我国生态标识食品的发展现状、制约因素与政府干预与政府干预

本文在介绍我国生态标识食品发展现状的基础上,分析了我国发展生态标识食品的制约因素,提出了生态标识食品的外部性和公共产品属性的重要性及其影响,并就政府对生态标识食品实施市场干预进行了初步探讨。     

影响消费者对生态标识食品购买行为的因素分析——基于南京市鸡蛋消费的调查

本文运用实证研究方法,基于详实的南京市鸡蛋消费市场调查数据,对消费者购买生态标识鸡蛋行为的影响因素进行了计量经济分析.研究结果表明,受教育程度、性别及对鸡蛋安全的关心程度对消费者生态标识鸡蛋的购买选择影响显著.收入水平仅对无公害鸡蛋的购买行为影响显著,但有反向作用;对绿色鸡蛋的选择影响并不具有显著的统计学意义.在现有市场价格水平上,消费者不选择生态标识鸡蛋并不是因为支付能力不足.最后,文章针对影响消费者购买选择的主要因素,提出扩大生态标识食品消费需求的几点建议.     

新政策新法规

中央财政将奖励节能企业；我国出台《生态住宅认证标准》；国家发改委在5行业实施循环经济高技术产业专项；《食品标识管理规定》出台；高耗能企业优惠电价取消；国家海洋局下发《关于海洋领域应对气候变化有关工作的意见》；     

我国生态(有机)食品产业探析

随着人们生活水平的不断提高和环保意识的增强 ,人们会逐渐增加对生态 (有机 )食品的需求 ,针对目前我国生态 (有机 )食品产业发展势头缓慢 ,分析了影响该产业发展的食品质量认证信息不对称、供给低效、产销脱节、消费观念陈旧、市场营销落后等方面的原因 ,并提出了发展生态 (有机 )食品产业的相关对策。     

我国居民食品消费低碳化推进问题研究

基于居民食品活动碳排放对环境的影响正在日益加重的背景与趋势下,分析我国居民食品消费现状特点,指出了食品消费低碳化理念缺位、经济社会发展顶层设计存在推进食品消费低碳化方面的不足、食品碳标识率低与碳标签制度滞后、缺乏发展低碳食品的政策体系等存在问题。针对客观现实与未来需要,提出了加强食品消费低碳化宣传教育、加强社会经济发展顶层设计与低碳食品实践推进的有效对接、创新供给侧改革视角下加强低碳食品的研发设计及有效供应、全面推动全社会的"低碳食品文化"建设等针对性对策措施。     

我国消费者对食品安全信息认识现状的调查与分析

食品不安全的重要原因在于市场中经营者和消费者信息不对称,而在减少食品市场信息缺失方面,消费者起着至关重要的作用。文章对北京市消费者关于食品标识的认知情况进行了调查,了解了目前我国消费者对食品安全信息的基本态度,指出消费者食品安全意识不足的原因,为完善我国食品信息公开制度提出了相应的对策与建议。     

中国转基因食品安全管理的现状及对策

转基因食品是当今世界各国基因研究的重点。我国的转基因技术发展迅速,但科学界在转基因食品对人类健康和生态风险方面的认识存在局限性,政府应制定相应的政策、措施对其进行安全管理。本文介绍了转基因食品的概念及在我国的发展情况,分析了我国转基因食品安全管理的现状,阐述了转基因食品安全管理的重要性,并针对其中存在的问题,提出相应的对策。     

论我国生态经济的发展趋向

本文阐明了我国生态经济发展的趋向,即生态经济将成为我国经济主要增长点之一;生态农 业、有机（绿色）食品、生态旅游是我国最具发展潜力的生态产业;环保产业将进入快速成长期。     

物品编码及标识标准现状的研究

随着我国国民经济不断的发展提高,也在很大程度上推动了我国物品编码以及物品标识的发展进程,所以,本文主要立足于物品编码及标识标准现状,展开了深入的研究与分析,以此期望为我国今后在对于物品编码以及标识标准的现状研究问题上,提供一些参考性的建议.     

网络舆情视角下绿色食品消费行为及其影响因素研究

基于网络舆情视角,本文对武汉市和成都市城镇居民的绿色食品消费行为进行问卷调查,对影响绿色食品消费行为的因素进行回归分析,梳理城镇居民绿色食品消费行为与食品安全网络舆情传播发展之间的关系.结果表明:性别、婚姻状况、家中是否有特殊群体、对身体健康关注程度、对我国食品体系信任程度、家庭年收入、对包装标识的信任程度和自身对风险的接受程度等8个因素会影响城镇居民绿色食品消费行为.其中性别,婚姻状况、家中是否有特殊群体、家庭年收入、对身体健康关注程度和自身对风险的接受程度等因素通过群体传播途径影响消费者的舆情感知;对我国食品体系信任程度和对包装标识的信任程度两个因素通过大众传播途径影响消费者对舆情的感知.同时,由于两城市绿色食品产业发展程度和地区经济发展水平存在差异,导致两市城镇居民绿色食品消费行为的影响因素存在差异.     

Competing eco-labels and product market competition

I examine the impact of competition between eco-labeling programs in a market where eco-labels that communicate information about product's environmental quality (a credence attribute) are also strategic variables for competing firms. Specifically, I consider a dynamic setting where an industry-sponsored eco-labeling program and a program sponsored by environmental NGOs compete strategically in setting the labeling standards, before price-setting firms make strategic choices of which eco-label (if any) to adopt; adopting firms not presently meeting the labeling standards undertake costly quality improvement to comply with them. I find that the competition between eco-labeling programs may lead to the same high environmental benefit as when there exists only the NGO program. I also find that the competition may yield higher social welfare.     

