Protecting Property: The Politics of Redistribution,Expropriation, and Market Openness

This paper develops a formal model to disentangle the competing political incentives for redistribution, expropriation, and market openness. Although redistribution and expropriation are both types of government extraction, redistribution re‐allocates wealth within the citizenry, while expropriation re‐allocates wealth from citizens to the government. Representative political institutions increase redistribution and reduce expropriation. Market openness changes these incentives, as foreign investors prefer reductions in both redistribution and expropriation. When political institutions are representative, the government will rely more on reducing expropriation, rather than limiting redistribution, to attract foreign investment. Under representative institutions then, openness partially reinforces the preferences of voters rather than undermining them. In addition, market liberalization occurs only when the policy changes needed to attract foreign investment are relatively small. If existing policies are satisfactory to foreign investors, moves toward openness may be accompanied by greater redistribution and expropriation, as governments are tempted by a larger base for extraction. Thus, openness has ambiguous effects on economic policy, at times encouraging and at times constraining extraction.     

College football attendance: a panel study of the Football Bowl Subdivision

Panel data with an instrumented real ticket price are used to estimate a regular season game-day attendance and per cent of capacity regression equations. Better team performance, whether short term (season wins), intermediate term (bowls games in last 10 years) or long term (lifetime winning percentage), higher undergraduate enrolment, traditional rivalries and video coverage increase per cent of capacity used. Poor weather (more rain or cloud cover), higher travel costs and larger local population decrease it. Fan interest wanes as a season progresses, but this is offset as a team wins more games. Games played near a National Football League stadium, those with conference opponents, non-FBS opponents and non-BCS opponents have lower stadium utilization. The substantive results of the analysis do not change when attendance is used as the dependent variable rather than per cent of capacity.     

企业专利与外部融资

除保护技术输出的传统职能外,专利在企业和利益相关者沟通中也发挥着重要的信号传递职能。其中,专利在资本市场上的信号价值近年来备受关注,已有研究指出专利作为质量信号有助于企业获得投资者认可,并且专利信号效果依赖于投资者获得企业信息的多少。在此基础上,进一步讨论了投资者获得企业信息的内容对信号价值的影响。具体地,在负面信号情境下（企业过去的财务绩效差、收益波动性大、未来不确定性高）,专利的信号价值更强,而在正面信号情境专利信号效果减弱。利用来自深沪两市1 787家上市公司2000-2011年面板数据验证了以上假设,专利数量和外部融资之间存在正向关系,并且在负面信号情境下二者正向关系更强。稳健性检验进一步表明,发明专利的信号效应比非发明专利更强,而私企的专利信号效应比国企更强。     

Morale,performance and disclosure

We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto-dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non-monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade-off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.     

Mode of International Investment and Endogenous Risk of Expropriation

This paper analyzes the relationship between the mode of international investment and institutional quality. Foreign investors from a capital‐rich North can either purchase productive assets in a capital‐poor South and transfer their capital within integrated multinational firms or they can form joint ventures with local asset owners. The South is ruled by an autocratic elite that may use its political power to expropriate productive assets. The expropriation risk lowers the incentive to provide specific capital in an integrated firm and distorts the decision between joint ventures and integrated production. We determine the equilibrium risk of expropriation in this framework and the resulting pattern of international production. We also analyze as to how globalization, which is reflected in a decline in investment costs, influences institutional quality.     

INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES

The impact of property rights on economic growth is examined using indicators provided by country risk evaluators to potential foreign investors. Indicators include evaluations of contract enforceability and risk of expropriation. Using these variables, property rights are found to have a greater impact on investment and growth than has previously been found for proxies such as the Gastil indices of liberties, and frequencies of revolutions, coups and political assassinations. Rates of convergence to U.S.-level incomes increase notably when these property rights variables are included in growth regressions. These results are robust to the inclusion of measures of factor accumulation and of economic policy.     

Competition in the stock market with asymmetric information

We build a game theoretical model to examine how the level of information advantage of insiders and the competition between insiders and sophisticated investors affect stock price movements and traders’ trading strategies and profits. We show that the competition between insiders and sophisticated investors can reduce the losses of less sophisticated investors, and thus alleviates the disadvantaged position of the less sophisticated investors. Further, traders’ profits are affected by the accuracy of insiders’ private information, and the number of days that insiders have obtained the information in advance. These findings show the importance of information transparency and the role of sophisticated investors in limiting insiders’ trading advantages and mitigating the expropriation of investors by insiders.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

Do mutual fund flows affect the French corporate bond market?

