Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments

We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival good from their private contributions. A social ordering function associates to each economy a complete ranking of the allocations. We build social ordering functions satisfying the properties that individual welfare levels below the stand-alone lower bound (respectively, above the unanimity upper bound) should be increased (respectively, reduced). Combining either property with efficiency and robustness properties with respect to changes in the set of agents, we obtain a kind of welfare egalitarianism based on a constructed numerical representation of individual preferences.     

Mecro‐Economic Voting: Local Information and Micro‐Perceptions of the Macro‐Economy

We develop an incomplete information theory of economic voting, where voters' information about macro‐economic performance is determined by the economic conditions of people similar to themselves. We test our theory using both cross‐sectional and time‐series survey data. A novel survey instrument that asks respondents their numerical assessment of the unemployment rate confirms that individuals' economic information responds to the economic conditions of people similar to themselves. Furthermore, these assessments are correlated with individuals' vote choices. We also show in time‐series data that state unemployment robustly correlates with evaluations of national economic conditions, and presidential support.     

建立我国经济国际化衡量指标体系再思考

为了使我国的外向型经济健康、有序的发展,必须要有一定的理论基础,为我国经济国际化的发展决策提供支持,因此有必要在对经济国际化进行质的研究的基础上进行量的描述,建立一套综合指标来反映和测度经济国际化的程度。文章在借鉴国内外研究成果的基础上,从定量分析和定性分析两个方面对怎样建立一套指标体系进行分析研究,并通过实证来进一步验证所得出的结论。     

Exchange rate volatility–economic growth nexus in Uganda

The global financial crisis has disrupted trade and capital flows in most developing economies, resulting in an increased volatility of exchange rates. We develop an autoregressive distributed lag model to investigate the effect of exchange rate volatility on economic growth in Uganda. Using data spanning the period 1960–2011, we find that exchange rate volatility positively affects economic growth in Uganda in both the short run and the long run. However, in the short run, political instability negatively moderates the exchange rate volatility–economic growth nexus. These results are robust to alternative specifications of the economic growth model.     

Vested Interests and the Common People in Developing Countries: Understanding Oppressive Societies and Their Effects

The standard economic model of how economies work is that activities are essentially productive. This is not a correct view of reality. The principal difficulty is that there is economic activity that is unproductive and harmful (from the point of view of those being harmed). This is a central feature of the economic organization of these societies, and creates poverty. The first section of the article discusses the concept of harm. The second section describes how societies are run on this basic set of principles: Take and maintain control of the government and other aspects of society, and use the power of government to obtain income. The third section of the article describes how this system harms the common people. Topics include corruption, misappropriation of natural resources, conflict and other harm engendered by the struggle for control, the influence on present society of the past operation of harmful economic systems, and discrimination as well as other “barriers to entry.”     

A dynamic exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents

In this paper, we analyze a heterogeneous agent model in which the fundamental exchange rate is endogenously determined by the real markets. The exchange rate market and the real markets are linked through the balance of payments. We have analytically found that there exists at least a steady state in which the exchange rate is equal to its fundamental value and incomes of both countries are equal to the autonomous components times the multiplier (as in the Income-Expenditure model). This steady state can be unique and unstable when all agents act as contrarians, while when agents act as fundamentalists it is unique but its stability depends on the reactivity of actors of the market. Finally, we show that the (in)stability of the economic system depends on both the reactivity of the markets and that of different types of agents involved. Employing well-know functional forms, we show that the model can replicate some of the statistical features of the true time series of the exchange rate.     

Moral markets: A marginalistic interpretation of Adam Smith

The article is built upon James Otteson's analogy between the structure of moral and economic rules. In Otteson's interpretation of Adam Smith's works both of them develop from an exchange of information of interacting agents. We develop that concept about Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, analyzing those exchanges, and considering them Moral Market processes, in the Austrian Tradition of markets as processes. We think that Smith's emphasis on graduality and his metaphor of the Impartial Spectator allows us to propose a marginalistic approach to those markets stating how, in some of them which we call moral exchanges of justice, and through a great number of exchanges, moral rules of justice emerge. Finally, we present the problems that arise when legislation tries to change the results of these exchanges, in what we called a price control in the moral market.     