Eco-Labeling and Market Equilibria with Noisy Certification Tests

An intriguing alternative to traditional methods for regulating externalities is the provision of information about firms’ environmental attributes. An increasingly important example of this approach is “eco-labeling,” where a third party certifies firms’ products. Such schemes are currently used in a variety of countries. This paper investigates the equilibria that may occur with eco-labeling, and the attendant welfare effects. I model certification as a noisy test, subject to both type I and type II errors, but where green firms more likely to pass than brown firms. While it commonly leads to an increase in the fraction of green units in the market, the introduction of an eco-label can either increase or decrease welfare.     

Consumer confusion over the profusion of eco-labels: Lessons from a double differentiation model

How are eco-label strategies affected by consumer confusion arising from the profusion of eco-labels? This article provides a theoretical insight into this issue using a double differentiation framework. We assume that consumers perceive a label as a sign of quality compared to an unlabeled product, but that they cannot fully assess the environmental quality associated with each label and only see each label as a particular variety of a similar product. We analyze the pricing strategies of three firms, each one providing one product: a labeled product, with high or medium environmental quality, according to the eco-label, or an unlabeled product. We infer lessons for eco-labeling policies, according to the identity of the certifying organization: the regulator, an NGO or the firms. We show that the firm supplying the eco-labeled product with a high environmental quality is weakened by consumer confusion while the firm selling the unlabeled product suffers from strict labeling standards, to the benefit of the firm providing the labeled product with a lower environmental quality, which gains a competitive advantage. Most labeling policies consist of harmonizing labeling criteria, but only certification by a third party, the regulator or a NGO, guarantees the high environmental quality of labeled products, whereas certification by firms leads to a uniform undemanding standard. However, when both labels are provided by two different certifiers, including a firm, harmonization of environmental standards does not occur and the NGO's or regulator's eco-labeling standard will be much more stringent than the firm's one, preventing NGO's or public eco-labeling policy to significantly enhance quality of the environment and welfare.     

Eco-Labeling and Stages of Development

The paper examines the effectiveness of eco-labeling in providing a market-based solution to the under-consumption of eco-friendly products in developing and developed countries. The authors show that whether labeling is an effective device in solving the problem of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, or whether false labeling severs the link between willingness to pay and environmental conscious production choices, depends crucially on how monitoring intensities respond endogenously to economic growth, openness to trade, and technology transfers. In particular, by accounting for endogenous policy responses to economic growth, it is shown that an inverted-U relationship exists between consumer spending on eco-unfriendly products and national income. In addition, while international trade unambiguously benefits the environment in the presence of eco-labeling with perfect enforcement, trade openness may nevertheless delay the turning point of the growth and environment relationship, when the cost of enforcement falls disproportionately on developing countries, and when environmental policies are employed to reap terms-of-trade gains.     

我国绿色食品产业发展影响因素的动态演进与发展机理

基于"钻石模型"提取了产业发展的影响(动力)因素,并分析了其动态特征,提出绿色食品产业发展机理的理论分析模型。研究结果表明:绿色食品产业的发展演化过程是一个各种因素交互作用的系统的、动态的过程;产业政策、产业组织与结构创新是绿色食品产业发展的源动力,产业发展动力随产业发展阶段的变化表现出更迭性。     

Green Business and Blue Angels

This paper presents a model of a monopolist'svoluntary overcompliance with legal environmentalstandards under asymmetric information about thefirm's environmental impacts. The key assumptions are:the existence of quality premia for environmentalsoundness, a positive but imperfect degree ofmonitoring, and adaptive consumer expectations.Conditions necessary for overcompliance to arise in aprofit-maximizing equilibrium are derived. The effectsof a third-party eco-labeling system are analyzed. Itis shown that the existence of an independent labelingauthority increases the likelihood of overcomplianceto be profit-maximizing. Moreover, firms might have anincentive to lobby for the introduction of such asystem. The effect of consumers' risk preferences andan instrument for preventing ``Greenwash' (companieslying about their environmental performance) is alsodiscussed.     

循环绿色食品产业集群生成的动力与行为主体博弈分析

人们对食品安全问题的关注推动着绿色食品产业的发展。自然资源的绝对稀缺和生态环境的不断恶化使循环经济发展模式成为绿色食品产业发展的必然选择,为提高绿色食品产业的竞争力,区域产业集群是个极好的载体。因此,对于生态环境优越、地方特色食品产业发展初具规模、且在主体功能区划中被划分为限制开发区的地区比较适合发展循环绿色食品产业集群。首先对循环绿色食品产业集群的生成动力进行论述,然后通过建立模型,运用多种博弈分析方法,分别分析政府与企业、企业与企业间在集群生成过程中的利益博弈,得出政府的策动力及龙头企业的影响力对集群的生成非常重要的结论。     

我国绿色食品产业区域发展差异与策略

基于文献综述,构建了我国绿色食品产业区域发展能力评价指标体系,建立了以截面数据为基础的因子分析评价模型,并对我国31个省(自治区、直辖市)的绿色食品产业发展能力进行了综合评价,对其主要影响因素进行了分析。最后,据此提出提高各区域绿色食品产业竞争优势的战略思路与对策。     

Too much of a good thing? Why altruism can harm the environment?

Success of eco-labeling schemes, broadly defined, varies among products and across countries. Based on a simple theoretical framework, we show that the nature of environmental attributes among products (i.e., private versus public) and the consumer type (i.e., egoist versus altruist) shape the overall performance of such schemes. In addition, we demonstrate that altruistic consumers exhibiting a too high willingness to pay for the eco-labeled product can inadvertently prevent egoistic consumers from purchasing it, leading to a sub-optimal outcome in terms of environmental performance. Several policy and managerial implications are drawn.