On the provision of official and private foreign aid

The provision of official relative to private foreign aid varies considerably between donor countries. We explain the variations in terms of country size, household composition, income distribution, and the government's ability to commit to aid, and derive inter alia the results: (1) official aid crowds out private aid, (2) total aid and official aid collected from each household are lower in more populous countries, (3) total aid is lower if (i) the distribution of income favors the more altruistic households, and (ii) the government can credibly commit to a certain level of aid. Evidences suggest that the theoretical results can explain stylized facts.     

The informational effects of competition and collusion in legislative politics

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.     

中国财政竞争与地方公共支出结构分析

This article examines the impact of intergovernmental fiscal competition on local public expenditure in China under current performance assessment system in which GDP is a critical factor. First, we present the assignment of public goods and tax burden and the share of foreign direct investment (FDI) of 30 provinces, and we find that current fiscal competition in China has taken the form of public expenditure improvement accompanied by preferential tax policies. Second, we regress the share of FDI on different components of provincial public expenditure, and find that the share of FDI is correlated negatively with the public service, tax burden and health care service while positively with infrastructure development. Therefore, FDI-based infrastructural investment crowds out public services investment, which fails to support the view that fiscal competition improves social welfares.     

Privatization and the Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policy

This article considers the interdependence between international financial markets, privatization, and strategic trade policies. We describe an economy where portfolio allocations are chosen by risk-averse agents who rationally forecast future trade policies. Assuming a government responsive to the policy preferences of voters, we show that ownership structure affects trade policy through the incentives for lobbying by private agents. Portfolios and trade policy are thus jointly determined in political-economic equilibrium. Privatization of state-owned industry exerts an important influence over the trade policies chosen by domestic and foreign governments by expanding the scope for individual diversification.     

Trust,risk and time preferences: evidence from survey data

The paper shows that time preferences and risk preferences are key covariates of self-reported trust. They both predict negatively a measure of generalized trust; however, risk aversion is positively correlated with an index of particularized trusting behaviour (which refers to the circle of known people).     

Market access for sale

This paper focuses on the links between foreign lobbying and preferential market access granted by the United States' government to exporters in the rest of the Americas. We first develop a simple framework based on Grossman and Helpman [Grossman, G., Helpman, E., 1994. Protection for sale. American Economic Review 84 (4) 833–850.] to explain how lobbying by foreign firms affects their preferential access to the United States market. We then estimate the model using data on tariff preferences and lobby contributions for the 34 countries in the region. Empirical results suggest that foreign lobbying is an important force behind preferential market access to the United States. The structural estimates indicate that the weight given to foreign lobby contributions in the United States' government objective function is five times higher than the weight granted to tariff revenue forgone due to preferences. Thus, our results indicate that market access is up for sale and foreign lobbies are buying it.     

What determines foreign aid? The donors' perspective

This paper examines the factors affecting the support for foreign aid among voters in donor countries. A simple theoretical model, which considers an endogenous determination of official and private aid flows, relates individual income to aid support and also suggests that government efficiency is an important factor in this regard. The empirical analysis of individual attitudes, based on the World Values Surveys, reveals that satisfaction with own government performance and individual relative income are positively related to the willingness to provide foreign aid. Furthermore, using actual donor country data we find that aid is adversely affected by own government inefficiency.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF U.S. FOREIGN AID: AMERICAN LEGISLATORS AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF AID

Are there systematic political economy factors that shape preferences for foreign aid, a key component of American foreign policy? We analyze votes in the House of Representatives from 1979 to 2003 that would increase or decrease foreign aid by considering the political, economic, and ideological characteristics of legislators and their districts. To understand who supports and opposes foreign aid, we utilize theories of foreign economic policy preferences. By examining different types of aid policy, we show that domestic politics and especially the distributional consequences of economic aid can matter. The economic characteristics of a district and its left–right ideological predispositions influence support for aid in a systematic fashion over the nearly 25‐year period. Stolper–Samuelson models along with political ideology can help explain legislators' preferences toward aid.     

Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism: Evidence from the Caribbean

There exist legal channels for informational lobbying of US policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. This paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism, and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. Panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and US tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries.     

Foreign informational lobbying can enhance tourism: Evidence from the Caribbean

There exist legal channels for informational lobbying of US policymakers by foreign principals. Foreign governments and private sector principals frequently and intensively use this institutional channel to lobby on trade and tourism issues. This paper empirically studies whether such lobbying effectively achieves its goal of trade promotion in the context of Caribbean tourism, and suggests the potential for using foreign lobbying as a vehicle for development. Panel data are used to explore and quantify the association between foreign lobbying by Caribbean principals and US tourist arrivals to Caribbean destinations. A variety of sensitivity analyses support the finding of a strong association. The policy implications are obvious and potentially important for developing countries.     

Patterns of multi-agent land conservation: Crowding in/out,agglomeration, and policy

Private agents make large contributions to networks of conserved land, but little is known about how private agents’ decisions might be altered by government actions. This paper explores the impact of public conservation and public policy on the quantity and configuration of private land conservation and the extent to which the social optimum is reached. Because land conservation benefits often have thresholds and spatial characteristics, we consider the impact of different land conservation benefit functions on the patterns of conservation created by the interaction of private and public agents. We find that public conservation crowds private conservation in or out depending on whether marginal conservation benefits increase or decrease with total acreage, and crowding out is mitigated by the presence of budget constraints. We show how land conservation agents might interact strategically in space depending on preferences over fragmentation, and we explore that spatial strategic interaction in a case with a regional land trust and a case with hot-spot parcels. We identify when government policies, such as agglomeration bonuses and mitigating coordination costs, are most likely to increase the social benefits provided by private land conservation agents.     

Optimal tax treatment of private contributions for public goods with and without warm glow preferences

Tax-favored contributions for financing some public goods may be a useful part of optimal nonlinear income tax and expenditure policy. There are two sides to the potential gain from subsidized donations. First, for a given level of public good provision, higher private donations from high earners than low earners eases the incentive compatibility constraint for donors and so can raise social welfare. This follows since considering a lower-paid job includes a perception of a drop in public good provision. Second, private donation reduces consumption, easing the resource constraint. This paper explores optimal policy, using first a model with standard preferences and then a model with a warm glow of giving. In addition to showing the conditions for the level of public goods, the paper considers the pattern of optimal subsidization across earnings levels. Analysis of optimal taxation with warm glow preferences is sensitive to the choice of preferences that are relevant for a social welfare evaluation. After considering optimal rules with formulations of social welfare which do and do not include warm glow utility, the paper considers the choice of normative criterion. Like the earlier literature, this paper assumes that organizing private donations is costless while tax collection has a deadweight burden. Since private charitable fundraising is very far from costless, the paper is an exploration of economic mechanisms, not a direct guide to policy.     

Private savings and transition

After the collapse in the early transition years, saving rates in Eastern European EU‐accession countries have recovered strongly. But is private saving in these countries now driven by the same forces as in the EU? A GMM estimator is applied to analyze the determinants of private saving in both country groups. The main results are: saving rates are rather persistent; income growth increases saving, whereas public saving crowds out private saving. There is evidence that in both country groups domestic saving and foreign capital operate at least partly as substitutes, which is an indicator for international financial integration. The long‐run effects of income growth and public saving are larger in the EU‐15 than in the EU‐accession countries.     

Revisiting the impact of impure public goods on consumers’ prosocial behavior: A lab experiment in Shanghai

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.     

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

How is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich? Theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system. We develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures. We find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad-based democracy where politicians are responsive to low-income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich. The main predictions of the theory are consistent with state-level data and micro data from the U.S. as well as cross-country evidence from the Programme for International Student Assessment study.     

母国客户、东道国区位优势与外资银行进入——来自中国的证据

通过研究外资银行母国客户及中国区位优势对外资银行进入的影响,显示外资银行进入国内的规模同FDI和出口正相关,同进口负相关.中国的区位优势对外资银行具有一定吸引力,国内银行业竞争水平的提升一定程度上可以限制外资银行进入.     

