Political frictions and public policy outcomes

We study the role of political frictions in public policy outcomes. We propose a simple model of fiscal policy that combines a lack of commitment by the government, political turnover, and another political friction that can be interpreted either as political polarization or as public rent-seeking. We show that political turnover increases public debt levels, while political polarization or public rent-seeking leads to higher public spending. We evaluate the importance of different political frictions for fiscal policy outcomes using a sample of twenty developed countries. We find that the data on political instability combined with the data on public rent-seeking explain 25% of the variation in public debt levels.     

关于大学政治功能的经济成本研究——兼论我国当前公私立大学政党政治成本支付状态

政府政治投资与教育投资的融合,是中央集权制国家教育财政的特点.在这些国家公立大学履行政党政治功能的费用,已成为学校运行成本的重要构成要素.当前我国公私立大学不同的功能设定,导致了支付政党政治成本的巨大差异.政府就大学预算安排方面存在的问题,从一个侧面说明了该成本支出应确定一个边际量,当总成本支出为一个定量时,其构成要素则互为变量.政治成本能否居于节约状态,本身就是检验其组织系统在学校履行政治功能绩效的主要参照系.政府编制财政预算必须考虑大学体制和承担功能的特殊性,并切实加强预算执行过程中的成本分类控制.     

Rent-seeking distortions and fiscal procyclicality

Recent research has demonstrated that while government expenditures are countercyclical in most industrialized countries, they tend to be procyclical in developing countries. We develop a dynamic political-economy model to explain this phenomenon. In the model, public expenditures provide insurance to uninsured households, and optimal fiscal policy is countercyclical. The introduction of a political friction, in which successive governments disagree on the desired distribution of public spending, can lead to procyclical fiscal policies. Numerical simulations of the model allow us to compare quantitatively the relative role of common explanations for fiscal procyclicality. We conclude that political distortions in the fiscal process can explain fiscal procyclicality better than other common explanations, such as borrowing constraints and macroeconomic volatility.     

Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance

The paper investigates the effects of ethnic diversity on economic performance. Previous studies have found that diversity has various detrimental microeconomic effects, tending to reduce public sector performance, and has large detrimental effects on the overall growth rate. I develop a simple model of the effect of ethnic diversity on a government decision problem in which there is a tradeoff between growth and distribution, in the contexts of democracy and dictatorship. I find that in democracy ethnic diversity has no effect upon the decision, whereas in dictatorship ethnic diversity leads to a government choice which reduces the growth rate. I then test these propositions on two data sets. The first is for 94 countries over the period 1960–1990. I find that whether diversity adversely affects overall economic growth depends upon the political environment. Diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies. The second is for World Bank projects in 89 countries. I find that the same relationship between diversity and democracy affects the proportion of projects which are successful.     

The size of public employment: An empirical study

Previous empirical studies of government have focused primarily on aggregate financial measures of size. This analysis examines a different measure: the share of public employment in total employment. In empirical tests on OECD countries for 1970 and 1980, the level of public employment is shown to be a clear reflection of voter demand for public goods, electoral support for socialist parties, and political response to the problems of unemployment. In contrast, variables that measure characteristics of the political process, such as degree of government decentralization, strength of interest groups, and voter participation in elections, are not statistically significant.     

Political instability and labour market institutions

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and labour market institutions. We develop a theoretical model in which political instability creates incentives for a government to introduce labour market regulation in the economy. The distortionary effect of regulation on unemployment effectively puts a constraint on the design of fiscal and public policies. We empirically investigate these predictions using panel data for 21 OECD countries for the period 1985–2006. Our results are consistent with the view that political instability is associated with more regulated labour markets, lower labour taxation, and lower unemployment benefit replacement rates.     

What Determines Australia's Response to Emergencies and Natural Disasters?

This article examines the determinants of Australia's response to emergencies and natural disasters. It examines the response from the Australian public by examining contributions made to the appeals of the country's largest Non‐Governmental Organisation: World Vision of Australia. It also examines the response of the Australian Government. The data include 43 emergencies and natural disasters since 1998. Results suggest that the responses from both the public and government are positively associated with the number of people affected, media coverage, and the level of political and civil freedom in the country where the event occurred. The type and location of the emergency or disaster are important for the public's response. Differences between public and government donations exist: support from the Australian Government is positively associated with smaller countries and there is some evidence that the public donates more to events occurring in larger and poorer countries.     

