DO DEPOSITORS RESPOND RATIONALLY TO BANK RISKS? EVIDENCE FROM JAPANESE BANKS DURING CRISES

This paper empirically examines depositors' ability to distinguish healthy banks from problematic banks, a necessary condition for depositors to impose discipline on banking institutions. We analyzed a large panel of 784 deposit‐taking institutions in Japan during the period from the 1992 financial year to the 2002 financial year. Our estimates indicate that depositors rightly appreciated the difference between healthy banks and risky banks, and that depositors of larger institutions are more sensitive to the bank risks than those of smaller institutions. We further argue that the estimated risk sensitivities of depositors are large enough to discipline the deposit‐taking institutions.     

The Impact of Liquidity Constraints on Bank Lending Policy

This paper examines banks' provision of liquidity to depositors and provision of loans. The problem identified is that banks may not be able to provide new funds for borrowers who are short of cash, because either the return on investments is poor, or because depositors withdraw more funds than expected. Banks subject to liquidity shortages may ration loans to good borrowers. This problem is shown to depend upon the nature of the deposit contract and banks' inability to issue subordinated deposits. State contingent renegotiation of loans and matching of the duration of project returns and investment needs mitigates the problem.     

Religiosity versus rationality: Depositor behavior in Islamic and conventional banks

This study investigates the behavioral aspects of Islamic bank depositors in a dual banking system. By categorizing depositors into groups based on the amount of their deposited funds, we estimate the responses of these groups to interest rate changes. We take the findings of conventional banks as a comparative baseline and investigate the extent to which the changes in different Islamic depositor groups differ from conventional depositor groups. The findings show that depositors in both Islamic and conventional banks respond to interest rate changes. The analysis indicates that Islamic bank depositors are more responsive when their deposit sizes are larger. When Islamic bank depositors’ opportunity costs rise due to a rise in the interest rate, they do not hesitate to withdraw deposits. The relation between interest rate changes and deposits is more robust in Islamic banks than in conventional banks.     

Are Islamic Banks More Resilient During Financial Panics?

Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments of the financial sector in developing countries. Rapid growth of this segment is accompanied with claims about its relative resilience to financial crises as compared to conventional banking. However, little empirical evidence is available to support such claims. Using data from Pakistan, where Islamic and conventional banks co‐exist, we compare the behaviour of Islamic and conventional banks during a financial panic. Our results show that Islamic bank branches are less prone to deposit withdrawals during financial panics, both unconditionally and after controlling for bank characteristics. The Islamic branches of banks that have both Islamic and conventional operations tend to attract (rather than lose) deposits during panics, which suggests a role for religious branding. We also find that Islamic bank branches grant more loans during financial panics and that their lending decisions are less sensitive to changes in deposits. Our findings suggest that greater financial inclusion of faith‐based groups may enhance the stability of the banking system.     

Foreign banks,financial crises and macroeconomic fluctuations

Understanding the implications of increased foreign bank presence is especially compelling in periods of financial crisis. In this paper, we explore this issue by examining the relationship between the involvement of foreign banks in the banking systems and the volatility of key macroeconomic variables in normal and crisis periods. Using a sample of 20 Emerging European countries from 1998 to 2013, we find that an increase in the assets of foreign banks in the banking system reduces output and consumption growth volatility in general but does not significantly affect the volatility of investments. However, these banks were found to play a significant role in increasing output, consumption and investment volatility in 2009. Our findings suggest that foreign banks’ harmful impact during the global crisis was only temporary and that they seem to help Emerging European countries stabilize macroeconomic volatility in normal times and after the global crisis.     

Why the money multiplier has remained persistently so low in the post-crisis United States?

The money multiplier collapsed in the USA in the wake of the Lehman crisis, and since then it remained at particularly low levels. The main reason for this collapse is to be found in the significant increase in banks’ excess reserves and the modest increase in deposits. The weak growth of deposits resulted from a contained growth of loans. Most scholars attribute the latter to the low propensity of banks to grant credit. Using quarterly data for the period 1991–2017 we estimate a demand for loans by firms and households. We show that the modest increase in deposits and the persistence of low levels of the US money multiplier has been due to the weak demand for loans by the private sector.     

