirical analysis

Most empirical studies have sought to explain the overall growth of the total government expenditures. Few studies have focused on the growth of spending at the provincial level. This article seeks to fill the gap. It examines the growth of government expenditures in Canadian provinces. Data spanning the past three decades are used to explain the growth of provincial government expenditures in Canada and to test alternative hypotheses. From a basic general theoretical model, three empirical models are developed and tested. It is concluded that the growth of the private sector share of the Provincial Gross Domestic Product (PGDP), capacity utilization and factors such as federal transfer payments to the provincial governments best explain the growth in expenditure at the provincial level. The expenditure policies of provincial governments are found to be independent of the political stance of the political parties in power. Estimated short-run and long-run ‘income’ elasticities of provincial government expenditures with respect to PGDP reveal that government expenditures have grown in proportion to PGDP. The growth of provincial spending over the last three decades has been stimulated by the demand for services (such as education and health) and by federal transfer payment programmes through their combined income and substitution effects.     

FORGETFULNESS AND THE POLITICAL CYCLE*

This paper examines a mechanism that underlies both the political business cycle and the cycle in non-economic policies executed by politicians. We show that if rational voters suffer from forgetfulness (a noise in the memory). then government expenditure on the production of public good increases as elections approach. Hence, the model describes a cycle that is observed in the government expenditures of democratic societies. Unlike previous models, this model does not require that the government have information superiority over rational voters with respect to its competency. According to this model, incumbents transfer resources from the beginning of their terms of service and use them near the end of their terms. We also find that the less concave the production function, the wider the cycle.     

Are there political cycles hidden inside government expenditures?

This article examines the presence of political cycles inside the Portuguese governments’ aggregate expenditures by using annual data for 10 expenditure components. The results indicate that the choice of the expenditure components to be increased during election periods by Portuguese governments generally relates to more visible items such as general public services, social protection and health care.     

Transfer payments from the central government to the local governments and the local governments' efforts on taxation: taking China as an example

The influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments' efforts on taxation must be taken into consideration by every country for the design of the transfer payments. Based on the theoretical analysis on the influence of the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments on the local governments'payments, this paper indicates that the local governments'efforts on taxation depends on the demand elasticity of the district for public goods. It increases with the increase of the elasticityλ.Judge the degree of the local government's efforts on taxation by measureλ. After an empirical analysis on the transfer payments from the central government to the local governments from 2000 to 2004, thins paper gets the conclusion that the local governments'efforts on taxation abates with the increase of supporting payments or with the increase of the ratio of transfer payments to local willing public payments. Under specific circumstances, the higher the ratio of transfer payments to the local fiscal expenditure is, the smaller the local governments' efforts on taxation is under the central payments, whereas the higher the local income is, the higher the efforts is under the eentral payments. Based on this. this paper gives the meanmg of its corresponding policies.     

政府竞争、财政压力及其调节作用研究*——以地方政府财政支出偏向为视角

本文以政府间事权与支出责任划分改革为出发点，基于2009—2017年地级市层面的面板数据，运用系统GMM估计方法审视财政压力、政府竞争与地方政府民生支出偏向之间的相关关系。实证分析结果表明，相较于政府竞争而言，财政压力才是降低地方政府民生支出偏向的主要原因。财政压力对政府竞争具有调节作用，政府竞争对民生支出偏向的反向作用程度显著依赖于财政压力。具体而言，政府竞争对教育、医疗卫生、社会保障与就业支出偏向不具有直接效应，但在财政压力的调节作用下显著影响上述三项支出。本文进一步发现，经济发展水平越低，政府竞争与民生支出偏向之间的相关关系越不显著；地方政府在执行多任务导向型的中央决策时，具有较为明显的自我选择倾向。     

空间外部性视角下的地方政府支出策略互动模式

运用空间面板计量方法研究了分税制改革以来中国地方政府支出的策略互动模式。结果表明,基本建设、文教科卫和预算外支出具有显著的空间自相关性,表现出策略互补,行政管理支出则由于地方财力情况的差异形成策略替代,效益外溢性、财政竞争机制和标尺效应在其中交替发挥了主导作用。财政收支分权对支出策略互动模式的影响效果并不一致,扩张支出分权将加剧以基建支出为主的地方政府竞争。财政分权的改革方向是使地方政府在一定程度上拥有收入自主权,中央适当上收具有强烈区域外溢性的公共品供给责任,降低地方非正式收支自主权,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

The tax-spending nexus: Evidence from a panel of US state-local governments

We re-examine the tax-spending nexus using a panel of 50 US state-local government units between 1963 and 1997. We find that, unlike tax revenues, expenditures adjust to revert back to a long-term equilibrium relationship. The evidence on the short-term dynamics is also consistent with the tax-and-spend hypothesis. One implication of this finding is that the size of the government at the state-local level is not determined by expenditure demand, but rather by resource supply. This is consistent with the fact that many US state and local governments operate under constitutional or legislative limitations that seek to constrain deficits.     

