The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions

I compare two information structures in a common value first-price auction with two bidders: In one, each of the two bidders knows only his own signal about the value of the object, and in the other, one of the bidders learns his opponent's signal as well. Gaining the additional information in the second information structure makes the informed bidder worse off if the value is submodular in the bidders' signals and better off if it is supermodular. If the value is supermodular, then the seller's revenue tends to be lower with the informed bidder than without.     

Exchange rate disconnect and financial constraints —evidence from Chinese firms

One puzzling observation in international economics is the lack of response of exports to exchange rate fluctuations. Employing the most comprehensive export data from China for the 2000–2007 period, we provide sector- and firm-level evidence that the response of exports to exchange rate movements depends crucially on the level of financial constraints. For sectors with large financial constraints, the response is small, whereas, for less financially constrained sectors, the response can be much larger, with the estimated elasticity decreasing with the sector's degree of financial constraints. At the firm-level, financial constraints affect the firm's response to exchange rate shocks at both the intensive and the extensive margins. At the intensive margin, financial constraints dampen the effect of exchange rate on exports by restricting the firm's export value to the existing destination market; at the extensive margin, financial constraints restrict the number of firms participating in exporting, the number of firm-product pairs being exported, and the probability of entering a new destination market.     

A Simple Model of Expert and Non-Expert Bidding in First-Price Auctions

This paper studies the equilibrium bidding behavior in a first-price sealed-bid auction when the number of informed bidders is not common knowledge. Both the independent private values and the common value cases are analyzed, under the assumption that a “neutral” signal exists. In equilibrium, experts and non-experts draw their bids from distinct supports: experts bid in the upper and lower tail of the bidding distribution and non-experts randomize their bids in between. For common values, it is shown that the seller's expected revenue always decreases with the probability of a bidder being informed when this probability is small. The opposite result is shown for the case of independent private values.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D82.     

Institutional constraints,double imbalances and policy option—global financial crisis and China’s fiscal policy

With the enormous development of China’s economy, we re-implement the proactive fiscal policy not only to response to the global financial crisis, but also to take advantage of the opportunity to resolve the institutional constraints, transform China’s economic growth pattern, keep stability and promote the sustainable growth of the economy. So the goal of fiscal policy should weigh easing the economic crisis against long-term stability and the development of economy. The past experiences of fiscal policy practices in China indicate that the traditional simple counter-cyclical fiscal policy may be able to pull the economy out of recession, but it has little effect on automatic recovery of the economy. Therefore, the fiscal policies need to hang on the entire reform process and the whole economic structure adjustment. This paper firstly reveals the root of “double imbalances” and institutional constraints, then analyzes the paradox between such constraints, and discusses the space of positive fiscal policy.     

Environmental taxation,information precision,and information sharing

We analyze how environmental taxes should be optimally levied in a sequential game in which regulators and firms face costs uncertainties. First, the regulator chooses the intensity of emissions taxes to reduce externalities. Then, facing common and private information with noisy signals, firms compete in the marketplace and choose outputs. We show that, under nonuniform quality of signals across firms, the regulator may calibrate differentiated tax policy. We also show that the social impact of more precise private signals hinges largely and fundamentally on the value of the ratio of the slopes of the marginal damage and the marginal consumer surplus. Finally, we investigate information sharing between polluters and its impacts on welfare. We stress that, when there are threats of severe environmental damages under deep uncertainties, collusion is welfare reducing and may jeopardize the regulatory process. Regulators need to set an appropriate precautionary policy. Numerical simulations illustrate the results that the model delivers.     

Strategic behavior in dynamic auctions

Summary In this paper, we study a two-period common-value auction model in which the seller possesses some private information about the value of the object being sold. Assuming that buyers possess no private information in the first period, we characterize a set of equilibria in which the strategy of the seller is equivalent to a decision of whether to sell the object in the first or the second period with no reserve price. The seller sells in the second period if and only if the information is favorable enough. We also show that revealing private information increases the seller's profit in some equilibria, but not in others. One implication is that the seller's ability to sell on more occasions reduces his expected revenue under certain conditions.This is a revised version of Chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation. I am very grateful to my advisor, Robert Rosenthal, for his extremely valuable advice. I would like to thank him, Dan Bernhardt, Jacob Glazer, Ronald Harstad, Albert Ma, Michael Manove, Michael Peters, Philip Reny, Doug Tattrie, Andrew Weiss, and especially the anonymous referee for their very helpful comments, Marilyn Banting for her editorial assistance, and the National Science Foundation for financial support under Grant #SES-8808362.     

