Where does the risk lie? Systemic risk and tail risk networks in the Chinese financial market

This paper studies tail risk connectedness and systemic risk in the Chinese financial market in the post-crisis period of 2009–2017. We adopt the conditional value at risk (CoVaR) and complex theory to construct the tail risk connectedness network and identify the systemically important financial institutions during the Chinese financial turbulence. We precisely characterize the dynamic evolution of the tail risk connectedness at the institutional, sector and market levels. We find that, during normal times, the banking sector contributes the most tail risk to the market and that the real estate sector contributes the least. However, during the crisis period, the real estate sector played its role and became the most significant tail risk emitter. In addition, we identify the significant important financial institutions in the Chinese financial market, highlighting the fact that the four state-owned commercial banks and two largest insurance companies dominate. Our results are helpful to both regulators for developing macroprudential supervision policies and investors interested in the Chinese financial market for making risk management strategies.     

市场风险与信用风险:风险管理中存在的悖论

利率、汇率波动的加剧,使金融衍生市场的风险成为影响金融体系稳定运行的最重要因素之一。在金融风险定价理论和资产组合技术的支持下,金融衍生工具已成为防范基础性金融风险的有效工具。但金融衍生工具在用于金融风险管理中也存在市场风险、信用风险、流动性风险等基本金融风险。不仅存在着市场风险与信用风险的替代性,还存在着加大金融风险总量的可能。金融风险管理的实质是寻求风险损失与风险收益的平衡。     

Optimal risk sharing with background risk

This paper examines qualitative properties of efficient insurance contracts in the presence of background risk. In order to get results for all strictly risk-averse expected utility maximizers, the concept of “stochastic increasingness” is used. Different assumptions on the stochastic dependence between the insurable and uninsurable risk lead to different qualitative properties of the efficient contracts. The new results obtained under hypotheses of dependent risks are compared to classical results in the absence of background risk or to the case of independent risks. The theory is further generalized to nonexpected utility maximizers.     

Terrorism risk concern in Europe

Motivated by the Bayesian framework, we explore terrorism risk perception differences across European countries. Perception variation is explained by the long-term terrorism countries face, while the cyclical part of terrorism does not seem to play any role.     

Comprehension in risk elicitation experiments

Economic experiments are increasingly conducted with field populations for whom comprehension of instructions may be more difficult to achieve. We investigate how framing experimental instructions in a familiar context and incentivizing the experimental task may affect comprehension. Based on an experiment with 146 German farmers, we compare four different versions of a Holt-and-Laury multiple price list. We find that incentives have a small positive effect on comprehension, as measured by the probability of making inconsistent choices and subjects’ self-assessment. In the absence of incentives, framing negatively affects comprehension. Comprehension is enhanced for farmers who score high on a numeracy test. We conclude that contextual framing might confuse subjects, whereas incentives can help to facilitate comprehension of experimental instructions.     

Credit risk in general equilibrium

This paper contributes to the literature on default in general equilibrium. Borrowing and lending takes place via a clearing house (bank) that monitors agents and enforces contracts. Our model develops a concept of bankruptcy equilibrium that is a direct generalization of the standard general equilibrium model with financial markets. Borrowers may default in equilibrium and returns on loans are determined endogenously. Restricted to a special form of mean variance preferences, we derive a version of the capital asset pricing model with bankruptcy. In this case, we can characterize equilibrium prices and allocations and discuss implications for credit risk modeling.     

Average drawdown risk reduction and risk tolerances

We investigate the effects of average drawdown risk reduction on US mutual funds. Due to numerous evidence of the asymmetric distribution of portfolio returns, the asymmetric risk measures have extensively been used in risk management during the recent decades with extensive usages on the n-degree lower partial moment (LPM) methodology. Unlike the previous literature, we use the n-degree average drawdown risk measure, which is a special case of n-degree LPM, to empirically investigate the impacts of n-degree average drawdown risk reduction on the risk tolerances generated by the US mutual funds.The evidence shows that skewness does not impose any significant problem on the n-degree A-DRM model. Moreover, the effect of changing the tolerances of average drawdown risk in the n-degree A-DRM models is a reduction in the fund returns. The n-degree CA-DRM optimization model reduces investors׳ risk more than other models. Thus, the A-DRM can be accommodated with risk-averse investors׳ approach. The efficient set of mean–variance choices from the investment opportunity set, as described by Markowitz, shows that the n-degree CA-DRM algorithms create this set with lower risk than other algorithms. It implies that the mean–variance opportunity set generated by the n-degree CA-DRM creates lower risk for a given return than covariance and CLPM.     

Currency-related risk and risk premium in the world's currency market

The foreign exchange market has become a major arena for investment activity for both corporate and individual investors. Intensive and widespread international investment activity makes the empirical estimation of exchange risk a very topical subject. In this connection, the classic controversy between Hicks and Telser assumes new relevance. In this paper, exchange risk is estimated in the context of the systematic-risk framework. The estimation is performed for three major floating currencies: the English pound, the Swiss franc, and the Deutsche mark, over a four-year period. The results suggest that although the total risk (measured by the variance) is high, the systematic risk is close to zero. This result provides an explanation for the apparent inconsistency between the Hicks-Keynes hypothesis which indicates the existence of a positive risk premium in the forward exchange market and the empirical evidence of a zero risk premium.     