Does higher government debt link to higher social expenditure? New method,new evidence

Scholars believe that higher social expenditures are usually linked with higher government debts, whereas higher debts reduce social expenditures. However, it is reasonable to speculate that higher government debt may contribute to higher social spending, while fiscal deficits occur during a recession, which commonly creates greater demand for social expenditure. For a deeper investigation, this paper revisits the dynamic relationship between social spending and public debts in the time-frequency domain, using the novel wavelet-coherency analysis as well as the phase-difference technique to derive the co-moved and causal relationships between social spending and public debts in 13 OECD countries. The evidence identifies a dynamic relationship between variables. While higher social expenditures increase government debts, the shocks from government debts to social expenditures are conversely uncertain. We discover that higher government debt does reduce social expenditures, but it may be linked to higher social spending. The robustness of partial coherency and phase-difference discovers the role of a political party in the decision over social welfare programmes in the sample countries.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

Politics and privatization in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines how government ideology influenced privatization efforts in Central and Eastern Europe after the transition from socialism. We analyse a dataset of privatization indicators covering small‐ and large‐scale industries in 19 transition countries over the period 1990–2007 and introduce a government ideology index. The results suggest that market‐oriented governments promoted the privatization of small‐scale industries more than that of large‐scale ones. In the rapid transition process in the early 1990s, leftist governments stuck to public ownership more strongly than in the following period from the mid‐1990s to 2007. The remarkable differences between leftist and right‐wing governments concerning both the role of government in the economy and the basic elements of political order are in line with developments in OECD countries, and may also hold further implications for transition and democratizing countries outside Central and Eastern Europe.     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY AND THE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY OVER TIME*

This article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico‐economic equilibria. To this end, I develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice, and the evolution of political constituency. My main finding is that a right‐wing ideology may increase the size of government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect, there is a positive relationship between the right‐wing political constituency and government size. This is consistent with my theoretical prediction, but hard to explain by existing theories.     

Are electronic government innovations helpful to deter corruption? Evidence from across the world

Electronic government innovations have been a critical development in public administration in recent years. Many countries have implemented e-government policies to enhance efficiency and transparency and combat corruption. This paper examines the impact of e-government on corruption using longitudinal data for more than 170 countries from 2002 to 2020. The empirical results suggest that e-government serves as a deterrent to corrupt activities. We analyse which e-government domains affect corruption, which types of corruption are more affected by e-government and the circumstances under which e-government is more effective in reducing corruption. The empirical results suggest that online service completion and e-participation are important features of e-government as an anticorruption tool. Evidence suggests that e-participation reduces corrupt legislature activities, public sector theft, executive bribery, and corrupt exchanges. The potential of e-government to deter corruption is higher in countries where corruption is moderate or high and economic development is lower. Higher levels of GDP per capita, foreign direct investment, and political rights are also associated with lower levels of corruption.     

转型期中国县级政府的客观治理绩效与政治信任——从“经济增长合法性”到“公共产品合法性”

善治是中国政府的执政要务,政治信任反映着公民对政府治理的认可和支持。文章利用2008年中国公民意识调查及政府统计数据,实证分析了政府治理绩效的主观和客观维度对政治信任的影响。研究发现,公民对政府在经济增长、民生福利、纯公共产品领域治理绩效的回顾性和前瞻性积极评价都正相关于政治信任;纯公共产品提供的主观评价对政治信任的影响大于经济增长和民生福利。县级政府的客观治理绩效对政治信任有重要影响,在高人均福利支出、低基尼系数和低失业率的县级单位,政治信任更高,而人均GDP反而微弱地负作用于政治信任。因此,尽管经济增长仍然是政治信任的重要来源,但民生福利和纯公共产品正赶上并超越经济增长,成为公民提供政治信任的新源泉。     

ELIMINATING THE INFLATIONARY FINANCE TRAP IN A POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRY: DOMESTIC POLITICS VS. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE

This paper presents an intertemporal political economy model of public finance relevant for developing and transition countries where there is inherent political instability. As in Cukierman et al. (1992) , it is shown that political instability causes myopic behaviour by a rational government resulting in high levels of revenue from seigniorage. It is then argued that inflationary finance also increases barter and currency substitution, but if the government tries to suppress them, seigniorage taxation rises even more. Only international financial pressure can help eliminate the inflationary finance trap, but becomes less effective as the instability increases.     

