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公平分配是维持技术标准联盟发展和成功的基础。论述了技术标准联盟收益分配的内涵、原则及其分配方法。 相似文献
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针对供应链知识共享中难以建立公平合理的收益分配机制问题,基于供应链知识共享及分配评价理论,结合供应链自身特点,构建了供应链知识共享收益分配体系。在传统Shapley值算法基础上,加入新的修正因子,利用群体层次分析法(Gahp)和Yaahp软件求出修正因子,并给出算例进行验证。认为分配体系的建立最大限度规避了合作企业之间的非合作博弈,将定性问题定量化、模糊问题明晰化;引入修正因子的Shapley值评价方法更具合理性、公正性,也更利于调动联盟企业的积极性;基于Gahp修正因子的计算,使得专家自身的权威在Ahp分析中也得到了一定的体现。 相似文献
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本文在给出产学研合作各方收益的经典Shapley值和区间Shapley值的两种算法,然后依次运用经典Shapley值法、区间Shapley值法对产学研合作利益分配问题做了算例分析,并对结果进行了比较与分析,最后得出结论:即三方合作是大家所共同期望的,运用Shapley值法来协调解决产学研合作中的利益分配问题是合理的、可行的。 相似文献
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基于J省18个农业产销合作社的实地调查数据,以大白菜、葡萄和鲜鱼这三个典型农产品为研究对象,本文利用Shapley值研究方法考察了我国农业产业化背景下的“农超对接”收益分配问题.基于多产品数据的研究结论表明,采用“农户+合作社+大型零售商”这种对接方式,有助于推进农业产业化的进行,具有降低农产品流通成本、发挥农业产业化规模经济双重优势.而收益分配研究结果表明,相对于合理的农户和大型零售商的分配比例中,现有的农户收益分配比例相对偏低.因此,为了更好地发挥“农超对接”的双重优势,需要从政府部门应加强“农超对接”宣传力度、通过多种途径疏通“农超对接”的对接渠道、构建“农超对接”收益返还机制等方面入手. 相似文献
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文章以中小物流企业联盟收益分配为研究对象,在阐述中小物流企业联盟的概念、类型以及收益分配的目的和内涵的基础上,针对中小物流企业联盟的三种类型,分析了收益分配模式选择和成员企业收益构成的差异,提出了物流任务分解和以成员企业物流服务质量为导向的收益分配思路,构建了混合模式下的中小物流企业联盟收益分配模型,并以收益分配相对复杂的盟主型联盟为例进行了实例分析,说明了模型的有效性、合理性和创新性。文章提出的收益分配模型基本框架比较完整,基于物流服务质量的收益分配激励方式具有一定的创新性,对现阶段我国中小物流企业联盟实践具有较强的借鉴和指导意义。 相似文献
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外包是现代服务业的一种新业态,由于全球外包事业的迅速发展以及其所蕴藏的巨大发展潜力,我国已经把外包作为发展经济的一个新增长点,并且逐渐成长为一个接包大国.但是,我国现有的接包模式已经不能很好的适应市场需求,所以建立接包企业联盟迫在眉睫.本文介绍了建立接包企业联盟的动因,并在Shapley值法的基础上提出了基于工作成效、风险及创新的接包企业联盟利益分配模型. 相似文献
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基于Shapley值的知识共享利益分配策略及改进 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
知识共享是组织获取竞争优势的重要来源,激励成员进行知识共享是知识管理活动首要解决的问题,而合理分配知识共享利益是成功实现激励的基础。通过分析知识共享活动的特点,提出将Shapley值法应用于解决知识共享活动中各成员收益分配问题。同时考虑到成员贡献知识量对实现知识共享的重要性,将Shapely值法进行了修正,进一步对各成员的收益分配额进行了调整。 相似文献
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We consider the game in which b buyers each seek to purchase 1 unit of an indivisible good from s sellers, each of whom has k units to sell. The good is worth 0 to each seller and 1 to each buyer. Using the central limit theorem, and implicitly convergence
to tied down Brownian motion, we find a closed form solution for the limiting Shapley value as s and b increase without bound. This asymptotic value depends upon the seller size k, the limiting ratio b/ks of buyers to items for sale, and the limiting ratio of the excess supply relative to the square root of the number of market participants.