Did foreign banks stay committed to emerging Europe during recent financial crises?

Our objective is to investigate empirically the behavior of foreign banks with respect to real loan growth during periods of financial crisis for a set of countries in which foreign banks dominate the banking sectors due primarily to having taken over large existing former state-owned banks. The eight countries are among the most developed in emerging Europe, their banking sectors having been modernized by the middle of the last decade. We consider a data period that includes an initial credit boom (2005 – 2007) followed by the global financial crisis (2008 & 2009) and the onset of the Eurozone crisis (2010). Our two innovations with respect to the existing literature on banking during the financial crisis are to separate foreign banks into two categories, namely, subsidiaries of the Big 6 European multinational banks (MNBs) and all other foreign-controlled banks, and to take account of the impact of exchange rates during the period. Our results show that bank lending was impacted adversely by both crises but that the two types of foreign banks behaved differently. The Big 6 banks remained committed to the region in that their lending behavior was not different from that of domestic banks supporting the notion that these countries are treated as a “second home market” by these European MNBs. Contrariwise, the other foreign banks active in the region were involved in fueling the credit boom but then decreased their lending aggressively during the crisis periods. Our results also indicate that bank behavior in countries having flexible exchange rate regimes differs from that in those in (or effectively in) the Eurozone. Our results suggest that both innovations matter for studying bank behavior during crisis periods in the region and, by extension, to other small countries in which banking sectors are dominated by foreign financial institutions having different business models.     

Financial institutions and the financial crisis in East Asia

This paper investigates institutional reasons for the soft-budget constraint problem; and how the soft-budget constraint problem creates conditions which may result in a financial crisis. As a consequence of soft-budget constraints, bad projects do not stop; bad loans accumulate; and banks and depositors do not receive bad news on time. Poorly informed depositors are then likely to herd to overinvest when there is no bankruptcy (`frenzy'); and they are likely to herd to panic when bankruptcy occurs (`crash'), which may be the result of excessive bad loans that are also a consequence of soft-budget constraints. In contrast, under hard-budget constraints information is disclosed quickly regarding liquidation. Better-informed investors are then less likely to herd wrongly.     

ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN BANKING SERVICES

In order to examine theories of domestic and international trade in banking, information is presented in this paper on the vast array of service charges banks levy on their customers, both resident and non-resident, and the complex of interest rates on deposits and loans that must be collected. Examination is also necessary of collection procedures of the various charges which central banks levy on banks, as well as interest rates paid on reserves, insurance premia on deposits and the like in order to test propositions that international trade in banking is a function of the various monetary policies followed by Monetary Authorities.     

Banking reforms,performance and risk in China

We investigate the impact of the banking reform started from 2005 on ownership structures in China on commercial banks’ profitability, efficiency and risk over the period 2000–2012, providing comprehensive evidence on the impact of banking reform in China. We find that banks on average tend to have higher profitability, lower risk and lower efficiency after the reforms, and the results are robust with our difference-in-difference approach. Our results also show that the Big 5 state-owned banks (SOCB) underperform banks with other types of ownership when risk is measured by non-performing loans (NPLs) over the entire study period but tend to have fewer NPLs than other banks during the post-reform period. Our results provide some supporting evidence on the ongoing banking reforms in China, suggesting that attracting strategic foreign investors and listing SOCBs on stock exchanges appear to be effective ways to help SOCBs deal with the problem of NPLs and manage their risk.     

