On Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standards

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector (‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) model with Cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm’s long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.     

Emissions trading, point-of-regulation and facility siting choices in the electric markets

This paper examines the effects of emissions trading on firms’ capacity siting choices in the electric sector, considering three programs that are different by their point-of-regulation: source-, load and first-jurisdictional-deliverer approaches. We model each program by assuming electricity sales are through bilateral contracts, and analyze the solutions properties and economic and emissions implications. We have three central findings in this paper. First, when electricity sales in both directions (i.e., in-state to out-of-state and vice verse) are subject to an emissions cap, three programs will produce identical siting distribution. Second, the emissions leakage in the long-run could be lower than in the short-run case in which capacity expansion is not allowed. This is so because in the long-run power producers may opt for clean technologies in fear of the emission costs under a cap-and-trade program. Third, if compared to pure source-based program in which the import sales are not subject to an emissions cap, more pollution-intensive facilities are expected to build in uncapped states, where the regulation is less stringent. Our findings are therefore consistent with some empirical evidence of pollution haven hypothesis.     

Allocation and leakage in regional cap-and-trade markets for CO2

The allocation or assignment of the emissions permits is one of the most contentious elements of the design of cap-and-trade systems In this paper we develop a detailed representation of the U.S. western electricity market to assess the potential impacts of various permit allocation proposals. Several proposals involve the “updating” of allocations, where the allocation is tied to the ongoing output, or input use, of plants. These allocation proposals are designed with the goals of limiting the pass-through of carbon costs to product prices, mitigating leakage, and of mitigating the costs to high-emissions firms. However, allocation updating can also inflate permit prices, thereby limiting the benefits of such schemes to high emissions firms.     

Multiple equilibria in the context of inspection probabilities depending on firms’ relative emissions

This paper presents a model of environmental regulations with firms that are heterogeneous with respect to the cost for reducing emissions to the legally permitted level. Given that the enforcement capacity is limited due to budgetary constraints and that each firm's inspection probability depends on its emissions relative to other firms’ emissions, the likelihood of being punished for violations is endogenously determined and multiple equilibria may therefore arise. Hence, both good outcomes with high compliance rates and bad outcomes with many violations are possible. Multiple equilibria are most likely to emerge at intermediate levels of deterrence and at low permitted emission levels. However, it is generally not straightforward how stricter legislation impacts on equilibrium outcomes, indicating that behavioral expectations among regulated firms are an important factor to consider when adapting enforcement to changes in the law.     

Who Wins from Emissions Trading? Evidence from California

Researchers and environmental policy advocates have raised questions regarding the distributional impacts of emissions trading programs, a.k.a. “cap-and-trade”. While previous research has been careful to identify the causal effect of emissions trading on emissions reductions (Fowlie et al. in Am Econ Rev 102(2):965–993, 2012, hereafter FHM), we argue that existing estimates of differential impacts on demographic groups have relied on unrealistic assumptions regarding pollution dispersion. In this paper, we estimate the emissions reduction due to the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program in Southern California following the identification strategy of FHM, but we relax the assumption of uniform dispersion surrounding point sources. We model the transport of effluents using a state-of-the-science dispersion model to determine the areas impacted by emissions from each source. Importantly, conditional on race and ethnicity, we find that higher income areas receive larger reductions in pollution under cap-and-trade. Furthermore, conditional on income (or poverty rates), we find that Blacks benefit while Hispanics lose relative to whites under RECLAIM.     

Financial structure and the effectiveness of pollution control in an oligopolistic industry

This paper explores the link between pollution taxes and the financial and output decisions of firms in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. It is shown that environmental regulations such as pollution taxes may induce firms to alter their financial structure, which in turn influences both output levels and the effectiveness of the tax in controlling pollution emissions. It is demonstrated that there exist circumstances in which highly leveraged firms may respond to pollution taxes by expanding output and emission levels. This possibility arises in a leveraged oligopoly since the tax acts as a credible commitment device which leads to more aggressive competition in output markets.     