We study whether investors’ withdrawals from mutual funds affect corporate bond prices. As mutual funds have become major players in the financial markets, they are likely to exert downward pressures on asset prices when facing investors’ redemptions, particularly in the less liquid markets such as corporate bonds. We use a novel dataset on the French bond funds and show that both flows in and out of mutual funds lead to a significant effect on the corporate bond yields. This effect is asymmetric as redemptions provoke a change in yields of greater magnitude than inflows. Moreover, all corporate bonds are not equally affected by investors’ withdrawals from funds: The more a bond is detained by funds, the higher the impact of redemptions on its yield. These three results are robust to various changes in econometric specifications.     

Private-information group contests with complementarities

We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, the effort complementarity is uncertain at the time efforts are exerted, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. We analyze the effects of increasing the number of team members and the anticipated complementarity of efforts. We find that the effort underprovision brought about by a larger group membership is especially severe if the complementarity is high. More generally, higher complementarity may exacerbate rather than alleviate the underprovision of effort. Members of groups that are otherwise symmetric—and only differ with respect to the anticipated complementarity of efforts—use the same equilibrium strategy. And, when groups differ only in size, members of the smaller group act more aggressively, but the smaller or larger group may be more likely to win.     

Regulatory chill and the effect of investor state dispute settlements

Legal conflicts between multinational firms and host governments are often decided by international arbitration panels—as opposed to courts in the host country—because of provisions in international investment agreements known as investor state dispute settlements (ISDS). Critics fear that investor protection such as ISDS make governments reluctant to adopt appropriate policies (regulatory chill). In this paper I develop a theoretical model in which the outcome of cases brought to court is uncertain owing to the vagueness of the law protecting investors and a court's inability to correctly identify a state of nature with certainty. I show that from a world welfare perspective there is no underregulation, only an overregulation problem. However, from a national welfare perspective “frivolous” lawsuits may lead to regulatory chill. I also identify conditions under which ISDS can lead to a Pareto improvement that involves simultaneous changes in compensation payments and protection rights relative to a national court.     

"What Goes Up Must Come Down"-How Charts Influence Decisions to Buy and Sell Stocks

Five experiments examine how charts depicting past stock prices influence investing decisions. We expected investors to use extreme past prices depicted in charts as comparison standards to which expectations about future prices are assimilated. Investors should thus expect stocks depicted in a chart with a salient high to perform better than stocks depicted in a chart with a salient low. And as a consequence, investors should be more likely to buy and less likely to sell stocks depicted in a chart with a salient high than a low. Results of five experiments support this reasoning. Whether investors are private or professional and whether background information about the stock was limited or abundant, expectations about future prices assimilated to extreme past prices. Consequently, investors buy more and sell less when the critical chart is characterized by a salient high than a low. The implications of these findings for the core role comparison processes play in investing decisions are discussed.     

Determinants of control structure choice between entrepreneurs and investors in venture capital-backed startups

This study examines two kinds of control structures in venture capital-backed startups. Based on incomplete contracting theory, we analyze the influence of various factors on these control structures in venture capital models, from the perspectives of investors, entrepreneurs, and startups. In particular, we show how factors such as bargaining power, monitoring costs, private benefits, and risk aversion impact the allocation of control rights. Using the survey data on a heterogeneous group of venture capital-backed startups in China, we empirically examine the impacts of various factors on the control structures of these enterprises. Based on the full sample of enterprises, we find that the stronger the venture capitalist’s bargaining power and the higher the monitoring costs, the more likely investors and entrepreneurs are to prefer joint control. Further, the greater the entrepreneur’s financing need and private benefits, the more likely investors and entrepreneurs are to choose joint control. High-tech startups are more likely to choose a joint control model than those in traditional industries. This is especially true for high-tech startups at an early stage of development. In addition, for high-tech startups, the probability of choosing joint control shows a negative relationship with investors’ strategic benefits and a positive relationship with investors’ risk aversion. Regarding startups in traditional industries, investors’ strategic benefits and risk aversion have an insignificant impact on their control structures.     

Winning or losing in investor‐to‐state dispute resolution: The role of arbitrator bias and experience

When an investor sues a state for alleged breaches of its obligations under an investment treaty or a trade agreement with investment provisions, all that should matter for who wins the case are the merits of the claim itself. Alas, investor‐to‐state dispute settlement (ISDS) does not take place in a vacuum. Such cases are decided by a tribunal typically consisting of three arbitrators, one each nominated by the two parties while the president is mutually agreed upon. We demonstrate that the kind of involvement of these arbitrators in previous ISDS cases matters for the case under dispute. Specifically, we show that what we label the presidents' pro‐investor appointment bias—the number of times they have previously been nominated by an investor minus the number of times they have represented respondent states—raises the likelihood that an investor wins an ISDS case. The same holds for the pro‐investor appointment bias of state‐appointed arbitrators. Given the president's crucial role, the main implication of our findings is that presidents should be drawn from among those who have not systematically represented more one side than the other in previous cases.     

