Unbundling the local loop

We study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop, where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure. We use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete “service-based”, and/or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete “facility-based”, given the rental price.We show that the incumbent sets too low a rental price for its loops; hence, the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type (quality) of the new technology to be adopted. We also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes, a sunset clause does not improve social welfare.     

Product differentiation,price discrimination and collusion

The existing literature which analyses the relationship between the product differentiation degree and the sustainability of a collusive agreement on price assumes that firms cannot price discriminate, and concludes that there is a negative relationship between the product differentiation degree and the critical discount factor. This paper, in contrast, assumes that firms are able to price discriminate. Within the Hotelling framework, three different collusive schemes are studied: perfect collusion on discriminatory prices; perfect collusion on a uniform price; collusion not to discriminate. We obtain that the critical discount factor of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product differentiation degree, while the critical discount factor of the second collusive scheme depends positively on the product differentiation degree. Moreover, we show that imperfect collusion is more difficult to sustain than perfect collusion.     

Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. Moreover we show that asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.     

Vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs and upstream collusion

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It turns out this is the joint-profit maximum of the colluding firms. The discount factor needed to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it difficult to reconcile raising-rivals’-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here.     

Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining, discount pricing, etc.) expose buyers to the “price risk”, the uncertainty of not knowing how much to pay in advance. Fixed price trading eliminates the price risk, which is why risk averse customers accept paying more to shop at such stores.     

Backward integration and collusion in a duopoly model with asymmetric costs

This paper formalizes the idea that input transactions might be used to implement side payments among colluding firms. A model is proposed to analyze the effect of backward integration on collusive outcomes in a downstream duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Vertical integration expands the set of collusive outcomes that are sustainable for a given realization of the discount factor. This is an additional effect of vertical integration that antitrust authorities should consider. Side payments implemented by input sales are more relevant the larger the difference in marginal costs, since they allow for the shifting of production towards the relatively more efficient firms, while maintaining firms’ incentives to collude. A price of the input above that posted by an alternative source or sales of the input below cost may be observed, depending on the realization of downstream firms’ costs.      

Transfer fee regulations in European football

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (“pre-Bosman”), currently in use (“Bosman”), and recently approved (“Monti”) differ with respect to the transfer fee an initial club is entitled to depending on whether a player has a valid contract or not. We show that the different systems differ only with respect to the contract length if the contract which maximizes the expected joint surplus of the initial club and the player is feasible under each system. Otherwise, regime P is strictly dominated by regime B in terms of expected social welfare. Regime M leads to higher effort but lower incentives to invest in training compared to system B.     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

Viscous demand

In many markets, demand adjusts slowly to changes in prices, i.e., demand is “viscous”. This viscosity gives each firm some monopoly power, since it can raise its price above that of its competitors without immediately losing all of its customers. The resulting equilibrium pricing behavior and market outcomes can differ significantly from what one would predict in the absence of demand viscosity. In particular, the model explains the importance of market share as an investment, as well as “kinked demand curves”. It also explains how apparently “competitive” pricing behavior can lead to outcomes that mimic those of collusion.     

Superstition and “lucky” apartments: Evidence from transaction-level data

Using a sample of apartment transactions during 2004–2006 in Chengdu, China, we investigate the impact of superstitions in the Chinese real estate market. Numerology forms an important component of Chinese superstitious lore, with the numbers 8 and 6 signifying good luck, and the number 4 bad luck. We find that secondhand apartments located on floors ending with “8” fetch, on average, a 235 RMB higher price (per square meter) than on other floors. For newly constructed apartments, this price premium disappears due to uniform pricing of new housing units, but apartments on floors ending in an “8” are sold, on average, 6.9 days faster than on other floors. Buyers who have a phone number containing more “8”’s are more likely to purchase apartments in a floor ending with “8”; this suggests that at least part of the price premium for “lucky” apartments arises from the buyers’ superstitious beliefs.     

Strategic managerial incentives and cross ownership structure: A note

In this note, we study the behavior of firms competing in a Cournot duopoly framework where owners and managers are separate identities and where cross-participation at the ownership level exists. We find that depending on the degree of cross ownership, managerial incentives may be more or less towards profit maximizing behavior. Moreover we show that limited cross-participation may be a way for owners to obtain collusive behavior without apparently offending Anti-Trust laws.We would like to thank M. P. Espinosa, C. Matutes, J. D. Pérez Castrillo, J. Ricart, V. Salas, X. Vives, and an anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions. I. Macho-Stadler's research was partially supported by the project PGV 9022.1. The usual disclaimers apply.     

