Rational expectations in the foreign exchange market? Some survey evidence

Although many papers have already proposed empirical models of currency crises, the timing of such crises has received relatively little attention so far. Most papers use indeed a static specification and impose the same lag structure across all explanatory variables. This, by construction, prevents from specifically timing the crisis signals sent by the leading indicators. The objective here is to fill this gap by considering a set of dynamic discrete choice models. The first contribution is to identify how early in advance each explanatory variable sends a warning signal. Some indicators are found to signal a crisis in the very short run while others signal a crisis at more distant horizons. The second contribution is to show that state dependence matters, albeit mostly in the short run. The results have important implications for crisis prevention in terms of the timeliness and usefulness of the envisaged policy response.     

International Financial Contagion: Why are Eastern Europe's banks not failing when everybody else's are?

While the Asian financial crisis spread to Russia and Brazil, the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) are largely unaffected by international financial contagion. This is the more surprising considering that most economies have experienced severe banking sector problems in the past, that large bad loan ratios are still prevalent, that banking regulation and supervision are only slowly improving, and that stabilizing policies have slowly been eliminated. What insulated the CEECs from the recent wave of financial instability? To consider the counterfactual, we first provide a framework that links banking crises to financial deregulation. We then focus on a number of macro- and microeconomic factors, using data compiled from the IMF's International Financial Statistics, from the World Bank's World Debt Tables, and from the BIS's Consolidated International Banking Statistics. We first compare past experiences in CEECs with those in other emerging economies as a cross-sectional reference point. We then consider whether the situation in CEECs has changed since the last banking sector problems, in order to establish a reference point across time. Our results indicate that the factors leading up to past banking crises are generally different in CEECs from those in other emerging economies. However, in recent years, the characteristics of CEECs have become more similar to those of other emerging economies.     

新兴市场国家(地区)本币升值影响因素的国际经验比较

通过对经历或正在面临本币升值压力的主要新兴市场国家(地区)影响本币升值的因素进行国际经验比较分析,我们可以发现,在众多的影响因素中,贸易收支顺差、金融账户顺差和GDP增长率成为引发上述国家(地区)本币升值的主要因素。基于样本国家(地区)面板资料的实证研究为国际经验比较分析提供了证据。以上结论显然对于同样作为新兴市场国家,同时面临人民币升值压力的我国具有重要的借鉴意义。在我国应对人民币升值的政策中,应该优先考虑可能导致上述因素积极变化的政策的制定和实施。     

The relative importance of capital inflows: some evidence from emerging market economies

This article examines the relative importance of the main components of capital inflows for a sample of emerging market economies. Does composition matter? Is there a nexus between capital inflow components? We assess, firstly, how each capital inflow component reacts to important macro and policy variables, and secondly, how the components themselves interact. We find that bank inflows appear the most sensitive to macro factors, institutions matter more for Latin America and external financial factors matter more for Asia. Further, for Latin America, capital inflows interact largely as complements, while for Asia, any expansion of bank inflows might crowd out FDI and portfolio flows.     

亚洲金融危机之后的深层思考

进入20世纪90年代以来,全球各类金融危机频频发生。影响国际经济金融秩序的因素发生了新变化,目前的国际金融秩序已经不能适应国际政治格局和经济、技术发展趋势,不能适应调整当前国际金融关系的需要,必须进行变革,并建立公正、合理的国际金融新秩序。     

Financial market spillovers in transition economies

This paper examines financial market comovements across European transition economies and compares their experience to that of other regions. Correlations in monthly indices of exchange market pressures can partly be explained by direct trade linkages, but not by measures of other fundamentals. Higher-frequency data during three crisis periods reveals the presence of structural breaks in the relationship between exchange-, but not stock markets. While the reaction of markets during the Asian and Czech crises is muted, the pattern of high-frequency spillovers during the Russian crisis looks very similar to that observed in other regions during turbulent times. With greater financial market integration, the financial markets of the more advanced transition economies can be expected to behave more and more like their Asian and Latin American counterparts.     