Marginal abatement costs of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture, cost effectiveness, and the EU non-ETS burden sharing agreement

We propose a quantitative assessment of the marginal abatement costs (MAC) of greenhouse gas emissions from European agriculture and analyze the implications of the non-ETS burden-sharing agreement (BSA) for this sector. This assessment is based on MAC reduced forms, the generic specification of which enables simple parameterization and numerical computations. Such MAC curves are parameterized for each Member State using the outputs of a detailed model of the European agricultural supply. They are then used to compute total and marginal abatement costs involved by the BSA targets, as well as the cost-effective effort sharing, the corresponding emission price and abatement costs. The main findings are: (i) flexibility mechanisms such as a cap-and-trade system for agricultural emissions could reduce the total costs of meeting the 10% EU abatement target by a factor two to three relative to the strict implementation of each country's target, (ii) the corresponding equilibrium emission price is found to be 32-42 €/tCO₂eq depending on the assumption regarding business-as-usual emissions, and (iii) a cap-and-trade system with allowances based on the BSA targets would involve substantial transfers from EU-15 countries to New Member States, an important share of which being made of ‘hot air’.     

Piecemeal Multilateral Environmental Policy Reforms under Asymmetric Oligopoly

We develop a general two‐country model with oligopolistic interdependence in which a fixed number of firms make their output and emission decisions simultaneously. We examine the effect of multilateral reforms of emission taxes on global emission levels. With sufficient asymmetry in pollution intensities between the two countries, a proportional multilateral increase in emission tax rates can increase global emission levels. However, a multilateral equal increase of emission tax rates unambiguously reduces global emission levels. We also consider the case of free entry and exit of firms, and find a rule of multilateral reforms which unambiguously lowers total emission levels.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Firms Responses to Effluent Regulations: Pulp and Paper in Ontario, 1985-1989

This paper explores the effects of effluent regulatory activity in the Ontarian pulp and paper industry. The model uses instrumental variables to distinguish between that correlation between emission limits and emissions coming from regulatory capture and that coming from true influence on the part of the regulator. Results suggest that total suspended solids (TSS) limits were more effective than biological oxygen demand (BOD) limits. Firm responses to TSS limits were in part through modulating output and these responses lowered emissions. In contrast, firms reported investing in abatement technology in response to BOD limits, but these investments had no discernible impact on emissions.     

The Effects of Emission Permits on Growth and the Environment

We develop an overlapping generations model of growth and the environment in which industrial firms produce environmentally harmful emissions. A government controls the emissions by assigning emission quotas to firms, and permits could be issued and freely traded as financial instruments across firms on the basis of the quotas. We show that an environmental policy that decreases an aggregate number of emission quotas could degenerate economic growth and lower environmental quality in the long run. We also show the implications of this result for environmental policy.     

Market Power in Emission Permit Markets: Theory and Evidence from the EU ETS

A well-known result about market power in emission permit markets is that efficiency can be achieved by full free allocation to the dominant firm. I show that this result breaks down when taking the interaction between input and output markets into account, even if the dominant firm perceives market power in the permit market alone. I then examine the empirical evidence for price manipulation by the ten largest electricity firms during phase I of the EU ETS. I find that some firms’ excess allowance holdings are consistent with strategic price manipulation, and that they cannot be explained by price speculation or by precautionary purchases to insure against uncertain future emissions. My results suggest that market power is likely to be an empirically relevant concern during the early years of emission permit markets.     

A Cournot Mechanism for Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information

The contribution of this paper is to show that a simple nonlinear tax can achieve a long-run socially optimal level of pollution without the regulator knowing marginal abatement costs. Firms are charged their differential contribution to total damages, evaluated at the upper margin of current emissions. This induces a Cournot game in pollution levels. We show that the Nash equilibrium exists, corresponds to the socially optimal long-run output and emission levels and number of firms, is stable, and can be reached by iterative computations where conjectures are formed using a linear estimator based on past emission levels.     

Alternative Approaches to Cost Containment in a Cap-and-Trade System

We compare several emissions reduction instruments, including quantity policies with banking and borrowing, price policies, and hybrid policies (safety valve and price collar), using a dynamic model with stochastic baseline emissions. The instruments are compared under the design goal of obtaining the same expected cumulative emissions across all options. Based on simulation analysis with the model parameterized to values relevant to proposed US climate mitigation policies, we find that restrictions on banking and borrowing, including the provision of interest rates on the borrowings, can severely limit the value of the policy, depending on the regulator-chosen allowance issuance path. Although emissions taxes generally provide the lowest expected abatement costs, a cap-and-trade system combined with either a safety valve or a price collar can be designed to provide expected abatement costs near those of a tax, but with lower emissions variance than a tax. Consistently, a price collar is more cost-effective than a safety valve for a given expected cumulative emissions outcome because it encourages inexpensive abatement when abatement costs decline.     