Time-inconsistent preferences in a general equilibrium model

This paper introduces time-inconsistent preferences in a multicommodity general equilibrium framework with incomplete markets. The standard concept of competitive equilibrium is extended in order to allow for changes in intertemporal preferences. Depending on whether or not agents recognize that their intertemporal preferences change, agents are called sophisticated or naïve. This paper presents competitive equilibrium notions for economies with naïve agents and economies with sophisticated agents and provides assumptions under which both types of equilibria exist. Surprisingly, the set of naïve equilibria in societies populated by time-consistent households is not allocationally equivalent to the set of competitive equilibria. For sophisticated equilibria, the equivalence holds. Time-inconsistency also raises conceptual issues about the appropriate concept of efficiency. Choices have to be made concerning the incorporation of future preferences and the appropriate instruments to create Pareto improvements. For both naïve and sophisticated societies, we present four possible efficiency concepts. Suitable conditions are specified for which both naïve and sophisticated equilibria satisfy appropriate efficiency concepts.     

Ordinal aggregation and quantiles

Consider the problem of aggregating a profile of interpersonally comparable utilities into a social utility. We require that the units of measurement of utility used for agents is the same as the units of measurement for society (ordinal covariance) and a mild Pareto condition (monotonicity). We provide several representations of such social aggregation operators: a canonical representation, a Choquet expectation representation, a minimax representation, and a quantile representation (with respect to a possibly non-additive set function on the agents). We also isolate an additional condition that gives us a quantile representation with respect to a probability measure, in both the finite and infinite agents case.     

Coevolution of economic and ecological systems

This paper analyzes a model of economy–environment coevolution in which economic activities induce the genetic evolution of a biological species. This model is applied to the problem of pesticide resistance management. Just as in Munro (Environ Resour Econ, 9:429–449, 1997), we consider three main types of interactions: (1) a large pest population reduces economic revenues, (2) economic activities select for resistant genes and (3) the spread of resistant genes affects the size of the pest population. The model differs from Munro in that it includes evolutionary modeling of economic strategies. Economic agents are assumed to be boundedly rational, i.e they cannot compute the optimal level of pesticide use that minimizes resistance among pests. Economic evolution represents the change in the distribution of pesticide strategies in the population of economic agents and is modeled by a replicator dynamics equation. The interactions between economic evolution of pesticide strategies, pest population dynamics and genetic evolution of resistance of pests are studied in a system of three differential equations. We explore the dynamics and stability properties of the system using numerical simulations.     

Aid, policy and growth in post-conflict societies

Countries emerging from civil war attract both aid and policy advice. This paper provides the first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth process. It is based on a comprehensive data set of large civil wars, and covers 17 societies that were in their first decade of post-conflict economic recovery. We first investigate whether the absorptive capacity for aid is systematically different in post-conflict countries. We find that during the first 3 post-conflict years absorptive capacity is no greater than normal, but that in the rest of the first decade it is approximately double its normal level. Thus, ideally, aid should phase in during the decade. Historically, aid has not, on average, been higher in post-conflict societies, and indeed it has tended to taper out over the course of the decade. We then investigate whether the contribution of policy to growth is systematically different in post-conflict countries, and in particular, whether particular components of policy are differentially important. For this we use the World Bank policy rating database. We find that growth is more sensitive to policy in post-conflict societies. Comparing the efficacy of different policies, we find that social policies are differentially important relative to macroeconomic policies. However, historically, this does not appear to have been how policy reform has been prioritized in post-conflict societies.     

A complete characterization of Pareto optimality for general OLG economies

In the context of general pure exchange OLG economies where agents can have heterogeneous longevities, we provide both sufficient and necessary conditions for Pareto optimality of competitive equilibria. For the case in which all agents live for the same number of periods, we find that these conditions are equivalent. We also find this equivalence when agents can have different lifetimes, but in this case we need to impose particular restrictions on relative equilibrium prices. Moreover, we show that without these conditions on prices the equivalence, and hence a full characterization, is not necessarily obtained.     