Thy Neighbor's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth

We show that regional instability, defined as politicalinstability in neighboring countries, has a strong negative effecton a country's economic performance. The magnitude of this negativeexternality is similar in size to that of an equivalent increasein domestic political instability. We also identify two mainchannels through which regional instability lowers economic performance.First, regional instability disrupts trade flows. The sharesof merchandise and manufactured trade are lower in countrieswith high regional instability. Second, regional instabilityleads to increased military outlays. Defense expenditures arehigher in countries with high regional instability. In contrast,the share of government expenditures allocated to education islower in countries with politically unstable neighbors. Our resultssuggest the existence of negative spillovers among politicallyunstable neighboring countries. These adverse regional influencesshould be taken into account when projecting the future economicperformance of countries. The evidence presented also suggeststhat the gains from reducing regional instability extend farbeyond the welfare of the country experiencing political unrest.Policies directed at settling current territorial disputes ina peaceful and orderly manner can have large beneficial effectsfor parties not directly involved in the conflict.     

Political instability and economic growth

This paper investigates the relationship between political instability and per capita GDP growth in a sample of 113 countries for the period 1950 through 1982. We define political instability as the propensity of a government collapse, and we estimate a model in which such a measure of political instability and economic growth are jointly determined. The main result of this paper is that in countries and time periods with a high propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise. We also discuss the effects of different types of government changes on growth.     

The political economy of IMF conditionality and central bank independence

International organizations (IOs) often drive policy change in member countries. Given IOs' limited political leverage over a member country, previous research argues that IOs rely on a combination of hard pressures (i.e., conditionality) and soft pressures (i.e., socialization) to attain their political goals. Expanding this literature, we hypothesize that IOs can enhance their political leverage through loan conditions aimed at enhancing the political independence of key administrative units. Studying this mechanism in the context of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we argue that through prescribing structural loan conditions on central banks (CBI conditionality), the IMF empowers central banks to gain more political leverage with the aim to limit a government's ability to (ab)use monetary policy for political gain. Divorcing monetary authorities from their respective government, the IMF intends to alter political dynamics towards achieving greater program compliance and enhance long-term macro-financial stability. Relying on a dataset including up to 124 countries between 1980 and 2012, we find that the IMF deploys CBI conditionality to countries with fewer checks and balances, a less independent central bank, and where the government relies more heavily on the monetization of public debt.     

政府绩效评估的新发展——基于新公共服务理论的分析

新公共服务在对新公共管理批判的基础上,更强调对公共利益的维护和公民权利的尊重,以纠正新公共管理的偏颇,一定程度上实现了对新公共管理的超越。因此,在新公共管理运动中被各国政府倍加推崇的政府改革工具——绩效管理与评估也将在新公共服务理论的指导下获得新的发展,同时为创新我国政府绩效评估提供许多有益的启示。     

The economic effects of constitutions: do budget institutions make forms of government more alike?

According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments relative to parliamentary countries because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, however, presidential and parliamentary countries come in many forms. In particular, variation in procedural rules that assign budget prerogatives across the popular branches of government may affect the underlying incentives that differentiate these types of regimes in terms of fiscal outcomes. More specifically, we argue that more hierarchical rules that concentrate budgetary power in the executive relative to the legislature do not only reduce the extent of the common pool problem but also limit the degree of separation of powers, which may have a countervailing effect. Consequently, the effect of the form of government on public expenditures is conditional on specific procedural rules. We test this hypothesis on a broad cross-section of countries and find that presidentialism has a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes when the executive’s discretion over the budget process is higher. This result, in addition to highlighting that not all budget institutions have the same effect on incentives and outcomes, points out how important it is to go beyond broad characterizations of political institutions for explaining policy outcomes, and more generally, for moving forward the research agenda in constitutional political economy.