Foreign Aid,Government Spending,and the Environment

Using an endogenous growth model, this paper examines the growth and welfare effects of the allocation of foreign aid in the recipient economy. As public inputs are a productive factor, a rise in the allocation of aid to the public inputs increases growth and hence the welfare of the economy. However, raising the ratio of aid to pollution abatement may not help an economy, because it crowds out public inputs. Since public inputs are also partly financed by income taxation, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is larger than the growth‐maximizing rate, because a portion of the aid constitutes a lump‐sum transfer and can increase household consumption and hence welfare.     

Foreign Aid in the Aftermath of Large Natural Disasters

This paper examines Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the aftermath of large natural disasters between 1970 and 2008. Using an event‐study approach, the paper finds that while the median increase in ODA is 18% compared with pre‐disaster flows, the typical surge is small in relation to the size of the affected economies. Moreover, aid surges typically cover only 3% of the total estimated economic damages caused by the disasters. The main determinants of post‐disaster aid surges are found to be the intensity of the event itself and the recipient country's characteristics such as the level of development, country size and the stock of foreign reserves. The paper does not find evidence that political considerations or strategic behavior on the part of donors determine the size of post‐disaster aid surges.     

Dissertation abstract: The experimental analysis of the political economics of fisheries governance

This dissertation focuses on the political economy of fisheries governance. The study develops a formal model of fisheries governance by combining the features of the common pool fishery and the political institution of lobbying; designs a laboratory fishery governance institution and conducts economic experiments to test the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Specifically, the study analyzes how fishing firms invest in efforts to influence fishery regulation and management through voluntary contribution lobbying. The study also analyses and compares contribution and effort behavior in the lobbying and the CPR using data from economic experiments. The results indicate that lobbying to change suboptimal fishery regulations was significantly below the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction and contributions to raise the cap were significantly different than contributions to lower the cap toward the social optimum. Study results show that subjects successfully lobbied to raise inefficiently low fishing quotas, but were unable to lobby to reduce inefficiently high fishing quotas. Detailed analysis of subjects’ contribution and effort behavior suggest that despite the interesting benefit-cost duality between pure public goods and CPRs, the pattern of cooperative behavior in these two social dilemma situations was different and the level of cooperation in the voluntary contribution lobbying experiment was lower than those reported in other public goods experiments. To provide external validity to these experimental findings, the study further analyzes and compares lobbying expenditures in the fishery sector with those in other natural resource industries using field data from the United States. A comparison of actual lobbying expenditures as percentage of valued added shows that lobbying effort in the U.S fishery sector is not significantly different than those in other natural resource industries such as mining and electric utility industries, but the pattern of lobbying is different. Whereas fishing firms lobby through associations or pressure groups, firms in other natural resource industries lobby unilaterally. This observation suggests that differences in industrial structure and incentives influence the pattern of lobbying and the lobbying behavior of firms across industries. The theoretical predictions derived from the formal model of fisheries governance are consistent with our experimental findings and with the field data on lobbying in the US fisheries sector. These findings suggest that heterogeneity drives rent-seeking activities in the US fisheries sector and that fishing firms attempt to circumvent political collective action problems by forming and lobbying through associations of stakeholders with relatively homogenous policy preferences. JEL Classification D22, D72, D78, H41 Advisor: Prof. Jon G. Sutinen     

A new investor sentiment indicator (ISI) based on artificial intelligence: A powerful return predictor in China

This paper utilizes deep learning approach widely documented in artificial intelligence, and proposes an investor-sentiment indicator (ISI) that is consistent with the purpose of forecasting stock market returns. We find that ISI is positively correlated with future stock market returns at a monthly frequency, but negatively associated with subsequent returns over a longer horizon. Moreover, ISI outperforms other well-recognized predictors both in and out of sample, and can predict cross-sectional stock returns sorted by industry. We also show a positive association between monthly ISI and dividend growth rate, which indicates that investors’ expectations about future cash flows may contribute to the return predictability of ISI.