Foreign aid,institutional quality and economic growth: Evidence from the developing world

This paper examines the effect of sectoral foreign aid and institutional quality on the economic growth of 74 developing countries from Africa, Asia and South America, and covers the period 1980–2016. We consider bilateral aid flows into three sectors, namely education, health and agriculture, and find that among the three types of aid, education aid is more effective for aid-receiving countries. The effect is conditional on the current level of institutional quality and varies substantially across regions. While education aid is more effective in South America, health aid is more effective in Asia and agricultural aid is more effective in Africa. As the level of institutional quality improves, the gap between the marginal effect of education, health and agricultural aids widen. Our findings have strong policy implication for donor countries and international aid organisations, which shows that it is more desirable to shift aid flows towards the education sector as the level of institutional quality improves.     

The curse of aid

Foreign aid provides a windfall of resources to recipient countries and may result in the same rent seeking behavior as documented in the “curse of natural resources” literature. In this paper we discuss this effect and document its magnitude. Using panel data for 108 recipient countries in the period 1960–1999, we find that foreign aid has a negative impact on institutions. In particular, if the foreign aid over GDP that a country receives over a period of 5 years reaches the 75th percentile in the sample, then a 10-point index of democracy is reduced between 0.5 and almost one point, a large effect. For comparison, we also measure the effect of oil rents on political institutions. We find that aid is a bigger curse than oil.     

The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements

Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies – notably the World Bank – often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributes this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents an empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., the paper presents evidence that World Bank structural adjustment loan disbursements are less dependent on macroeconomic performance in countries aligned with the United States.     

The impact of the Interaction between institutional quality and aid volatility on growth: theory and evidence

We analyze both theoretically and empirically, the effect of aid volatility and its interaction effect with institutional quality on per capita economic growth. Our theoretical model, in which an aid-recipient government, operating in an institutional environment of some given quality (making choices over the distribution of aid), predicts that a negative effect of aid volatility on growth is mitigated by stronger institutional quality. We use panel data covering the period 1984–2004 for 78 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Using Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) we find the relationship between growth and aid volatility is significantly negative and depends on institutional quality. Our baseline results are robust to various computations of aid volatility and foreign aid, time periods, sub-samples and additional covariates.     

Multiple equilibria arising from donor’s aid policy in economic development

This paper presents a neoclassical growth model comprising education and child labor with a focus on developing and aid-receiving countries to demonstrate cyclical growth and bifurcation in economic development. The appearance of multiple equilibria has often been attributed to the internal affairs of recipient countries, such as technology in production, subsistence minimum in consumption, and liquidity constraints in investment. The main argument of this paper is that the aid allocation policy employed by donor countries, thereby the motive of aid-providers, leads to divaricated and cyclical development in the recipient countries.     

Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

AID, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND GROWTH

Foreign aid has often been intended by donors to entice recipient nations into policy and institutional reforms favorable to private sector economic development. In this study, we investigate the relationship between aid and changes to economic freedom in recipient nations over the 1990–2000 decade. The evidence is mixed. In general, we find that foreign aid has no significant effect on economic freedom overall. However, using a hedonic approach on the different categories of economic freedom, we find that aid has still managed to contribute toward a policy and institutional environment favorable to growth, as the different categories of economic freedom improved by aid more than offset those which are harmed by aid, in terms of their impact on growth . ( JEL 010, 019)     

Foreign aid and governance in Africa

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debate on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996–2010. An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo and Collier on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank position on political governance nor the Asongu stance on the aid-corruption nexus in a debate with Okada and Samreth. The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries.     

