Union wage effects in Australia: an endogenous switching approach

Using data from the Household and Labour Income Dynamics Australia (HILDA), an endogenous switching model is employed to analyse union wage effects in Australia between 2001 and 2013. An advantage of this approach is that the decision to join a union is treated as potentially endogenous, a function of the wage differential between union and non-union workers, rather than exogenous as is the case in virtually all previous Australian studies. The article finds that the decision to join a union is highly sensitive to the wage differential between union and non-union workers. The article also finds that male (female) union workers with average union characteristics earn 12% (18%) more than male (female) non-union workers with average non-union characteristics. However, a decomposition analysis finds that this difference is due to union workers having better human capital endowments than their non-union counterparts. In addition, they also receive a lower return for those endowments. These decomposition results suggest that union wage effects in Australia may be negative, rather than the small positive effects typically found in the Australian literature.     

Errors in self-reported earnings: The role of previous earnings volatility and individual characteristics

I report the measurement error in self-reported earnings for a developing country using a novel data set. The data set consists of two cross-sections of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) wage and salary sectors; additionally, a subset of the two cross-sections may be linked to create a panel. Administrative data from FSM Social Security office are matched to the FSM Census data for the wage and salary sectors. I find that the error in annual self-reported earnings is centered on zero. Additionally, I find strong evidence for mean reversion in the data suggesting non-classical measurement error. I identify the impact of prior years' earnings variability on the current reporting of earnings using administrative data on earnings histories. Prior earnings volatility strongly affects measurement error in current period. However, the effect of prior shocks diminish significantly over time—suggesting that first-differencing and fixed-effects techniques will not improve accuracy.     

The assimilation of Australian immigrants: does occupation matter?

This paper utilises the occupational attainment approach to investigate immigrant labour market assimilation, complementing other assimilation approaches such as employability, earnings, skills-match and job satisfaction. Our results show that all immigrant groups suffer from initial occupational attainment disadvantage. Worryingly, no ‘catch-up’ over time is evident – even when disaggregated to reflect different cultures and backgrounds. Nor is there much evidence that the occupational status of younger arrivals matches those of Australian born residents, despite being immersed in local mores and institutions while undertaking schooling in Australia. Newer cohorts of immigrants (those who arrived between 2000 and 2014) are also more prone to suffering an occupational penalty. We recommend policymakers subsidise bridging courses to aid recognition of overseas-obtained qualifications and encourage immigrants to obtain local qualifications that can complement their overseas-obtained work experience. This will increase their ‘Australian-ready’ skill-set and occupational attainment in their new host country.     

THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK ON SELF‐ASSESSMENT

It is a well‐known phenomenon that people have difficulties in assessing their ability correctly. Often they overestimate their (relative) abilities. We conduct an experiment to test whether the self‐assessment of individuals improves when they receive feedback and there are incentives to make a correct self‐assessment. We investigate the subjects' reactions to feedback in several subsequent rounds to see not only if, but also when and how they react. Our main finding is that feedback influences subjects' decisions and can improve their overall self‐assessment. The effects, however, depend on the kind of feedback. Furthermore, we observe differences in the reactions of subjects (e.g., to what extent they follow feedback), the robustness of their belief about their relative ability, and how they process feedback.     

A systematic analysis of the links amongst the Marshallian,Hicksian, and Frischian demand functions: A note

Three types of demand functions are central to contemporary consumer theory: the Marshallian, the Hicksian, and the Frischian demand functions. This paper presents a systematic definition of the analytical relationships amongst these demand functions under the maintained hypothesis that the decision maker is a profit maximizer.     

Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability

Rationalizability and similar notions of consistency have proved to be highly problematic in the context of social choice, as witnessed by a range of impossibility results, among which Arrow?s is the most prominent. We propose to rationalize choice functions by preference relations over sets of alternatives (set-rationalizability) and introduce two consistency conditions, and , which are defined in analogy to Sen?s α and γ. We find that a choice function satisfies if and only if it is set-rationalizable and that it satisfies and if and only if it is self-stable, a new concept based on earlier work by Dutta. The class of self-stable social choice functions contains a number of appealing Condorcet extensions.     