机构投资者对关联担保抑制效应的实证研究

基于近代公司治理理论的＂利益侵占假说＂,大股东可能通过上市公司的关联担保进行＂隧道挖掘＂,侵占中小股东的利益。近年来,中国证券市场上,作为公司治理的可能参与者,机构投资者发展迅猛。在资本市场的发展获得了新的契机之下,机构投资者有能力、有动力抑制大股东的挖掘行为。选取2008年沪深两市A股的183个样本,采用二元Logistic回归模型,研究发现,机构投资者持股比例与上市公司关联担保显著负相关,说明机构投资者对关联担保存在抑制效应。同时,我们发现,绝对控股股东持股比例与上市公司关联担保显著负相关。即绝对控股股东持股比例越高,绝对控股股东越不倾向于采用关联担保方式进行＂隧道挖掘＂。     

Bilateral portfolio dynamics during the global financial crisis

There has been considerable bilateral variation in the pattern of portfolio capital flows during the global financial crisis: for a given destination, investors from different countries adjusted their holdings to different degrees. We show that the size of the initial bilateral holding, geographical distance, common language, the level of trade and common institutional linkages help to explain the pattern of adjustment. These bilateral factors are more important for equities than for bonds and for investors from developing countries than for investors from advanced countries.     

Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands

Abstract. The Berle–Means problem – information and incentive asymmetries disrupting relations between knowledgeable managers and remote investors – has remained a durable issue engaging researchers since the 1930s. However, the Berle–Means paradigm – widely dispersed, helpless investors facing strong, entrenched managers – is under stress in the wake of the cross‐country evidence presented by La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, and their legal approach to corporate control. This paper continues to investigate the roles of investor protections and concentrated ownership by examining firm behaviour in the Netherlands. Our within‐country analysis generates two key results. First, the role of investor protections emphasized in the legal approach is not sustained. Rather, firm performance is enhanced when the firm is freed of equity market constraints. Second, ownership concentration does not have a discernible impact on firm performance, which may reflect large shareholders' dual role in lowering the costs of managerial agency problems but raising the agency costs of expropriation.     

Strategic Privatization in Developing Countries

Privatization of state‐owned enterprises may have important welfare implications, in particular in less developed economies where markets are small and domestic firms are typically relatively weak, both technologically and financially. In these environments, a high‐tech foreign investor acquiring the state‐owned assets may end up dominating the local market, thereby harming local consumer and producer interests. A foreign investor, however, is likely to be both willing and able to offer a higher bid for the assets than local investors. This paper addresses the trade‐off for local governments between privatization revenues and foreign market power. The authors find that there may be an incentive to privatize “strategically” by selling the state‐owned firm to a local (less advanced) investor at a lower price in order to achieve a more competitive post‐privatization market structure.     

机构持股、公司治理与上市公司R&D投入——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

基于代理理论,检验了机构投资者能否作为一种公司治理机制,降低管理层的代理成本,激励上市公司管理层增加R&D投入、追求上市公司的长期价值。结论显示,机构持股与上市公司R&D支出之间存在显著正相关关系,机构持股能够激励企业进行长期投资。以上发现表明,机构投资者已经能够作为一种公司治理的机制参与到公司治理中,并对公司的经营运作发挥监督作用。     

Does it matter where you come from? Vertical spillovers from foreign direct investment and the origin of investors

This study uses firm-level panel data from Romania to examine whether the origin of foreign investors affects the degree of vertical spillovers from FDI. Investors' origin may matter for spillovers to domestic producers supplying intermediate inputs in two ways. First, the share of intermediates sourced locally by multinationals is likely to increase with the distance between the host and the source economy. Second, the sourcing pattern is likely to be affected by preferential trade agreements. In this case, the Association Agreement between Romania and the European Union (EU) implies that inputs sourced from the EU are subject to a lower tariff than inputs sourced from the United States or Canada. This means that on average American investors may have a greater incentive than EU investors to source from Romania and hence present a greater potential for vertical spillovers. The empirical analysis produces evidence consistent with this hypothesis. The results show a positive association between the presence of American companies in downstream sectors and the productivity of Romanian firms in the supplying industries and no significant relationship in the case of European affiliates. The results also indicate that Romanian firms in sectors whose products are expensive to transport benefit more from downstream presence of American affiliates than Romanian firms in sectors with low shipping costs. No such pattern is found for European affiliates.