Good governance and good aid allocation

We model the aid allocation process as a rent-seeking contest between two countries and investigate the effects of differing allocation rules on recipients' behavior in a simple framework. We investigate the aid allocation mechanism design that attempts to increase the governance quality of potential recipient countries: the potential recipients spend costly resources improving governance, while the donor country allocates the fund based on their governance quality. The paper compares two mechanisms: one uses a simple winner-takes-all tournament to award the entire available purse to the country with the best governance; while under the other aid is distributed among countries in proportion to their governance qualities. The paper shows the second mechanism outperforms the first only if competing countries are sufficiently asymmetric. Moreover, the recipient who is most effective in governance – and stands to benefit the most from development assistance – has interests opposite to those of the donor. In addition, the paper shows that if the donor country allocates the fund based on both governance and the levels of poverty, it may result in a poverty trap: the leaders of potential recipient countries deliberately allocate funds away from the poorest so as not to better their position in order to receive more aid.     

Genetic distance,economic growth and top income shares: Evidence from OECD countries

The relationship between economic growth and income inequality remains a puzzle in the literature. The main problem has been finding a way to account for the endogeneity of growth. Using century-long data of 14 OECD countries, this study disentangles the growth–inequality relationship. In doing so, our main contribution is employing genetic and geographical distances as instruments for economic growth. The instruments are constructed on the premise that the growth of one country spills over to the others if they are connected through trade and other forms of exchange; however, the genetic and geographical distances between countries represent barriers to such spillovers. Using alternative specifications and measures, we find that growth reduces the inequality measured by top income shares. As capital share increases in the growth process and capital substitutes labour, inequality-reducing strength of growth declines. Another important finding is that the effect of growth on top income shares is more significant among the highest income groups.     

Aiding violence or peace? The impact of foreign aid on the risk of civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa

This paper considers the impact of foreign aid flows on the risk of civil conflict. We improve on earlier studies on this topic by addressing the problem of the endogenous aid allocation using GDP levels of donor countries as instruments. A more structural addition to the literature is that we efficiently control for unobserved country specific effects in typical conflict onset and conflict continuation models by first differencing. The literature often overlooks the dynamic nature of these types of models, thereby forcing unlikely i.i.d. structures on the error terms implicitly.¹ As a consequence, malfunctioning institutions, deep-rooted political grievances, or any other obvious, yet unobserved and time persistent determinants of war are simply assumed away. We find a statistically significant and economically important negative effect of foreign aid flows on the probability of ongoing civil conflicts to continue (the continuation probability), such that increasing aid flows tends to decrease civil conflict duration. We do not find a significant relationship between aid flows and the probability of civil conflicts to start (the onset probability).     

When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination

Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we cover the 1967-2002 period. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a recipient country. This effect is sensitive to economic and social conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of recipients.     

The role of institutions in finance curse: Evidence from international data

This paper investigates the effect of banking sector development on economic growth in a panel of 87 countries, paying particular attention to the role of institutions in reducing the finance curse phenomenon. The dynamic generalized method-of-moments (GMM) results indicate that institutions play an important role in mediating the positive relationship between banking sector development and growth. This suggests that the marginal impact of financial development on growth depends on institutional quality. Using the four-way partition of institutions classified by Rodrik (2005), we also find that resilient market-regulating, market-stabilizing, and market-creating institutions act as mediators to the financial market in facilitating growth. The results are robust to using alternative institutions indicators, estimation strategies, and stopping the sample before the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.     

Political institutions and telecommunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and discuss venues for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.     

Measuring absorptive capacity constraints to foreign aid

To assist with progress towards the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in developing countries, the international community is scaling-up foreign aid to record levels. Concurrently, there are concerns that additional aid will not be used effectively due to a problem of absorptive capacity in recipient countries. Empirical studies lend support to these concerns with many finding that there are diminishing returns to foreign aid. This paper reviews the extensive aid effectiveness literature to identify the various dimensions of absorptive capacity. It proceeds by devising a composite index of absorptive capacity for individual recipient countries which can assist policymakers in guiding the allocation of their aid. The relevance of the index is confirmed through its employment in a standard empirical model of aid effectiveness. The paper highlights the developing countries that currently receive high levels of aid relative to their estimated level of absorptive capacity.     