Credit Risk Determinants for the Bulgarian Banking System

Using an autoregressive distributed lag model, this paper examines the factors that influence the credit risk of the Bulgarian banking system over the decade 2001–2010, as measured by non-performing loans. Recent papers aim to identify the determinants of non-performing loans using a cross-country modelling framework. As the South East European region (SEE) is non-homogeneous, our analysis is country-specific and captures the timeline between the bank privatisation era up to the global financial crisis and the ensuing Greek crisis. The contribution of our paper is twofold: it uses the ARDL modelling framework that is scarcely employed in related studies but also investigates spillover effects from the Greek crisis in view of the material presence of Greek banks in Bulgaria. In accordance with previous studies, the findings suggest that the credit risk determinants of Bulgarian banks should be sought endogenously in macroeconomic variables and industry-specific factors but also in exogenous factors. We evidence a pronounced role of the global financial crisis and the country’s bank regulatory framework. The Greek debt crisis appears to play an immaterial role indicating that Greek banks have not been a Trojan horse in the Bulgarian banking system.     

What are the bank-specific and macroeconomic drivers of banks’ leverage? Evidence from Luxembourg

We investigate the leverage cycle in Luxembourg’s banking sector using individual bank-level data for the period 2003 Q1–2010 Q1. One of our findings is that Luxembourg’s banks have a procyclical leverage. This procyclicality is not due to marking-to-market but because Luxembourg’s banks are liquidity providers to the EU banking sector. We then empirically investigate the role of bank characteristics as well as real, financial and expectation variables that proxy for macroeconomic conditions in the pre-crisis and crisis period. We find that off-balance sheet exposures have different effects in the pre-crisis and crisis period, and that the share of liquid assets in the portfolio only affects security holdings. As for macroeconomic variables, we find that the Euribor-OIS spread is a significant driver of the build-up in leverage in the pre-crisis period. The reason is that most banks in Luxembourg are either branches or subsidiaries. This makes leverage a less relevant indicator of riskiness for investors. It also implies that in times of liquidity shortages, mother companies or groups demand further liquidity from their branch or subsidiary. The downturn in leverage during the crisis can be accredited to reductions in expectations, which we proxy by an economic sentiment indicator. It can also be explained by increasing bond prices which induce depositors to shift their funds from bank deposits into bonds. We find no important role for GDP growth.     

FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE BANKING IMPUTATION IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

The banking problem in the National Accounts arises because interest rates paid by banks on deposits are generally lower than the rates charged for loans and service charges levied by banks are generally less than the cost of the banking services provided. This paper offers two explanations for such observations: first there is the new neo-classical theory of private banking and central banking which suggests that they arise because of distorting “taxes” levied by regulating central banks. Second there is the Keynesian theory which accounts for the observations by the fact that the public good services of monetary stabilization supplied directly by the central banks and indirectly by private banks cannot be priced. Both theories account for the empirical observations giving rise to the banking problem. Neither theory lends support to the banking imputation currently carried out in most National Accounts.     

ARE LAC COOPERATIVE AND COMMERCIAL BANKS SO DIFFERENT IN THEIR MANAGEMENT OF NON‐PERFORMING LOANS?

This paper assesses technical efficiency in the management of non‐performing loans (NPLs) in the Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) banking industry. To that end, Data Envelopment Analysis techniques are employed with data from the years 2013 to 2016 on a sample of 307 LAC cooperative and commercial banks. Our main contribution to existing literature is that differences of efficiency between cooperative banks and commercial banks are assessed as the result of the different capacities of their managers – managerial efficiency – and the so‐called programme efficiency, which represents differences in the technology used by these two categories of entities. Our principal result suggests that the technology used by cooperative banks in the management of NPLs is more efficient than the technology of commercial banks.     