预算约束与金融制度选择的新理论:文献述评

本文的考察发现,在预算约束与金融制度结构之间存在着十分紧密的逻辑联系,而且国内外不少文献已经围绕于此展开了广泛而深入的讨论。针对预算约束与金融制度选择的关系,现有文献的理论发现大致包括三个层面:第一,虽然缓解乃至消除软预算约束是任何一种金融体系共同面临的挑战,但软预算约束的消除并非一定有利于长期经济增长;第二,分权的或者集权的金融体制都具有"内生性",因此,至少在理论上无法对其进行孰优孰劣的直观评判,同时也无法在它们之间进行简单的复制和移植;第三,金融体系应对预算约束问题的能力要远弱于企业制度,因此,当一个国家面对预算约束问题时,应当首先着手改善微观经济基础的金融需求结构,而不是调整金融供给结构。     

Competition policy: ten lessons learnt from the financial crisis

The financial crisis brought great challenges also for competition policy. The aim of this paper is to summarize the most important insights for competition policy that could be derived from the turbulent period 2008–2010. The financial crisis is seen as project that demanded sound management from competition policy and enforcement. The insights will be presented in the instructive form of ‘lessons learnt’ which represents a common approved project management technique. We come to the result that the financial crisis is not the result of ‘too much competition’, but of regulatory failure and that the main answers to the financial crisis have to come from ‘smart regulation’. The relaxation of competition policy would be the wrong policy response in troubled times since competition policy can play an important role in bringing the crisis economy back on track. In contrast to banking we see no economic rationale for rescue packages for other economic sectors by referring to systemic risk. The renaissance of industrial policy is viewed with great skepticism since empirical evidence shows that the effort of picking ‘winners’ all too often results in saving ‘losers’.     

News-driven international credit cycles

How does news about future economic fundamentals affect within-country and cross-country credit allocation? How effective is unconventional policy when financial crises are driven by unfulfilled favorable news? I study these questions by employing a two-sector, two-country macroeconomic model with a banking sector in which financial crises are associated with occasionally binding leverage constraints. In response to positive news on the valuation of non-traded sector capital which turns out to be incorrect at a later date, the model captures the patterns of financial flows and current account dynamics in Spain between 2000–2010, including the changes in the sectoral allocation of bank credit and movements in cross-country borrowing during the boom and the bust. When there are unconventional policies by a common authority in response to unfulfilled favorable news, liquidity injections perform better in ameliorating the downturn than direct assets purchases from the non-traded sector.     

Treasury auctions in Spain: a linear approach

Abstract. The majority of Treasuries use discriminatory auctions to sell government debt. A few Treasuries use uniform auctions. The Spanish Treasury is the only one that uses a hybrid format of discriminatory and uniform auctions. All Treasury auctions are multiple-unit multiple-bid auctions, usually assumed to be common and unknown value auctions. Taking in account these features, we analyze the Spanish auction format, taking a linear approximation to bidders' multiple bids, and characterize a parameter set in which the Spanish format gives higher expected seller's revenue than discriminatory and uniform auctions. Policy implications are obtained by calibrating theoretical results with data. We thank S. Nu?ez, and seminar participants at GREQAM, CEFI, the 1999 CEF meeting in Boston and the 57th European Meeting of the Econcometric Society for suggestions. We are especially grateful to two anonymous referees for detailed comments that greatly improved the paper. Any error is our responsability. The authors express their thanks for financial support to Ministerio de Ciencia y Teconologia from Proyecto SEC2000-0723, n_o 9114.     

