Welfare‐improving Coordinated Tariff and Sales Tax Reforms under Imperfect Competition

This paper studies the welfare effects of coordinated domestic sales tax reform associated with a reduction of the import tariff under imperfect competition. We set up a simple oligopoly trading model where domestic and exporting firms compete in the home market. We show that, if the initial levels of import tariff and sales tax are positive, there always exist welfare‐improving sales tax reforms. In some cases, a reduction of the sales tax accompanied by a reduction of the import tariff increases social welfare, whereas in other cases, raising the sales tax can increase social welfare.     

Capital tax competition: bane or boon

This paper reviews potential advantages and disadvantages of capital tax competition. Tax competition may introduce, mitigate, or exacerbate inefficiencies in both the private sector and the public sector. In different models, tax competition may either limit or increase public expenditures and taxes on mobile factors, with differing welfare consequences. We also discuss the implications of tax competition for redistributive policies and for policies dealing with risk, and we identify some of the possible empirical implications of tax competition.     

Measuring tax efficiency: A tax optimality index

This paper introduces an index of tax optimality that measures the distance of some current tax structure from the optimal tax structure in the presence of public goods. This index is defined on the [0, 1] interval and measures the proportion of the optimal tax rates that will achieve the same welfare outcome as some arbitrarily given initial tax structure. We call this number the Tax Optimality Index. We also show how the basic methodology can be altered to derive a revenue equivalent uniform tax, which measures the tax burden implied by the public sector. A numerical example is used to illustrate the method developed, and extensions of the analysis to handle models with multiple households and nonlinear taxation structures are undertaken.     

Tax Progression and Human Capital in Imperfect Labour Markets

Recent contributions to the theory of taxation argue that tax progression raises welfare and employment in the presence of labour market imperfections. This literature takes the endowment of workers with human capital as given. The present paper analyses the effects of tax progression in a model with endogenous human capital formation. We show that the effect of tax progression on human capital investment depends on the deductibility of the cost of human capital formation. With full deductibility, tax progression raises employment and welfare. With incomplete deductibility, in contrast, the effect of tax progression on employment and welfare may be negative.     

Comparing Tax and Tax Reallocation Payments in Financing Rail Noise Abatement Programmes: Results from a Stated Choice Valuation Study in Italy

The paper examines the use of stated choice experiments (SC) to assess the economic value of alternative rail noise reduction interventions on the Brennero railway in Italy. The paper formally tests the econometric robustness of the SC estimates under three payment regimes: (a) a regional tax, where consumers must trade off welfare gains due to noise reduction for part of their income; (b) a transport tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the public transport sector; and (c) an administration tax reallocation scheme, where consumers must trade off a part of the tax payments that are currently spent on the administration sector. The test results are varied. On the one hand, the SC estimates are found to be statistically different for the tax reallocation and the tax introduction regimes. This confirms previous valuation research results, and thus reiterates the hypothesis that states the inequality between marginal values of private income and public money. On the other hand, the SC estimates are not found to be statistically different for the two proposed tax reallocation regimes, suggesting that, in the case study investigated here, the marginal value of public money does not depend upon the budget source.     

Public finance solutions to the European unemployment problem?

Unemployment in Europe is heavily concentrated among low-skilled workers. It has therefore been suggested that structural unemployment could be reduced by shifting the tax burden away from low-skilled labour and away from the production of consumer services, which are intensive in the use of such labour. This paper finds that a tax shift away from low-paid labour may raise aggregate employment and welfare, but only if wage formation is sufficiently responsive to changing tax incentives. The analysis also suggests that non-negligible employment and welfare gains could be reaped by offering tax concessions or subsidies to those parts of the consumer service sector which compete most directly with low-productivity home production and with underground economic activity.     

Environmental Policy in the Presence of Induced Technological Change

We examine the hypothesis that induced technological change (ITC) can dramatically lower the cost of a carbon tax in a static optimal tax model. The research and development sector is represented by an aggregate stock of energy-saving technology, which acts as a weak substitute with a polluting resource in the energy generation sector. Using this model, we analytically show how ITC occurs and affects the cost of a carbon tax. Applying quantitative estimates of the size of ITC to numerical simulations calibrated to the US economy, we find that existing empirical evidence can reduce the welfare cost of environmental tax reform by 12%. Our tests of alternative parameters show that this result is highly sensitive to the assumptions used, suggesting that ITC could result in much larger reductions in cost.     

Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument

Government-run entities are often more labor-intensive than private companies, even with identical production technologies. This need not imply slack in the public sector, but may reflect a wage tax advantage, stemming from the fact that government entities (partly) pay their taxes to themselves. A tax-induced cost advantage of public production precludes production efficiency and reduces welfare when labor supply is inelastic. With an elastic labor supply, a wage tax advantage of the public sector may improve welfare if it allows for a higher net wage.      

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Growth effects of environmental policy when pollution affects health

In this paper, we develop a R&D-based growth model with a pollution externality and a health production sector. We study how health-impairing pollution affects long term growth, and the effect of an emissions' reduction policy (tax). We show that a tighter environmental tax has positive effects on growth via two channels. On the one hand, it improves workers' health and, thereby, productivity; on the other hand, it induces a reallocation of resources towards R&D and, thereby, higher research intensity. The size of the growth effect of a tighter environmental tax, and the level of the optimal environmental tax, are both positively correlated with the weight individuals place on health relative to consumption. As for welfare, a tighter environmental tax brings about utility gains in the long run and, potentially, also in the short run.     

Environmental Quality,Public Debt and Economic Development

This article analyzes the consequences on capital accumulation and environmental quality of environmental policies financed by public debt. A public sector of pollution abatement is financed by a tax or by public debt. We show that if the initial capital stock is high enough, the economy monotonically converges to a long-run steady state. On the contrary, when the initial capital stock is low, the economy is relegated to an environmental poverty trap. We also explore the implications of public policies on the trap and on the long-run stable steady state. In particular, we find that government should decrease debt and increase pollution abatement to promote capital accumulation and environmental quality at the stable long-run steady state. Finally, a welfare analysis shows that there exists a level of public debt that allows a long run steady state to be optimal.     

International commodity taxation in the presence of unemployment

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of commodity tax competition on welfare and employment under the destination and origin principles, when the labor market is imperfectly competitive owing to a binding fixed wage. Our main finding is that commodity taxation causes an employment externality whose signs may be opposite under the two principles. While tax competition leads to inefficient tax rates under both principles, we also prove that the origin principle guarantees lower unemployment and higher welfare when the fixed wage is high. Finally, we show that the employment externality still exists in a standard union model of wage determination.     

Tax Reform,Structural Unemployment and the Environment

The effects of environmental tax reform, i.e., using the proceeds of a higher energy tax rate to lower the labour tax rate, on wage formation, employment and environmental quality are analysed in the context of a small open economy with structural unemployment caused by hiring costs. We find that such a reform may boost employment if it shifts the tax burden away from workers towards those without employment in the formal sector. Environmental tax reform succeeds in shifting the tax burden away from workers in the formal sector if higher energy taxes reduce earnings in the informal sector by reducing labour productivity.     

Consequences of a tax on the brain drain for unemployment and income inequality in less developed countries

Welfare implications of an income tax paid by emigrant skilled workers are analyzed in a model which assumes international capital mobility and allows for unemployed labor in the modern sector of a developing country. The tax discourages overinvestment in education and also contributes to the welfare of those remaining through the direct revenue effect. However, expected earnings of unskilled workers decline as a result of the tax, while those of non-migrant skilled workers rise. The tax may thus exacerbate domestic income inequality. In addition, modern sector employment, output, and capital stock may fall.     

Dealing with monopsony power: Employment subsidies vs. minimum wages

We show in a monopsony model that accounting for changes in hours a minimum wage has ambiguous effects on employment and welfare. When all workers have the same preference ordering over leisure and consumption employment subsidies unambiguously improve welfare. Many countries have minimum wages and also tax minimum wage workers.     

Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes

This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.     

Mixed duopoly,privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.     

Labour market effects of public capital stock: evidence for the Spanish private sector

This paper provides a new rationale for the positive effect of public capital stock on employment and wages. We show that higher levels of public capital reduce wages along the wage equation and enhance employment due to the resulting larger elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages. The estimation of a structural model for the Spanish private sector reveals that this wage channel is empirically relevant. We use the estimated parameters to simulate the recent incidence of the ratio of public to private capital stock on the private sector economic performance. We find (i) sizeable effects on employment, capital stock and gross domestic product, and (ii) that the wage channel is particularly important for employment.     

Public–Private Sector Wage Differentials in Australia

This paper examines public–private sector wage differentials in Australia. After controlling for observed characteristics and individual fixed effects, we show that on average workers in the public sector earn about 5.1 per cent more in hourly wages than those in the private sector. The wage premium is slightly higher for females than males. Using a panel data quantile regression model with fixed effects, we show that the positive wage effects of public sector employment are heterogeneous, with comparatively larger impact at the lower end of the wage distribution than at other parts. We also find evidence of heterogeneity in the public sector wage premiums by qualification, time period, occupation and state/territory.