The Welfare Effects of Allowance Banking in Emissions Trading Programs

Permitting allowance banking in emissions trading programs can reduce expected compliance costs by giving capped firms flexibility to adjust the time path of abatement and to hedge against future uncertainty. Recent literature suggests that this compliance cost dividend is significant (Fell and Morgenstern Environ Resour Econ 47:275–297, 2010). Allowance banking may yield an environmental dividend (a) if the growth rate of marginal damages from emissions is less than the discount rate and (b) if emissions are lower in the short run as firms bank permits for use in later periods. A discrete, stochastic dynamic programming model is considered to simulate the two dividends of allowance banking in the context of the most recent Federal United States greenhouse gas cap-and-trade legislation. Simulation results show that under a range of parameter values, the environmental dividend has the same order of magnitude as the compliance cost dividend. Under the central set of parameters, allowance banking increases expected present value of benefits by about $350$ million dollars per year of the program. The environmental dividend, however, is completely eliminated if capped firms can borrow permits from future periods without limit.     

Price setting in Indian industry

Price setting models with variable mark-up rates are specified and estimated for four sectors of Indian industry. It is found that capacity utilisation has a significant effect on mark-up rates implying a Phillips curve type trade-off between output and prices. International prices do not appear to be as important in the price-setting behaviour of firms.     

Global emissions effects of CDM projects with relative baselines

CDM is an offset mechanism designed to reduce the overall cost of implementing a given global target for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in Annex B countries of the Kyoto Protocol. A problem with CDM is that it provides incentives to increase, if possible, the baseline emissions for CDM projects, to optimize the value of CDM credits. Under a “relative baselines” crediting rule, the CDM may also unduly increase energy consumption even during the CDM implementation phase. Less than full offset of emissions is then likely, and the CDM will lead to increased global GHG emissions. We show that this is a potentially serious problem, due to asymmetric information between project hosts and the regulator, the CDM Executive Board, and to the basic rules for crediting CDM quotas. In certain cases, the use of “relative baselines” to credit CDM quotas could fully eliminate any emissions reductions achieved by CDM projects. Remedies to overcome the problems are discussed. They may involve setting the baseline independently of initial energy intensity and final output for the project; or involve information revelation mechanisms that minimize policy losses and net rent capture by project sponsors.     

Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes

It id assumed that firms have different technologies, and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist, but not which is used by which firms. Neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable. The output of each individual firm, however, can be monitored without cost. Based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities. Conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions.     

Imported carbon emissions: Evidence from French manufacturing companies

This paper analyzes imported carbon emission at the firm level. To do so, we combine information on emissions, imports, imported emissions and energy prices for French manufacturing firms between 1997 and 2014. We document a significant increase of the carbon emissions embedded in imports of French manufacturing companies over the period 1997 to 2014 that is attributable mainly to a shift towards more carbon-intensive products and countries. We then estimate the impact of imported emissions on domestic emissions and emission intensity using a shift-share instrumental variable strategy based on third countries supply shocks. We do not find compelling evidence of an impact of carbon imports on total emissions, but emission efficiency improves significantly in companies offshoring emissions abroad. A 10% increase in carbon offshoring causes a 4% decline in emission intensity. In addition, we find that the elasticity of domestic emission intensity to imported emissions is stronger in energy-intensive sectors, on high-productivity companies and among exporters. Reassuringly, the relationship between imported emissions and emission intensity does not seem to be driven by a pollution haven motive.     

Trade and the Environment: The Role of Firm Heterogeneity

In this paper, we derive a new effect of trade liberalization on the quality of the environment. We show that in the presence of heterogeneous firms, the aggregate volume of emissions is influenced by a reallocation effect resulting from an increase in the relative size of more productive firms. The relative importance of this reallocation effect and the scale effect well‐known from the literature is affected by the emission intensity at the firm level. Domestic emissions decrease as a result of a unilateral tariff reduction if and only if firm‐specific emission intensity decreases strongly with increasing firm productivity. As a result of the induced change in foreign emissions, domestic pollution can increase even if domestic emissions decrease.