Development Aid to Agriculture and Economic Growth

The link between foreign aid and economic growth has been a controversial issue with no strong consensus so far. This paper argues that a possible reason why some studies may conclude that aid is ineffective in promoting economic growth might be that not all aid is given for development purposes (i.e. aid given for strategic considerations, humanitarian reasons or emergency relief). This study classifies foreign aid into four subcategories: agricultural aid, social infrastructure aid, investment aid, and non‐investment aid. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique on a Barro type growth regression with panel data from the aid recipient economies, this paper finds that when aid is directed to the agricultural sector of the developing countries, it is positively and significantly related to growth and can affect economic growth in the short run.     

Growth in a time of external imbalances

Globalization and financial integration have increased in the last three decades giving rise to cumulated large external imbalances. The question we address in this paper is whether economic growth can be affected by these external imbalances. We estimate an augmented growth equation with the external stock position of the countries measured by the net foreign asset position. Unlike previous literature, we use non-parametric methods that capture non-linearities and heterogeneity, and apply them to a sample that includes 106 developed and developing countries for the period 1983-2011. Contrary to the neoclassical theory, we find that improvements in the external position foster growth. Our results are in line with current theoretical contributions explaining the Lucas Paradox where financial frictions are present. Within this framework, the general outcome should be a positive sign and the “neoclassical” negative relationship between net foreign assets and growth would be just a particular case, with no universal explanatory mechanism. Accordingly, we find that the effect of the net foreign asset position on growth is heterogeneous, the impact depending on the characteristics of the countries such as institutional quality, openness and financial development.     

Searching for empirical linkages between demographic structure and economic growth

Demographic structure could affect economic growth through many channels. However, little is known about how demographic structure affects economic growth since no study has examined an extensive collection of channels through which demographic structure could affect economic growth in a single context. This paper overcomes this limitation by examining 45 potential mediating variables between demographic structure and economic growth. A causal search algorithm is used to identify channels through which demographic structure affects economic growth. Our results suggest that demographic structure affects economic growth differently between developed and developing countries. For developed countries, we find that an increase in the share of middle-aged workers has a positive effect on economic growth through institutions, investment and education channels. On the other hand, an increase in the share of the senior population has a negative effect on economic growth through institutions and investment channels. For developing countries, we find (but with weak evidence) that an increase in the share of young workers has a negative effect on economic growth through investment, financial market development and trade channels.     

Do remittances and foreign aid augment the gross savings: Bangladesh,India and Philippines perspective?

Savings is considered to be a principal determinant to achieve long-run economic growth. Remittances and foreign aid are two important foreign capital inflows to meet the savings deficiency of developing nations. The objective of this study is to investigate the long-run impact of remittance to stimulate savings in remittance recipient countries. This paper contributes to the macroeconomic impact of remittance through a comparative study on Bangladesh, India and Philippines that positioned among the top ten largest remittance recipient countries from 2008 and onwards. The analysis makes use of an annual time series data over the period of 1980–2015. The Johansen cointegration test suggested long-run cointegrating relationship of remittance and foreign aid on gross savings. The test result suggests positive effect of remittances on gross savings for Bangladesh and Philippines although an insignificant negative effect for India. However, foreign aid has significant negative long-run impact in all the three cases. Government policy should focus on leveraging remittance flows to facilitate savings and investment for capital accumulation.     

How foreign direct investment promote institutional quality: Evidence from Vietnam

Using a unique dataset from a provincial competitiveness survey and the rising foreign direct investment (FDI) from joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), I find that variations in economic institutions across the provinces of Vietnam are associated with the flow of foreign investment. To overcome endogeneity problems, I use the minimum distance from each province to a main economic centre as an instrument for foreign investment inflows. The instrumental variable approach shows that the direction of influence is from greater foreign investment to better institutions. These results hold after controlling for various additional covariates, and are also robust to various alternative measures of institutions. I also find that foreign direct investment has greater short-term impacts on institutional quality in the northern provinces.