Tracing the causes of the banking crisis

We add the Bernanke–Gertler–Gilchrist model to a modified version of the Smets–Wouters model of the U.S. in order to explore the causes of the banking crisis. The innovation of this article is estimating the model using unfiltered data allowing for non-stationary shocks in order to replicate how the model predicts the crisis. We find that ‘traditional shocks’ account for most of the fluctuations in macroeconomic variables; the non-stationarity of the productivity shock plays a key role. Crises occur when there is a ‘run’ of bad shocks; based on this sample they occur on average once every 64 years and when they occur around 10% are accompanied by financial crisis. Financial shocks on their own, even when extreme, do not cause crises – provided the government acts swiftly to counteract such a shock as happened in this sample.     

Theorizing the Financial Statecraft of Emerging Powers

‘Financial statecraft’, or the intentional use of credit, investment and currency levers by the incumbent governments of creditor – and sometimes debtor – states for both international economic and political advantage, has a long history, ranging from money doctors to currency wars. A neorealist, zero-sum framing of international monetary relations is not inevitable, yet casts a persistent shadow especially during periods of prospective interstate power transitions when previously peripheral countries find themselves with unexpected new capabilities. This article seeks to understand and theorise the financial statecraft of emerging economies, moving beyond the traditional understanding that closely identifies the concept with financial sanctions imposed by a strong state on a weaker state. We propose that the aims of financial statecraft may be either ‘defensive' or ‘offensive’. Financial statecraft may be targeted either ‘bilaterally' or ‘systemically’. Finally such statecraft may employ instruments that are either ‘financial' or ‘monetary’. As emerging market economies have moved up in the ranks in the interstate distribution of capabilities, they have also expanded their financial statecraft strategies from narrowly defensive and bilateral to those involving offensive tactics and targeted at the global and systemic level. Historical and contemporary examples illustrate the analysis.     

A Minskyan account of emerging currencies dynamics

Abstract

The currencies of a few emerging market economies (EMEs) have been following a specific dynamic since the early 2000s: They are strongly subordinated to international financial conditions, appreciating in moments of tranquility and presenting sharp depreciations in peaks of uncertainty. What is the mechanism behind it? To answer this question, this article applies the Minskyan framework to the context of money managers and their portfolio allocation decisions. The approach provides a detailed account of the mechanisms of the appreciation phase, thus complementing the emerging currencies’ literature that is focused on crisis episodes. The result is a dynamic characterized by deviation-amplifying systems—the opposite of the mainstream view where fundamentals lead to an equilibrium-seeking mechanism. Apart from these contributions to the exchange rate literature, it enriches the Minskyan literature for providing a broader reading of the original framework that allows it to be transposed to a larger set of contexts and for identifying the main elements to be translated in an analysis of a different context.     

Portugal’s banking and financial crises: unexpected consequences of monetary integration?

Portugal’s current financial crisis might be related to a banking crisis resulting from joining the Euro. The new-currency eliminated the exchange rate risk, but not the credit or liquidity risks within the Euroarea. However, Portuguese banks acted as if all of these risks had disappeared. They began pumping money in Portugal, by borrowing intensively in Euros abroad at low interest rates. The ensuing liquidity generated a capital-flow bonanza boom that culminated in a bust phase. Private and sovereign debt dramatically increased, which further soared when the government rescued banks. Portugal was then compelled to take extreme measures to address extraordinary debt-levels.     

现代网络银行发展中的金融监管思考

网络银行是技术进步与金融产业相结合的产物，给传统中央银行监管提出了新课题。本文分析了网络银行对监管体制的挑战，概括介绍了国际实践经验与通行做法，结合我国网络银行发展的现实国情，提出了构建适应我国网络银行发展的金融监控体系设想。     

P2P网络借贷市场对资本市场的风险溢出效应

构建Copula-GARCH模型,并利用2013—2016年中国P2P网络借贷市场、股票市场和债券市场的日收益率数据,实证研究了P2P网络借贷市场对资本市场的风险溢出效应。结果显示:P2P网络借贷市场与股票市场之间存在"跷跷板"效应,与债券市场之间呈现出较弱的联动效应;P2P网络借贷市场与股票市场和债券市场的上、下尾部相关性均很弱,风险溢出效应不显著。结论表明:在确保金融系统稳定的同时,中国可以适度发展P2P网络借贷行业。