Post-compulsory education: Participation and politics

In a much-cited paper Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) suggest that public spending on higher education is politically sustained by middle- and high income groups voting for a policy which is positive but not generous enough to allow lower income families to overcome the financial constraints that prevent their participation. Using a quantitative model, calibrated to the UK economy, we find that current public spending on post compulsory education corresponds to a political equilibrium. Support for the equilibrium policy comes primarily from low- and middle income groups, indicating that the policy needn't be highly regressive. Credit constraints play a minor role.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Financial sector opening and financial constraints: an empirical study based on China’s experiences

ABSTRACT

The paper investigates the effect of financial sector opening on financial constraints based on the experiences in China. We firstly review the policy of China’s financial sector opening and set up exogenous policy measures. Then based on the panel data of listed firms from 2010 to 2015, we calculate four indices to measure China’s firm-level financial constraints through internal and external finance channels. We find that China’s financial sector opening alleviates financial constraints and upgrades the financing structure for China’s listed firms. Financial sector opening also eliminates ownership discrimination and promotes financing efficiency, to alleviate financial constraints of private enterprises and profitable enterprises. The mechanism of the effects of financial sector opening on financial constrain is mainly through the collateral channels and the elimination of information asymmetry.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

Is debt conservatism the solution to financial constraints? An empirical analysis of Japanese firms

ABSTRACT

This paper investigates why firms choose the conservative financing strategy known as non-positive net debt policy, which is a more recent prevalent trend among Japanese firms. The analysis reveals that Japanese firms are more likely to be financially conservative if they are smaller, older and more profitable and have fewer growth opportunities and tangibility. The survival analysis further investigates the duration of conservative debt policy and ordinary debt policy. The evidence shows that firms adopt/abandon the conservative policy with different motivations and preferences over debt conservatism. In particular, we argue that the more financially constrained firms abandon the conservative debt policy sooner than their counterparts, while less financially constrained firms abandon the ordinary (less conservative) debt policy sooner than their counterparts. The results suggest that a firm uses a conservative debt policy in terms of net leverage as a temporary buffer to mitigate financial constraints.     

Why do firms choose zero-leverage policy? Evidence from China

In recent years, firms choosing zero-leverage policy have largely increased around the world. However, few studies have focused on why Chinese firms choose zero-leverage policy. In this article, we investigate the motivations for firms choosing zero-leverage policy from the perspective of financing needs. Using a sample of public firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock market in China from 2007 to 2014, we find that firms without external financing needs are more likely to become zero-leverage firms, and that financial constraints and financial flexibility also may be the motivations for firms choosing zero-leverage policy.     

Corporate financial policy with pension accounts: an extension of the Modigliani–Miller theorem

We build a model of an incomplete market economy with a firm, which we apply to the study of corporate financial policies with pension accounts. We show that prior to ERISA, even though the sponsoring firm's integral financial policy is neutral for its market value, it may affect the economy by creating a pension call option. On the other hand, in the post‐ERISA periods, the firm's financial policy is not only neutral for its value but also has no real effect on the economy. Thus, the Modigliani–Miller theorem is valid in this sense.     

MONETARY POLICY,FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS,AND REDISTRIBUTION

This article examines how financial constraints affect redistribution via monetary policy. We explore a novel mechanism of monetary nonneutrality, which is based on debt limits imposed in nominal terms. Specifically, when debt is constrained by current income, monetary policy can alter the real terms of borrowing. Changes in inflation exert ambiguous effects, depending on the initial debt/wealth position and the willingness to borrow. We show analytically that borrowers can benefit from increased debt limits under lower inflation rates. This novel effect can dominate conventional debt deflation effects. We find that particularly less indebted borrowers as well as potential future borrowers gain and that aggregate welfare can be enhanced under a permanent reduction in inflation.     

Incomplete Markets, Allocative Efficiency, and the Information Revealed by Prices

We compare rational expectations equilibria with different degrees of information revelation through prices. These equilibria arise in a two-period exchange economy with finitely many states and signals, multiple commodities and incomplete financial markets for nominal assets. We show that there are always equilibria where information is redundant in the sense of being of no value to the uninformed traders. We give conditions under which for a generic set of economies, parametrized by endowments and utilities, there exist open sets of equilibria for which allocative and informational efficiency are independent, with implications for monetary policy. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D60, D82, E52.