Fiscal risk in a monetary union

We present a dynamic and quantitative model of a fiscal solvency crisis in a monetary union. Diverse fiscal policies, which are subject to fiscal limits and stochastic shocks, can threaten a monetary union. The fiscal limits arise due to distortionary taxation and political will. Stochastic shocks are random and could push a fiscally sound policy towards its limit. In equilibrium agents refuse to lend along a path which violates the fiscal limits, creating a fiscal solvency crisis. The dynamics leading to the crisis depend on the policy response to restore lending. We focus on two responses, default and policy switching. We simulate our model to quantify the probability of a fiscal solvency crisis in the European Monetary Union with fiscal variables at end of 2009 values. Our model predicts the Greek crisis which occurred and warns of an Italian one.     

Higher-order risk preferences in social settings

We study prudence and temperance (next to risk aversion) in social settings. Previous experimental studies have shown that these higher-order risk preferences affect the choices of individuals deciding privately on lotteries that only affect their own payoff. Yet, many risky and financially relevant decisions are made in the social settings of households or organizations. We elicit higher-order risk preferences of individuals and systematically vary how an individual’s decision is made (alone or while communicating with a partner) and who is affected by the decision (only the individual or the partner as well). In doing so, we can isolate the effects of other-regarding concerns and communication on choices. Our results reveal that the majority of choices are risk averse, prudent, and temperate across social settings. We also observe that individuals are influenced significantly by the preferences of a partner when they are able to communicate and choices are payoff-relevant for both of them.     

Taxonomy methods in credit risk evaluation

In their bid for integration with the European Union, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are faced with the need to introduce numerous significant improvements to their economic systems. A highly important role in this process is to make changes in the existing banking systems. The credit risk evaluation method presented here, using taxonomic measures to plot so-called credit risk maps, may be used to develop sound principles of credit policies. It is a proposition that could solve one of the many problems arising in the course of adaptation of banking systems in Central and Eastern Europe to conditions of market economy.     

On optimality in intergenerational risk sharing

Summary. This paper defines and studies optimality in a dynamic stochastic economy with finitely lived agents, and investigates the optimality properties of an equilibrium with or without sequentially complete markets. Various Pareto optimality concepts are considered, including interim and ex ante optimality. We show that, at an equilibrium with a productive asset (land) and sequentially complete markets, the intervention of a government may be justified, but only to improve risk sharing between generations. If markets are incomplete, constrained interim optimality is investigated in two-period lived OLG economies. We extend the optimality properties of an equilibrium with land and give conditions under which introducing a pay-as-you-go system at an equilibrium would not lead to any Pareto improvement. Received: October 5, 1998; revised version: April 3, 2001     

Concealment of risk and regulation of bank risk taking

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of banking regulation when risk can be concealed from the regulator. Three banking regimes are considered: regulation with direct controls, incentives-based regulation, and laissez-faire banking. The relative performance of the three regimes depends on the effectiveness of monitoring. Regulation with direct controls is superior when monitoring effectiveness is low, while incentives-based regulation is superior when monitoring effectiveness is high. Laissez-faire banking is equivalent to incentives-based regulation if market analysts and the regulator have access to the same information. When monitoring effectiveness is low, a regulator with direct controls can better restrain banks' risk taking than can the market; this result applies when banks can conceal much of their risk from the regulator.     

The role of risk in contract choice

Structuring contracts to share risk in light of incentive problemsis the central premise of contract theory, yet the risk-sharingimplications have rarely been thoroughly tested using micro-levelcontract data. In this article we test the major implicationsof a principal-agent model of contracts using detailed dataon more than 4000 individual contracts from modern North Americanagriculture. On a case-by-case basis, our evidence fails tosupport the standard principal-agent model with risk aversionas an explanation of contract choice in modern North Americanfarming. At the same time, we find some support for models thatassume risk-neutral contracting parties and stress multiplemargins for moral hazard and enforcement costs.     

Background risk in generalized expected utility theory

Summary. In this paper, it is shown that, for a wide range of risk-averse generalized expected utility preferences, independent risks are complementary, contrary to the results for expected utility preferences satisfying conditions such as proper and standard risk aversion. Received: August 10, 2001; revised version: June 18, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"I thank Simon Grant and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and criticism. This research was supported by an Australian Research Council Senior Fellowship and Australian Research Council Large Grant A79800678.     

企业财务风险的防范措施

在一个较长的时期内,企业财务风险是我国国民经济面临的较为重要的一种风险。这一风险的形成,既有企业外部法律和经济环境变动的影响,又有企业内部机制和管理中存在先天不足的原因。通过对我国国有企业的总体分析可以看出,我国国有企业已经进入高财务风险时期,发展趋势令人担忧,防范和化解财务风险的任务日益紧迫。     

Channels of interprovincial risk sharing in China

This paper decomposes consumption risk sharing among provinces in China over the 1980–2007 period. We find that 9.4% of the shocks to gross provincial product are smoothed by the interprovincial fiscal transfer system. This system also cushions a relatively large fraction of the province-specific shocks in the coastal provinces of China. Using a variety of indicators, we explore non-fiscal channels of consumption risk sharing. We find that the migration of rural labor to urban areas and the remittance of migrant wages play important roles in promoting interprovincial consumption risk sharing in the inland provinces of China. In contrast, the extent of risk sharing through financial intermediaries and the capital markets is very limited. These factors have resulted in a low degree of risk sharing among Chinese provinces, especially over the last decade.     

Risk aversion and risk loving in the small: a decomposition of the multivariate risk premium

This note proposes a decomposition of the familiar scalar multivariate risk premium into components which can be easily interpreted in the context of consumer theory. The premium under consideration is the standard one used to ascertain the impact of price and income risk on consumer welfare. This proposed premium decomposition allows for a more intuitive identification of the detrimental and beneficial effects that arise from income and price risk. As an illustrative example, this decomposition is used to ascertain the welfare effects arising from the price fluctuations experienced by UK households over the period 1963–97.