Two is not too many for monopoly

Many research contributions have investigated the identity of the leader in oligopolistic markets. As a general rule, this literature points to the leader being either the most efficient, the largest or the best informed player. However, there tend to be exceptions to this rule and it is unclear who will become the leader when firms at the same time are different in size, efficiency of production and/or the quality of the information they have. The present paper reveals insights regarding this last question. As such, it points to the elements that really matter to explain for leadership when firms are different from each other in more than one respect. It turns out that the most efficient firm becomes the leader, regardless whether or not its rival has invested in more capacity. While this result tends to be in line with the previous findings regarding the identity of the leader being the relatively more efficient firm, it contradicts the dominant firm scenario regarding price leadership. This is the result of enlarging the strategy space of the players, by including a buyout option. As such, the paper provides the foundations and hence a theoretical justification for price leadership out of a collusive motive. Since a priori the model also does not exclude a barometric price leadership outcome, it is appropriate to conclude that the buyout option truly is a collusive device strong enough to suppress other reasons for price leadership. Therefore, the arrangements observed in reality aiming at the implementation of buyout possibilities have to be watched very closely from an antitrust perspective.     

Allocation of resources in a team

The informational efficiency of “price” and “demand” messages in a resource allocation mechanism is studied here with the aid of the theory of teams¹. In the usual analysis of adjustment mechanisms (tâtonnement, decomposition), the adjustment process is assumed to run to completion, so that all the allocation and resource decisions can be made on the basis of enough information to guarantee optimal decisions². If, however, decisions must be made before the adjustment process is completed, say, after only a few iterations, then the decisions must be taken with limited information, and thus under conditions of uncertainty. This paper discusses a simple model in an attempt to examine explicitly these problems of uncertainty and limited information. A set of enterprise managers are assumed to produce various commodities, using scarce resources allocated to the enterprises by a resource manager. The enterprise managers also make decisions that affect their individual outputs. Varous kinds of communication among the managers, together with the corresponding information structures, are formulated, including the communication of price and demand messages. Optimal decision rules for the managers are calculated for the objective of maximizing the expected value of an index of total output. (It is assumed that the production functions and the supplies of scarce resources are stochastic, but are observed by the respective managers.) It is shown that optimal decision rules based on a single exchange of price and demand messages, between the resource manager on the one hand and the enterprise managers on the other, produces as good results as rules based on (1) complete information for the resource manager, and (2) information about the supplies of resources on the part of the enterprise managers. Furthermore, these price and demand messages produce approximately fully optimal results when the number of enterprises is large. However, the optimal decisions of the enterprise managers do not maximize profits, at least relative to any price that is the same for all enterprises. An assumption that the production functions are quadratic plays a key role.     

Taxation and the sustainability of collusion: ad valorem versus specific taxes

Assuming constant marginal cost, it is shown that a switch from specific to ad valorem taxation that results in the same collusive price has no effect on the critical discount factor required to sustain collusion. This result is shown to hold for Cournot oligopoly when collusion is sustained with Nash-reversion strategies or optimal-punishment strategies. In a Cournot duopoly model with linear demand and quadratic costs, it is shown that the critical discount factor is lower with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that results in the same collusive price. However, in contrast to Colombo and Labrecciosa (J Public Econ 97:196–205, 2013) it is shown that the revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax.     

The discount rate and the value of remaining years of life

We back out an estimate of a personal discount rate of between 3 and 4 percent for a person with a life expectancy of 74 years who dies at age 30 or 40 and has a value of statistical life of $6.3 million. We employ the Makeham “model” of life expectancy and Murphy-Topel “values of life years” in our calculations.     

Myopia, redistribution and pensions

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their “myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to “habit formation” and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, which complicates public policy.     

Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining

We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (nonquadratic) utilities.     

Discounting and altruism to future decision-makers

Is discounting of future decision-makers’ consumption utilities consistent with “pure” altruism toward those decision-makers, that is, a concern that they are better off according to their own, likewise forward-looking, preferences? It turns out that the answer is positive for many but not all discount functions used in the economics literature. In particular, “hyperbolic” discounting of the form used by Phelps and Pollak (Rev. Econ. Studies 35 (1968) 201) and Laibson (Quart. J. Econ. 112 (1997) 443) is consistent with exponential altruism towards future generations. More generally, we establish a one-to-one relationship between discount functions and altruism weight systems, and provide sufficient, as well as necessary, conditions for discount functions to be consistent with pure altruism.     

The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?

This paper considers the stability of tacit collusion in price setting duopolies with repeated interaction. The minimum discount factor above which tacit collusion can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium is called the critical discount factor δ*. In addition, δ* is often used as an intuitive measure for the stability of a tacit cartel, assuming that a collusive equilibrium is more difficult to sustain when δ* increases. However, according to standard theory the distance δ − δ* between the actual and the critical discount factor does not matter for stability as long as δ > δ*. This paper contributes experimental evidence that supports the intuitive idea that a larger critical discount factor makes collusion a less likely outcome.