中国商业银行市场势力、效率及其福利效应

文章对中国商业银行1998-2007年的市场势力与效率之间的关系及其福利效应进行了初步研究。结果表明,运用随机前沿成本函数所估计的贷款边际成本大于存款边际成本,四大国有银行的市场势力勒纳指数明显大于股份制商业银行,国有银行行政性市场势力不容忽视。在此基础上,文章估计了基于市场势力的社会福利效应,因银行成本无效率带来的福利损失远大于因市场势力而引致的社会福利损失。检验安逸生活假设表明,贷款市场拒绝安逸生活假设,而存款市场接受安逸生活假设。贷款市场势力对银行业发展具有一定的负面作用,而银行生产率的提高促进了银行业的持续发展。     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

The impact of setting negative policy rates on banking flows and exchange rates

In the aftermath of the great contraction of 2008, policymakers were faced with the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB) on nominal interest rates. Central banks implemented several unconventional monetary policies to overcome the ZLB, including setting negative nominal interest rates. This paper explores possible unintended effects of setting negative policy rates. Using Danish data, I assess the impact of paying a negative interest rate on reserves. Results suggest that going into negative territory has a particular impact, distinct from that of simply lowering interest rates: it leads to higher banking outflows and depreciation of the currency. Due to the reluctance of commercial banks to pass on negative rates to their depositors (retail deposits can easily be switched into cash), paying a negative (vs. positive) interest rate on reserves creates a disconnection between the assets and liabilities of commercial banks' balance sheets. Commercial banks can avoid this disconnection by holding external assets or assets in foreign currencies. This incentive to increase banking outflows appears to explain the particular impact of going into negative territory.     

Banking Competition,Risk and Regulation*

In a dynamic framework, commercial banks compete for customers by setting acceptance criteria for granting loans, while taking into account regulatory requirements. By easing its acceptance criteria a bank faces a trade‐off between attracting more demand for loans, thus making higher per‐period profits, and deterioration in the quality of its loan portfolio, thus tolerating a higher risk of failure. Our main results state that more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter acceptance criteria, and that increased competition in the banking industry leads to riskier bank behaviour. It is shown that risk‐adjusted regulation is effective. In an extension of our basic model, we show that it may be beneficial for a bank to hold more equity than prescribed by the regulator, even though issuing equity is more expensive than attracting deposits.     

Does ownership concentration affect banks’ credit risk? Evidence from MENA emerging markets

The purpose of this study is to explore the impact of ownership concentration on banks’ credit risk. The study employs a dynamic panel approach using data from 98 banks listed in the 10 Middle East and North African (MENA) emerging stock markets between 2003 and 2016. To better understand the nature of the relationship between ownership concentration and bank credit risk and how this relationship is shaped by the recent financial crisis, we conducted a pre- and postcrisis analysis. Our findings document a positive relationship between ownership concentration and nonperforming loans in the precrisis period, which surprisingly reverses during the postcrisis period. We argue that the reversal of this relationship is driven by changes in controlling shareholders’ risk aversion, behavior, and attitude prompted by the financial crisis. Given that central banks are entrusted with forestalling banks’ failure, incorporating ownership concentration, as a fundamental determinant of banks’ credit risk, is crucial to anticipate future financial calamities. Our findings highlight the gravity of agency problems in emerging MENA markets. Reinforcing firm-level as well as country-level governance mechanisms is crucial to restore a sound banking system, enhance markets’ integrity, and increase investors’ confidence.     

The Efficiency of China's Banking Industry and the Determinants

The recent global financial crisis highlights the importance of a sound financial sector for economic development. This paper evaluates the economic efficiency of China's banking industry and investigates the determinants of this efficiency. Our analysis shows that the average economic efficiency of joint-stock commercial banks is highest, followed by the ‘Big Four’ state-owned commercial banks and city commercial banks. The economic inefficiency of these banks during the past 15 years was mainly caused by technical inefficiency, and this technical inefficiency was mainly caused by scale inefficiency. Using the scores of efficiency as dependent variables, the paper also comprehensively studies the impact of (1) the characteristics of individual banks, (2) the characteristics of the whole banking industry and (3) macroeconomic factors on banking efficiency. The results suggest a number of factors that banks can work on to improve efficiency and lend support to deepening reforms in the Chinese banking industry, including regulatory reforms that require capital adequacy in a more strict way, reforms that introduce more competition and, more broadly, reforms that aim at establishing institutions that can truly commercialize Chinese banks. Last but not least, the efficiency of banking depends on healthy growth of the overall economy.