Optimal multilateral contracts

Summary The purpose of this paper is to derive the structure of optimal multilateral contracts in a costly state verification model with multiple agents who may be risk averse and need not be identical. We consider two different verification technology specifications. When the verification technology is deterministic, we show that the optimal contract is a multilateral debt contract in the sense that the monitoring set is a lower interval. When the verification technology is stochastic, we show that transfers and monitoring probabilities are decreasing functions of wealth. The key economic problem in this environment is that optimal contracts areinterdependent. We are able to resolve this interdependency problem by using abstract measure theoretic tools.We wish to thank Mark Feldman, Wayne Shafer and Nicholas Yannelis for useful comments. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 89-09242).     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice.     

Exchange rate puzzles: A tale of switching attractors

The rational expectations efficient market model of the exchange rate has failed empirically. In this paper, we develop a model of the exchange rate in which agents use simple forecasting rules. Based on an ex post evaluation of the relative profitability of these rules they decide whether to switch or not. In addition, transactions costs in the goods market are introduced. We show that this simple model creates great complexity in the market which is characterised by the fact that the exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamental most of the time. Finally we show that this model mimicks most of the empirical puzzles uncovered in the literature.     

马克思主义社会主义观科学性的哲学解析

近年来,随着资本主义经济的发展,资本主义社会产生了很多新变化,以前马克思恩格斯眼里资本主义马上就要灭亡的论断越来越和资本主义发展的强势现实形成鲜明的反差。很多人开始怀疑马克思主义社会主义观的科学性,甚至从对马克思主义社会主义观的否定扩大到对整个马克思主义的否定。现在是马克思主义社会主义观如何与时俱进发展的问题而不是其是否科学的问题。只有这样,才真正掌握了马克思主义社会主义观的科学实质,最终推动马克思主义社会主义观的不断发展和完善。     

Growth: some combined cross- sectional and time series evidence from OECD countries

The uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis and three variants of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination are assessed under a vector autoregression representation of the available information variables, using monthly data on six major US dollar exchange rates over the period 1978–90. A large information set is used, and the time series properties of the information variables are taken into account. The cross-equation restrictions imposed on the estimated parameters are tested statistically and the economic significance of the models is evaluated independently on the basis of appropriate volatility tests. A weak test for exchange rate bubbles, based on a decomposition of market noise, is proposed.     

The Exchange Rate and its Fundamentals in a Complex World

We develop a nonlinear exchange rate model with heterogeneous agents. Some agents adopt a “fundamentalist” forecasting rule, while others use a “chartist” forecasting rule. We show that the model is capable of explaining the empirical puzzles relating to exchange rate movements. In particular, the model explains the “exchange rate determination” and PPP puzzles, the excess volatility, and fat tails in exchange rate returns.     

Agriculture as a major evolutionary transition to human ultrasociality

The adoption of agriculture was one of the most momentous transformations in human history. It set into motion forces that changed our species from living in small numbers within the confines of local ecosystems into one that is now changing the biophysical characteristics of the entire planet. We argue that this transformation can be understood as a leap to ultrasociality—a type of social organization rare in nature but wildly successful when it occurs. Several species of ants and termites made a similar leap in social organization and the broad characteristics of their societies are remarkably similar to post hunter-gatherer human societies. Ultrasocial species dominate the ecosystems they occupy in terms of sheer numbers and the scale of ecosystem exploitation. We argue that the drivers for the ultrasocial transition to agriculture are economic. These societies operate as superorganisms exhibiting an unparalleled degree of division of labor and an economic organization centered around surplus production. We suggest that the origin of human and insect agriculture is an example of parallel evolution driven by similar forces of multi-level selection. Only with the evolution of expansionist agriculturalist societies did humans join ants and termites in the social domination of Earth. Viewing agriculture as an ultrasocial transition offers insights not only about the origins of agriculture and its consequences, but also about the forces shaping the current demographic transition and the modern global socio-economic system.     

发挥比较优势与优化山西产业结构的探讨

振兴山西经济,必须发展具有比较优势的产业,转变经济增长方式,优化山西产业结构.在发掘山西矿产资源丰富的优势的同时,也要积极寻找新的经济增长点.在发展山西传统产业的同时,也要大力发展新的具有高附加值的产业.在把外资引进来的同时,山西企业也要走出山西,走向世界.