Fiscal consolidations and electoral outcomes in emerging economies: Does the policy mix matter? Macro and micro level evidence from Latin America

Do voters punish governments that introduce fiscal “austerity” measures? If so, does voter response vary according to the composition of fiscal adjustments? The empirical literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustments, which is mostly OECD-based, argues that consolidations do not have significant electoral consequences. In contrast, we find that voters punish fiscal consolidations at the polls in Latin America. To explain this result, we focus on the way fiscal adjustments episodes are implemented, both in terms of their design (taxes vs. spending) and timing. Such episodes rely fundamentally on increasing tax rates and bases of indirect taxes (such as the VAT) that hit broad segments of the population. Moreover, these policies are often implemented when politicians have no choice but to consolidate, that is, under severe economic circumstances. These macro results are corroborated with micro evidence from an original survey experiment that measures voter’s fiscal policy preferences over the business cycle in seven countries across Latin America. The experimental evidence shows that respondents prefer expenditure cuts to tax increases during downturns, which is the opposite of the type of consolidations that countries typically pursue.     

The tax–spending nexus: evidence from Romania using wavelet analysis

This article investigates the relationship between government revenue and expenditure in Romania between 1991 and 2015 using the wavelet approach. The article presents detailed information for different sub-periods and frequencies, emphasising the lead–lag nexus between variables under cyclical and anti-cyclical shocks. The main findings show that using individual taxation techniques under structural reforms should control short-term budget deficits. Separately, when an economic crisis arises, expenditure adjustment is a more appropriate fiscal instrument. In the medium and long term, the taxation system for individuals is recommended to be used to control for budgetary deficits during crisis. At the same time, in the medium term, government expenditures also represent a suitable policy choice.     

Is health care a luxury? The debate revisited with new evidence from emerging economies

This paper studies the long-run relationship between health care expenditure and income using a panel data set of emerging economies over the period 1995–2012. The results show that expenditure on health care and income are non-stationary and cointegrated. After controlling for cross-sectional dependence and unobserved heterogeneity among different countries, we find that the income elasticity of health care is less than 1, indicating that health care is a necessity and not a luxury. Government expenditure and out-of-pocket expenditure turn out to be important determinants of health care expenditure. Among non-monetary factors, results show that old age dependency and female education seem to have significant bearings on health care expenditures. Policy recommendations suggest that government should increase spending on health care in emerging economies since higher incomes may not automatically translate into higher health care spending by the people of these countries.     

对地方政府保障房支出缺口的估计——来自江苏省的证据

估计地方政府保障房实际支出与合理支出之间缺口的大小对于判断政府供给责任以及制定保障房建设规划具有非常重要的意义。为此,本文运用IMF较为齐全的40个国家(地区)2005-2007年的面板数据,估计了地方政府保障房的合理支出值,利用《2009年江苏省住房保障目标任务完成情况表》估算了江苏各市(县)政府保障房的实际支出值,以江苏各市(县)为例测算地方政府保障房支出缺口。估计结果表明,几乎所有地方政府均存在保障房支出的正缺口。经济发展水平居中且受到上级政府监管力度不大的苏中地区政府保障房支出缺口相对较大,苏南和苏北地区缺口相对较小。深化经济体制改革与加大监管力度双管齐下、约束地方政府非公共服务行为,有利于促使保障房的实际支出值等于或者接近合理支出值,从而缩小地方政府的保障房支出缺口。     

Parties,divided government,and infrastructure expenditures: Evidence from U.S. states

This paper examines the impact of parties and divided government on infrastructure expenditures for transportation, education, and social services in U.S. states. As infrastructure expenditures are considered a bi-partisan priority, we hypothesize that divided governments expand infrastructure spending compared to governments under true Democratic or Republican control. We test this hypothesis using U.S. state-level data over the period 1970 to 2008 and find that divided governments indeed increase expenditures for these budget categories. Specifically, divided governments spend more on transportation than unified Democratic governments, and more on education and social services than unified Republican governments. The effect is most pronounced for the core infrastructure of transportation and even stronger when only looking at capital outlays instead of total expenditures.     

School Finance Litigation, Tax and Expenditure Limitations, and Education Spending

Since the early 1970s, litigation in many U.S. states has led to education finance reform. Over the same period, many states have imposed new tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on local governments. The imposition of a TEL may alter how local and state education expenditures change subsequent to court-mandated decreases in spending inequality. Similarly, the effectiveness of TELs in limiting local education expenditures may be influenced by reform. To better evaluate the effects of reform and TELs on education spending, this article considers them jointly and finds that reform has a negative effect on local own-source education expenditures only in the presence of TELs. In the absence of court-ordered reform, TELs decrease own-source expenditure, but the effect is less pronounced than when TELs are present with reform. When both are present, state government spending on education is higher. Also TELs and court-ordered reform independently increase state government spending on education. (JEL H72 , I22 )