Self-regulatory strength and dynamic optimal purchase

I study a single-agent dynamic purchase problem by using a Gul and Pesendorfer’s [Gul, F., Pesendorfer, W., 2007. Harmful addiction. Review of Economic Studies 74 (1), 147-172] dynamic preference: extreme self-control cannot be sustained and leads to addiction. This type of agent exhibits a behavioral pattern of self-regulatory depletion.     

Bidding fever in eBay auctions of Amazon.com gift certificates

In a set of eBay auctions of Amazon.com gift certificates, 41.1% of winning prices exceed face value, which is an observable upper bound for rational bidding because Amazon.com sells certificates at face value. Alternative interpretations to bidding fever are explored.     

The competitive firm and the role of information about uncertain factor prices

This paper studies the role of information about uncertain input prices for a competitive firm. The production decision has to be taken when the price of an input factor is perceived as random. However, a signal is observable in advance, conveying some information about the future factor price. Transparency is linked to the informational content of this signal. The impact of a higher level of transparency is analyzed from an ex ante perspective, i.e. before the information signal is observed. The change of factor use, production amount and cost are determined by comparing the strength of the curvatures of total and marginal product. By contrast, ex ante profit always increases, independently of the shape of the production function.     

Certainty Independence and the Separation of Utility and Beliefs

Economists often operate under an implicit assumption that the tastes of a decision maker are quite stable, while his beliefs change with the availability of new information. We show that for a general class of preferences, a separation of a key component of tastes, the utility function, from the other components of the representation is possible only if the decision maker's preferences satisfy a mild but not completely innocuous condition, called ‘certainty independence’. We also outline the axiomatic characterization of the preferences that obtain such separation, which are a subset of the biseparable preferences.     

Subjective probabilities on “small” domains

The Savagian choice-theoretic construction of subjective probability does not apply to preferences, like those in the Ellsberg Paradox, that reflect a distinction between risk and ambiguity. We formulate two representation results—one for expected utility, the other for probabilistic sophistication—that derive subjective probabilities but only on a “small” domain of risky events. Risky events can be either specified exogenously or in terms of choice behavior; in the latter case, both the values and the domain of probability are subjective. The analysis identifies a mathematical structure—called a mosaic—that is intuitive for both exogenous and behavioral specifications of risky events. This structure is weaker than an algebra or even a λ-system.     

Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude

The objective of this paper is to show how ambiguity, and a decision maker (DM)'s response to it, can be modelled formally in the context of a general decision model. We introduce a relation derived from the DM's preferences, called “unambiguous preference”, and show that it can be represented by a set of probabilities. We provide such set with a simple differential characterization, and argue that it is a behavioral representation of the “ambiguity” that the DM may perceive. Given such revealed ambiguity, we provide a representation of ambiguity attitudes. We also characterize axiomatically a special case of our decision model, the “α-maxmin” expected utility model.     

US household real net worth through the Great Recession and beyond: Have we recovered?

Household data adjusted for inflation show that net worth is still below its pre-Great Recession levels, unlike aggregate Federal Reserve data. Poorer and younger households both lost and recovered more net worth percentage-wise. Financial assets have recovered more than non-financial assets.     

What to maximize if you must

The assumption that decision makers choose actions to maximize their preferences is a central tenet in economics, often justified formally or informally by appealing to evolutionary arguments. In contrast, we show that in almost every game and for almost every family of distortions of a player's actual payoffs, some degree of this distortion is beneficial to the player, and will not be driven out by any evolutionary process involving payoff-monotonic selection dynamics. Consequently, under any such selection dynamics the population will not converge to payoff-maximizing behavior. We also show that payoff-maximizing behavior need not prevail when preferences are imperfectly observed.