This work was sponsered in part by NSF Grant DMS-03-01795. 相似文献
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The paper introduces and discusses several characterizations of the multi-choice Shapley value (introduced by Nouweland et al. in ZOR-Math Methods Oper Res 41:289–311, 1995), on the domain of multi-choice games. These characterizations generalize the potential approach and results of Calvo and Santos (Math Soc Sci 34:175–190, 1997) into this domain, and the relations are treated with the axiomatic approach in Calvo and Santos (Math Soc Sci 40:341–354, 2000). Also, based on the axioms of two-person standardness and consistency, we offer an axiomatization of the multi-choice Shapley value. The authors are grateful to Professor Sjaak Hurkens and the anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments. 相似文献
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文章运用中国综合社会调查2006年数据,基于夏普里值过程的回归分解方法,对我国劳动力市场上工资收入差距的决定因素进行了系统的实证研究。研究发现,教育人力资本是导致工资收入差距的最重要因素,其对不平等程度的贡献达到了37.47%;地区、性别和行业因素仅次于教育,成为导致工资收入分配不平等的重要因素;职业类型、单位所有制和社会关系是控制工资收入差距不容忽视的因素;而单位规模、户籍和工作经验对不平等程度的贡献则几乎可以忽略不计。另外,工资收入差距的决定因素在东部和中西部地区存在巨大差异。 相似文献
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Efficient bidding with externalities 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ins Macho-Stadler David Prez-Castrillo David Wettstein 《Games and Economic Behavior》2006,57(2):304-320
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the other for positive externalities. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these mechanisms coincide with the sharing proposals. 相似文献
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Tobias Hiller 《Applied economics》2016,48(4):321-330
In this article, we introduce a new value for cooperative games. This value is based on the Shapley (1953) value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. One example of such exclusions are the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. A case study demonstrates the application of the new value for these situations. 相似文献
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We analyse a two-period model of the interbank market, i.e. the market where banks trade liquidity. We assume that banks do not take the interbank interest rate as given, but instead negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes with each other. The solution concept applied is the Shapley value. We show that there are a multiplicity of average equilibrium interest rates of the first period so that the average interest rate in this period does not convey any information on the expected liquidity situation on the interbank market. As the banks control not only the transaction volumes, but also the interest rates, they can leave the interest rates constant and adjust the transaction volumes when, for example, a liquidity deficit becomes more likely. 相似文献
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This paper provides a framework for implementing and comparing several solution concepts for transferable utility cooperative games. We construct bidding mechanisms where players bid for the role of the proposer. The mechanisms differ in the power awarded to the proposer. The Shapley, consensus and equal surplus values are implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes as power shifts away from the proposer to the rest of the players. Moreover, an alternative informational structure where these solution concepts can be implemented without imposing any conditions of the transferable utility game is discussed as well. The authors thank Yukihiko Funaki, Andreu Mas-Colell, David Pérez-Castrillo and Jana Vyrastekova for helpful discussions. We also appreciate the comments from the seminar and conference participants at Keele University, Tilburg University, University of Haifa, University of Warwick, CORE at Louvain-la-Neuve, Catholic University Leuven, Pablo de Olavide University in Seville, University of Vigo, the 2006 Annual Conference of the Israeli Mathematical Union in Neve Ilan, Israel, and the 61st European Meeting of the Econometric Society in Vienna, Austria in 2006. In particular, we are grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous referee. Their valuable comments and constructive suggestions contributed to a significant improvement of the paper. Wettstein acknowledges the financial support of the Pinchas Sapir Center for Development in Tel Aviv University. 相似文献
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In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by “unanimity for the grand coalition” and translation covariance, these axioms characterize the Nash solution on the class of n-person choice problems with reference points. A classical bargaining problem consists of a convex feasible set that contains the disagreement point here called reference point. The feasible set of a choice problem does not necessarily contain the reference point and may not be convex. However, we assume that it satisfies some standard properties. Our result is robust so that the characterization is still valid for many subclasses of choice problems, among those is the class of classical bargaining problems. Moreover, we show that each of the employed axioms – including independence of irrelevant alternatives – may be logically independent of the remaining axioms. 相似文献
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运用2012年中国劳动力动态调查微观数据,结合Heckman样本选择方法,估计垄断行业和竞争行业的收入方程,结果发现,垄断对行业收入的影响远大于性别、教育、工作经验等个人特征。运用Shapley值分解方法,考察各因素对我国城镇内部行业工资差距的贡献,结果发现,人力资本因素对行业收入差距的贡献最大。分行业看,人力资本因素能够解释垄断行业收入差距的一半左右,管理岗位对竞争行业收入差距的贡献最大,性别因素对竞争行业收入差距的贡献高出垄断行业两倍,非农户口在解释垄断行业收入差距时的贡献要远大于竞争行业。因此,缩小我国行业收入差距,亟需打破行业垄断壁垒,提高劳动者的受教育水平,减轻劳动者地区间流动障碍。 相似文献